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ABSTRACT 
In 2000, Zimbabwe’s century old land movement took a swift turn, rupturing into 
nationwide occupation of mainly White owned commercial farms. The speed with 
which occupations spread, their organisation, the political and economic context, the 
historical origins and interaction of the forces, shaped an unprecedented and 
complex land movement impacting on the region, the continent and beyond. 
Zimbabwe’s land occupations were unique in two ways. First, the leading role of 
War Veterans of the 1970s anti-colonial guerrilla war in the land occupations was 
exceptional. Second, the simultaneous challenge to racial, settler economic 
dominance and neo-colonialism by marginalised peasants, farm workers, war 
veterans, urban youth and the unemployed, was a new experience in post-colonial 
history of Africa’s liberation movements. Zimbabwe’s land occupations were a long 
continuum of land struggles to resolve the colonial legacy of racial resource 
distribution but as they occurred, the role played by the state, the contested terrain of 
the civil society, formidable political opposition and imperialist interventions of 
western powers clouded the identity of the land movement thereby making it 
difficult to distinguish the moving current and the identity of forces from the wider 
political conflicts swirling around it. Who exactly initiated the occupations and for 
what reasons? This thesis attempts to unpack these intricately locked forces in a bid 
to understand their origins, interests, strategies, tactics and above all, the alliances 
between and amongst them, for clearer understanding of the core of the movement. 
This thesis traces the history of Zimbabwe’s liberation movement as foundation to 
understanding political reconfigurations that shaped post independence social 
movements and assesses agrarian technology responses to such a dramatic social 
change of Africa’s post-colonial settler society. The thesis provokes prognostic 
thoughts about the role played by social capital of liberation struggles in future 
economic and cultural emancipation from shackles of neo-colonialism and racial, 
settler capitalism.  
 
  
iv
CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ i 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................. iii 
Contents ................................................................................................................................ iv 
Acronyms and Abbreviations ....................................................................................... vi 
Chapter 1................................................................................................................................ 1 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................1 
1.2 Land and race dichotomies.........................................................................2 
1.2.1 The land problem as a race problem.......................................................... 3 
1.3 Resulting agricultural dualism ..................................................................4 
1.4 Resettlement and changing objectives ......................................................6 
1.5 Land distribution as political tool............................................................14 
1.6 Land and religion .......................................................................................16 
1.7 Land ideology and War Veterans ............................................................18 
1.8 An exposition of the argument of the thesis ..........................................20 
1.9 The research questions ..............................................................................22 
1.9.1 The main research question ...................................................................... 22 
1.9.2 The sub-research questions....................................................................... 22 
1.9.3 Methodology............................................................................................... 23 
1.10 Research methods ......................................................................................25 
1.10.1 Participant observation .................................................................................... 25 
1.10.2 Interviews .................................................................................................... 26 
1.10.3 Focus group discussions............................................................................ 27 
1.10.4 Content analysis.......................................................................................... 28 
1.10.5 Naturally occurring talk ............................................................................ 28 
1.10.6 Participatory methods................................................................................ 28 
1.11 The study area ............................................................................................29 
1.12 Structure of the thesis ................................................................................30 
Chapter 2.............................................................................................................................. 33 
The Roots of the War Veterans’ Movement: a History of the Guerrilla 
Struggle ................................................................................................................................ 33 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................33 
2.2 The Chitepo phase .....................................................................................34 
2.3 The ZIPA period.........................................................................................41 
2.4 The Mugabe era..........................................................................................50 
Chapter 3.............................................................................................................................. 59 
The Post War Development of the War Veterans’ Movement .......................... 59 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................59 
3.2 The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979: a background.....................60 
3.3 The deficiencies of the demobilisation process .....................................65 
3.4 The War Veterans’ movement from the 1987 Unity Accord to the land 
occupations in 1997 ....................................................................................80 
3.5 War Veteran grievances and the truce of 1997 ......................................90 
3.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................93 
Chapter 4.............................................................................................................................. 97 
         v 
The Role of War Veterans in the Early Land Occupations (1998-2000).......... 97 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................97 
4.2 The occupations in Svosve and Chikwaka (1998) .................................97 
4.3 The mobilisation of people for the early occupations ........................108 
4.4 The mobilisation of cultural resources..................................................111 
4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................117 
Chapter 5............................................................................................................................ 119 
The Role of the War Veterans in the Later Occupations, 2000-2004.............. 119 
5.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................119 
5.2 Organisation and mobilisation by War Veterans ................................123 
5.3 Peasant organisation; the role of spirit mediums ................................134 
5.4 Involvement of farm workers.................................................................139 
5.5 Reaction of the White commercial farmers ..........................................144 
5.6 Spontaneity, horizontality and localisation .........................................148 
5.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................150 
Chapter 6............................................................................................................................ 151 
Technocracy and African Land Use: Technological Continuities and 
Discontinuities in Zimbabwe’s Agrarian Transformation .............................. 151 
6.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................151 
6.2 Contextualising technology shifts .........................................................152 
6.3 Agricultural technology during the occupation period .....................160 
6.4 Agricultural technology during the fast track .....................................162 
Chapter 7............................................................................................................................ 175 
Conclusion: the Land Movement in its Wider Political Context ................... 175 
7.1 Relations and interaction with ZANU-PF and the state ....................175 
7.2 Interaction with the opposition movement (1998-2006).....................183 
7.3 Effect of government FTLRP on the land movement .........................187 
7.3.1 The structure ............................................................................................. 187 
7.4 The Murambatsvina period 2005 to date..............................................194 
7.5 Post Murambatsvina: withering away of the land movement? ........197 
7.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................204 
References ......................................................................................................................... 207 
Appendices ....................................................................................................................... 219 
Appendix 1...........................................................................................................220 
Appendix 1...........................................................................................................220 
Appendix 2...........................................................................................................222 
Appendix 3...........................................................................................................223 
Appendix 4...........................................................................................................227 
Appendix 5...........................................................................................................235 
Appendix 6...........................................................................................................238 
Samenvatting ................................................................................................................... 245 
Summary............................................................................................................................ 249 
Pfupsio................................................................................................................................ 253 
About the Author............................................................................................................ 257 
 
 
  
vi
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ANC  African National Congress  
ANP  African Nationalistic Paradigm  
APs  Assembly Points 
AREX   Agricultural Research and Extension 
ARP  Accelerated Resettlement Program 
ASPEF  Agricultural Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility 
AZTREC Association of Zimbabwe Traditional Ecologists  
BSAC  British South Africa Company 
CA  Communal Agriculture 
CFU  Commercial Farmers Union 
CICSA  Centre for Indigenous Cultures in Southern Africa 
CIO  Central Intelligence Organisation  
CSO  Civil Society Organisations 
DA  District Administrator 
DDF  District Development Fund 
ESAP  Economic Structural Adjustment Program 
FRELIMO Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
FROLIZI Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe 
FTLRP  Fast Track Land Reform Program 
HC  High Court 
HRTSA Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa 
MDC  Movement for Democratic Change 
MOTSRUD Management Outreach Training for Rural and Urban Development 
MWART Mashonaland West Mining, Agricultural, Residential and Tourism 
Association 
NCA  National Constitutional Assembly 
NDP  National Democratic Party 
OAU  Organisation of African Unity 
OCCZIM Organisation of Collective Cooperatives of Zimbabwe 
PRA  Participatory Rural Appraisal 
PTSD  Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
RDC  Rural District Council 
RSF  Rhodesian Security Forces 
RUF  Revolutionary United Front 
SC  Supreme Court 
SNV  Netherlands Development Organisation 
UDI  Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
UN  United Nations 
WFD  Westminster Foundation for Democracy 
WVA  War Veterans Association 
ZANLA    Zimbabwe National Liberation Army 
ZANU  Zimbabwe African National Union 
ZANU-PF  Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front 
ZAPU    Zimbabwe African People’s Union  
ZCTU  Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
ZIPA     Zimbabwe People’s Army 
ZIPRA       Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army 
         vii
ZIRCIK      Zimbabwe Resource Centre for Indigenous Knowledge  
ZLP         Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 
ZNA  Zimbabwe National Army 
ZNLWVA    Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association  
ZRP  Zimbabwe Republic Police 
ZUD        Zimbabwe Union of Democrats 
ZUM  Zimbabwe Unity Movement 
 
 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In February 2000, Zimbabwe’s land movement took a dramatic twist, sparked by a 
referendum to decide on a new constitution for the country. A ‘no’ vote prevailed 
against the government-sponsored draft constitution. A few days after the vote, War 
Veterans of the 1970s guerrilla war that led to Zimbabwe’s independence from 
Britain in 1980, occupied a derelict White-owned farm just outside the south-eastern 
capital of, Masvingo located in Masvingo Province, in protest. The War Veterans 
claimed that the referendum, an event in which the country’s White population had 
participated more actively than any other election since independence, was in 
essence an organised ‘no’ vote against the land clause included in the draft 
constitution. The clause stated that land for resettlement would be taken 
compulsorily, and only land improvements would be compensated. Compensation, 
the draft constitution stated, would have to be paid by the British government, as the 
power standing behind by the colonial authority that had originally appropriated the 
land.4 
 
The occupation received wide coverage in local media, triggering a contagious 
mass movement through which occupations spread like a veldt fire across the 
country. The actors included peasants, urban workers, professionals, farm workers 
and political activists. Occupiers played different roles at different times, 
intermittently facing stiff resistance from the opposition and commercial farmers, 
and in some cases the situation degenerated into bloody violence ending in loss of 
life. 
 
The occupations of 2000 occurred when Zimbabwe African National Union -
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the ruling party, and President Mugabe were all under 
the most formidable political challenge to their authority since independence. Since 
1990, when an Economic Structural Adjustment Policy was adopted by the 
government, there had been progressive deterioration of the economy with 
widespread retrenchments, industrial decline, negative economic growth, huge 
balance of payments deficit, rising inflation and countless micro economic problems. 
Chronic poverty began to spread, increasing the gap between rich and poor. Gradual 
reorganisation from below, rupturing explosively in 2000, seemingly signalled the 
advent of a new political era in the country. 
 
The Zimbabwe land occupations were very controversial among Zimbabweans 
and abroad. They drew the attention of the international community and resulted in 
intense diplomatic pressure on the country from Europe and the USA. The land 
occupations were carried out amid major activity by the political opposition 
organised as the Movement for Democratic Change posing a serious challenge to the 
post colonial state. Occupations were also intermingled with violent political 
                                                 
4 The British government had promised to provide funds for resettlement to the new 
Zimbabwe government at the Lancaster House Conference (Selby 2006). 
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campaigns by various groups, making it difficult to distinguish land occupations 
sustained by land hunger dating from the colonial period of peasants and 
agricultural workers from spoiling operations linked to the political survival tactics 
of ZANU-PF, state functionaries and President Robert Mugabe. 
Moreover, state organs like the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), the police, 
the army and service departments, and parastatals like the District Development 
Fund, actively participated in the ‘invasions’ (as some term them) in various ways at 
different times. This added to the suspicions of many, including foreign observers, 
that the land movement was not (this time) initiated from below, but was driven by 
forces external to the agrarian community, and was top-down. 
 
This thesis seeks to contribute analytically to the debate about the correct 
characterisation of land occupations, including a focus on the critical issue of 
government intervention and its influence over the process of occupation. But 
looking at government actions alone will not shed sufficient light on the subject, 
because the incumbent government was born out of a broader liberation movement, 
spearheaded by but representing a wider spread of interests than subsequently 
absorbed within the political mainstream represented by ZANU-PF (itself a united 
front of the former PF ZAPU and ZANU-PF).5 Deeper understanding of the history 
of the liberation movement is called for, in order to explain the evolving tactics and 
actions of the ZANU-PF government and its shifting positions regarding the land 
movement.  
 
 
1.2 Land and race dichotomies 
Land occupations in Zimbabwe did not start in 2000, after the referendum, but have 
a history continuous with the anti-colonial struggle triggered by British colonisation 
in 1890 (Ranger 1967; 1970, Davidson 1988) and the subsequent distribution of land 
on racial lines, with Africans moved to areas of poor agricultural potential (Moyana 
1987, Moyo 2001, Sadomba 2007). The African struggle for fairer land redistribution 
became the main form of conflict between a settler community of European descent 
and indigenous people, and this extends into the post independence period, since the 
Lancaster House agreements through which independence from Britain was finally 
agreed, allowed a redistribution of land only through the principle of ‘willing buyer, 
                                                 
5 The country’s first nationalist movement was the Southern Rhodesian African National 
Youth League that was formed in August 1955 under the leadership of James Chikerema, 
George Nyandoro and Dunduzu Chisiza. The Youth League joined the Bulawayo branch of 
the old African Nationalist Congress (ANC) and formed a revitalised ANC in 1957 led by 
Joshua Nkomo. The ANC was banned in 1959 leading to the formation of the National 
Democratic Party (NDP) in 1960 led by Joshua Nkomo. The NDP was banned the following 
year in 1961. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) was formed on December 18, 
1961 again under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and was banned in 1962 after its leadership 
was arrested. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed (by mostly Shona 
people) on 8 August 1963 as a splinter of ZAPU and was banned in 1964. The banning of the 
two nationalist parties resulted into the re-organisation of the parties in exile, operating in 
neighbouring Zambia, Botswana, and other countries like Tanzania, Ghana and Egypt. ZAPU 
formed an armed wing, Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPRA) and ZANU formed Zimbabwe 
National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The two waged the war of liberation from the 1960s that 
brought about independence in 1980. 
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willing seller’. The violent appropriation of land from the indigenous population was 
never matched by a comprehensive de-appropriation.  
 
The land issue undoubtedly changed form and intensity during the colonial 
period, but it remained the central focus for the nationalist movement, and later 
fuelled the guerrilla war that precipitated the need for the Lancaster House 
negotiations, resulting in Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. In effect, that 
negotiation was a peace process, and like many such peace processes, led to a 
cessation of hostilities without removing or fully resolving the tensions underlying 
war. In this respect Zimbabwe was different from other decolonisation processes in 
British Africa, and it can now be seen that a generation later true peace has yet to be 
found. As such, the explosion centring on the 2000 land occupations evidences a 
complex matrix of unresolved historical and agrarian issues central to understanding 
the social tensions at the heart of Zimbabwe’s current economic and political 
predicament today. The international community sees Zimbabwe’s current problems 
as centring on a time-expired president. The data and analysis presented in this 
thesis support a finer-grained and more sociological and historical perspective. In 
this thesis it will be argued that what is needed is a full resolution of Zimbabwe’s 
agrarian question. The purpose of the thesis, therefore, is to look at the causal factors 
underpinning the agrarian rupture of 2000. 
 
1.2.1 The land problem as a race problem 
Racial land distribution started in 1894 after the defeat of Chief Lobengula, when the 
Matebele people were moved to the Gwaai and Shangaan Reserves (Davidson 1988). 
Other native reserves were created around the country. In 1930, the Land 
Apportionment Act was promulgated, effectively dividing the country into 
exclusively White and Black farming areas, in terms of ownership. The White areas 
were the richer, better watered highlands, and the African areas were generally the 
lower lying, drier areas with poor potential for agriculture and infested with tsetse 
flies and mosquitoes that cause malaria. In 1950, the Land Husbandry Act was 
passed. This was a comprehensive attempt to bring African agriculture into line with 
the requirements of commodity-oriented (i.e. capitalist) production. But the act (and 
associated policies) also sought to change the mentality and institutions of the 
indigenous people. The linked policies aimed to change notions of tenure and land 
use, gender relations, and agronomic techniques, and to limit African livestock 
production, thereby affecting household reproduction. The Land Tenure Act of 1969 
intensified efforts to effect the changes envisaged in the two earlier pieces of 
legislation, and the more pressure for change was intensified, the more the 
resentment and resistance of the Black population grew (Quinton 1960, Moyana 1987, 
Page and Page 1991, Sadomba, F. 1999). 
 
By the time of independence in 1980 the skewed racial land distribution 
encapsulated the inherited problem of colonial legacy. Moyo and Yeros (2005) 
summarise the situation thus: 
For its own part, the White agrarian bourgeoisie, some 6,000 farmers at independence, 
retained 39 percent of the land, amounting to 15.5 million hectares of prime agro-
ecological farmland, while one million black households remained consigned to 41.4 
percent of the land, or 16.4 million hectares of marginal land. In all, the White minority, 
at below 3 percent of the population, commanded nearly two-thirds of national income; 
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while the black majority, at 97 percent, took the remaining one-third. (Moyo and Yeros 
2005) 
 
In other words the land problem was a problem of racial distribution, and it was 
not resolved in the post independence period. The government policy of peace-
making with a White landed elite (i.e. reconciliation) was interpreted to mean ‘a one-
off process whereby Whites were forgiven for their past oppression of Blacks, and 
whereby unequal national resources allocations, including the fixed heritage of land 
were to remain largely as they were before 1980’ (Moyo 1995). The status quo was 
maintained. The policy of reconciliation, operating under the Lancaster House 
Constitution, not only preserved White supremacy politically and economically, but 
it also made the racial dimension of the land problem in Zimbabwe a taboo which 
the nation had yet to squarely face (Moyo 1995). However, the issue of race was not 
the only problem that the government had to deal with in the post independence 
period. Other agrarian problems of equal importance had to be dealt with. Some are 
outlined in the next section. 
 
 
1.3 Resulting agricultural dualism 
At independence the government was faced with a dual system of agriculture. This 
inherited system survived under a very complex political dispensation. On one hand 
the new regime was confronted by the poorer classes of society, tempered in a 
liberation struggle, and having high expectations for land distribution. On the other 
hand, it faced an established White settler community with long term experience in 
dealing with state formations and skilled in influencing political directions that 
would place them in a vantage position to control land ownership. Government 
strategy was to forge a practical alliance with White agrarian capital, while 
sustaining its populist rhetoric in the face of mass expectations (Moore 1990, Moyo 
1995, McCandless 2005, Selby 2006). Moyo and Yeros (2005: 171), citing Mandaza and 
Sibanda, succinctly sum up this alliance as follows: 
The ‘post-white- settler colonial state’ was a particular variety of the neo-colonial state, 
for formal power had not been ceded to a black petty bourgeoisie alone; instead, the 
aspiring black bourgeoisie would share power with the established white-settler capital 
(Mandaza 1986a, 1986b). Ideologically, this political dispensation was cast in the form of 
‘reconciliation’ and echo of post war ‘partnership’ consisting of effectively in a 
reconciliation not ‘between races’ but ‘with capital’ (Sibanda 1988). 
 
Another detailed study of the alliance between White commercial farmers and 
government was undertaken by Selby (2006), who devotes his PhD thesis6 to analysis 
of the complex alliance between the settler commercial farmers and the state during 
the colonial period through to the post independence era. Selby (2006: 145) notes that 
‘The alliance was remarkable given the history of settler farming and the legacy of 
                                                 
6 Selby’s thesis will be extensively referenced in this introduction for two reasons. First, it is 
the first detailed study of the nature of the internal organisation, strategies and tactics of the 
White farmer community, and how its grip on land was sustained from colonial to post 
independence times. Secondly, Selby exposes White farmer tactics of political manipulation 
and alliance with key state officials in order to maintain control over the pace and scale of 
land redistribution. As a son of a former White farmer Selby offers important ‘participant’ 
insights into a key process largely inaccessible to the present researcher.  
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the war, but more intricate autopsy reveals the complexity of the arrangement.’ Selby 
(2006) illustrates that an organised, though varied, White farmer community led by 
the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU)7 produced political strategists with 
outstanding abilities to manipulate the state and sustain the alliance. They organised 
‘regular meetings and social interaction with targeted ministers, at which the 
President, Vice President and Director [of CFU] would build up personal trust in key 
individuals’ in government and ZANU-PF. ‘When [John] Laurie8 took office’, writes 
Selby, ‘he had 30 ministerial meetings in the first two months, including three with 
Mugabe[!].’ However Selby’s thesis fails to capture the internal dynamics of the 
liberation movement especially in the post war period, in order to offer a 
comprehensive explanation to the breakdown of the alliance. This thesis argues that 
the breakdown of this alliance was mainly due to the internal opposition within the 
liberation movement. The internal conflicts, epitomised by a war veteran led 
opposition, challenged the ruling elite for negating liberation objectives of which the 
alliance with White capital was seen as the causal factor. 
 
However, although these meetings were under the banner of reconciliation (even 
if hidden from popular view) it became clear to many rank-and-file onlookers that 
the ruling elite of ZANU-PF and the President, Robert Mugabe himself, were in effect 
betraying the liberation agenda and ‘sleeping with the enemy’ (Selby 2006). Policy at 
the top caused disquiet among some of the ruling party members, who ‘were averse 
to the high profile relationship with commercial farmers, and felt that the ideals of 
the liberation struggle had been betrayed’ according to Kumbirai Kangai, former 
member of Revolutionary Council (Dare reChimurenga) and Minister of Labour at 
the time (Selby 2006). This sense of betrayal was especially strong among the War 
Veterans who had not only born the brunt of the struggle but who now found 
themselves relegated to the margins of policy formation in the immediate post 
independence period. 
 
Under this politics of racial reconciliation the new government decided to 
maintain the status quo with regards to land ownership, engaging in only a limited 
resettlement program (1980-4) under the Lancaster House provisions. Government 
acquired a total of 1,172 farms totalling 2,587,735 ha, under the ‘willing buyer, willing 
seller’ proviso (Rugube et al. 2003) and settled 35,000 families by 1985. ‘The 1981/82 
and 1982/83 financial years accounted for 70 percent of all land purchases up to 
1989’ (Alexander 2006: 115). The surging momentum of the liberation struggle 
demanded some action on land, but the steps taken met only a small proportion of 
the demand. The program was mostly a process of regularising land occupied by 
peasants, War Veterans and farm workers, beginning in the zones liberated during 
the guerrilla war. The program was thus termed an ‘accelerated’ resettlement 
                                                 
7 The union of White commercial farmers (CFU) started soon after the colony of Rhodesia was 
established in 1890 (Lee 1974). The organisations developed from strength to strength in 
different forms and became the organisational structure for White settlers. The CFU continues 
to exist even today. 
8 ‘John Laurie, Sinclair’s vice-president and successor, was widely considered the most 
effective CFU President since Independence, even in government circles.’ David Hasluck [CFU 
President] described Laurie as ‘the straightest of the Presidents … the honest broker of the alliance.’ 
(Selby 2006: 148). 
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program, with provision of minimum infrastructure to allow rapid settler placement. 
One might say it went fast, but not far.9 
The amount allocated from 1980 for resettlement, as a proportion of national 
budget was very little. For example, land reform was allocated less than one percent 
of the national budget in contrast to defence that had in access of 15 percent, which 
(i.e. 5 percent of the gross domestic product) in the 1980s (Selby 2006). This allocation 
was less than government’s ‘annual maize subsidies to private grain millers and 
consumers, which stood at over one billion Zimbabwe Dollars per annum until 1993’ 
(Moyo 1995). Government reaction to popular demands for land from the mid 1980s 
will be discussed in Chapter 4 and 5. When landless peasants and War Veterans 
attempted self provisioning of land they were evicted in many cases. Moyo (2001: 21) 
presents the government’s response as follows:  
The brutality with which ... evictions were carried out, both by police and farmers, were 
reminiscent of colonial era evictions ... in the decades prior to Independence. This was 
coupled with increasing violence by property owners, particularly white farmers, against 
illegal occupants [termed ‘squatters’], often with implicit or explicit state approval. … 
However, ‘squatting’ as a concept … gains meaning within a particular moral 
framework that is codified as ‘law’ by the state [-] Rhodesian law defined a squatter as ‘an 
African whose house happens to be situated in an area which has been declared European 
or is set apart for some other reason.’ 
 
Thus doubts are raised whether nationalist leaders were sufficiently committed to 
land redistribution in particular and to transforming the nature of life of 
marginalised Africans in general, in view of their propagation of Rhodesian legal 
concepts and violent eviction of the land hungry. The government did not remove 
the settler capitalist system and left the economic systems largely intact. 
 
 
1.4 Resettlement and changing objectives 
The original objectives of the resettlement program are outlined in a document, 
Resettlement Policies and Procedures (Harare Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural 
Development 1980). These can be summarised as (Gunning et al. 2000) 
1. To alleviate population pressure in the communal areas 
2. To extend and improve the base of the largest and poorest sector of the 
population 
3. To improve the level of living standards of the largest and poorest sector of the 
population 
4. To provide, at the lower end of the scale, opportunities for people who have no 
land and who are without employment and may therefore be classed as destitute 
                                                 
9 In principle, the Fast Track Resettlement Programme of 2000 was similar to the accelerated 
resettlement programme. Both were preceded by extensive land occupations which the 
government had to regularise by officially allocating land. Both programmes disregarded the 
set standards of infrastructural provision, although the former provided more than the latter. 
Both were low cost operations. For example, Selby (2006: 133) says this about the ARP, 
‘ZANU-PF initiated an Accelerated Resettlement Programme (ARP), whereby ‘squatters’ were 
permitted to remain on land they had occupied. This legitimised the self-provisioning of land’. On the 
fast track land reform, Sachikonye (2005: 33) wrote: ‘From July 2000 onwards, the government 
defined the parameters of the land distribution process (also termed jambanja) more clearly. It was to be 
implemented at an accelerated pace through a fast-track programme’. 
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5. To bring abandoned or underutilised land into full production as one facet of 
implementing an equitable program of land redistribution 
6. To expand or improve the infrastructure of economic production  
7. To achieve national stability and progress in a country that has only recently 
emerged from the turmoil of war.  
 
The accelerated resettlement program (ARP) was implemented 1980-5. Its initial 
target population was to resettle 18,000 families on 1.1 million ha. This was quickly 
revised upwards, and by 1983 the target was 162,000 families. However this change 
in targets was not based on serious evaluation of the land demand but on political 
decision by President Mugabe.10 The increase in the official target differed from a 
much lower real number of settlements as Moyo (1995: 123) argues: 
The pace of resettlement was fast in the first four years of the 1980s, with around 10,000 
families settled per annum, only to slow down to less than 5,000 families settled per 
annum during the late 1980s. This reflected massive political pressure for access to land 
in the first few years, during a period when hegemony over leftist intellectuals, ex-
combatants and party leaders, as well as peasant communities was still uncertain. (Moyo 
1995: 123) 
 
From 1986, criteria for beneficiary selection drastically changed, thereby throwing 
the original objectives of the program into doubt. Emphasis shifted from poverty 
alleviation, decongestion of communal lands, reduction of unemployment and 
benefitting those affected by the war,11 to productivity. The Master Farmer 
Certificate12 was then used as a basic qualification and proof of farming ability (Moyo 
1995, Kinsey 1999a, Selby 2006). This was amidst tremendous pressure from 
Commercial farmers who argued that resettlement was unproductive and caused 
environmental degradation (Selby 2006) and what had already been done ‘was more 
than adequate’ (Moyo 1995). The productivity debate became more prominent as the 
accelerated resettlement program was implemented and eventually it became a 
dominant concern.13  
From the late 1980s and subsequently the government approach was dominated 
by efficiency concerns, influenced by the neo-liberal market-oriented land reform 
policies of the donors agencies (the so-called Washington Consensus). Under these 
policies a Black middle class was earmarked for settlement (Moyo 1995) since only 
                                                 
10 ‘According to Dr Mupawose (Secretary of Agriculture 1980-7) this figure emanated from the 1982 
ZANU-PF party conference, where Mugabe stated that he wanted the program to be magnified 
threefold’ from 54,000 target of 1981 (Selby 2006: 130). 
11‘It is estimated that over 80 per cent of [of beneficiaries of the early 1980s resettlement] fell into the 
categories of the most needy; refugees and the war-affected, the landless, and those with insufficient 
land to maintain themselves’ (Kinsey 1999a: 181). 
12 The Master Farmer programme was started by a colonial missionary-extensionist, Emory 
Alvord, as a combined strategy for religious conversion and transformation of African 
agriculture through ‘modern’ techniques. The certificate was awarded to those who had 
demonstrated satisfactorily that they had abandoned African agricultural practices (and ways 
of thinking). Recent research has argued that the African agronomic methods Alvord was 
fighting against were more environmentally sustainable and better for food security than he 
supposed (Sadomba, F. 1999).  
13 According to Kinsey (1999a: 176) policy was ‘side-tracked unwittingly into the vacuous debate 
on agricultural productivity and the alleged superiority of large-scale farming provoked by the 
Commercial Farmers’ Union’s attacks on misuse of land in resettlement areas.’ See also Moyo (1995) 
and Selby (2006). 
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the ‘middle peasant’ would have the size of holding and market orientation to 
provide an efficient replacement for White farmers. Consolidation of a Black middle 
class in the agricultural sector continued, such that ‘in late 1997 the state identified ... 
1,772 farms (4.6 million ha) for acquisition for resettlement. Forty percent of these 
farms (30 percent of the area) were apparently to be used to resettle “indigenous 
commercial farmers”.’ (Kinsey 1999a: 178). According to Kinsey (1999a), many of 
these were civil servants, members of the security services and ruling party 
apparatchiks, some of whom ‘had benefitted in the past’ (Kinsey 1999a) although 
Moyo argues that this fact is exaggerated (Personal communication with Sam Moyo 
2007). Nevertheless, earlier commitment to redistributive justice had been abandoned 
by the ZANU-PF government. 14 
 
The logic and justice of this policy trend has been questioned by some academic 
commentators, and in political circles also (Moyo 1995, Moyo and Yeros 2005). First, 
it seems illogical to give large land allocations to Black farmers, who often had to go 
through a steep learning curve to manage those big pieces of land, and as yet lacked 
other key factors of production, when already the inefficiencies of large-scale farms 
were being exposed (Moyo et al. 1991). Another argument was that land acquired for 
resettlement had first to be allocated to many landless people who needed it badly 
for livelihood. Thirdly the new form of redistribution favoured capitalist 
accumulation at the expense of the mass of the poor (Moyo 1995). With the recent 
experience of the former Soviet block in mind history teaches that the first generation 
of beneficiaries in any ill-considered redistribution of former state resources tend to 
be ‘asset strippers’ rather than ‘production minded’.  
 
This policy continues to shape newer developments. The Fast Track Land Reform 
Program (FTLRP) in 2000 reserved land for ‘A2 farmers’ (i.e. those presumed able to 
farm on a large scale) and remains one of the most criticised aspects of government 
land policy up until the time of writing. The rationale to remove a White farmer and 
replace with a Black farmer on the same piece of land has been under attack from 
many quarters on the grounds that these large farms are mainly given to elites of the 
ruling party (Kinsey 1999a). Although the matter raises a huge emotional storm, 
leading to exaggerated claims at times, the class bias of the program has not been 
disputed by scholars and analysts15, and challenges to it from below are one of the 
central issues examined in this thesis and strengthens Moyo and Yero’s (2005) 
argument. 
 
The issue, it should be noted, is one of justice (in land reallocation) versus 
productivity. This opposition is a smoke screen raised (for their own purposes) by 
the White farmers, but now used as a pretext by government. Lack of faith in the 
peasant levels productivity and fears that significant resettlement might cause 
                                                 
14 This view about small-scale farming, once entrenched, did not subsequently change, and it 
was the basis for preferring to lease government-acquired land, under the guise of 
indigenisation and Black empowerment, to senior civil servants (representatives of a rising 
Black bourgeoisie) and associates of the ruling oligarchy, ‘to cement corroding political 
loyalty’ (Kinsey 1999a: 174, Moyo 1995). For example, ‘Bartha Farm in Wedza, which was 
acquired in April 1993 for the resettlement of 33 families, had instead been allocated to ex-Agriculture 
Minister Mangwende’ (Selby 2006: 222). 
15 For example, Moyo (1995: 20) states that ‘Government’s political balancing ... tends to favour 
elites to the detriment of the rural poor’ a point which has been presented in a variety of ways by critics 
of the land reform’ (Kinsey 1999a, Hammar and Raftopolous 2003, Alexander 2006, Selby 2006). 
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hunger belongs to the mythic charter of the settler class, but is based on little hard 
evidence. Kinsey (1999a: 174) observes: 
Despite evidence that small-scale farming can be a powerful source of growth in 
Zimbabwe, support to the sub-sector dwindled in the late 1980s and throughout the late 
1990s. Over this same period, a myth grew in political thinking, promoted by vigorous 
lobbying, that the beneficiaries of the land reform program were the least productive 
farmers in the country and thus undeserving of the land they had been ‘given’. Concrete, 
unbiased evidence to sustain this myth is almost non-existent.16(Kinsey 1999a: 174) 
 
Mythic charters assist rulers to assert hegemony. The independent government of 
Zimbabwe soon realised that the land issue, as conceptualised in the productivity 
debate by the settler class, could be adapted to its own hegemonic needs. Land grants 
could be used to reward desired elements associated with the regime. Henceforth, 
land became an important tool of patrimonial governance. It is therefore not 
surprising that government quickly abandoned any proactive role in land 
redistribution and only engaged in it to suit its own purposes, or when (from time to 
time) forced to acknowledge facts established on the ground by determined 
occupiers. This establishes a point to which this thesis regularly returns – that land 
redistribution was a tool of governance, while land occupation was a tool of a certain 
kind of political force within the post independence liberation movement opposed to 
the ruling oligarchy. When the government appears from time to time (in the story 
unfolded below) to side with land occupiers, it is doing so in an attempt to retain 
control over its own preferred instrument of political control. 
 
A few data help support the point just made. Figures on land distribution show 
that government was not proactive, but only reacted to the momentum of occupiers, 
once resettlement of peasants stalled from the mid 1980s, despite clear continued 
land demand by these people. Government acquired land for resettlement, but it did 
not distribute it to the land hungry, as a comparison of Tables 1.1 and 1.2 shows. 
Government commitment to serious agrarian transformation is also questionable 
when fiscal allocations are considered from the year 2000 as shown in Table 1.3. The 
figures show that, ‘despite the fact that GoZ is a signatory of the Maputo Declaration 
of 2003 which mandates African governments to allocate at least 10 percent of 
national budgetary resources to agriculture’, this ration was never achieved, the best 
attempt being in 2006 and 2007 in the fluctuation graph to allocation. 
 
                                                 
16 Kinsey (1999a) argues that the judgement against resettled Africans in the 1980s was faulty 
in that ‘considerable body of region-specific and international received wisdom advises that the benefits 
– or otherwise – of programmes which involve large-scale human resettlement are unlikely to become 
apparent in less than a generation [yet] sweeping judgements on the programme nevertheless began to 
appear within just a few years of its (resettlement programme) inception.’ Kinsey (1999a) also cites a 
document of the British aid ministry (Overseas Development Administration 1988) which 
characterises Zimbabwe’s resettlement programme as ‘impressive’ in achieving its objectives 
and contributing to post war reconstruction and stability, with a quoted rate of return on 
investment of (a satisfactory) 21 percent . See also Selby (2006: 221) who notes that in 1992 Dr. 
Ndimande, Secretary for Agriculture, mentioned to the CFU that he did not simply want 
reproduction of resettlement areas ... or a continuation of the dualist farming structure. He 
wanted the ‘integration of competent Black farmers’. 
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Table 1.1 Land purchased for resettlement (1980-1990) 
Financial year Land purchased in 
ha 
Amount paid in ZW 
$ 
1979-1980 87,415 1,699,750 
1980-1981 223,196 3,517,198 
1981-1982 900,196 18,803,158 
1983-1984 75,058 2,966,849 
1985-1986 86,187 4,444,610 
1986-1987 133,518 3,898,335 
1987-1988 20,319 874,200 
1988-1989 63,917 2,807,335 
1989-1990 91,266 10,508,100 
Total 2,780,863 76,164,890 
Source: Auditor General’s report 1993, as cited in Moyo (1995: 122) 
 
Table 1.2 Land acquired for resettlement but not yet occupied (1993) 
Province Area in ha  Cost in ZW $  
Manicaland 2,137 496,600 
Mashonaland East 9,234 1,970,500 
Mashonaland Central 9,987 1 644,714 
Mashonaland West 11,162 280,000 
Midlands 15,202 812,400 
Masvingo 1,954 79,300 
Matabeleland North 9,444 449,500 
Matabeleland South 176,868 3,308,455 
Total 235,988 9,041,469 
Source: Auditor General’s report 1993, as cited in Moyo (1995: 122) 
 
Table 1.3 Government fiscal support to agriculture since 2000 
Year National budget 
(ZW $ in millions) 
Allocation to 
agriculture 
Percentage 
share (%) 
2000 109,197.2 2,173.2 2.0 
2001 276,450.0 5,520.4 2.0 
2002 421,926.3 16,943.1 4.0 
2003 783,934.0 40,549.1 5.0 
2004 7,747,638.5 497,615.3 6.0 
2005 28,363,608.4 1,000,155.3 4.0 
2006 430,836,273.0 32,198,830.0 7.47 
200717 41,725,656.0 3,053,734.0 7.32 
2008 7,905,314,086.0 366,858,058.0 4.64 
Source: Pazvakavambwa, cited in Moyo (2008); data from GoZ estimates of revenue and expenditure  
 
                                                 
17 Three zero’s had been slashed from the local currency in July 2006 by the RBZ. 
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The Lancaster House negotiation of 1979 yielded positive results for White 
commercial farmers and settlers in general, since it provided a focus on agrarian 
issues (e.g. the maintenance of an agricultural export economy) through which the 
settlers managed to manipulate, and to an extent co-opt, nationalist leaders, and thus 
to forge an alliance through which their position in independent Zimbabwe could be 
safeguarded. As with many peace processes, key issues were bargained among the 
main politically influential parties, and then presented to a war weary populace, 
euphoric that the fighting has ended, as a ‘policy’ of reconciliation. What this did, in 
fact, was not to resolve an old injustice, but to embed the issue over which the parties 
had been fighting within a new power-sharing scenario. Land was henceforth an 
issue over which Black and White political class fractions now to some extent had a 
common interest.  
 
This alliance between commercial farmers and the state was, of course, no new 
thing in the politics of the country. Settler farmers had for a long time managed to 
influence the state, both directly and indirectly, throughout the colonial period (Lee 
1974, Selby 2006). The settler farmer movement started to grow soon after colonial 
conquest in 1890, and by 1904 Southern Rhodesia had twelve farming associations 
formed ‘for the protection of farming interests’. Selby (2006) insists that White 
farmers grew from strength to strength and argues, contrary to other researchers, 
that, ‘whilst the RF and the Rhodesian state weakened [during Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence (UDI)], the relative power of farmers within the White electorate 
actually strengthened.’ This ‘powerful farmer group’ was able to influence the course 
of political direction during UDI, shifting power from civilian administration to a 
military bureaucracy spreading to the farms and businesses. By the time of the 
Lancaster House negotiations and subsequent Independence, settler White farmers 
were politically mature and highly experienced in dealing with the state and 
manipulating it to their advantage. However the politics of post independence was 
qualitatively different from the colonial period in that the new state was now a 
product of a liberation struggle whose internal forces and contradictions introduced 
a completely new political scenario, a point which White commercial farmers did not 
appreciate. As a result they continued to act as if they possessed both the land and 
political power as manifest in their arrogant challenges to government land 
acquisition program, which government was under pressure from below (Moyo 
1994).18 
There was latent but escalating polarisation between protagonists for land 
redistribution and those who had reservations about it. The debate for land 
redistribution shifted from the moral argument over redress of injustices and land 
demands by the poor to the economics of resettlement and evaluation of the added 
value and productivity associated with settler agriculture (linked to potential claims 
for compensation, should matters deteriorate politically). Those who opposed 
resettlement like commercial farmers thought that settler productivity was low, 
while environmental degradation was high in the resettlement areas of the early 
1980s. Productivity as criterion for accessing land as a resource endowment was an 
                                                 
18 Selby (2006: 218) has underplayed this stance by the White commercial farmers which is 
highlighted by Moyo (1994) yet it is critical in two ways. First, the arrogance and inflexibility 
of the farmers put the government that was under pressure from the masses, in a corner. 
Second, by pointing out that Ministers farms had to be designated first, resorting to the 
private media, the courts and advocacy with western powers undermined the negotiation 
route and introduced direct conflict leading to inevitable breakdown of the alliance.  
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old-age debate. It is rooted in John Locke’s theories of enclosure – Locke was a 
pioneer of the labour theory of value, and thought that land had no value until 
improved (Wood 1984) and became a major argument for land dispossession of the 
Black peasants in the first 50 years of colonial rule. In an argument spearheaded by 
Emory Alvord, founder of the Native Agriculture Department in Rhodesia, African 
agriculture was considered wasteful, inefficient and of low productivity, thereby 
justifying dispossession of its owners, and reallocation of land to White settlers (Page 
and Page 1991, Alvord undated a; 1928a; 1928b; 1929; 1948; Bolding 2004, McGregor 
1995, Moyo 2001). However, this convenient sentiment contradicted facts on the 
ground. Longitudinal surveys by Bill Kinsey from early 1982, studying farmers 
settled from 1980 and spanning more than two decades are very revealing and 
demand attention, considering the lengthy period of time required for valid 
conclusions to be drawn on any attempted agrarian transformation. Comparing 
production between farmers in communal agriculture (CA) areas (i.e. farmers 
cultivating under customary rights) and farmers, originating in these but now 
resettled on reassigned land, Kinsey (1999a: 194) concludes that: 
Zimbabwe’s resettlement program [such as it is!] has ... resulted in both higher incomes 
and more equally distributed income ... Resettled households crop twice the amount of 
land and earn more than three times the unit revenues of CA families. Values of 
livestock, crop production, food and non food expenditure, and holdings of cereal stocks 
are all higher and more equitably distributed in RAs than in the neighbouring CAs. 
Further, the average RA household relies far less on cash remittances and spends much 
less on staple cereals than its CA counterpart. (Gunning et al. 2000: 13) 
 
Benefitting from Kinsey’s longitudinal surveys over 17 years then compare social 
and economic wellbeing of resettled farmers and the communal farmers left behind. 
The authors conclude that: 
 (i) there has been an impressive accumulation of assets by these households; (ii) while 
this accumulation has played a role in increases in crop income, it appears that increases 
in returns to these assets have been especially important in generating the dramatic 
increase in crop incomes ... (iii) differences in initial conditions ... such as previous 
farming experience, have few persistent effects ... their impact is virtually non-existent by 
1995/96.  
 
These studies dispel the Alvordian myth about small-scale farming in Zimbabwe. 
They also reveal that changing criteria for resettlement to Master Farmer 
qualifications was a groundless requirement, with no bearing on the alleged under-
productivity of resettled farmers. Within three years of production, as Gunning et al. 
(2000) observed, previous training, including Master Farmer programs, had no 
significant effect.19 These data argue that the official policy of preferring ‘qualified’ 
farmers simply encapsulates an old colonial myth. The myth was nurtured from the 
1920s as a fundamental plank of policy of colonial agriculture in Rhodesia (Sadomba, 
F. 1999). Its persistence in policy circles rests on no valid empirical data, and served 
only to reinforce abandonment of the original objectives of the resettlement program 
in favour of the hegemony of the ruling party elite. 
                                                 
19 The Master Farmer programme was formal training and extension given to selected few 
peasants who established demonstration plots. Agricultural extension workers trained the 
farmers in mono-cropping, use of fertilisers and the plough, and conservation. Master 
Farmers were awarded certificates for successful abandonment of African agriculture 
(Sadomba 1999). 
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The Alvordian perspective, revived and adopted for its own purposes by the 
government after Independence, did not have it all its own way. A counter-argument 
in the productivity debate was developed by pointing out the inefficiency of large-
scale farming in Zimbabwe. Large-scale commercial farmers underutilised the land 
that they owned. Moyo et al. (1991: 61) make a critical observation regarding 
underutilisation of land by commercial farmers: 
There was considerable under-utilisation of land on commercial farms. In the 1981/82 
season, in Mashonaland, only 10 percent of the land that is potentially arable was 
actually cropped and this represented 75 percent of the total area cropped by the 
commercial sector in the whole country ... Overall, 34 percent of the large scale 
commercial farmers land is cultivated and 66 percent is fallow ... as much as 1.45 million 
ha out of 4.3 million ha of land found in the high potential land of Mashonaland 
remained uncultivated in the 1983/84 season. 
 
The distribution of land, as a major means of production, also entails access to 
public resources. Financing agriculture through subsidies, concessionary interest 
rates, inputs, infrastructure (for irrigation, transport, communication and power), 
and access to export processing zones with many exemptions, all tended to favour 
the established commercial farmers at the expense of the communal small-scale 
farmers. Policies, especially after adoption of an Economic Structural Adjustment 
Program (ESAP) in 1990, were designed to cushion large-scale farmers and to 
promote exports. This became an incentive to farmers to divert from supplying food 
to the local market to export crops like tobacco, even during times of drought,20 with 
disastrous food security consequences. Such policies widened the gap between the 
rich and the poor:  
... more [commercial] farmers indulged in (imported) luxury goods - power-boats, luxury 
vehicles and larger farmhouses ... Many senior farming respondents lamented these 
ostentatious displays of wealth, and identified them as key drivers of class and race 
resentment ... so displays of wealth by some farmers shaped the direction and tone of 
public debate. (Selby 2006: 196) 
 
A widening agrarian income gap that might be reduced through resettlement had 
potential for social unrest and racial conflict, as Kinsey warned: 
... genuine poverty reduction through resettlement is possible. Yet there appears little 
recognition at the policy level that, through land reform Zimbabwe has the potential [for] 
... national development ... Declines in inequality are likely to reinforce political stability 
...When incomes of a political or economic elite are high or increasing rapidly, while the 
income of rural non elites stagnate, there is risk that large segments of the population will 
become politically alienated. Declining inequality implies, in contrast, that non-elites are 
sharing in the benefits of economic growth ... These are considerations ZANU-PF would 
do well to weigh carefully in the years ahead. (Kinsey 1999a: 195) 
 
Unfortunately, the ZANU-PF government did not seem committed to broad based 
resettlement as a progressive principle for poverty alleviation, but only used it as 
                                                 
20 For example, during the 1992 drought, the worst in Zimbabwe’s living memory, 
commercial farmers were offered parallel market prices of ZW $1,000/tonne (itself almost 181 
percent of the official price of ZW $550.00/tonne) to induce them to sell their maize to the 
state Grain Marketing Board for distribution to the population on the brink of starvation, but 
the farmers still refused, demanding instead ZW $1,500/ton, i.e. 50 percent more than the 
parallel market price. They argued that they needed the maize for their livestock. 
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rhetoric from time to time, mainly during electoral campaigns. Anger and 
despondency grew among poor peasants, farm workers and neglected War Veterans, 
feeding the militant land occupation movement led by former fighters, long 
dissatisfied with the ‘reconciliation’ negotiated under the Lancaster House 
agreement. Land occupation (as argued above) developed as an expression of 
political dissent, even while government was (nominally) committed to the idea of 
land redistribution. As Kinsey (1999a) perceptively sensed a social movement was 
coalescing around the notion of direct action to reclaim land. In the momentous year 
of 2000 this movement erupted in a simultaneous rising against the White settler 
agrarian property owning group and its allies of convenience, the neo-colonial 
regime. 
 
 
1.5 Land distribution as political tool 
That land would be the centre of political struggle in Zimbabwe can be sensed from 
the proceeding of the Lancaster House talks. The commercial farmers influenced this 
agreement to protect their interests. In the Bill of Rights, enshrined in the Lancaster 
House Constitution there is a key land clause prohibiting compulsory acquisition of 
property, and guaranteeing fair compensation on a ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ 
basis. The nationalist leaders resisted this element, but yielded after being promised 
money (from Britain) to buy land for resettlement.21 Selby (2006: 112) argues that this 
was: 
Effective and shrewd diplomacy, conducted in the well-organised manner in which the 
CFU had lobbied for decades and would continue to do for years to come. [A]n updated 
version of the willing-buyer, willing-seller paper, which the final constitution was based 
on [had] The Bill of Rights clause [that] protected the interests of the white farming 
community and restricted the ability of the inheriting powers to deliver much of the land-
based expectation immediately, whilst the funding guarantees will remain one of the 
great unanswered controversies in Zimbabwean history. 
 
With benefit of hindsight the position of the Patriotic Front at Lancaster House 
seems difficult to understand, and may indicate that the Front was already divided 
about how to proceed. On one hand, in agreeing to the British funding package, the 
nationalists seemed determined to ensure that land would be taken from the White 
commercial farmers for widespread and speedy resettlement of the landless. On the 
other hand, their rather rapid abandonment of the landless classes, as soon as 
Zimbabwe became independent, seems to cast doubt as to whether they were serious 
about their stance in the negotiations. Immediately after independence, Robert 
Mugabe announced the policy of reconciliation which, according to Selby: 
... favoured the whites. This may have provided a cornerstone of stability, but enduring 
land and race inequities remained unresolved. ‘Political neutrality’ had been a guiding 
principle of CFU policy since the early 1970s, even though their proximity to the RF and 
the Rhodesian government amounted to an alliance. Their guiding principle to ‘work 
with the government of the day’ provided a slogan on which to justify their repositioning 
to an alliance with the Patriotic Front, which was the most visible symbol of settlement 
for both sides. (Selby 2006: 113) 
                                                 
21 ‘Josiah Chinamano [prominent ZAPU politician] reassured delegates that if there were sufficient 
financial guarantees then ZAPU’s land policy was directly in line with the CFU’s. Both groups could 
agree, provided there was money’ (Selby 2006: 117). 
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How genuine were Patriotic Front leaders about the importance of the land issue, 
therefore, at Lancaster House? If they were, why did Mugabe announce the policy of 
reconciliation, and not long thereafter openly act against the landless whom he 
purported to stand for in the negotiations? Was land being used to garner support 
from the electorate only for the imminent elections? How would the landless and 
marginalised War Veterans react if finally land was not delivered as per their 
expectations? These are unavoidable questions when one considers the policy of 
reconciliation, subsequent stalling of the land resettlement program and alliance of 
the ruling party elites with White capital. 
 
It can be noted that each time elections loom ZANU-PF made noises about the 
land issue, but did little or nothing to adequately address popular sentiment once the 
vote was secured (Moyo 2001). Nothing changed until it was faced with a formidable 
opposition from within (by War Veterans) and from outside, by Movement for 
Democratic Change. As we shall see in Chapter 6, a more activist stance on the land 
issue seemed a possible way of foiling vital leadership changes within the ruling 
party and heading off mass defection from the ruling party to the opposition. The 
regime now sought to make the land issue its trump card. President Mugabe, put 
himself in the forefront by becoming the de facto spokesman of the land movement, 
his earlier alliance with the White commercial farmers in the 1980s to 1990s 
notwithstanding.  
 
In trying to make sense of these developments it is helpful to delve into the 
history of the liberation movement, post independence. A fundamental 
reconfiguration of forces within the liberation movement occurred soon after 
independence, resulting in the relegation of the ex-fighters (known in Zimbabwe as 
‘War Veterans’) to the sidelines. This relegation took place under very complex 
circumstances. Soon after Independence the alliance of political parties that had 
waged the armed struggle sundered, after Robert Mugabe announced that he would 
not stand in the first general elections as a leader of the united Patriotic Front but as 
presidential candidate for ZANU-PF. This division increased long-standing lines of 
fissure between the two guerrilla armies,22 and tensions degenerated into heavy 
fighting threatening civil war. The risk of escalation led to ex-combatants (i.e. those 
with weapons of fighting techniques) being treated with suspicion, and subjected to 
the constant risk of being labelled ‘dissidents’. One consequence was that they were 
not allowed to participate in active party leadership, thereby curtailing the 
representation of their interests and concerns in the political process. Exclusion from 
active formal politics drove the War Veterans towards other modes of political 
expression, including interest in traditional religion. 
                                                 
22 The main nationalist political parties, ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army) 
and ZANLA (Zimbabwe National Liberation Army), were arch rivals, following the 
outbreaks of violence and animosity between ZANU and ZAPU. This animosity resulted in 
an ethnically inflected uprising of dissidents, which the state used force to subdue, at the 
same time as punishing the population in scorched earth campaigns during which many 
civilians were killed. Some argued the killings were consciously intended to deter ZAPU 
political rivalry with ZANU. 
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Figure 1.1 So-called protected villages in 1980 
The Smith regime had changed the rural landscape by putting people in ‘keeps’ where they 
were densely populated in order to isolate guerrillas. Peasants desperately needed land to 
change this situation.  
Source: Photos by author, Chiweshe 1980 
 
 
1.6 Land and religion 
Use of African religious ideas was a long-established factor in mobilising mass 
support for the guerrilla struggle, so it made sense for veterans to continue to 
develop this modality as a way of projecting the land struggle into the public arena, 
even when the government wished to sweep it towards the sidelines in the interests 
of ‘reconciliation’ among rival (Black and White) elites. During the colonial period, 
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spirit mediums and chiefs were at the centre of social mobilisation around territorial 
claims.23 For example, in the Eastern Highlands, the Tangwena land movement 
(1963-75) dragged the government to court in what became the most widely known 
case of resistance to the Land Apportionment (1930) and Land Tenure Acts (1969) 
during the colonial period (Moyana 1987, Moore 2005). Led by Chief Rekayi 
Tangwena and the Hwesa spirit mediums, the Tangwena people steadfastly refused 
to be moved from what had been designated European land. In the Matopo Hills, 
south of the country, the Sofasonke and Sofasihamba land movements were also led 
by chiefs, supported by the Mwali cult as the dominating religious influence (Ranger 
1999).24 
 
One of the most influential studies of religion as factor in the guerrilla struggle is a 
book by Lan (1985) entitled, Guns and Rains: guerrillas and spirit mediums in Zimbabwe. 
His work illustrates how Shona-speaking guerrillas used religion to mobilise support 
for the armed struggle. After analyzing the role of spirit mediums in traditional 
Shona social organisation and the management of ancestral territory, Lan traces the 
critical part played by spirit mediums in the mobilisation of peasants on the north-
eastern front during the 1970s liberation war. Religion has a material base, and the 
activities of spirit mediums and ancestral spirits only fully makes sense when 
integrated with ideas about the indigenous agricultural system. 
 
The indigenous agricultural system of the Shona people of Zimbabwe belongs to 
an agro-ecological religious complex prevailing over much of the farming zone in 
Africa (Mbiti 1969, Wiredu 1996, Eze 1998, Ramose 1999). Shona religion is composed 
of a spirit world with various levels: midzimu (ancestral spirits), mashave (professional 
spirits), animal spirits (shave remhuka e.g. shave regudo), ngozi (avenging spirits) and 
the highest spirit of all, generally called Mwari (creator) (Ranger 1999, Sadomba, F 
1999). The spirit world is understood to have its own internal dynamics, levels of 
seniority and different effect on human beings. It is also a world of both friendly and 
evil spirits. However, the spirit world always finds its way into the human society by 
expressing its wishes, interests or disappointments through mortal beings, or at 
times through nature, animals, caves and other phenomena (cf. Ranger 1999). 
 
Shona cosmology also recognises the seniority of nature over humans, and the 
close association of nature with the spirit world. Nature is known to possess powers 
no human being can fully comprehend. As in many African systems of thought, 
nature, according to the Shona, is too vast and complex to conquer. Far from being 
dead and lifeless, nature can also be a medium of the spirit world, just as human 
beings can serve as mediums. 
 
According to Shona belief, the creator (Musikavanhu/Mwari) created the first 
humans. These ancient ancestors are the ones who founded the many different clans 
and ethnic groups, which have then expanded by division and subdivision (Hodza 
and Fortune 1979, Hodza 1982, Chigwedere 1985). Memories or relics of the founders 
of each clan are kept and passed from one generation the next, especially through 
praise poems, and the reciting of oral traditions. These progenitors reside in the 
                                                 
23 A spirit medium is a person through whom ancestral spirit(s) talk. The medium is said to 
be possessed by the spirit and is usually in a trance induced by song and dance specific for 
this purpose. The medium might not know what the spirit says and an aide keeps the record. 
24 See also (Sadomba 2004: 5). 
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nyikadzimu (spirit world) and influence their current descendants by possessing the 
spirit medium (svikiro) whenever they need to speak (Lan 1985, Ranger 1999) 
 
The role of the spirit medium is to pass messages from the spirit world to mortals, 
and vice versa. Among others, some messages particularly concern agro-ecological 
management. They include preserving certain species of flora and fauna, prohibiting 
whole areas from human activity as marambatemwa (literally to be translated as 
‘places that refuse/cutting’; could be called ecological reserves in present-day idiom), 
or the declaration of certain points as sacred shrines, pools and caves (Hodza and 
Fortune 1979). The svikiro also performs the important social function of anointing 
the chief or headwoman of the clan, who then serves as the de facto administrator of 
the territory under her jurisdiction. Each headwoman or chief receives guidance on 
how to rule their subjects and to sustaining the environment from inputs from the 
spirit world through the svikiro. This is how the mortal is connected to the world of 
spirits. The ruler administers territory on behalf of and according to the wishes of the 
spirits of the land. This notion of territorial management provides the base of the 
system of land tenure values and customs. Thus, in crowning a chief (Hodza and 
Fortune 1979: 9) the Rozvi25 King or his emissary recites: 
Finally I say, here is a handful of soil, hold it in both hands. 
That shows you will rule the land and eat its fruit. 
Go pasture and guard every creature, big and small, in the land in which you are. (Hodza 
and Fortuen 1979: 9) 
‘The ideology of the Shona stressed this: the ruler was given clods of earth at his (her) 
installation’. (Beach 1980: 21) 
 
War Veterans were keen to engage this institution in the land occupations, 
knowing the significance this had on claims to territory. As this thesis will show, 
spirit mediums led occupations before the rupture of 2000 and War Veteran-led 
occupations of 1998. Spirit mediums were (and remain) at the heart of agrarian 
community organisation, despite the alignment of many rural Zimbabwean with 
mission religion. As will be shown later, the occupation of Gomba (the study area) is 
a case in point. 
 
 
1.7 Land ideology and War Veterans 
This thesis is about the role played by Zimbabwe’s War Veterans in the land 
occupations movement. The core of the land occupation movement is composed of 
people who participated in the liberation struggle. Through their exposure, 
association and training veterans developed certain distinct sets of (neo-traditional) 
values, rituals and ideologies affecting their actions in combat, and which have 
retained normative force in their activities in the post independence period. It will be 
argued that combat itself constituted a kind of ritual induction generating solidarities 
among veterans which have remained an active social force in the period of post 
independence peace (cf. Peters 2006).  
The liberation war went through three main phases, namely Chitepo, Zimbabwe 
People’s Army (ZIPA)26 and Mugabe periods, each of which will be more fully 
                                                 
25 The Rozvi are considered to have built the Great Mutapa Kingdom (See Beach 1984; 1994, 
Chigwedere 1980; 1985; 1992; 1998a; 1998b). 
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analysed in subsequent chapters. These phases each had its own distinctive types of 
recruits, leadership styles, levels of military engagement and ideological thrust, 
producing rather different sets of guerrilla fighters, in terms of their ideological 
persuasions and visions of emancipation. The Chitepo phase (1963-75) was the 
earliest period, followed by ZIPA (1975-7), the shortest of the three, and the Mugabe 
period (1977-2000+), the longest. The Chitepo phase, as will be analysed in the 
following chapter, was dominated by uneducated recruits of peasant background, 
many of whom were press-ganged in Zambia, with some later recruited from the 
hinterland of the north-eastern front (Mphoko undated). At this time, there was 
greater focus on military strategies and tactics, and little attention was placed on 
political education. This resulted in a highly militarised cadre of the guerrilla 
movement with limited political understanding. 
 
The ZIPA period was a more developed phase, politically and militarily. 
Recruiting mostly from Manicaland, the war incorporated a large number of literate 
cadres, many of whom were secondary school leavers, with a sprinkling of 
undergraduates from the University. Workers from towns and mining areas also 
flocked into the movement during this period. In addition the leadership of the war 
changed hands from an ‘old guard’ to younger, more intellectually inclined, cadres 
shaped by a mixture of Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and 
Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) ideologues. A more ideologically 
advanced cadre was fashioned during this period, and the pattern of military 
offensive changed, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Guerrillas from this period 
were exposed to political education that went beyond the more limited objectives of 
the older nationalists who wanted to replace the settler colonial government by a 
Black government without changing the economic structure of the country. 
 
The Mugabe phase was the antithesis of the ZIPA period, in that this phase 
actively reversed the ideological education initiatives started under ZIPA. Advanced 
political education, climaxing the establishment of the Wampoa Political Academy in 
Mozambique in 1976, was immediately stopped when Mugabe took control over the 
movement. The focus on recruitment also changed. Selective recruitment 
(Tungamirai 1995), which is tantamount to handpicking of nationalists from abroad, 
without experience of participating in the armed struggle - was driven by the top 
hierarchy of the nationalist leaders, sensing their imminent arrival in power and 
anxious to head off rivalry from among the guerrilla ranks. 
 
This new pattern of recruitment tended to displace actual fighters from leadership 
roles, in order to open a way for the nationalists to control the guerrilla cadres. In 
essence, these politicians with extensive external links, pushed the guerrillas to the 
back of the queue, knowing that they could later use them to advantage. 
The post independence period then saw an intensification of this process of 
marginalising and suppressing the ex-fighters, in order to consolidate a new civilian 
ruling class intent on forging class alliances with settler capitalists and farmers. 
Throughout the 1980s several attempts by War Veterans to re-organise were 
thwarted by divide-and-rule tactics, and it was only in the 1990s (with the war long 
                                                                                                                                            
26 ZIPA was a united guerrilla army formed out of ZIPRA formed by Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) formed by 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). 
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over) that sufficient organisational cohesion was finally achieved to challenge the 
regime and its alliance with settler capital. 
 
These challenges climaxed from mid 1997 to November that year when the War 
Veterans besieged State House, the official residency of President Mugabe, 
demanding welfare benefits and a return to the liberation agenda. War Veterans had 
started to pressure government for land redistribution in the early 1990s leading to 
the enactment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1992, i.e. after the Chinhoyi meeting 
between Mugabe and the War Veterans. However, government still was not keen to 
use the instrument to acquire land from White settlers and the piece of legislation 
remained lip service. War Veterans continued to mount pressure which escalated in 
1996 forcing government to designate 1,471 farms for compulsory acquisition in 
November 1997, when the truce with the President was entered. The land issue was 
once more drawn to the centre stage. However, the White farmers went to the courts 
to resist the designations and many of the farms were delisted. When the nationalist 
leaders failed to distribute land War Veterans forged an alliance with the land 
movement and provided key leadership for a militant land occupation movement 
from 1998. White commercial farmers, failed to read this political climate and the 
pressure from below against the alliance they had forged with the ruling elite. As a 
result, instead of compromise, White farmers exhibited racial arrogance by refusal to 
accept government supremacy in land adjudication (Moyo 1994). The government 
was in a tight corner. 
 
As already noted, this land occupation movement ruptured into nation-wide 
occupations in 2000 after the government sponsored draft constitution referendum 
was rejected by the electorate in a referendum. The President and ZANU-PF, under 
pressure from the powerful land movement and also from the opposition Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC), then opportunistically sought an alliance with the 
former. The land movement judged that it had less to gain from the MDC, a 
movement mainly reflecting a coalition of urban workers, settler farmers, business 
interests and support from international capital. The government’s adroit move 
succeeded, and once more War Veterans, farm workers and peasants accepted the 
nationalists, President Mugabe and the regime as part of the land movement. 
 
 
1.8 An exposition of the argument of the thesis 
This study is based on the theory of social movements. Social movement theory is 
used to attempt a better characterisation of Zimbabwe’s land occupations. This topic 
is yet to be settled in academic debate, and has generated more heat than light. To 
some the land occupations are little more than a political ploy by a moribund ruling 
oligarchy trying to cling to political power. One school of thought argues that the 
land occupations lack the credentials of a social movement (Cousins 2003, Hammar 
and Raftopoulos 2003, Feltoe 2004, Harrold-Barry 2004, Moore 2004, Zimbabwe 
Liberators Platform 2004, Alexander 2006, Selby 2006). This argument places 
emphasis on the role played by the state and the apparent high levels of anarchic 
violence associated with the occupations. 
 Another school of thought argues that there is a long history of land occupations 
in Zimbabwe, varying mainly in form but hardly in content (Moyo 2001; 2002, 
Marongwe 2003, Moyo and Yeros 2005, Sadomba 2007, Andrew and Sadomba 2006). 
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The argument of this school of thought is grounded in the theory of social 
movements (Jamison 1991, Layman 1995). Blumer defines social movements as: 
Collective enterprises to establish a new order of life. They [social movements] have their 
inception in a condition of unrest, and derive their motive power on one hand from 
dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and or system of living. The career of a social 
movement depicts emergence of a new order of life. (Blumer 1995) 
 
Literature and case studies on the theory of social movements tries to find a secure 
analytical base from which to characterise this social phenomenon. Eyerman outlines 
conditions giving rise to the emergence and development of social movements as: 
Peculiarities and avenues for protest: actual underlying causes of complaint; 
generalised beliefs, the role of ideologies and ideologists in shaping the way protest and 
complaint is understood by actors; precipitating factors, the specific sparks that ignite 
protest, leadership and communication, to direct and coordinate; and, finally, the 
operation of social control, the way established authorities react.27 (Eyerman and 
Jamison 1991: 17) 
 
The nature and character of social movements differ significantly from one part of 
the world to the other, reflecting (it is argued) an ‘increasing separation of the sites of 
theoretical production and collective action’ (Foweraker 1995). There is thus a challenge 
to see the general in the particular. Social movement theory will benefit, it is 
generally agreed, from carefully contextualised case study material. This is the 
ambition of the present thesis. Zimbabwe’s land occupations were characterised by 
specific features that need to be subjected to rigorous analysis, against a background 
of local history and ethnography. 
 
Moyo (2002), in his landmark introduction to the topic of the contemporary 
significance of land-focused social movements has developed a framework for land 
movements in Africa pointing out their specific features, useful for understanding 
Zimbabwe’s land occupations. He observes that African land movements are 
‘dispersed’ and ‘varied’ reactions to decaying post colonial African nation states. These 
struggles – although apparently highly specific when taken in isolation - together 
constitute an aggregate pattern assignable to the category of social movement,28 
albeit different in nature from such movements in Europe and Latin America, which 
tend to presume the existence of functional centralised national organisations. 
Seemingly ‘isolated’ peasant organisations and actions have induced major policy 
shifts in Africa, and this calls for profound studies on the nature of rural society and 
‘how the evolution of peasant organisations influence the processes of democratisation and 
economic change’ (Moyo 2002). Moyo goes on to argue that land occupations should 
be seen as a historical process rather than as isolated events:  
Land occupations [were] an ongoing social phenomenon in both urban and rural areas of 
Zimbabwe, before and after the country’s independence … The 2000-1 occupations mark 
the climax of a longer, less public and dispersed struggle over land shortages and land 
demand in the post independence period. (Moyo 2001: 3) 
 
Moyo focuses his analysis on the post independence land occupations without 
going deeply into the history of occupations prior to 1980. As a result his argument 
                                                 
27 Emphasis in the original. 
28 See three West African examples of social struggles related to land issues Chauveau and 
Richards (2008). 
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regarding historicity could be strengthened. Lacking enough time depth, the 
argument has been vulnerable to criticism (Sachikonye 1994, Alexander 2003, 
Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003, Raftopoulos 2003, Selby 2006) for failure to explain 
the sudden rupture of 2000, the associated violence, the active participation of the 
state in the occupations, the precipitating economic meltdown and the threat of 
imminent elections. In the eyes of critics, the state, ZANU-PF and President Mugabe 
were perceived to be using the land issue as a scapegoat, with the real motive being 
their continued determination to cling to power. These critical academic voices have 
drawn ‘qualitative distinctions between the 2000 invasions and the occupations 
occurring in 1998 or in previous periods since independence’ (Hammar and 
Raftopoulos 2003: 19). 
 
Closer characterisation of Zimbabwe’s land occupations is thus a vital task, in the 
hope of shedding light on the elements that constitute the occupations and how they 
have functioned. This will be helpful especially in assessing the role and functions of 
the regime and how it has influenced the land occupations. The Zimbabwean regime 
has been the centre of analysis in the studies of land occupations because of its 
shifting positions and particularly its violent participation at a time when the ruling 
party was under threat from the opposition forces within it and outside. Some 
researchers (Hammar and Raftopolous 2003, Alexander 2006, Selby 2006) have 
however underplayed the force of internal dynamics within the liberation movement 
which others have tended to highlight (Sithole 1979, Moyo 1995, Moyo 2001, Moyo 
and Yeros 2005, Sadomba 2008) thereby failing to comprehend the agency of 
marginalised War Veterans, peasants and farm workers in the land conflict. After the 
Unity Accord (1987) and formation of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War 
Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), there were cumulative achievements by the War 
Veterans’ movement including legislative (amendment of the War Victims 
Compensation Act 1992, Enactment (1992) and amendment of the War Veterans Act 
1996, Compulsory Land Acquisition Act 1992 to mention but the critical ones) and 
forcing government to designate White farms. This thesis will therefore analyze the 
development of the post independence state by looking at political tactics of those 
who control it in order to understand behaviour of some state organs during the land 
occupations and the agency of the marginalised peasants, War Veterans and farm 
workers.  
 
 
1.9 The research questions 
1.9.1 The main research question 
The main research question is: are the land occupations in Zimbabwe between 1998 
and 2004 primarily a result of elite-driven restructuring of access to land and political 
manoeuvring, or a result of bottom-up action from social movements informed by 
historical claims of popular demand for land? 
 
1.9.2 The sub-research questions 
• How and for what reasons have land conflicts in Zimbabwe developed from the 
colonial period until the present? 
• What social groupings emerged around the land issue, and how did they link to 
each other at different times? 
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• What continuities and discontinuities can be traced in the land movement over 
time? 
• What was the specific role of the War Veterans in these processes? 
 
1.9.3 Methodology 
The thesis combines two main research approaches, namely historiography and 
ethnography. It has been necessary to employ historiography to study critically the 
development of the liberation movement, particularly the guerrilla movement of the 
1970s, because this was the immediate prelude to Independence, the period in which 
the land occupations occurred. Participant observation covers both the emergence of 
the War Veterans’ movement and the more recent land occupations, since I was a 
participant in both. The work has been undertaken as a ‘movement intellectual’. This 
provides privileged access to data, but makes considerable demands in terms of 
seeking a standpoint from which to view the data objectively. I have paid attention to 
the methodological advice of other ‘movement intellectuals’ in seeking a degree of 
historiographical and ethnographic and objectivity, though recognise that this is 
never perfectly attainable (Laville 1998, Mafeje 1998, Moore 1998, Nkwi 1998, 
Mudege 2005). 
 
One (historiographical) move was to attempt a thorough reconstruction of the 
phases of the liberation war, as a necessary framework to address the research 
questions relating to the evolution and development of the War Veterans’ 
Movement. To do this I used both primary data (mainly in depth interviews with 
participants in the war) in addition to secondary data, in order to develop a synthesis 
open to inspection and criticism by other scholars and by veterans themselves. At 
times I have had to be cautious in identifying informants, but have checked my own 
memories of involvement in the armed struggle carefully against the multiple 
accounts I was able to assemble. To address possible bias, I sought out other studies, 
and other sources of material, to cross-check my interview materials and 
observations. Additionally, I consulted photographic and audio visual materials 
concerning the liberation war,29 from both the Rhodesian side and the guerrilla 
perspective. My analysis of materials had an extra advantage in that having been a 
participant I had a certain amount of practical knowledge of e.g. training, terrain and 
fighting techniques, useful in testing the reliability of both informants and diverse 
secondary accounts.30 
                                                 
29 Especially material held in The National Archives of Zimbabwe. 
30 For example, I was able to distinguish different categories of War Veterans according to 
their war time positions and dispositions, which helped contextualise their accounts. Did they 
belong to the notorious Security and Intelligence Department, were they graduates of 
Wampoa College, or did they belong to the first phase of the war? In some cases I was also 
able to supplement interview materials with my own reflections on the mobilisation process 
at the front, the political education in the rear, or in relation to knowledge of the strategies in 
the war zones. I reflected upon unpublished cartoons and poems written by ‘Nikita’, for 
example, relating to visions of an independent Zimbabwe. With this background, during the 
land occupations I made an effort to interview the different categories of people I could 
identify, probing on their past as well as their interpretation of the present in which they were 
participating, and their vision about the future. In addition I also subjected some of my own 
earlier writings, including a document (War Strategy for Chaminuka Sector) that I had 
drafted (1979), and some short stories, poems, notes and lecture materials that I had prepared 
to teach political lessons. My collection of war time photographs was also a subject of 
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In studying land occupations, the ethnographic method of participant observation 
was my main tool. With its emphasis on fieldwork I chose the approach for 
‘uncovering the masked, the latent, the unconscious … to clarify the opaque … [and] 
to give meaning to the meaningless’ (Crapanzano 1986: 51) issues pertaining to the 
complex social phenomenon of land occupations. As a result I made a conscious 
decision (as opposed to my war involvement) to follow my veteran activist 
informants and become a participant observer in the land occupations when they 
exploded in the year 2000. 
 
As a veteran myself, it could be said that my earlier war front experiences were a 
kind of participant observation, but the difference between the two situations was 
that in the latter case I was a student of anthropology in the Technology and 
Agrarian Development Group of the Social Sciences Department, in Wageningen 
University, following in the footsteps of other anthropologists working on African 
war (cf. Richards 1996, Peters 2006).31 Even so, the problem of identity still haunted 
me. The subject of my study was not foreign to me - I was part of them – 
simultaneously a researcher and a subject. There was no ‘traditional society doing its 
traditional thing, oblivious to the alien observing presence’ (Pratt 1986: 43). This 
challenged assumptions32 in anthropology about separation of observer and 
observed, and raises new methodological questions, like to what extent is one’s 
accumulated knowledge through socialisation, gained by virtue of being part of the 
society, group or process under study, to be accepted as scientific data for purposes 
of an anthropological research? Ethnography is a more flexible craft than it once was, 
and now welcomes research by members of the societies that are the subject of study, 
though debate is ongoing as to how the specific biases of the insider are to be 
accommodated within the field (Mafeje 1998). 
 
I am aware that there is a danger of losing perspective from being too intimate 
with the topic, but the dangers of insider bias seem to be no worse (even if of a 
different kind) than the dangers of being an outsider (having too much contextual 
information and not enough inside detail). Indeed, usefully different dynamics 
emanate from the interactions between the two kinds of researcher and their subjects. 
Even more so, it is compelling to consider for the ‘local’ anthropologist how best to 
‘decode and recode’ (Clifford 1986, see also Clifford 1996, Clifford and Marcus 1986, 
Marcus and Fisher 1986), to tell a story in which he/she is a participant. I find this a 
                                                                                                                                            
reflection. I also received materials from individuals interested in my work, including 
collections of pictures. Some of these materials are otherwise confined in the ZANU-PF 
archives and have not, almost a generation after the war, been released to the public. I also 
had assembled a collection of interview materials, including cassettes of interviews, 
undertaken by myself and other researchers, prior to envisaging the present study. Where 
appropriate, I sought and received permission from the researcher in question to use the 
materials. 
31 I started researching on land occupations in 2000, as they happened, and while waiting to 
enrol for a PhD programme. My studies of land occupations were therefore more by default 
than by design. 
32 Anthropology is in its origins a social science for studying foreign cultures, and has perhaps 
not entirely given up that orientation. For example, Marcus and Fischer (1986: 24) argue that, 
‘the main motif that ethnography as a science developed was that of salvaging cultural diversity, 
threatened with global Westernisation especially during the age of colonialism’. 
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particularly important challenge for African students of African anthropology, and 
readily accept the challenge in the present study.33 
 
 
1.10 Research methods 
1.10.1 Participant observation 
Anthropologists use both non-participant and participant forms of direct observation 
as research tools.  In this thesis I analyse data gathered from the specific participant 
perspective of the “movement intellectual”.  This means that I seek to analyse data 
gathered from within a movement in which I was (and remain) an activist. I myself 
am a veteran of the armed struggle for independence in Zimbabwe, and have 
remained active with groups of veterans seeking to bring about land reform. I took 
part in land occupations, and made observations and collected data as I did so. This 
means that I might describe myself as an observant-participator, as distinct from a 
participant-observer. I was part of that activity from the outset. 
 
In the pages that follow I do not seek to disguise my role, but I do strive for as 
objective an analytical standpoint as can be obtained. For this reason (after discussion 
with my supervisors) I rejected an autobiographical standpoint. I followed the advice 
of Richards (2005) that anthropologists analysing conflict situations should aim for 
“thin” rather than “thick” description, and offer transparency rather than 
complexity. I took part in many events associated with land occupation. For example, 
I took part in mobilisation of urban and rural people, worked out logistics, attended 
meetings, confronted White commercial farmers, occupied land, and followed 
through administrative procedures to be allocated land, up to the point of getting 
inputs and making occupied farms work. I sought to get involved in key situations in 
the occupation progressed.34 For example, I was a founder member of civil society 
organisations formed by War Veterans for purposes of sustaining the movement or 
diversifying it. During these various activities I also experienced land dispossession 
by ZANU-PF elites and civil servants in 2006.35   
 
I did not undertake these activities as a research strategy, but I knew that one day I 
wanted to make an accurate analysis of the events unfolding round me. I was in this 
                                                 
33 Sally Falk Moore (1986: 3) contends that, ‘To say that African studies have played a central role 
in these theoretical and methodological transformations (of social anthropology) may understate the 
case. The large body of data that has already been accumulated on African society is bound to make 
Africa a continuing locale for anthropological research of major importance.’ It is in view of this that 
I suggest that African (and any other) anthropologists studying their own societies need to 
contribute more to methodological writings, especially regarding their positions as 
simultaneous researchers and subjects. (See also Clifford 1986; 1996, Crapanzano 1986, Pratt 
1986.) 
34 For example when I was informed that War Veterans were organising to chase away 
another (‘elite’) War Veteran, backed by prominent ZANU-PF politicians, and return the 
White farmer because he was liked by the community for his support to Concession District 
Hospital, clinics and local schools, I decided to take part as a participant observer. I also 
decided to accompany the demonstrations against one farmer who had ploughed in a field on 
which occupiers had planted green maize before it had tussled. 
35 See Appendix 1 ‘Land dispossession: forced abandonment of an agricultural research centre 
in Mazowe District’. 
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sense an “embedded” intellectual, and at each stage I took field notes and records, 
and interviewed key activists. My analytical skills, such as they were at that stage, 
contributed to the land occupiers’ own assessments of their situation, as much as 
these assessments also fed my notebooks. In making a “thin” descriptive account I do 
not seek to disguise my role, but do not unduly privilege it either. I try and present a 
picture of an ongoing discourse among land activists, and at times I “disappear” into 
that picture as but one voice among several. I cannot (for security reasons) identify 
my informants. Instead they become initials, and (on occasion) I become an initial 
among them, not to disguise the part I played but to make it clear that I was acting in 
a group. 
 
Whether that group was as significant as I claim will be for others to judge. But my 
two basic aims are to show that such a group existed (I was there) and that it was far 
from being a tool of state power, as several analysts have claimed. I claim for my 
account in this thesis no more, but no less, objectivity than can be claimed for any 
other ethnographic account. I can report only the conversations that happened 
around me. I interviewed White farmers to gain some insight into their perspective. 
But it will fall to others (using other techniques) to assess the positions of (for 
example) government civil servants and members of the Mugabe regime in regard to 
land reform. Conflict (by its very nature) divides the parties, and every account is 
written from one side or the other. What is important is to have some kind of parity 
of accounts. It is essential to avoid the situation of the war in Sierra Leone in which 
all accounts (whether by academics or journalists) were written from one side alone 
(Peters 2006). I offer an account from within a segment of the land occupation 
movement in Zimbabwe, fully confident that others will answer it from the other 
side of the fence. 
 
As a veteran I was well known to activists in the land occupation movement, and had 
ready access to their deliberations and actions. I encountered state officials and 
community leaders and used every opportunity to obtain their views, even though at 
times they saw me in oppositional terms. To ensure that I was compiling evidence 
regularly (and not just when the going was easy) I made use of check lists and 
observation guides. I also made use of camera and recording equipment to ensure that 
as much as possible I had back-up records, to support my note taking and interviews. 
The fluid circumstances of a conflicted situation do impose severe limitations on what 
can and cannot be observed, but I believe my own work is not out of line with what is 
accepted as a feasible standard for conflict analysis in the heat of struggle (Richards 
2005, Peters 2006). 
 
1.10.2 Interviews 
I also used a variety other methods, including interviews (Bernard 1988), focus group 
discussions, content analysis and techniques of participatory rural appraisal (PRA). 
The interview method was particularly useful. I used it to collect case histories of 
War Veterans, farm workers, peasant farmers and White commercial farmers, some 
of whom agreed to be interviewed as key informants. The interview method was 
helpful to bridge gaps left by the participant observation method. The history of the 
liberation struggle, for example, was mainly collected through interviews from 
groups of participants. I also used the method to follow up on events that I could not 
be present at myself. Interviews were generally unstructured (though based, of 
course, on my own mental check list of topics about which I wished to enquire) and 
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followed the flow of conversation, thus yielding mainly qualitative data. As such I 
probed my informants especially to get information on sensitive areas such as violent 
occupations or repulsion. I recorded the interviews on cassettes or on a digital 
recorder and this gave me the opportunity to concentrate on the interview without 
much disruption to jot down notes. In most cases I had repeat interviews with 
informants, often visiting them several times, and I would study the cassettes 
between the visits to prepare questions where further probing was necessary or 
where gaps were discovered. Some of the interviews were transcribed by a research 
assistant but I transcribed most of them myself and this enabled me to have an in-
depth understanding of the materials before analysing them. The interview method 
was one of the most widely used in this research. The interviewees were informed 
about my research aims and agreed to be interviewed on that basis. They were 
offered anonymity in view of the sensitive nature of the subject. 
 
1.10.3 Focus group discussions  
Focus groups are group meetings held to probe a topic on a panel basis. They tend to 
elicit consensual views rather than facts, but I used them effectively for bringing out 
contradictory views about occupation processes between groups of landless farm 
workers and peasant beneficiaries, for example. Ten focus group discussions were 
held in Nyabira and Mazowe areas. These mainly focused on the occupations of 
2000. The method was useful in gathering data especially where conflicts had 
occurred. I asked representatives of the conflicting groups to discuss on various 
selected topics in order to get representations and reactions from both sides on the 
nature of occupations, the approaches, grievances and current relationships.36 This 
method was very effective in opening windows of understanding on the nature of 
conflict and the development of relationships between occupiers and farm workers. 
Through the method a dialogue was started even where the two groups remained 
antagonistic to each other.37 Focus group discussions were also held with 
homogenous groups such as occupiers, members of the same clan, or War Veterans. 
At times I chose to hold focus group discussions with only women, in case where I 
had discovered through other means that gender sensitive issues were prominent.38 
 
                                                 
36 One such focus group discussion held at Obvious Farm (2006) had a group comprised of a 
farmer, a War Veteran, a peasant occupier and two farm workers. 
37 For example at Witchens Farm, farm workers and occupiers had reached a stage where they 
would not attend each others’ funerals although they were next door to each other. The focus 
group discussion revealed that the problem lay in the occupation process, after which the 
farm workers got nothing. When I probed during the focus group discussion I discovered 
that farm workers were bitter because they claimed their participation had been so crucial 
that it would not have been possible to occupy the farm without their help. Counter 
accusations from occupiers were that at first generally the farm workers resisted occupations 
but farm workers argued that the reason was they were not informed about what was going 
on and from the moment they did, they took part even more than the peasant occupiers 
themselves. I then began to understand that the position of farm workers in occupations was 
not as static as other people have tried to present. 
38 For example, I discovered that occupations around Nyabira business centre had a high 
participation of commercial sex workers. I therefore felt that the women would participate 
more freely in the absence of men. I made followed up the individuals to conduct in-depth 
interviews where need arose. 
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1.10.4 Content analysis 
I used this method to analyse various materials including photographs, war time 
political lectures and popular occupation period songs. I analysed some of the songs 
that were written and sung for the occupations.39 I analysed films made by both 
liberation movements and the Rhodesian government in compiling the history of the 
liberation struggle. Content analysis was also used to analyse various texts, including 
minutes of meetings, emails, letters and newspaper articles. 
 
1.10.5 Naturally occurring talk 
Land occupations were the most topical issue in Zimbabwe while they were taking 
place. People discussed them with emotion and attachment at any time. This became 
a very rich vein of research data. I listened out for people’s views in public transport, 
at weddings and funerals, in pubs and any gatherings. At times I provoked the 
discussion and let the debate take a natural course. This was especially so at funerals 
and weddings, where a mixture of people usually congregate, including War 
Veterans, peasants, professionals, political party activists, old men, women and 
youths. At times I would play the devil’s advocate and take an extreme position only 
to provoke reaction or to support the side that seemed overpowered. At other times I 
just listened humbly to the methodical discussions of old men. I would record notes 
of the discussions afterwards and or follow-up by interviewing people who had 
fascinating arguments about the issue. Such discussions in natural settings were very 
informative because they were not preset, and informants felt free to express 
opinions without fear or suspicion of the interview process. 
 
I also made use of business trips with farmers and War Veterans to discuss land 
occupations. This was effective indeed as I used business issues to break the ice and 
introduce topics for discussion. I tried by all means to let the discussion flow, and I 
often succeeded, and even found myself accepted for follow up discussions.40 
 
1.10.6 Participatory methods 
At times where I found the subject to be sensitive, I used participatory (PRA) 
techniques to lead into a focus group discussion, without triggering these 
sensitivities. One technique that proved very useful was ‘Retrospective Community 
Mapping’ (Nelson and Wright 1995, Sadomba 1996) a method which assists people to 
                                                 
39 An example of one popular song that was sung during the occupation period was this. ‘If 
you see a War Vet take the land (Ukaona War Veteran richitora minda) (x2)/ This is the 
resolution we made (Ndicho chibvumirano chatakaita) We the War Vets (Isu maWar Vet)/ If you 
see parents (i.e. peasants/farm workers) take the farms/ This was the resolution we made’ 
The song had one voice leading and a sudden resounding repetition of the refrain from the 
crowd. It was simple to sing, since it required only repetition of the first voice, but the 
repetition hammered out a message that a decision to occupy land was based on a popular 
resolution. People sung it over and over again during occupations. Some of the songs sung 
were from the war time period but these were carefully selected to fit the occasion of 
occupation (see p. 97). 
40 I had one such trip with a dispossessed farmer who had established a beef consortium with 
others. I had recently been dispossessed of a farm that I had bought and I was selling the 
cattle to downsize operations. We both had a common grievance about the land reform, and 
interest in beef production, so the discussion flowed naturally. However, this discussion also 
enabled both of us to examine weaknesses of the land reform from our own experiences. 
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revisit historical events through a mapping exercise.41 I used this extensively in 
Nyabira, to augment a quantitative survey data collected through the African 
Institute for Agrarian Studies. In many cases I would have failed to get any 
information if this method had not been used. 
 
 
1.11 The study area 
To study the early (1998-9) and later (2000-4) occupations I was influenced by a 
number of factors. There was a need to choose a manageable case study area. I 
wanted an area I was familiar with, and where I could become actively involved in 
land for resettlement. This turned out to be Mazowe and Matepatepa areas. I first 
knew Mazowe and its surrounding areas in early 1978 when it was my area of 
operational deployment. Mazowe Detachment covered a much bigger area than 
Mazowe administrative district. That remained my official area of operation before I 
was attached to the whole sector of Chaminuka and later the Province of Tete.42 After 
the end of the war I was again deployed in Mazowe to carry out party political work, 
involving forming structures at local levels. When I was working in the Ministry of 
Local Government, leading the provincial Promotion and Training section, I was 
deployed in Mashonaland Province, and Mazowe was one of the districts under my 
supervision. With this background I chose Mazowe for my study area. See Figure 2.1. 
 
The study area for examining the occupations of 2000-4 covers three 
administrative districts (Bindura, Mazowe and Zvimba districts) falling in two 
provinces (Mashonaland West and Central). The study particularly focuses on 
                                                 
41
 I invented this method, working in a Water and Sanitation project under UNICEF. The 
method goes through the following steps: Step 1. Establish a baseline date and intervals of 
maps: maps were easily developed for each decade with 1920 being the base year. Step 2. 
Divide the community into mapping age groups: relevant groups are formed for each 
mapping period. Step 3. Drawing of maps Step 4. Presentation of maps: each group present 
their map. Step 5. Description of socio-economic and cultural conditions: discuss 
demographic changes and associated impacts, various institutions for health, education, 
bringing up children, family, marriage; their cardinal philosophy of life and belief patterns 
including religion, social cohesion; economic activities, access to means of production during 
their period such as land and finished commodities. Step 6. Presentation of life patterns for 
the period: community describes different patterns of life for each mapping period. Step 7. 
Focus group discussions: Community members ask questions, debate and discuss freely 
(Sadomba 1996). At Machirori where it was rumoured that occupiers were people who had 
not been accommodated in the villagisation programme of President Mugabe’s Kutama 
village because (so the rumour went) they were not close relatives I used retrospective 
community mapping to gather information on how these people moved to Machirori in 1999. 
Settlers presented maps to illustrate changes that caused them to go and occupy adjacent 
farms in 1999. Through mapping they recounted how they were mobilised by War Veterans 
from Murombedzi. The rumour was neither refuted nor confirmed and I did not probe 
because of the sensitivity of the issue, but the story of their occupation from Kutama came 
out; they had initially refused to talk to me at all. 
 
42 The lowest operational area was a detachment that covered about three administrative 
districts. A sector was comprised of five or more detachments and was the size of present 
administrative provinces. Chaminuka sector covered Mashonaland Central Province. There 
were only three provinces to cover the whole country according to ZANLA strategy. These 
were Tete, Manica and Gaza Provinces. 
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Mazowe District and the adjacent areas of Matepatepa in Bindura (east of Mazowe) 
and Nyabira in Zvimba (west of Mazowe). War Veterans criss-crossed districts and 
provinces as they led occupations of farms. Harare is also included as a study area, 
although urban occupations are not a subject of this study. However, War Veterans 
from Harare played a vital role in the land occupations from 1998, which became a 
model for the 2000 occupations in parts of the study area. 
The study area is agriculturally prominent, lying in natural region IIa. Close to 
Harare, the national capital, it is considered part of the bread basket of the country. It 
contains four peri-urban areas: Mvurwi, Concession, Nyabira and Glendale and the 
provincial town of Bindura. The one area of communal land, Chiweshe, is 
surrounded by former White owned commercial farms. With proximity to the capital 
and urban centres, the area is readily accessible to politicians, urbanised War 
Veterans, urban working class and professionals. This enriches the study, by 
bringing into the picture a full range of competing interests over land occupation. 
 
The case for Goromonzi and Svosve was different. I chose the two by default. 
When I started interviewing War Veterans on the occupations of Nyabira they told 
me that they had started occupying land in 1998 at Goromonzi. Upon probing I 
realised that a full study had to be done of these early occupations, but they had 
occurred elsewhere, in Goromonzi and Svosve in Mashonaland East Province. I 
decided to select these two areas for study. The intensity of this second study was not 
comparable to work I undertook on the 2000 occupations but was enough to 
understand continuities and discontinuities between the earlier and later 
occupations. 
 
 
1.12 Structure of the thesis 
I will conclude this introduction to the thesis with a short outline of the contents. As 
apparent, Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to and short exposition of the 
argument of the thesis, highlighting the main issues of the research. Chapter 2 deals 
with the history of land and evolution of the War Veterans’ movement, via a 
reconstruction the liberation war. Chapter 3 analyses the political turning point for 
the land issue in Zimbabwe and discusses how and when contradictions in the 
liberation movement sharpened, leading to the alliance of War Veterans with a 
broader social movement for land redistribution. Chapter 4 offers an account of early 
occupations led by War Veterans in Svosve and Goromonzi in 1998. Chapter 5 
provides a participant observation based account and analysis of the later 
occupations in Mazowe, Matepatepa and Nyabira (2000). Chapter 6 critically assesses 
directions of agrarian technology in the dynamic changes. Chapter 7 considers the 
institutional and political arrangements of the land movement, and draws some 
general conclusions. 
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Figure 1.2 The study area: Matepatepa, Mazowe and Nyabira in relation to 
Zimbabwe 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE ROOTS OF THE WAR VETERANS’ MOVEMENT: A 
HISTORY OF THE GUERRILLA STRUGGLE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis identifies four distinct currents within the guerrilla movement that 
brought about Zimbabwean independence. The interests, ideologies, strategies and 
tactics associated with these four currents help explain some of the intricacies 
associated with the land movement, when it finally burst forth in the late 1990s. In 
other words, the broad liberation movement had imbedded within it sets of 
conflicting interests, and alliances of forces that help explain not only the actions of 
the movement, but also some of the threats with which it struggled. 
 
In the present chapter I will examine the origins of the War Veterans’ movement 
and how the land issue was articulated in the history of that movement. The War 
Veterans’ movement is but one part of the broader liberation movement, as 
explained in more detail elsewhere: 
… the social movement that dislodged colonial rule in Zimbabwe (liberation movement) 
was an aggregate of a number of organised struggles, being smaller social movements. As 
such the liberation movement [was] not a homogeneous entity but [it] comprised of 
multifarious movements, viz. peasant land movement, nationalist movement, guerrilla 
movement and farm worker movement. Within the broad liberation movement [were] 
pushing and pulling movements and this explains the forces in Zimbabwe’s land 
movement [today]. (Sadomba 2007: 3)  
 
To understand the influences at work in the land movement, therefore, a detailed 
analysis of the evolution of the guerrilla movement is suggested. This is critical in 
two ways. Firstly the guerrilla movement dominated the other movements identified 
in the above quotation, and became synonymous with the liberation movement itself 
during the struggle for independence. Because of this dominance, any analysis of its 
development will reflect considerable light on the emergence of the land movement 
itself. Secondly, an examination of the evolution and development of the guerrilla 
movement will help us to understand the War Veterans’ movement, which is a direct 
post independence outcome. Without historical analysis of the origins of the War 
Veterans’ movement it is difficult to comprehend its later internal conflicts and 
relationships with the nationalist movement, the peasant land movement, and the 
farm workers, as well as linkages with opposition parties and civil society. 
 
This chapter, in illustrating important developments in the liberation struggle, fills 
a void that has caused difficulties or incomprehension in explaining the behaviour of 
War Veterans in the post independence period, particularly during the occupations. 
Although Moyo (2001; 2005) alludes to the relationship between the land issue, the 
liberation movement and the War Veterans he does not offer detailed analysis to 
illustrate the development of these relationships. The chapter is also important in 
understanding the limitations of nationalist politics. These limitations have proven to 
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be major influence over the outcome of the land occupations, as in the general 
politics of the liberation movement hitherto. 
 
Often War Veterans are considered homogenous, yet they comprise different 
elements, from various social backgrounds, and above all, different war time 
exposure and experiences. One of the most important differentiating factors among 
War Veterans is the different environments through which they passed at various 
stages in the armed struggle. The following section focuses on the three main phases 
of the liberation struggle and analyses influential factors that shaped War Veterans 
differentially. 
 
The origins of the War Veterans’ movement are located in the early 1960s, as the 
culmination point of the civil nationalist struggle. When both Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) were 
banned in 1962 and 1964, respectively, they formed underground organisations and 
recruited for the war youth exiled in Zambia. Armies were formed to mount armed 
struggle to dislodge the colonial government. The cadres recruited into these armies 
became the veterans of the liberation war at Independence in 1980. 
 
The War Veterans’ movement went through three major phases, periodised as 
follows: 1963-75 (Chitepo period, the first phase), coined after veteran nationalist 
politician and leader of ZANU’s revolutionary council operating in exile, 1975-7 
(Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) period) and from 1977 to date (the Mugabe era).43 
Each phase is distinguished by the nature and characteristics of leadership, methods 
of recruitment, quality of recruits, politico-ideological thrust and level of military 
offensive. A fully elaborated phase model, to explain the complex patterns of the 
liberation war, has not so far been developed. The model below is intended to 
stimulate debate towards a systematic analysis of the development of the war, to 
help sustain comparisons, analyses and syntheses. In the following sections three 
factors will be examined in order to understand the phases through which the cadres 
later forming War Veterans’ movement passed. 
 
 
2.2 The Chitepo phase 
Here, I term the initial phase of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle the Chitepo phase, 
because of the central leadership role of Herbert Tapfumaneyi Chitepo from 1963 to 
1975. He was the first Black advocate in Zimbabwe, who spent most of his time 
defending nationalists in the courts and fighting racial discrimination before passing 
into self-exile in 1962. He left his profession (as Tanganyika’s first African Director of 
Public Prosecutions) to lead the war and take over the external administration of 
ZANU, in 1966. He then became the first and only Chairman of the Dare 
reChimurenga (the highest political organ, Revolutionary Council, which stirred the 
                                                 
43 It is important to note that the Mugabe phase extended from the war period into the post 
independence era and continues today (2007). This means that the period spans an entire 
generation in Zimbabwe’s politics, making it the longest phase since nationalist politics began 
in the late 1950s. There is little doubt that the Mugabe era has had a major if not the greatest 
impact on the War Veterans’ movement, and therefore it is important to understand how this 
period helped shape the context within which the War Veterans rose to leadership in the land 
movement. 
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liberation war on the part of ZANU) from 1969 until his death in 1975. There were 
also notable people in ZAPU who made similar sacrifices, showing the same level of 
commitment. James Chikerema and J.Z. Moyo are two names very well identified 
with this period, for example. However, Chitepo’s contribution in developing the 
liberation struggle was particularly notable.44 
 
It was under Chitepo’s leadership that a military alliance was forged with the 
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) to allow guerrilla infiltration of 
Zimbabwe through Mozambique’s Tete Province - an offer first made to 
ZAPU/ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army), but at the time rejected.45 
The contacts between ZANU and FRELIMO had started in 1968, and in 1970 
FRELIMO: 
agreed to allow Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) guerrillas and 
armaments … to pass through Tete into north-eastern Rhodesia … then ZIPRA and not 
ZANLA would have had Mozambique as its vital rear base and the nature and outcome 
of the struggle for Zimbabwe might have been very different. (Flower 1987: 115-19)46  
 
Chitepo decisively transformed the struggle into a guerrilla war based on rural 
mobilisation from 1971, and this strategy determined the success of the liberation 
struggle: ‘Military confrontation was to become a thing of the past and in its place 
came a much more difficult problem – the new ZANLA tactic of mobilising the 
masses.’(Flower 1987: 121) 
 
This element became decisive military strategy, and formed the basis of the war 
until the ceasefire in 1979. This mobilisation of the masses had wide implications, in 
that the guerrilla war enabled deep and widespread contact between peasants, farm 
workers and fighters. Related to this, it also allowed long and wide coverage in 
interactions between the guerrillas and peasants, owing to the war’s protracted 
nature. Mobilisation, propaganda or intimidation (whatever may have been the case) 
lasted longer than the war itself, hardening into community memory and history. As 
will be seen in Chapters three and four, this constituted a body of cultural capital 
into which the War Veterans were able to tap during the subsequent mobilisation for 
land occupations. 
 
The early phase of the war was characterised by the dominance exercised by a 
number of progressive nationalists (some of whom might be considered true 
                                                 
44 Of particular importance was Chitepo’s shift to a guerrilla war after a reassessment of the 
period between 1969 and 1972. In 1970 James Chikerema had already announced a change in 
ZIPRA’s tactics and that both conventional and guerrilla methods of warfare should be 
considered (Flower 1987: 110, Martin and Johnson 1981: 13). 
45 ZAPU was one of the seven ‘authentics’ – Soviet supported African liberation Movements 
determined by invitation and participation in the 1969 Khartoum conference – and was 
therefore a naturally of Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). This was the 
basis for giving it first offer (Martin and Johnson 1981: 14). This also explains the Soviet 
influence in ZAPU and ZIPRA, both militarily and ideologically. Military strategy, training 
and hardware were based on Soviet conventional warfare. Ideologically had a high dosage of 
Marxism-Leninism with abundant literature. Most of the books in Wampoa library were 
obtained from ZIPRA. ZANU and ZANLA were inclined to the Chinese and were also 
influenced more by Mao-tse Tung thought. ZANLA military strategy of guerrilla warfare was 
a result of this influence as was less emphasis on Marxism-Leninism, ideologically. 
46 See also Martin and Johnson 1987: 14-20. 
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revolutionaries, in terms of commitment to socialist modernisation who took control 
of the liberation struggle. They recruited youths, organised them for military 
training, and formulated military strategies and tactics, despite lack of formal 
military training themselves. The period began with poor organisation and defective 
strategies. Being the initial phase in building a war machine, it can be considered 
immature, lacking in focus, and vulnerable to major setbacks (Martin and Johnson 
1981).47 
 
Transformation of the war into a guerrilla movement had two key consequences. 
Social mobilisation by the guerrillas led to the development of new relationships 
between cadres and peasants. This relationship especially involved a mutual 
engagement in the African spiritual world, an area that White Rhodesians could 
neither fully comprehend nor emulate, as Flower, Head of the Rhodesian Central 
Intelligence Organisation, admitted: 
ZANLA had moved ahead of us in the spirit world by invoking the national spirit of 
‘Chaminuka’ (the greatest Shona prophet at the time of the First Chimurenga [anti-
colonial war] in the 1890s) and by taking the spirit medium of Nehanda … [Rhodesian 
Forces] called [it] ‘mumbo jumbo of witchcraft’… [failing] to appreciate the significance 
of the simple fact that the war had now taken us into the heart of the former 
Munhumutapa empire, the spiritual home of the Shona peoples and their allies across the 
border in Mozambique. (Flower 1987: 115-16) 
 
Flower’s analysis is insightful. Lan (1985) devotes a full anthropological study to 
the role of Shona religion in the guerrilla war, entitled Guns and Rain: guerrillas and 
spirit mediums in Zimbabwe. Invoking spirits was the beginning of a long-term 
relationship between the rural masses and the fighters. African agro-ecological 
religion played a pivotal role from this time onwards among Shona-speaking fighters 
and farmers. The guerrilla movement drew on this belief system and its practices to 
develop an effective link between themselves and rural civilian populations capable 
of winning the war: ‘From a winning position between 1964 and 1972, Rhodesian 
Forces were entering the stage of the ‘no win’ war, which lasted from December 1972 
to 1976; after that, they were fighting a losing war.’(Flower 1987: 119) 
 
The Chitepo phase also witnessed structural changes redefining the relationship 
between the fighters and the nationalists. In ZANU, there was separation of powers 
and roles in 1973, when Tongogara was elected to the Dare, and chaired the High 
Command, a group containing no civilians. Different from ZAPU, this was important 
for military development, even if military training remained deficient during this 
stage.48 
                                                 
47 At times there were signs of adventurism and disregard for human life by the nationalists 
(Martin and Johnson 1981: 71). A fighter, S. (Interviews 2004), trained in Ghana, claimed that 
they were sent to the front without weapons, despite the fact they were sure that one of the 
trainees in their group had defected and sold them out to the Rhodesians. They were all 
caught crossing the Zambezi without the slightest of resistance and jailed. Other incidents of 
this kind occurred in the Chinhoyi battle of 1966, and the Wankie battle, involving ANC and 
ZIPRA cadres at a later date. 
48 The High Command, ZANLA’s highest military organ, did not know ‘… the difference 
between military strategies and tactics … [or] the relationship between something of operational 
significance, tactical significance or tactical-strategic significance … There was no co-ordination: it 
was fighting, defeating enemy tactics, destroying …’ (Machingura’s interview, in Moore 1995: 79). 
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Political education of the fighters during the Chitepo period was short, shallow 
and unfocused (and this was even more so for rural civilians) despite the fact that, 
through his leadership, Chitepo introduced a more fundamental ideological slant, 
seeking to transform ZANU’s ideology (such as it was) by adopting Marxism-
Leninism, e.g. through the document known as Mwenje 249 (in 1973), the second 
edition of Mwenje 1 (in 1973).50  
 
Earlier, the Dare had specifically prohibited the learning of Marxism by the mass 
of the guerrillas. According to Moore:  
In November 1971 a group of six was allowed to hold their first ‘seminar’ on Lenin’s -
State and Revolution. Until February 1972, the group studied Marx, Engels and Lenin 
every day. They made constant requests to include the rest of the camp members in their 
lessons, but were told that the time was not right and to ‘keep to Mwenje 1’.51 At that 
time ZANU’s chief of operations visited the camp and ordered the lessons to be stopped: 
the fear of intellectuals had spread to ZANU as well as ZAPU.52 (Moore 1990: 266) 
 
Political education during the Chitepo phase was in fact limited to shallow 
nationalist debate, and only a select few guerrillas were exposed to deeper 
ideological training in Marxism-Leninism. Political education for the rank-and-file 
cadres was limited to the very basics – memorising some of Mao’s thoughts (Moore 
1990: 318). Both some nationalists in the Dare reChimurenga, and some guerrilla 
fighters themselves, particularly the illiterate, were uncomfortable learning the 
revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism, as observed by Fay Chung: 
The end result was that a dominant and homogeneous group of guerrilla fighters 
emerged, later to be known as the ‘veterans’. Poorly educated and drawn mainly from the 
Karanga people, who had settled in Mumbwa53, they developed a pride in their military 
vocation with a marked disdain for education and a distrust of the educated.54(Bhebhe 
and Ranger 1995: 9-10) 
 
This means that within the ranks of guerrillas and nationalist leaders there were 
two camps with differing ideological visions at this early stage. Amongst nationalists 
forming the Dare reChimurenga there were those who subscribed to Marxist-
Leninist ideology like Herbert Chitepo himself, Matuku Hamadziripi and others. 
Although these were jailed in Zambia they are the ones who attempted to overthrow 
the Mugabe faction in 1977 but they, like ZIPA failed and were also jailed by 
FRELIMO. Within the guerrillas there also two opposing forces mainly distinguished 
by differential educational levels, and background. Uneducated peasant recruits who 
numerically dominated the liberation struggle this time formed one camp and the 
educated recruits formed another. The later struggled to acquire knowledge of 
                                                 
49 Mwenje is Shona word meaning ‘torch lighting flame’. 
50 ZANU Political Programme, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), 27 November 
1973.  
51 Mwenje 1 was based on the speech by Ndabaningi Sithole at the first congress of ZANU, in 
Gweru in 1963. 
52 This reflects ideological conflicts, considering that Chitepo wrote Mwenje 2 to transform the 
movement into a Marxist organisation and the Chief of Operations stopped the study of 
Marxism. 
53 Mumbwa is in Zambia’s capital, Lusaka. 
54 Quoted in Bhebhe and Ranger (eds) 1995: 9-10. The full was not published. 
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Marxism-Leninism by forming a study group. Boosted by a platoon of defectors from 
ZIPRA, the ZANLA group of cadres later became the leaders of ZIPA when the High 
Command was incarcerated in Zambia. At that time they consolidated their 
ideological position by establishing Wampoa Political Academy to spread the views 
of Marxism-Leninism. These two strands continued throughout the armed struggle, 
resulting in deep fissures manifest in conflicts culminating in attempted purgation 
and negation of one force by the other (Bhebhe and Ranger 1995) 
 
The main recruitment method of fighters during the Chitepo phase was 
conscription (enforced induction). Zambian residents of Zimbabwean nationality 
supplied the war with some of its manpower: ‘The Zimbabwean peasant families in 
Mumbwa formed the natural and easily available source of conscripts. Peasant 
youths, many of them poorly educated or even illiterate, were among the first to 
train as guerrillas.’ (Bhebhe and Ranger 1995: 9-10) 
 
The uneducated peasant recruits, joining at these early periods, had a great impact 
on the war as it unfolded. Intellectual capacity shrank55 relative to the overall size of 
a growing guerrilla force (Moore 1990). Nor was effective use made of the educated 
recruits; the manner of deploying them (in ideological instruction) then and 
throughout the liberation war was ineffective. As a result political education was 
limited to basic explanations of some nationalist grievances that caused the war and 
the political history of the party. There was no focus on what systems might replace 
colonial institutions and ideology. At times ‘education’ was little more than a recital 
of Mao’s red book of quotations. Low levels of basic education and general resistance 
to intellectual engagement were negative conditions to of complex political lectures 
concerning the methods and values of scientific socialism. 
 
Later recruits were inducted into the force from the north-eastern front, a region 
that had suffered high levels of governmental neglect under the White regime, and 
therefore had a particularly high level of illiteracy. Recruits from Mt. Darwin, 
Centenary, Rushinga, Muzarabani, Mutoko and Guruve were of a distinctly lower 
level of educational attainment than those who came (later) from Manicaland, 
Masvingo and Matebeleland - areas which were generally favoured by colonial 
government and the missionaries, who established many schools. The few educated 
guerrillas recruited in the Chitepo phase were often from other parts of Zimbabwe 
than the north-east although press ganging of St. Albert’s Mission school students in 
1973 boosted the numbers of north-eastern front recruits who were educated. This 
pattern of recruitment had a powerful bearing on ethnic related tensions throughout 
the liberation war. To some extent it still plays a role in current politics, and explains 
some of the intricacies of the land movement and the government fast track land 
reform program. These tensions manifest themselves in the current War Veterans’ 
movement by the formation of a splinter organisation, the Zimbabwe Liberators 
Platform (ZLP), by former ZIPA commanders. The ZLP has recruited mostly elite 
War Veterans with high social standing and has condemned the land occupations of 
                                                 
55 The informants of David Moore give accounts of how some of the recruits ran away after 
witnessing their counterparts tortured. One of them went and narrated his ordeal and that of 
others to Herbert Chitepo in Lusaka. During the ZIPA period many recruits ran away or 
attempted to run away from the torture by the illiterate Chitepo phase recruits (Personal 
observation, Nyadzonya 1975). Some of these recruits never came back and those that 
remained went into hibernation, pretending to be undedicated. 
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2000 and dissociated itself from them claiming that the rank and file are being used 
by Mugabe and Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).  
In sum, the Chitepo phase, geographically limited to recruitment of illiterate 
peasants, involved only shallow ideological training, owing to the lack of basic 
education of the recruited combatants. Although among the nationalists there were 
intellectuals with considerable potential for the kind of ideological education that 
might have served as a check on unbridled violence, these figures remained outside 
the harsh realities of guerrilla life. They continued living in urban environments 
(whether in the country or as exiles), apparently neither eager to become combatants 
nor prepared to make a paradigm shift in their somewhat narrow nationalist outlook. 
There was thus no scope to balance the rustic populism of the combatants or to keep 
the incipient elitism of the nationalists in check, through mutual exposure to the 
realities of the venture on which they had engaged. Richards (1996) and Peters (2006) 
make similar points about the diaspora student intellectuals who stirred the pot of 
rural rebellion in Sierra Leone, and then left the rough-and-ready cadres of the 
Revolutionary United Front to their fate. 
 
In the Zimbabwe case, however, lessons were learnt from experiences associated 
with the transformation of the war to a guerrilla movement from the early 1970s, 
coinciding with FRELIMO’s offer of Tete Province. Developments within this period 
had a bearing on the subsequent political thinking of some nationalists, who began to 
reflect on a perceived need to remove the system of capitalism, once decolonisation 
of the country had taken place (Interview with Dzinashe Machingura October 
2007).56 
 
The structure of the liberation movement during this period is distinct, in that 
both ZAPU’s National Executive and ZANU’s Dare reChimurenga were ad hoc 
arrangements to execute the armed struggle, rather than permanent political 
structures replacing those that had been formed at the inception of the two parties in 
the early 1960s. The two political parties still had structures inside Zimbabwe 
superior to those among the exiles entering the country as an armed movement. The 
roles played by the exiled nationalists in the armed struggle and their reluctance to 
undergo military training, resulted in a noticeable political and ideological gap 
between themselves and the fighters. Because they were not ‘in the bush’ the 
nationalists failed to keep up with ideological developments in the movement 
shaped by the contingencies of war. Political education had never been deep, and the 
nationalists feared to allow the fighters to deepen their political exposure. However, 
the Chitepo phase laid the foundation for a successful guerrilla war, built in part, as 
we have seen, from the absorption by (or activation within) the fighters of religious 
notions widespread among the local population. On to this underlay of local ideas 
the guerrilla leadership then successfully grafted a variant of Marxism-Leninism. 
 
It was within this space that a potent mix of ideas about ancestral land and 
modernist collectivisation emerged and that the land movement and the guerrilla 
movement began to take mutual shape. Peasant guerrillas dominating the struggle 
                                                 
56 Machingura suggested that nationalists who had undergone this ideological shift, such as 
Chitepo himself, and JJZ Moyo in ZAPU, became the targets of imperialists, and this 
accounted for their elimination even before Zimbabwe’s independence. Machingura believes 
these external elements consciously sought a set of more moderate leaders than the war-
hardened nationalists-turned-socialists. 
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had as their main political education course an analysis of key national grievances, of 
which the appropriation of the land by Whites made most sense to the different 
parties. War (as Richards 2007 has argued, drawing on Durkheim) is a kind of ritual 
engagement that heightens the emotions and fixes new collective representations. 
Land was now forged as a durable collective representation of what it was that the 
cadres were fighting for; the mentality of the land movement, as led and revived by 
War Veterans was beginning to take shape in the crucible of guerrilla struggle. 
 
Transition of the Chitepo phase to ZIPA was marked by a series of rapid military 
and political events that affected particularly ZANLA but had a bearing on its 
relationship with ZIPRA. First in 1974 ZANLA cadres who were in the war zone led 
by Badza and Nhari mutinied against the High Command, accusing them of 
pursuing luxurious life at the expense of the war. This resulted into deaths of more 
than 40 people who sympathised with the High Command members. The rebellion 
was however foiled by forces loyal to Tongogara led by Dzinashe Machingura. 
Dzinashe Machingura a ZIPA leader57 (1978, quoted in Moore 1995), captures the 
weaknesses of this organisational relationship. The rebels were court marshalled and 
executed, introducing a mode of punishment that would later affect the liberation 
movement (Martin and Johnson 1981). However, in the eyes of analysts, the crushing 
of the Nhari/Badza rebellion took an ethnic turn to settle leadership scores between 
the Manyika and Karanga groups.58 
 
Second, was a car bomb assassination of Chitepo himself. Third was the arrest of 
the High Command members of ZANLA by the Zambian government sparking 
diplomatic tension and grinding ZANLA military offensive to a halt (Mgagao 
Declaration 1975). Fourth, and seemingly unrelated, Mozambique gained 
independence from Portugal in June 1975, opening floodgates to the eastern front 
recruits. Fifth, political talks were held between nationalists and the Smith Regime at 
Victoria Falls. This resulted in the release of some of the detained nationalist leaders 
who were languishing in Rhodesian detention camps. 
 
Sixth, was the crossing into Mozambique of Robert Mugabe and Edgar Tekere, 
senior ZANU nationalists. Seventh, was the drafting and presentation of Mgagao 
Declaration by ZANLA fighters, pushing nationalist politicians asunder and kick-
starting the war under the command of ZIPRA and ZANLA. The new united force 
that officially had no political allegiance to either ZANU or ZAPU was called 
Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA). The following section discusses the details of this 
period. 
                                                 
57 A central figure in the formation and development of ZIPA in 1975, becoming ZIPA’s de 
facto Political Commissar. 
58 Although this could be considered false ethnic consciousness, in that the cadres the ethnic 
grouping was based on colonial construction, there were internal conflicts based Rhodesian 
government and missionary ethnic classification. During the Chitepo phase the 
ZANLA/ZANU (in exile) leadership was dominated by cadres from Manicaland who 
included Herbert Chitepo himself, Noel Mukono (who played a key role in forging the 
alliance between FRELIMO and ZANLA), William Ndangana, Enerst Kadungure, John 
Mataure etc. Another rival ‘ethnic’ group was the Karanga that was comprised of General 
Tongogara and others. The Nhari Badza rebellion provided an opportunity to ensnare the 
Manyika leadership who were not part of the rebellion. These were the likes of senior 
commanders like Noel Mukono. Chitepo’s death in March 1975 is seen as continuation of this 
purging of the Manyika leaders by the Karanga. 
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2.3 The ZIPA period 
The Zimbabwe People’s Army was comprised of military cadres from both ZAPU 
and ZANU. Internal developments within the forces, coupled with external force 
from frontline states for unity of the two guerrilla armies in order to avoid the rivalry 
like the one then experienced in Angola, caused the two armies to unite. ZIPA High 
Command was comprised of 16 commanders equally divided between ZANLA and 
ZIPRA. The ZIPA period, from April 1975 to January 1977, was the shortest phase of 
the liberation struggle, although its impact was far-reaching, and continues to 
influence Zimbabwean politics even today (Moore 1990). The ZIPA phase had a 
specific organisational character, in that, different from the other two phases, 
combatants had an opportunity to lead on both the political and the military fronts. 
Nationalists – remote from operations - had limited control over the guerrilla forces, 
and at times there was little more than indirect consultation of ZAPU leaders by 
ZIPRA on some decisions.59 Otherwise, they were relegated to the margins. 
 
The ZIPA phase followed the détente exercise and the death of Chitepo on 18 
March 1975. Leaders of ZANU and ZANLA (Dare and High Command) were 
incarcerated by the Zambian state, allegedly for killing Chitepo in an ethnic feud 
according to findings of a Commission of Enquiry into Chitepo’s death that was 
formed by the Zambian government. The war, more active on the ZANLA/ZANU 
flank than on the ZAPU/ZIPRA side, ground to a halt. There was no further training 
of recruits and therefore no reinforcement to the support those in the front. Supply of 
ammunition and other materiel halted. Only a few ZANLA commanders escaped the 
Zambian incarceration so reorganisation was required and new command structures 
were necessary, before the war could be started again. 
 
The death of Hebert Chitepo, and Independence of Mozambique from Portugal 
three months later in June 1975, were a double political and geographical coincidence 
that encouraged mass exodus of students from secondary schools, colleges, 
university and even primary schools, especially in the eastern Province of 
Manicaland, adjacent to Mozambique. Some of these young recruits were angered by 
the death of Chitepo and FRELIMO welcomed those who crossed the border 
resulting in the closure of many schools because they fell below minimum enrolment 
levels. The nature of recruitment during the ZIPA phase was captured by Fay Chung 
who described them as: 
… a new breed of leaders, young men and women in their teens and twenties who had 
joined the liberation struggle straight from secondary schools and universities. This 
younger group of military leaders had been influenced by the ideas of Marx and Lenin, 
and sincerely believed themselves to be participating in a revolution that would 
overthrow not only colonialism, but also the bourgeois capitalist form of government. 
This was quite a different objective from that of the old nationalists of the 1950s and 
1960s who had wanted African representation, but without major changes in the form of 
government. The young leaders were also a different breed from the militarists, the 
                                                 
59 Although it is claimed (Moore 1995) that the ZIPRA component of ZIPA reserved any 
decisions until they consulted their political superiors, in de facto terms the military committee 
was the decision making body. Military decisions were not per se subjected to scrutiny by 
politicians, and none was reversed by them. 
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‘veterans’, who believed in the supremacy of military might, but had little idea about the 
type of government they wanted after independence. (Chung 2006: 148) 
 
This changed statistical composition of the guerrillas with the educated being 
more numerous. The many thousands of more highly educated recruits flocking to 
Mozambique had no one to receive them, give them direction and inform them of 
any program. FRELIMO tried to help by giving these new cadres some sense of 
direction, but the new Mozambique regime had its own urgent priorities and was 
also pretty much in the dark about the now fragmented leadership of the war and its 
direction. Recruits formed their own command structure in order to have some sort 
of administration. Food was inadequate, as were medicines and clothing. Camps 
almost degenerated into chaos, with some recruits going back to Rhodesia and others 
attempting to walk to Tanzania in search of training. A few trained ZANLA 
combatants from Tanzania came to try and administer these (so-called) refugee 
camps. These trained guerrillas were necessarily Chitepo phase recruits, and many of 
them were illiterate. Tensions soon surfaced between the Chitepo and ZIPA phase 
recruits, manifest in a generation gap and educational differences. Bhebhe and 
Ranger conclude that: 
This dichotomy was to be reproduced on a much more massive scale within ZANLA from 
1973 onwards with a ‘flood of willing recruits’ into Mozambique, many of them 
secondary-school students, others ‘peasants’, youths and illiterate refugees. Later still, 
university students joined the recruits. These disparities added to the generational 
tensions60 within both guerrilla armies. (Bhebhe and Ranger 1995: 9) 
 
At this stage the leadership of the war was composed of nationalists, lacking 
military training, and thus the situation was different from FRELIMO, where leaders 
like Samora Machel were themselves experienced combatants. The functional 
distinction between ‘nationalists’ and ‘fighters’ was further underpinned by 
differential status, divergent experiences, and mental orientation as a result of war-
                                                 
60 To illustrate these tensions AG (Interview October 2007), a War Veteran who joined the war 
as a child soldier in 1975 and became a municipal security officer after the war, before going 
into the private sector, explained the generational and ethnic problems at Nyadzonya Camp 
(Mozambique) which held the largest number- and, according to him, the most educated and 
enlightened - recruits of the ZIPA period. Many of the recruits at Nyadzonya were abused, 
tortured and ill-treated, particularly the young girl school leavers. The Chitepo period 
recruits, most of whom came from the north-eastern front, accused the new recruits of joining 
the war for sex because the later arrivals were preferred (by those who abused them!) over 
the former. The tension developed to such high levels that the camp commanders - including 
Gutura, Morrison Nyathi and Saudi-, were imprisoned and then demoted after an open 
‘review meeting’ where one of the girls is reported to have said, ‘These people (Chitepo period 
recruits) have a habit of saying to us, “Why did you come to war? Even if you had not come we were 
capable of liberating the country without you.” Do they think that Zimbabwe is their own country 
exclusively?’ The meeting led to a change of administration, and Chitepo period recruits were 
replaced by better educated cadres, who helped introduce a new quality and set of values 
into ZIPA. For this punishment Nyathi later defected to the join the RSFs, and returned to 
attack the camp, thereby being responsible for the deaths of about 1800 unarmed recruits. 
Gutura was at the forefront in dealing with ZIPA cadres at the beginning of Mugabe phase in 
1976, and was reinstated as a member of the General Staff in reward for his later performance. 
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time experiences. Dzinashe Machingura (1978), a ZIPA leader61, captures the 
weaknesses of this organisational relationship: 
… though the fighting forces are under the political leadership and influence of the 
nationalist leadership, ideologically the fighting forces pursue a line opposed to that of the 
leadership. In the course of time, this ideological outlook develops to the point of 
influencing the organisation and political views of the fighting forces. This sets the 
fighting forces in a collision course with the petty bourgeois nationalist leadership … 
eventually develop[ing] to become the hotbed of tension within the nationalist 
organisation. (Moore 1995: 84-5) 
 
Dzinashe Machingura is here underlining some of the fundamental contradictions 
within the liberation movement, in that (as in so much of sub-Saharan Africa) the 
nationalist leaders were mercantilist or professional in orientation, and unexposed to 
the kinds of military conditions or political training that might have narrowed the 
gap between them and the combatants. As we shall see later in the thesis these 
contradictions figure strongly in the root causes of the tensions inhabiting the broad 
liberation movement, later inherited by the land occupation movement. They help 
explain an important plane of cleavage between War Veterans and the nationalists, 
evident in the failure of political factions within the ruling ZANU-PF party to unite 
around issues of peasant justice or agrarian development in the post independence 
period. 
 
The Mgagao cadres62 wrote a Declaration that they submitted to Hashim Mbita, 
Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Liberation63 committee and 
then to others, including the group of supportive African countries known as the 
front line states. The Mgagao Declaration proposed unity between ZIPRA and 
ZANLA. Out of thus suggestion a military committee was formed comprising eight 
ZIPRA and eight ZANLA commanders. The rapprochement of ZIPRA and ZANLA 
boosted military aid in he form of supplies from foreign allies, especially to the near-
starving, Chinese backed, ZANLA forces.  
 
The Mgagao Declaration has not yet been thoroughly analysed in terms of its 
contribution to the debate about nation building and national ethos. In its first 
paragraph it talks about ‘unswerving and unequivocal commitment to the liberation 
of Zimbabwe through arduous armed struggle… condemn[ing] any moves to 
continue talks with the Smith regime in whatever form’. The second paragraph is an 
evaluation of various ways in which unity can be categorised, namely: Revolutionary 
Unity, Counter Revolutionary Unity and Reactionary Unity. The fighters stood for 
revolutionary unity, defined as the unity of committed revolutionaries that enriches 
and drives forward the revolution. This became the basis for the formation of ZIPA, 
representing the unity of the two guerrilla armies, ZIPRA and ZANLA. It is 
important to note that only at this point did ZANLA and ZIPRA formally unite, a 
                                                 
61 A central figure in the formation and development of ZIPA in 1975, becoming ZIPA’s de 
facto Political Commissar. 
62 Mgagao was a training Camp in Tanzania where many liberation movement of Southern 
Africa were accommodated. Drafters of the declaration were the intellectual group of cadres 
some of whom then became members of the ZIPA High Command (Interview with Dzinashe 
Machingura 2007). 
63 Dzinashe Machingura (2 February 2006), critiquing Fay Chung’s publication Reliving the 
Second Chimurenga as discussant at the book launch at Book Café, Harare. 
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move that could – had it lasted - have pre-empted the post independence conflicts 
between the two armies, and prevented the Gukurahundi (the ethnic eliminations of 
the post independence period). 
 
With these principles in mind, these combatant ‘organic intellectuals’ then 
evaluated individuals and political organisations (e.g. the Zimbabwe Liberation 
Council),64 condemning three nationalist leaders (Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Reverend 
Ndabaningi Sithole, James Chikerema). It also went on to ‘condemn and completely 
dissociate ourselves from the Nkomo faction of the African National Congress (ANC) 
[because] holding his congress in Salisbury is clearly a reactionary move…’. 
Alongside this condemnation (paragraph 4) the fighters expressed sympathy for 
Robert Mugabe ‘for defying the rigours of guerrilla life’ and chose him to be the 
‘middle man’65 (i.e. power broker) when dealing with the nationalists. This provided 
for Mugabe’s ascent to power, offering him a strategic position from which to control 
the levers of armed struggle. Paragraph six covered diplomatic conflict with Zambia, 
with the fighters alleging that the Zambian state killed ZANLA combatants, and 
going on to claim that ‘the Zambian action has generated hostilities between itself 
and the Zimbabwe Freedom Fighters.’ The document concludes in paragraph seven 
with a bold and resolute stance. The fighters state that ‘If the OAU, the Tanzania and 
Mozambique governments cannot do anything to support the Armed Struggle in 
Zimbabwe, we shall start with throwing stones … If we cannot live as free men, we 
rather choose to die as FREE MEN’.66 
 
The Mgagao Declaration is important in providing documentary evidence of a 
key, shaping moment in the independence struggle, defining the basic tenets for 
inclusion or exclusion of actors in the liberation movement. The Mgagao fighters 
asserted who, among Zimbabwe’s Black populace qualified to be part of the 
liberation movement. Nationalist commitment to the revolution was openly put into 
question, with the implication that nationalists had to transform into revolutionaries 
according to the standards and values of the Mgagao Declaration. Never before had 
such standards been proposed, and at least up to that point, no one had been 
excluded from the liberation movement. The Mgagao Declaration attempted to 
separate sheep from goats, as it were. As we shall see later, standing in the liberation 
movement (according to Mgagao standards) is still an issue of concern up to today, 
and remains a basis for determining alliances between the liberation movement 
factions and other forces. In keeping with the declaration’s sectarian tone, some War 
Veterans continue to judge that the ethos, standards and values of Mgagao were 
negated by the Mugabe period, and as we shall see this continues to act as a 
touchstone for conflicting values and ideologies. The layering and partitioning of 
experience in the guerrilla war underpins persistent strife between the cadres and 
nationalists to the present. 
 
Another important aspect of the Mgagao document was that it helped to challenge 
the myth of the omnipotence of the (civil) leaders of the liberation movement in 
                                                 
64 It had been formed by Ndabaningi Sithole. 
65 However, Mugabe did not end up a ‘middleman’ and he used this phrase in the Mgagao 
Declaration as his pretext to seek control over the leadership of the guerrilla war. 
66 Such statements have been important in carving out cultural capital for the liberation 
movement, and we find it echoed in statements like ‘Zimbabwe will never be a colony again’, a 
cliché of the post 2000 land occupations. 
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Zimbabwe.67 These leaders now had to prove their commitment to the struggle by 
deeds over mere words. A precedent was set that fighters should not hesitate to 
denounce leaders who failed to meet ‘defined’ standards. Leaders had to be 
accountable to the group, and free from corruption. The Mgagao Declaration 
denounced leaders who were jumping from ‘capital to capital, raising funds which 
have never been put to the service of the revolution’. From this action onwards, 
nationalist leaders became much more vigilant about the mood of the fighters, and 
the need to control them, as we shall see. This became the basis for mistrust of the 
combatants, which in turn led (in the independence period) to ‘selective’ recruitment 
into the armed struggle of diaspora scholars and nationalist (Chung 1995, 
Tungamirai 1995), ‘economic disempowerment’ (Tapfumaneyi 1996), ‘social 
isolation’, ‘relegation’ and victimisation (Chitiyo 2000, Sadomba, F. 1999; 2004, 
Sadomba, F. and Dzinetsa 2004) of War Veterans. 
 
The Mgagao manifesto (like the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) document 
Footpaths to democracy (Richards 1996)) captures foundation of a sectarian moment. 
The value of the freedom fighter and her/his commitment to the colonised people of 
Zimbabwe was raised high by the Mgagao document only to be dashed to the 
ground when the civilian nationalists regained the upper hand and during the post 
independence peace times. The War Veterans continue to be influenced by the views 
and spirit of the Mgagao Declaration as a foundational sacred text, much as 
demoralised and marginalised RUF ex-combatants continued to copy out, furtively, 
select passages from their Footpaths manifesto to restore morale several years after 
the end of their struggle (Richards, Personal communication 2005). The wheeling and 
dealing of the factionalised Mugabe era was the antithesis of ZIPA solidarity. The 
ZIPA phase can thus be considered ‘sectarian’ or ‘egalitarian’ based in organisation 
and ideas, by analogy with Richards’ (1996) analysis of the ‘sectarian’ turn in the 
Sierra Leonean RUF, when a guerrilla movement became isolated from (and 
abandoned) by its wider intellectual leadership, and it was necessary (for survival 
and self protection) for the bush-enclaved cadres to rally around a boisterous 
egalitarianism and self-taught ideology. The reorganisation of the War Veterans in 
the 1990s reflects this, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
 
The Mgagao document was also important, however, in that it set aspirational 
expectations among a younger generation of committed Zimbabweans, suspicious of 
nationalist deal-making. It expressed important values within the liberation 
movement that would set parameters for an alternative vision of how to go about 
building a new post colonial Zimbabwean nation. It also had results, in the sense that 
it gave birth to unity between ZIPRA and ZANLA, resulted in the revival of the 
armed struggle, and deepened political and ideological education within the 
liberation movement, as we shall shortly see. Guerrilla war changed qualitatively 
and quantitatively. Militarily, ZIPA mounted an offensive that was based on the 
                                                 
67 During ZIPA it was forbidden to shout a slogan praising an individual, unless that person 
had died fighting for the liberation of Zimbabwe. This changed during the Mugabe era, when 
the first out of the only ten permitted slogans was ‘Forward with Comrade President Robert 
Mugabe!’ The slogan was so ubiquitous that Nhongo-Simbanegavi (2000: 102) noted, ‘Almost 
all the official documents prepared after 1977 bore the slogan … [but] earlier documents made no such 
reference to the Party President.’ This is because such a slogan was abolished by ZIPA only to be 
brought back during the Mugabe era. 
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strategy of engulfing the enemy by cutting communication and transport links 
employing guerrilla tactics:  
Whereas at the end of 1975 there were barely a hundred guerrillas in the north-east, 
within six months many of hundreds of them had infiltrated along most of Rhodesia’s 
borders with black Africa. This quantitative change was also reflected in the volume and 
nature of guerrilla war.68 (Moore 1995: 78)  
 
In addition to the Tete Province operation covering the north-eastern since 1972, 
Manica and Gaza Provinces, adjacent to Mozambique, were now opened. On the 
political front ZIPA also managed to change the whole complexion of the war. One 
senior ZIPA commanders observed that ‘because political parties were dead, ZIPA 
commanders had to continue the struggle on their own while politicians reorganised 
the parties (Dabengwa 1995). These are not negligible results, and thus the 
generation of liberation fighters inspired by the Mgagao manifesto has real 
achievements to which its aspirational sentiments relate. 
 
It is worth looking at some of these achievements a little closer, paying particular 
attention to their educational and ideological significance. This parallels the account 
given by Peters (2006) of a hidden ‘intellectual’ layer in the RUF, whose existence is 
fervently denied by the political classes threatened by its emergent calls to deep 
reform. In the ZIPA phase a new breed of political instructors of sound academic 
background were selected and posted to the holding camps of Nyadzonya, 
Chibavava and Tembwe, where large numbers of recruits were located. Others were 
deployed in the training camps. The political education program was transformed, 
with the core syllabus covering the following lectures: 
• Pouring out of national grievances 
• People’s war 
• People’s army 
• History of ZANU and nationalism in Zimbabwe 
• Classes and class struggle 
• Serving the people 
• Neo-colonialism 
• Mgagao declaration 
 
In addition to the common courses covered by everybody, ZIPA took the initiative 
to establish a Political Science College teaching Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-
Tung thought. This was called Wampoa Political Academy, established at Chimoio 
and later called Chitepo College. The first group of candidates, highly educated69 by 
the standards of a guerrilla movement, comprised a total of 100 guerrillas, about 15 
of whom were women. The courses covered included the following topics:70 
                                                 
68 David Moore 1995: 78, quoting Marmakin 1990, The Making of Zimbabwe: Decolonisation in 
Regional and International Politics. 
69 In the first group of 100 there were at least six undergraduates, some of whom had been 
dismissed from the University of Rhodesia following the 1973 student’s demonstration. At 
least 80 were ‘O’ and ‘A’ Level candidates when they left for the liberation struggle and about 
ten were professionals, including trained teachers (Personal observation, Wampoa 1976). The 
second and last group before abolition of the academy Wampoa was of a similar composition. 
Again, the comparison with the RUF (and the role of Bunumbu Teachers College) is uncanny 
(cf. Richards 2001, Peters 2006). 
70 Personal observation, Wampoa political academy, Chimoio 1976-7. 
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• Political and economic history of Zimbabwe 
• Economic geography of Zimbabwe 
• The history of philosophy 
• Dialectical materialism 
• Marxist political economy 
• Historical materialism 
• Scientific socialism 
• The two line struggle and national democratic revolution 
• Introduction to theories of adult education 
 
The first set of Wampoa graduates developed a new syllabus for further recruits 
to give a basic understanding of principles of socialist revolution. Lecture notes were 
developed and distributed to all camps.71 A second (and last) group was recruited 
but only finished the course under politically strenuous conditions, as the college 
was in a process of being banned by the incoming Mugabe leadership Wampoa 
graduates were deployed into the camps and to the front, yet by and large it was 
other, non-Wampoa cadres, who were sent to missions abroad for further training in 
aviation, intelligence and other professions (Interview with AGR October 2007). 
 
The demise of ZIPA started when the young commanders of the ZIPA Military 
Committee failed to sustain unity between ZIPRA and ZANLA. Partisan loyalty was 
fostered by the nationalists, and the revolutionary cadres failed to establish an 
effective organisation transcending ZANU and ZAPU. ZIPA then began to 
disintegrate. ‘[C]onflicts between ZANLA and ZIPRA soon began in the training 
camps in Tanzania, resulting in some deaths, and consequently the fighters proposed 
that there should be political leadership over the fighting forces’ (Zimbabwe 
Liberators Platform 2004). ZIPRA pulled out of the Mozambican camps (Bhebhe and 
Ranger 1995) amid accusations and counter accusations of murder. The proposal of 
surrendering power to the nationalist ‘elders’ was seen as essential to restore order 
and was accepted (Interview with Dzinashe Machungura October 2007). Indeed the 
political leadership then took over. This time the nationalists were led by Robert 
Mugabe for ZANU and Joshua Nkomo for ZAPU. This changed the course of the 
struggle once more. 
 
When the Geneva Conference of 1976 was called ZANU leaders were released 
from Zambian prisons. ZANU nationalists forged an alliance with members of the 
former High Command and as a group convinced Samora Machel to arrest ZIPA 
commanders. Frelimo arrested the ZIPA leadership group, and they were jailed until 
1980.72 In the camps, resistance was immediately thwarted73 by Frelimo and an 
                                                 
71 The new syllabus then included, for example the following courses: ‘Socio-economic 
formations’ to widen understanding of ‘People’s war’; ‘Capitalism’ to widen the scope of 
‘national grievances’ and ‘classes and class struggle in Zimbabwe’; ‘Imperialism the highest 
stage of capitalism’ to widen the scope of ‘Neo-colonialism’ and ‘State and revolution’ to 
widen the scope of ‘People’s army’. More time was allocated to cover the new syllabus. 
72 In a similar move, the international community stood back in Sierra Leone while the 
civilian government arrested and detained without charge almost the entire strength of the 
Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP) (the political party formed from the Sierra Leone 
rebel movement after the Lome Treaty of 1999) in May 2000. Most were not released (still 
without charge) until 2006 (Richards and Vincent 2008). 
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alliance between Chitepo phase recruits and the released High Command and Dare 
members. Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo (who betrayed ZIPA colleagues) were 
instrumental in this development. Robert Mugabe was then declared President of 
ZANU and leader of the guerrilla movement at a ‘Central Committee’ meeting held 
in March 1977. The meeting, however, was dominated by the most recent (Mugabe 
phase) recruits, who were mostly guerrillas co-opted into the structure, and hand-
picked nationalist recruited mostly from oversees where they had been engaged in 
various activities including education and employment. Some, like Nathan 
Shamuyarira who had defected from ZANU and formed the Front for the Liberation 
of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) with James Chikerema, were recruited from neighbouring 
states. 
 
Wampoa was disbanded forthwith. The syllabus compiled for the new political 
education program was banned and replaced by one that emphasised the history of 
ZANU and the new structure of the central committee. The whole political program 
changed and focused on the personality of the leader. For example, the slogan, 
‘Pamberi na Cde Robert Mugabe’ (i.e. Forward with Comrade Robert Mugabe!) was 
first introduced in specific challenge to ZIPA’s position that no one would be 
considered a hero unless already dead, and a revolutionary to the end. The ZIPA 
position reflected a deep awareness that human beings change. Under the new 
dispensation, political lectures were replaced mainly by lessons that demanded 
memorising the new structure of ZANU and the names of the incumbents of the 
Politburo, Central Committee and High Command. This became the thrust of 
political education characteristic of the Mugabe phase. Names mattered more than 
ideas. Recruits of radical intellectual background were once more persecuted, as had 
happened during the Chitepo phase. The Mugabe period was based on forging a 
unity between the Chitepo phase recruits and the Mugabe phase recruits, some of 
whom were hand-picked from the cohort of ZIPA period guerrillas (Sadomba 2007). 
A cult, building the personality of ZANU’s President Robert Mugabe, developed 
rapidly from that time, lasting into the independence era, and thereby reversing (in 
the eyes of the egalitarian cadres) all ZIPAs achievements on the ideological front 
(Moore 1990). 
 
2.3.1 ZIPA – a balance sheet 
A combination of recruitment, political and ideological focus, military developments 
and leadership made the ZIPA period a distinctive phase in the armed struggle. The 
ZIPA period was introduced by defining the liberation movement, and raising the 
quality of its actors and its ethos through a process of self education. ZIPA differed 
from the preceding Chitepo phase in important ways. First, the nature of recruits 
drastically changed, and student, urbanite, and worker-peasant groups began 
                                                                                                                                            
73 An assertion (made Dzinashe Machingura 2006 at the launch of Fay Chung’s book in 2006 
at the Book Café) that there was no resistance in the camps is not true. At Chimoio Wampoa 
cadres were arrested for mobilising resistance, and the tension between the Old Guard and 
the ZIPA recruits was clear. At Doeroi, under the leadership of the late Moses Mvenge, High 
Command members (Old Guard) faced resistance to get into the camps, and at Tembwe, it is 
alleged that ambushes were laid, but foiled. If FRELIMO had not moved in, the situation 
could have degenerated into an armed conflict, and it was not likely that the Old Guard and 
the nationalist would then have triumphed, considering the number of cadres sympathetic to 
ZIPA. ZIPA recruits, who knew little or nothing about the Old Guard and therefore naturally 
supported ZIPA, numerically surpassed Chitepo phase recruits by far. 
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numerically to dominate. These were relatively younger, and recruited mainly 
through ideological and political propaganda (i.e. they were brought to the liberation 
movement by ideas), rather than through direct physical contact with the guerrillas.74 
 
ZIPA was full of ideas. But as with many such idealistic ‘youth’ movements its 
zeal at times outweighed its practical sense. One of the major deficiencies of ZIPA 
was a failure to achieve unanimity in terms of judging the ‘Old Guard’. Some ZIPA 
leaders were loyal to the jailed High Command to a point of adoration. ZIPA then 
was divided internally when it came face to face with the problem of handling the 
released High Command. This problem was coupled with the failure of its 
diplomatic offensive. It is difficult to understand why ZIPA did not seize the 
opportunity to have Samora Machel (President of Mozambique and ex-guerrilla and 
President of Front for the Liberation of Mozambique - FRELIMO) on their side, 
having worked with him for a whole year. They also failed to use Nyerere’s influence 
to convince Machel that they were the authentic heirs of the liberation mantle. In 
their defence, ZIPA commanders argue that shortage of time was a major hindrance 
for them, but some inexperience, or lack of far-sightedness and diplomatic skill, 
seems also to be involved. 
 
Perhaps the worst failure of ZIPA lay in its inability to sustain its most significant 
achievement – uniting ZIPRA and ZANLA forces (and overcoming the centrifugal 
tendencies of ‘tribalism’). Partisan loyalties seem in some case to have been based on 
individual patrimonial commitments. In effect, some key ZIPA cadres failed to 
imagine a revolutionary society beyond ZANU and ZANLA or beyond ZAPU and 
ZIPRA. They were trapped by ‘nationalist’ (for which read sectional) politics ‘hook, 
line and sinker’. The golden opportunity to unite the forces slipped out of their 
hands in a bloody conflict. The pull out by ZIPRA weakened the movement 
ideologically, militarily and organisationally. In addition ZIPA leadership was not 
fully aware of the key structural changes required to transform a war machine into a 
revolutionary vanguard. For example, the notorious security and intelligence 
department was left virtually intact, in the hands of Chitepo phase recruits such as 
the notorious (late) Tsuro, who persecuted many cadres on ethnic grounds. His 
methods, and the fear he instilled, can be glimpsed in the account of one interviewee, 
who claimed that the (late) Sheba Tavarwisa’s husband Edgar died under torture and 
interrogation by Tsoro (Interview with A. November 2007, former member of 
Security and Intelligence Department, and eyewitness to Edgar’s death). The failures 
of ZIPA to deal with these challenges affected the entire liberation movement, and 
this failure is still felt today. ZIPA phase ex-combatants are still terror stricken by 
these experiences.75 
 
 
                                                 
74 Revealingly, Chitepo phase recruits referred to the new ZIPA recruits in derogatory terms 
as ‘those who joined the war by train’ or ‘those recruited by radio’. 
75 Besides the murder of Edgar there was torture that resulted in post traumatic stress 
disorders (PTSDs) and physical problems of the victims. For example, some well known cases 
of mental breakdown of Wampoa College graduates include Geos, Quinine, late Farai 
(female) and Zuka to mention but just a few. One typical example of torture involved 
Mhondoro (not real name) who was tied to a tree in Ruya Game Reserve by Chitepo phase 
section commander, Nhau Dzehondo (not real name) and left for dead (Personal observation 
1977-85). 
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2.4 The Mugabe era 
Robert Mugabe became President of ZANU in 1977, after the imprisonment of ZIPA 
commanders by FRELIMO. That year was announced as the ‘Year of the Party’, 
focusing on reorganisation of ZANU. A new Central Committee was established 
comprising former members of the Dare now released from prison, and one or two 
ZIPA characters who allied with the new dispensation (Martin and Johnson 1981) 
 
During this period the Mozambican so-called ‘refugee’ camps were overflowing 
with recruits:76  
By 1977 there were three major refugee camps in Mozambique. They were: Doeroi with 
17,000 refugees, Toronga with 12,000 and Mavudzi with 6,000 – making a total of 
35,000 refugees. It was from among these refugees77 that ZANLA recruited cadres for 
military training. (Tungamirai 1995: 42) 
 
Any further recruitment from the front was stopped. However recruitment 
continued in a different way, typical of this phase of the war. Tungamirai (1995) 
describes recruitment at this period as ‘selective’.78 The recruits were hand-picked 
                                                 
76 Martin and Johnson (1981: 276) give higher figures for so-called refugees by the end of the 
war. ‘In 1977 there were 29,000 refugees – excluding recruits, who numbered about 10,000 trained 
and in training – in three camps … Doeroi, which eventually became a virtual city mud-and-wattle 
huts hous[ed] the bulk of the estimated 150,000 refugees in Mozambique at the end of the war.’ 
77 Camps like Nyadzonya, Doeroi and Chibavava which are generally termed refugees camps 
were actually holding camps where recruits received basic political education and went 
through training in basic military tactics, although without guns. The Mgagao Declaration, 
with no need to misrepresent this position to the frontline states and the OAU Liberation 
Committee (who knew the true position), did not refer to the camps as refugee camps. 
Instead the document is explicit in defining the people as recruits. ‘Another of our problems is 
the training of our thousands of recruits currently in Mozambique. We shall be grateful if you make the 
necessary arrangements for the training of our fighters’ (ZANLA 1975: section 7). During the war 
these settlement s were termed refugee camps so that they could be used to solicit 
international support from humanitarian organisations. However their continued designation 
of the camps and the cadres from there as refugees is today opportunistic and part of a tactic 
of downgrading the status of War Veterans (Interview with MSH, a War Veteran and senior 
civil servant when driving from Bulawayo to Harare in 2006). MSH (Interview with SS 2004, 
narrated a story where some former ‘refugees’ came to his office and queried why after 
independence they were considered refugees, which was never their designation during the 
war. They then asked why others like Dr. S. who had not received military training were 
taken as War Veterans, and they were ‘refugees’. They put it to SS that they were considered 
refugees not because it was their true status but they were former fighters of non-elite social 
and economic background. Also in a speech by Jabulani Sibanda (Chairman of Zimbabwe 
National Liberation War Veterans Association, ZNLWVA, on 30 January 2008) addressing 
Harare Province war veterans. Sibanda emphasised that there people who crossed the border 
in pursuit of the struggle were not refugees whether they were finally trained or not. 
78 Fay Chung (2006: 188) writes about this recruitment as follows: ‘Robert Mugabe embarked on 
this new task (building up a new leadership) with alacrity. He brought in a new group of university 
educated leaders such as Sydney Sekeramayi … Witness Mangwende … Ibo Mandaza … Ignatius 
Chigwendere …Davison Mugabe … Hebert Ushewokunze and Eddison Zvobgo (both of whom had 
integrated themselves to the ANC) … Military leaders like including Josiah Tongogara, Robson 
Manyika, William Ndangana, Meyor Hurimbo, Solomon Mujuru, and Vitalis Zvinavashe were 
integrated into the political leadership … Josiah Tungamirai … Perence Shiri … and Dominic 
Chiwenga [also became part of the new leadership].’ Recruits like Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, Dr. 
Sydney Sekeramayi and Nathan Shamuyarira had specialised skills, and most of them were 
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from the diaspora to join, mostly, the political leadership of the war. These became 
key players and formed the core of ZANU ‘group’ and later the new government of 
1980, causing tensions and conflict in the liberation movement from this period, 
centred on leadership struggle, as Matuku Hamadziripi (1975: 23) wrote, in a note 
smuggled out of Zambian jail: 79 
The leadership issue cannot be solved mechanically, that is, by imposing or importing a 
leader from without, one who has not been tried and tested and has not been closely 
following the ups and downs of the struggle. Leadership has to be produced and developed 
by the revolutionary movement itself. … [coming] from the leading cadres in the 
movement, leaders who have been part and parcel of the development of the revolution. 
 
Mugabe’s success in isolating ZIPA (by incarceration) and taking over command 
of the guerrilla movement in its final stages can be attributed to a number of factors, 
including his forging an opportunistic alliance with the peasant recruits of Chitepo 
phase, support from Frelimo80 at a critical juncture, and winning the support of the 
‘Old Guard’, including Rex Nhongo (later General of the Zimbabwe National Army). 
He was then quick and adept at entrenching his power by embarking on ‘structural 
consolidation’ (Mugabe 1977) soon after purging the liberation movement of ZIPA 
radicals. 
 
At the second Central Committee Meeting held in September 1977 President 
Mugabe delivered the ‘historic’ Chimoio speech defining the Party Line. This speech 
laid out the fundamental philosophical underpinnings and general ethos of Mugabe 
era. He defined enemies of the liberation struggle as: 
                                                                                                                                            
nationalist allies or nationalists themselves. However Tungamirai’s (1995) assertion that those 
with special skills included teachers, nurses and even drivers is not true because these 
belonged to the ordinary recruitment base of the ZIPA period. He also misses the point when 
he claims that in 1974 and 1975 detente exercise disturbed recruitment. On the contrary 
recruitment rose abruptly during this period, when Mozambique became independent and 
soon after the death of Chitepo. Tungamirai, as an ally of Mugabe, underplays the 
contribution of ZIPA. This is clear when he argues that, ‘Between 1976 and 1979 ZANU 
embarked on a major recruitment drive in order to build up a large fighting force to carry out the 
objective which was outlined by its President R.G. Mugabe in his 1979 (Gore reGukurahundi- Year of 
the People’s Storm) new year message’ (Tungamirai 1995: 41). Mugabe was under house arrest in 
Quilimane in Mozambique during 1976, and surely the 1979 objectives could not have 
influenced the recruitment of three years earlier. From 1975, recruits crossed the Rhodesian-
Mozambique border daily to join the war, a major characteristic of the ZIPA period. 
Tungamirai also argues that recruits came from ‘all parts of Rhodesia’ which contradicts other 
indication to show the concentration of recruits were from Manicaland during this period. It 
has been suggested that Manicaland contributed at least 75 percent of liberation war fighters 
(Chidawanyika 2000). A statement by War Veterans of Manicaland claimed even a higher 
figure of 80 percent (Manicaland dialogue conference 2004). This ethnic distribution is 
important to note, because in ZANU it was as critical factor as it is now. Arguably, it is a 
hidden factor behind the ethnicity-conscious ZANU-PF leadership’s relegation of War 
Veterans to refugee status.  
Internal evidence suggests the article was written sometime at the end of 1975. The document 
acknowledges ‘participants in producing the book: Matuku Hamadziripi (Dare member - Leader), 
Meya Urimbo (ZANLA PC), Alec Dovi, Enos Musarapasi, Johnson Ndoda, Stan Mutandiro, sadat 
Kufa Mazuva, Dennis Madzingira, Justin Mazivanhanga and Kanyuchi.’ 
80 Frelimo sent two heavily armed companies of soldiers to quell resistance at Chimoio and 
provide safe take over of the camps from ZIPA (Personal observation, Chimoio 1976). 
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… destructive forces [who] strive in any direction that militates against the Party line or 
… seek, like the rebels of 197481 and 1975/6, to bring about change in the leadership or 
structure of the party … their actions are a negation of the struggle. We must negate 
them in turn [-] negation of the negation. (Mugabe 1977: 37) 
 
Party line here is defined relative to ‘the leadership or structure of the party’. 
Seeking a change in leadership became tantamount to straying away from ‘the’ line. 
This was a new era in ZANU politics, where overt personality cult building was 
central to the propaganda theme of the liberation struggle. Values had indeed 
changed. Coercion, punishment and purgation were hovering threats, and often 
applied through purgation as with the Muparuri/Hamadziripi group that was again 
thrown into FRELIMO gaols in 1977-8 (Mugabe 1977). Freedom of expression, 
plurality of ideas and ‘dissension’ were considered rebellion. According to 
Machingura (Discussant at Book Café booked launch of Fay Chung’s book, 2 
February 2006), ZANU became a despotic organisation.82 The psychological 
foundation of the Mugabe era was propounded philosophically in the President’s 
address as advancing the concept of discipline:  
…discipline [has] two dimensions – the external and the internal … the internal kind of 
discipline [being] the more important of the two. Internal discipline is a state of order 
within a person that propels him constantly to do right things. It is a stage of individual 
development that resolves the contradictions within an individual. (Mugabe 1977: 37)  
 
Internal and external discipline was emphasised to enforce unequivocal loyalty to 
nationalist authority at the expense of commitment to organisational objectives and 
ideology although such discipline was important in keeping the guerrilla movement 
cohesive. Members of the organisation had to internalise the leadership’s 
characteristics to reach a ‘stage’ where they become unquestioning followers, thereby 
‘resolving’ any ‘contradictions within an individual’ that might stem from negative 
judgements concerning the leadership qualities of incumbent characters. 
 
The party, ZANU, was redefined exclusively to mean a ‘group’ of individual 
leaders, with the rank-and-file as coerced followers. The democratic base shrank and 
power became centralised and concentrated (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000). 
Our group is the party called ZANU. ZANU has an order, rules and regulations which 
make its system – the ZANU system of behaviour. When an individual cannot subject 
himself to discipline, then external discipline must apply. The Party must compel83 him 
to conform. This is where punishment comes in. (Mugabe 1977) 
 
Compulsion was displacing education and intellectual development. Wampoa’s 
programs and political education (or propaganda) for the fighters became irrelevant. 
                                                 
81 This is a reference to the Badza-Nhari revolt that marked the beginning of the end of 
Chitepo period. Badza and Nhari were commanders at the front who were critical of corrupt 
commanders and intent on setting up a new command structure. They accused commanders 
such as Josiah Tongogara of living in luxury in Lusaka, womanising and neglecting the needs 
of the guerrillas. The Nhari/Badza group was overpowered by ZANLA reinforcements from 
Tanzania. Badza is said to have been buried alive in a standing posture despite the verdict of 
Herbert Chitepo (who presided the court marshal) that the group had to be surrendered to 
FRELIMO and await the independence of Zimbabwe for judgement.  
82 Three years of Mugabe’s leadership during the armed struggle witnessed purgation of two 
groups – the Vashandi and Hamadziripi/Gumbo group. 
83 Emphasis mine. 
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The ‘ZANU system of behaviour’ was based on ‘compulsion’, ‘punishment’ and 
intolerance of anything beyond the ‘order, rules and regulations which make its 
system’.84 The change of approach was accompanied by structural changes: ‘We, who 
are members of the Central Committee, have to demonstrate by our own actions that 
we are entitled to demand of others compliance to rules of discipline.’ (Mugabe 
1977)85 
 
Emphasis on discipline enforced by a powerful Security Department filled with 
illiterate cadres of peasant background resulted in a reign of terror. Freedom of 
speech and expression were curtailed. Intellectual contributions to the progress of the 
liberation movement were held in suspicion, and any form of criticism was labelled 
rebellious. The promised punishment was to be severe. Mugabe continues: ‘This 
exercise [quelling the ZIPA revolt] was followed by a politicisation program in the 
camps. We warned any person with a tendency to revolt that the ZANU axe would 
fall on their necks.’ (Mugabe 1977: 13)86 
 
This speech is multi-layered in its overall effects. First, the ‘politicisation program’ 
evoking fear of the axe a ‘fall[ing] on the neck’ yielded its positive results: ‘Robert 
Mugabe conceded that there was very little ideological awareness, even amongst the 
leaders themselves. He spoke of plans to reconsider opening Chitepo Ideological 
College to start giving cadres proper orientation to avoid problems in the future.’ 
(Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000: 40)87 
 
This is an important observation. If lack of ‘ideological awareness’ was cited 
during the Mugabe phase, despite previous ZIPA intervention, it shows that the 
different phases exposed the guerrillas to different qualities of political education. 
The Mugabe phase reversed the ideological gains of the liberation struggle, as 
Mugabe himself lamented. The psychological effects of this can be traced in the fear 
of and reluctance to carry out political education. Nhongo-Simbanegavi assesses the 
outcome: 
                                                 
84 Dzinashe Machingura as discussant on the book launch of Fay Chung’s ‘Reliving Second 
Chimurenga’, Book Café, Harare 2 February 2006. 
85 Emphasis mine. 
86 Indeed that became the main objective of political education, coated with promises to re-
open Chitepo College. Mugabe’s proposal was rhetoric, according to Nhongo-Simbanegavi 
(2000: 39) ‘Faced with limited challenge in this regard, ZANLA’s ideological orientation remained 
within the confining limits of nationalism. The obsession with articulating a universal nationalist 
position within the organisation stifled debate on other political views. Any issues not immediately 
identifiable with the conventional struggle (as defined by the nationalist leadership) were viewed as 
divisive in the camps and were met with repression. When a few better educated fighters made attempts 
to raise rank-and-file issues, carrying their analyses beyond nationalist parochialism by addressing 
class differences, ZANU’s leadership panicked and acted to convey a clear message to the rest of the 
fighters: anyone who took the concept of revolutionary war too seriously risked official ostracism and, 
consequently, their political demise.’ This was stated at the meeting of the Party Ideology 
Development Committee that met in Chimoio, Mozambique, on 12 March 1979. Nhongo-
Simbabnegavi’s sources were the ZANU (PF) Archives, File: Political Commisariat, Doc: 
Circular to the High Command and General Staff Members’ undated but estimated to be 
from 1979. 
87 This was at the meeting of the Party Ideology Development Committee that met in 
Chimoio, Mozambique, on 12 March 1979 (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000: fn. 37).  
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… respondants voiced concerns like: ‘deep political education will cause me to revolt. 
Intimidation by the security personnel had almost paralysed ZANLA’s operational 
system … They also said they had not yet heard from the Party (leaders) if they could 
resume political education since the 1976-7 Vashandi88 Revolt. (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 
2000: 40) 
 
Second, as illustrated, the speech defined new patterns of structural authority in 
ZANU. There was now a new Central Committee that controlled ZANLA. Whereas 
the Chitepo phase had the ‘Dare reChimurenga’ as an adhoc supreme body, but 
according to ZANU’s permanent structures which were in Rhodesia. Dare was 
subordinate to the internal Central Committee of ZANU, and the ZIPA period was 
headed by a military committee, the Mugabe phase introduced for the first time a 
Central Committee and Politburo in exile. This changed the power structure in that 
the transient nature of the Dare and the military committee was replaced by the final 
authority of the Central Committee and Politburo in exile, the first steps towards 
building the absolute power now enjoyed by Robert Mugabe. The Politburo, the new 
structure, was created for the purpose of concentrating and centralising power. 
 
Third, it defined a new kind of relationship between the guerrilla army and the 
party structure. The new Central Committee of ZANU was different from the Dare in 
that the former had only loose control of the fighters, who were more independent, 
with only Josiah Magama Tongogara being a member of that body. 
 
Fourth, it set new boundaries on the individual party member, who was reduced 
to the status of blind follower, especially under the new command of authoritarian 
Josiah Tongogara (Moore 1990). Although in the 1977 Central Committee, the ‘most 
important new element was a strong representation from the military, which now 
comprised almost half of the governing body [with only] one or two ZIPA leaders ...’ 
(Martin and Johnson 1981: 275).89 Although ZIPA denounced nationalist leaders and 
had no space for nationalists in its structures Mugabe period had a strong 
representation of the military. This was hardly for purposes of power sharing 
between the guerrillas and nationalists but strategy of the nationalists to provide a 
mechanism for controlling guerrillas through their commanders. 
 
                                                 
88 Vashandi is a Shona word which means ‘workers’. The ZIPA group coined this term in 
reference to the Marxist working class ideology that they advanced. At the first Chimoio rally 
after the arrest of ZIPA leaders in Beira, Mugabe said, after explaining that the ZIPA group 
had been arrested, ‘Down with these workers’, referring to ZIPA (Personal observation, 
Chimoio 1976). It was also at that rally that Josiah Magama Tongogara first shouted the 
slogan, ‘Pamberi na Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe!’ (i.e. Forward with Comrade Robert 
Gabriel Mugabe!). 
89 Active participation of guerrillas in the top leadership of the war differed. In the Chitepo 
period, the DARE, the supreme organ, was dominated by nationalists with Tongogara 
representing the forces from 1972. During the ZIPA period nationalists played a very 
insignificant role because of the Mgagao Declaration. Even Mugabe and Tekere who had not 
been denounced by Mgagao cadres were during this time, under house arrest in Quilimane, 
Mozambique. During Mugabe phase there were many guerrillas as well as many selectively 
recruited nationalists in the Politburo and Central Committees. However, guerrilla 
dominance should be understood in terms of selective co-optation by the nationalists, in view 
of the need to instil discipline and loyalty among the rank and file of the guerrillas. Power 
balance was clearly in favour of the nationalists. 
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The heavy representation of the military was to ensure that the requirement ‘to 
demand of others compliance to the rules of discipline’ would be enforced by the 
guerrilla leaders. A special alliance of forces made this possible. Chitepo phase 
guerrillas, particularly the peasants loyal to the ‘Old Guard’, were instrumental in 
the new dispensation. Some had become adept at torture during the Chitepo phase,90 
and now used these ‘skills’ to suppress the ZIPA generation guerrillas, thereby 
helping entrench the power of the new ZANU group led by President Mugabe. 
 
Fifth, it spelt out the action to be taken against the individual who failed to 
comply – they would be severely punished. Two years later Dzinashe Machingura91 
(1978) was to reflect, while in FRELIMO gaols, that: 
Consequently, the broad masses of the fighters are in reality not politically interred into 
nationalist organisations; they are only members of the army … never consulted and are 
regarded as military instruments. In a revolutionary situation, such political relations 
between the army and political organisation, can only be counter-productive; the denial 
of democracy to the fighting forces … give[s] rise to political instability. (Quoted in 
Moore 1995: 84) 
  
Machingura’s analysis is important in understanding the contradictions now 
apparent in ZANU-PF today, and sheds some light on the source of internal conflicts 
within the liberation movement as a whole. The success of the liberation struggle 
depended a great deal on the initiative and political understanding of the guerrilla 
cadres, especially in the ZIPA period, but this very political awaking spelt potential 
trouble to a class of nationalist politicians determined to control the fruits of 
independence. Their tactic was to marginalise the guerrillas by whatever means. 
Marginalisation and disempowerment of these fighters meant they were never truly 
demobilised. Mentally, many resented the new regime as they clung to their war-
induced sense of solidarity and comradeship. This sowed seeds of longer-term 
political instability in the post independence period, rising to a climax in the land 
occupation movement led by War Veterans. The post war power distribution and 
ideological mix of the liberation movement then laid the basis for a post 
independence reconfiguration of forces with a high likelihood for the nationalists to 
forge a class alliance with settler capital, and commercial farmers in particular (Moyo 
and Yeros 2005). The President could bide his time. If the White capital ever rose 
against him he could always play the land card, and court instant popularity by 
booting the White Farmers out of the country. The commercial farmers enjoyed a 
longer tenure than many imagined, but they were always sitting on a ticking time 
bomb. As for disinherited War Veterans, he used a combination of wartime tactics of 
Mugabe phase and the new state machine to deal with them (Scholtz 2004). 
 
2.4.1 Analysis of the Mugabe phase 
The Mugabe phase of the war left a complex legacy. Nationalists, like the cunning 
wounded buffalo, had bounced back to take control of the liberation movement. 
ZIPA provided many lessons about the vulnerability of the nationalists, and 
sharpened generational contradictions, raising at least the possibility of a shift from 
ethnic to class-based politics in the new Zimbabwe. Above all, by marginalisation of 
                                                 
90 Personal communication with late War Veterans, Marko Muchineripi Mabhunu (in 
Matopos prison 1976-7) and Bassopo Mpangara, (1976 at Chimoio Headquarters). 
91 Quoted in Moore (1995: 84). 
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the nationalists, and leaving them wallow in ‘prison’ houses, far removed from the 
leadership or any active participation in the armed struggle they had initiated, a new 
political strategy was introduced – the politics of ‘negation’, in place of the politics of 
accommodation. The enthusiasm of youth (especially when it takes a sectarian turn) 
can be dogmatic and divisive. And if ZIPA fighters had successfully overthrown 
their own ZANU leader, Ndabaningi Sithole, Abel Muzorewa (African National 
Congress), the FROLIZI leaders Nathan Shamuyarira and James Chikerema, and 
even challenged Joshua Nkomo, the question was, could they fail but to do it to 
everyone else? This threat and fear destroyed trust between the nationalists and the 
guerrillas, and replaced a true alliance, with a marriage of convenience. 
 
With benefit of hindsight, ZIPA’s failure (and Mugabe’s success) was partly 
rooted in poor timing (on ZIPA’s part) and partly in the immature or inappropriate 
application of Marxist theory to the realities of a liberation war in a peasant society. 
The critical (and perhaps insoluble) puzzle that ZIPA attempted to address was how 
to transform a national democratic revolution, based on a loose conglomeration of 
petty bourgeois, intellectual, peasant and semi-proletarian interests into a socialist 
revolution guided by Marxist ideology. Their strategy for this was to transform the 
guerrilla movement by deepening the socialist content of the war effort, a process 
which sharpened class and generational tensions, and threatened the mercantile 
elements and opportunists with no role in the Marxist revolutionary scheme of 
things, but essential as allies if the White settlers were to be beaten. Attaining success 
would always be a delicate balancing act and ZIPA would have first to co-opt 
remaining progressive nationalists, which they failed to do. When nationalists and 
the ‘Old Guard’ forged an alliance, ZIPA was all too easily isolated, and with the 
help of FRELIMO, as easily ousted. 
 
What does this mean to Zimbabwe’s politics and understanding of the land issue 
in particular? First, Mugabe’s selective recruitment brought clever nationalists into 
the leadership of the armed struggle. Second, a powerful alliance was forged 
between the nationalists and selected guerrilla leaders mainly of the Chitepo phase. 
Third, the ideological thrust changed and the idea of socialist transformation 
remained, but only on a rhetorical level (Moore 1990).92 Fourth, emphasis on levels of 
discipline that was backed by threats of purgation shrank democratic space and fear 
within the guerrilla army. The stage was set for the emergence of a typical neo-
colonial regime under settler economic domination.  
 
In essence this was a political dispensation that focused on acquiring political 
power from the Smith regime, only to work in cahoots with settler capital and 
commercial farmers against the interests of a marginalised African peasantry and 
rural (farm worker) proletarians. However, during the Mugabe phase, the ruling elite 
could not easily rid itself of the younger generation of guerrillas of ZIPA orientation. 
Mugabe chose to work with the rhetoric of socialist revolution that had gathered so 
much momentum during ZIPA, but this may have been a mistake since it only 
resonated with (and thus kept alive memories of) the ‘more authentic’ radicalism 
these cadres had experience under conditions of heightened consciousness and 
mutual dependence in a bush war. Under such circumstances the land issue, debated 
                                                 
92 As Moore (1990) neatly puts it ZANU-PF ‘went on to escalate their Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, 
while simultaneously arriving at a delicate modus vivendi with the international actors who would 
deliver them from Ian Smith’s rule to that of international capital.’ 
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within the neo-colonial setting, was particularly tricky. Continued ownership of land 
by White settlers was entrenched in the Lancaster House Constitution and the 
nationalists accepted it, pleading pressure from the frontline states and the British. 
The ingenious Mr. Mugabe held the land card close to his chest. Eventually, faced 
with economic downturn, mutinous War Veterans, surging land movement, growing 
opposition and international pressure, he abandoned his alliance with White capital 
forging a ‘new’ alliance with the land movement now led by War Veterans. He 
needed the land to reward the loyal members of his regime, at which point the 
commercial farmers were shown the door. But it took time for ex-guerrillas, peasants 
and farm workers to discover that this was not the beginning of their emancipation. 
The ancestral spirits with which they had bonded in the bush would not come to 
their rescue without struggle. A Third Chimurenga was now required, almost two 
decades after independence. 
CHAPTER 2 
 
58 
 
 
THE POST WAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR VETERANS’ MOVEMENT 
 
59 
CHAPTER 3  
THE POST WAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR VETERANS’ 
MOVEMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described how the guerrilla forces evolved during the phases 
of the war, and how the political awareness of cadres (or lack of it) reflected these 
developments, leaving a legacy for the post war period. The present chapter seeks to 
trace the story from the signing of the Lancaster House agreements through the first 
two decades of political independence in Zimbabwe. The focus is on explaining the 
part played by a distinct War Veterans’ movement in the explosion of land activism 
at the end of the 1990s. The dynamics of demobilisation and reintegration into 
civilian life is explained from the perspective of the ex-fighters themselves. In 
significant respects this both enriches and contradicts other analytic perspectives on 
the demobilisation process (Rupiah 1995, Tapfumaneyi 1996, Sadomba, F. 1999; 2004, 
Chitiyo 2000, Kriger 2003, Sadomva and Dzinesa 2004, McCandless 2005, Sadomba 
2008). 
  
Robert Mugabe’s ascendancy to leadership of his movement was followed within 
two years by the Lancaster House talks in London, to negotiate cessation of hostilities 
and a post war settlement for independent Zimbabwe. The talks, involving the 
participation of Bishop Muzorewa’s African National Congress (ANC), the Patriotic 
Front comprising Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU), and a Rhodesian delegation headed by Ian Douglas 
Smith, were chaired by Lord Carrington, a senior member of the Thatcher 
government in Britain. Agreement was finally reached, after a number of deadlocks, 
on a ceasefire, and the Lancaster House Constitution for independent Zimbabwe was 
drafted. This marked the end of the war between the Smith regime and the liberation 
fighters, and ushered in a new political climate, and new relationships formed. 
 
The Lancaster House talks marked the beginning of a new era in Zimbabwe’s 
political life.93 Throughout the guerrilla movement there was palpable sense of a new 
state being formed, and this can be deemed the point at which regime change began 
in earnest. The nationalist movement, being in control of the liberation movement as 
a whole, directed the path towards hand-over of power. As will be shown below, this 
resulted in guerrilla interests and the aspirations of the land movement being denied.  
 
In effect, different visions of independence began to surface in a movement that 
had remained reasonably cohesive while there was a war to be won. The present 
                                                 
93 The three-month long conference almost failed to reach an accord due to disagreements on 
land reform. Mugabe was pressured to sign and land was the key stumbling block. Both the 
British and American governments offered to buy land from willing White settlers who could 
not accept reconciliation (the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ principle) and a fund was 
established, to operate from 1980 to 1990  
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lancaster_House_Agreement). 
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chapter will look at the consequences of these differences, and how they impacted on 
the development of a civilian War Veterans’ movement, with a multi-stakeholder 
land occupation movement taking shape in the background. The chapter discusses 
the transition from guerrilla war to independence and beyond, and seeks to highlight 
the major roles played by the state, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF) and the commercial farmer lobby on the land movement. The focus is on 
the agency of both land hungry peasants and an emergent War Veterans’ movement. 
 
 
3.2 The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979: a background 
Cease-fire was negotiated through the Lancaster House agreement. It was thus the 
means through which the war was ended. But the actual locale (a stately home in 
London) was remote from the world and interests of the fighters. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly (not least, given the venue) the fighters felt their interests were not 
well represented. Sibanda, a key informant for F. Sadomba stated that: 
When the politicians went to Lancaster we hoped that they would … recognise our role, 
but this was not the case at all. We felt as if the politicians were ‘men on a mission’. 
(Sadomba, F. 1999: 11) 
 
Grasp of detail in the negotiations was so poor the Patriotic Front delegation 
comprising of ZANU and ZAPU delegations actually had any plans about the future 
of those guerrillas who decided not to join the army. Tapfumaneyi (1996: 50) contests 
‘the assertion … made in one World Bank study, that in the case of Zimbabwe, the 
[demobilisation] decisions became part of the peace negotiation’. In fact, the only 
allusion to the future of guerrillas was made by Lord Carrington in concluding 
remarks after the agreement had already been signed. He reminded the delegates 
that many of the guerrillas would wish to return to civilian life and post war military 
planning was a matter for the new government after independence. The issue was 
completely forgotten by the Patriotic Front, the name assumed by the alliance of 
ZAPU and ZANU during the negotiations. 
 
White commercial farmers, by this time had taken a proactive decision to 
influence the transition to majority rule. According to Selby: 
Direct exposure to the mounting pressures of the war, combined with the growing 
realisation that The Rhodesia Front [the political party of the settlers] was increasingly 
directionless, encouraged farmers towards compromise. They were … willing to 
encourage transition so long as they were guaranteed continued access to their land … 
The wealthier more progressive sectors of white Rhodesia could handle political reform, 
with conditions. (Selby 2006: 90-2) 
 
This is important, in that indeed the White farmers managed to influence the 
transition to majority rule using all the mental and material resources at their 
disposal. In the event, they were successful in negating the land objectives of most 
fighters in the liberation war. Informants in the land movement remain deeply 
suspicious that the activities of the commercial farmers amounted to a ruse. Some go 
so far as to opine that the proactive approach of the commercial farmers included a 
number of events during the war itself. The killings of Hebert Chitepo, J.Z. Moyo and 
Josiah Tongogara – leaders tempered by the armed struggle - and the timely release 
from Rhodesian jails of civilian nationalists less enthused by the land issue than 
those who were close to the fighters in the bush, is seen by some in the land 
THE POST WAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR VETERANS’ MOVEMENT 
 
61 
movement as a carefully planned anticipatory machination by White farmers to 
defuse the land issue during peace negotiations (Interview with D 2007). 
A Commonwealth peace-keeping force was organised to monitor the short 
transition period from December 1979 to April 1980, and the Conservative peer, Lord 
Soames was appointed by Britain (still the internationally recognised colonial power, 
given that the RF coup, Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), in 1965 was 
never recognised internationally) as Governor. Guerrillas were moved first to 
rendezvous positions, from where they were transported to Assembly Points (AP) 
monitored by the Commonwealth peace keeping force according to the agreement. 
In the Assembly Points the guerrillas were made to fill in forms to indicate whether 
they wished to join the army, seek employment, or resume education (I offer here 
eyewitness observations from Echo AP, 1980). This raised hopes that nationalist 
leaders might be after all willing to accommodate guerrilla interests. The forms 
seemed to signify that plans had at last been made for the positive integration of the 
ex-combatants into post colonial society. This was far from being the case, as will be 
discussed. 
 
There were four main priorities facing Zimbabwe after the Lancaster House 
Agreement. One was to comply with the cease-fire conditions, i.e. to get guerrillas to 
the APs scattered over the operational zones. The second was to hold elections and 
form a government. The third was to form a single army out of three fighting forces, 
namely Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), Zimbabwe People’s 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). This was a 
daunting task without any colonial African precedents ((Campbell, 2003 #194), and 
the task required meticulous planning. The fourth was, of course, disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (Tapfumaneyi 1996). 
 
The situation of the guerrillas during the ceasefire period and immediately 
afterwards needs to be explained. Many came from peasant backgrounds (Kriger 
1995). In most cases, they came from the poorest peasant strata (families typically on 
the edge of subsistence crisis at the best of times) and their families could ill afford to 
support the returning ex-combatants. Very often villages and homesteads of the 
fighters had been destroyed by the RSF during the war, or their kinsfolk had been 
forced into ‘protected villages’. Former fighters were by no means sure they had 
homes to go to. Typically, ex-combatants faced a situation in which parents had died, 
or were living in abject poverty. These families in fact looked up to the returning ex-
combatant for help.94 The volunteers, especially the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) 
and Mugabe phase recruits, had abandoned their education, careers or jobs in order 
to join the war. They now required school fees and a subsistence grant to cover their 
own basic needs and the needs of their dependants (including both parents and 
children!). The situation was very stressful. 
 
                                                 
94 For example, my own situation was that when I returned home to Honde Valley I was 
faced with the responsibility of looking after my mother and two brothers who were 
attending school. I had to pay for their secondary school fees, clothing and everything else. I 
decided that even if I were to get a sponsor for my education, I could not go back to school 
full time unless the sponsor also covered these expenses as well, since they were my 
responsibility. I then had to look for employment and pursued my education plans part-time 
as the government offered no help. 
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Unlike their Rhodesian counterparts, who were salaried, the guerrillas had 
nothing. They had been unpaid in the bush, and lacked savings, pension plan, health 
schemes or any other benefits of employment. They possessed nothing in terms of 
shelter and source of food. They even lacked clothes, and had to rely on what ended 
up being called ‘Thatcher’s clothes’. Tapfumaneyi describes what was on offer: 
… two barrack-type blankets, a shirt, a pair of trousers, two face towels, a tube of 
toothpaste and a toothbrush. There was no underwear and no shoes. The same clothes 
were given to everybody regardless of gender. (Tapfumaneyi 1996: 58) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Guerrilla Training at Tembwe military base in Mozambique (date 
unknown) 
At the conclusion of the Lancaster House Agreement many guerrillas were in such 
conditions. At independence they did not receive demobilisation funds, they were 
not rehabilitated and there were no programs to reintegrate them back into society. 
Destitution followed.  
Source: Photo, author’s collection, also deposited with the NAZ 
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Nationalist political leaders (with little experience of the bush campaign, and its 
privations) had little sense of what was needed for a successful demobilisation of 
guerrillas, and they failed to raise this issue as part of the negotiation package. 
Tapfumaneyi emphasises this point, saying: 
… the 1980-5 demobilisation was not planned … [t]hus, post war demobilisation as a 
subject, is conspicuous by its absence from the position papers presented by the parties at 
the [Lancaster House] Conference … [B]oth ZANU (PF) and ZAPU, had not made such 
considerations by election day [and] the only planning of significance, from a military 
point of view came from the British … working out coherent plans from 5 November 
1979. … ‘Operation Agila’ … covered only the separation of forces, containment within 
cantons, the development of cooperation/dialogue, the development of reconciliation and 
integration into a national force. Demobilisation was not covered. (Tapfumaneyi 1996: 
49-51) 
 
A book chapter by a splinter War veterans’ group is clear that the reason for 
absence of demobilisation planning was that the revolution had been hijacked and 
the position of guerrillas compromised: 
After the struggle, the freedom fighters were relegated to a secondary role … The 
revolution was hijacked partly during the struggle, partly during the Lancaster House 
negotiations, and partly during the post independence era. (Zimbabwe Liberators 
Platform 2004: 37) 
 
These claims have wider implications. If failure to plan for guerrillas was not just 
an oversight, but the consequences of a hijacked revolution, then it may be 
reasonable to conclude that the nationalists saw it in their sectional interests to agree 
to the protection of White owned land and White supremacy in general by the 
Lancaster House Constitution. So was the revolution hijacked? 
 
Although nationalists on many occasions threatened to abandon the talks because 
they disagreed with the proposal on land redistribution after independence, they 
finally conceded to clauses inhibiting the smooth and speedy redistribution of land. 
The Lancaster House Constitution stipulated that for ten years land would be 
acquired for resettlement by government only on a ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ 
basis. Moreover the negotiations produced, as Moyo shows: 
… [a] constitution which secured, for the whites, unhindered citizenship rights; a bill of 
rights which precluded the expropriation of private property, secured freedom of 
expression, movement and dual citizenship; a restricted executive power, 
disproportionate white parliamentary representation and protection of white civil 
servants’ employment and pensions. It provided a ten year grace period during which the 
constitution could not be amended, while the independence of the judiciary was 
entrenched to guarantee white rights. (Moyo 1995: 106) 
 
A clear answer cannot yet be given. The Thatcher government was a campaigning 
neo-liberal regime, and its instinct will have been to encourage a modern market-
oriented property regime, irrespective of the murky means through which the 
property was originally acquired. It is not hard to imagine that the nationalists were 
counselled on the side to accept the deal, as a means of getting Britain off the colonial 
hook, and ending a damaging armed conflict. Leaders will have been enticed, 
perhaps, with promises that Zimbabwe would be favoured with international 
development aid for fast-track modernisation, and told the usual (but untrue) story 
that wealth would soon trickle down to benefit the poor. Whatever the case, the 
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nationalists wavered on the land issue, and the agreement was signed. Undoubtedly, 
the effect of the new constitution was to end, at a blow, the aspirations of guerrillas 
and peasant farmers to acquire land as part the post war settlement. They would 
have to wait in line, and yet were aware enough to know that if money sometimes is 
redistributed property never ‘trickles down’. 
 
Warring peasants, farm workers and guerrillas however were approaching the 
land issue very differently from what was going on at Lancaster. Guerrillas were 
mobilising peasants to occupy abandoned farms left by fleeing Rhodesians. In 
Manicaland the mobilisation was so strong that soon after the war in Honde Valley 
for example, there was mass movement of peasants to occupy the forest areas in the 
highlands to reclaim the land they had been removed from during the 1950s and 
1960s. They occupied land where their original homesteads were trying to follow the 
land use patterns practiced before colonial dispossession (Personal observation, 
Honde Valley 1980s; Interview with Mbuya Nyanzunda 1998). These occupations 
were regularised by the accelerated resettlement scheme of the early 1980s after the 
peasants War Veterans had vowed not to be removed. 
 
In Chaminuka Sector, which covers most of Mashonaland Administrative 
Province, I wrote the war strategy for the sector that was adopted by the High 
Command of the Tete Province during the first quarter of 1979. The strategy had 
three main components, the unique one of which was agricultural production. This 
had become a necessity because the war was no longer sustainable given that 
peasants had no longer food reserves and they could not replenish them owing to the 
activities of the war and the cyclical droughts in the liberated zones.95 
 
I trained a special unit of guerrillas at Tete to spearhead the strategy between 
March and May 1979. The agricultural development component of the strategy 
involved driving White farmers off the land adjacent to Tribal Trust Lands (as 
Communal Lands were then called) for peasant and farm worker occupation thereby 
expanding the liberated zones. Groups of trained youth were tasked to accompany 
the combatants into the not yet liberated areas which were dominated by White 
farmers, to take inputs and equipment and transport them to the liberated zones 
where ‘war farms’ were established. These farms were located along the Mazowe 
River from Mazowe River Bridge in Rushinga and they served three purposes. First 
they were designed to provide food self sufficiency to the peasants and combatants. 
Second they were designed to prepare for the final translocation of Tete Province 
Administration from Mozambique to Zimbabwe. Third they were to become centres 
of government in liberated zones, where different services including primary 
schools,96 clinics and other public services would be rendered. Military training and 
coordination of counter intelligence operations were organised from there. Peasants 
and youth from both Takawira and Chaminuka sectors in Rushinga and Pfungwe 
areas were mobilised to implement this strategy which did not realise its full 
implementation because of the ceasefire concluded at Lancaster House. 
 
                                                 
95 The liberated zones, adjacent to the Mozambican border, were in the Zambezi Valley area 
lies in Natural Region IV and V. Food was scarce and communities could no longer provide 
for the war which they had been engaged in since 1972. 
96 Primary schools had already been opened in Nehanda Sector, part of Tete Province. 
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There were other similar initiatives carried in other liberated zones (Personal 
communication, Gonese, 1992). The land ideologies curved from these guerrilla war 
strategies had lasting impact on views of the land which were to be at tangent with 
the Lancaster House Agreement negotiated by the nationalists. The agreement was 
therefore viewed by peasants, farm workers and War Veterans, as a betrayal. As we 
shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, this grievance was at the base of the rupture of 2000. 
 
This sense of betrayal – that the main objective of the war had been squandered to 
allow the nationalists to come to power - was later to become the main basis for 
alliance between the War Veterans, peasants and farm workers in the land 
occupations. In a way the explanatory problem is not to account for why the land 
issue remained an issue, but why it took so long to re-emerge.  
 
The claim made by the informant above summarises the perceptions of many 
guerrillas on the period from the Lancaster House Agreement to the assumption of 
power by the Mugabe government. As we shall see, the core of the War Veterans’ 
movement rotates around grievances emanating from these developments. First, we 
need to resume the story of the War Veteran constituency at the point of 
independence. 
 
 
3.3 The deficiencies of the demobilisation process  
The main demobilisation exercise was long delayed. It started two years after 
independence, in 1982. Until then the only amount given to a demobilised was ZW 
$400.00 as severance pay: 
… when given … a $185 per month allowance for two years, it seemed to offer the ex-
combatant a short-term advantage over the poverty datum line [PDL] of $125. 
Unfortunately, the PDL was pegged on the assumption that the individual had shelter, 
food and a disposable income (savings capacity), which the guerrillas lacked. … Poverty 
and destitution would follow. (Tapfumaneyi 1996: 91) 
 
Numbers entering demobilisation are, even today, disputed. According to 
Tungamirai (1995: 42), ZANU’s Department of Personnel records revealed that 
’66,367 people were registered as recruits undergoing military training or trained 
combatants in 1979’. This suggests that the government figure of 21,500 fighters 
under arms and a total (including trainees) of 35,000 is a considerable under-
estimate. Tapfumaneyi (1996: 53) in fact suggests that ’65,000 seems to be a more 
realistic working figure’ for the total number of trained guerrillas. Judith Todd’s 
figures (Daily News 15 December 2000) imply that at independence there were at least 
80,000 ex-combatants, in the broad sense (of including trainees). Kriger (2003: 70), 
suggests that ‘Altogether, some 25,000 Africans, roughly equivalent to the numbers 
of assembled guerrillas immediately after the independence election, were disbanded 
without benefits’. Tungamirai (1995) had access to ZANU-PF archives, which up till 
now have not been opened to other researchers, so his figures should be taken 
seriously. Furthermore, these relate only to ZANLA. If ZIPRA is considered as well 
then Todd’s figure of more than 80,000 guerrillas is quite believable.  
 
It is also important to realise that the pool of mobilised persons from which the 
War Veterans’ movement draws encompasses a wider group than the ex-combatants 
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bearing arms. Many of the so-called ‘refugees’ were in fact recruits awaiting training. 
These recruits had undergone political education, and in Mozambique they also 
trained in individual tactics, theories of guerrilla warfare, ambush, surprise attack, 
marching and encampment, etc. Their camps were designated ‘refugee’ settlements 
only for tactical reasons (to do with supplies and security). 
 
Table 3.1 Estimated strength of the guerrilla armies as at 31 December 1979 
Army No. in APs Other elements Total 
ZANLA 16,000 5,500 21,500 
ZIPRA 5,000 6,000- 8,000 11,500-13,500 
Total  21,500 11,500-13,500 33,000-35,000 
Source: Tapfumaneyi 1996. Judith Todd estimates that ZANLA only had 66,367 guerrillas 
 
In contrast to the predicament of the ex-guerrillas the new Zimbabwe government 
continued to respect demobilisation obligations to the army originally legislated in 
1945-7 to deal with veterans of the Second World War. This became a focus of 
controversy for the guerrilla ex-combatants (Tapfumaneyi 1996: 36).97 In the case of 
former RSF soldiers from the 1970s war ‘they [were] still receiving their pensions, 
partly in foreign currency’ up to the year 2000 (Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004: 
39).98 This conformed to the Lancaster House agreement, but it also fulfilled Robert 
Mugabe’s reconciliation policy which, as Moyo and Yeros (2005: 171) put it, was ‘not 
between races but with White capital’. 
 
War Veterans also tend to feel that of the three armies integrated into the 
Zimbabwe Defence Forces the two guerrilla armies were targeted more for 
demobilisation than the former Rhodesian army, thereby disproportionately 
suffering from a badly planned and inadequately funded scheme (Interview with 
DTM, former ZIPA High Command member and leader of land occupations, 2000).99 
Our problem is … I think we should get back to the 1980s when after independence we 
are the only country that waged a liberation war and after the war was won the fighters 
were demobilised. Almost en masse they were demobilised and only a few were 
incorporated into the national force, in the police, the army and the air force. It’s a bit 
disturbing to know that while the War Veterans were demobilised the Rhodesian Force 
that we were fighting … remained intact. Those [former Rhodesian forces] that left the 
army … the police [and] Air force, left on their own accord because they would not stand 
a … Black government. They fled to South Africa [and] other places but they were not 
demobilised … So one would ask - why was it done that way? 
                                                 
97 Tapfumaneyi (1996: 36), writing during the time of ex-combatant demonstrations against 
the government and President Mugabe observed that ‘…the post independence government is 
still having to meet the obligations of that exercise to surviving White ex-servicemen, [and this] has 
actually become one of the major political issues in the current debate regarding the manner in which 
the veterans of the Second Chimurenga War were demobilised between 1980 and 1985’. 
98 It is not clear whether the government has abandoned this obligation, or whether former 
Rhodesian soldiers, who fought against the guerrillas, continue to benefit. 
99 Tapfumaneyi, (1996: 36) notes ‘… the disparity between the demobilisation conditions for Whites 
and Africans in the 1945-7 exercise, and the fact that the post independence government still has to 
meet the obligations of that exercise to surviving White ex-servicemen.’ 
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It is therefore not difficult to imagine why the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 
(2004: 37-8) concludes that, ‘There was a convergence of interests between the 
nationalists and the Western powers.’ These are the authentic sentiments; it is 
claimed, of a large number of ex-combatants, who felt that their struggle had been 
undermined, and that nationalists were serving the interests of the Western powers. 
Lack of planning, commitment and corruption in the demobilisation exercise 
(Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004) were seen by the War Veterans not merely as a 
failure or oversight on the part of the new government but an intentional neo-
colonial coup on the part of nationalist politicians and imperialist forces. 
 
The demobilised ex-combatants then dispersed. Some of them were employed by 
state organisations, parastatals and local authorities. Neither the public sector nor 
private companies were particularly sympathetic to ex-combatants (Kriger 2003). A 
few War Veterans went into trade and small-scale business. A number formed 
producer and service cooperatives, mainly in agriculture. Some ex-combatants 
benefitted from the resettlement program of 1980-4. Of the beneficiaries many were 
given conditions to form agricultural cooperatives in order to receive their 
demobilisation money in bulk. As a result economic coercion was the basis for 
formation of many of the agricultural cooperatives that were considered as model B 
resettlement according to government policy. Others got into the transport and 
hospitality industries. With lack of training, lack commercial knowledge and 
business administration, most of these cooperatives failed (Rupiah 1995, Kriger 2003). 
 
But much more remained unemployed. Table 3.2 presents some figures on 
occupational status of ex-combatants in mid 1984. 
 
Table 3.2 State of demobilisation of former freedom fighters as at 26 July 1984 
Serial  Category Total 
1 Opted for various scholarships 4,700 
2 Engaged in commercial programs 2,900 
3 In self-reliance projects 4,333 
4 Self-employed  1,579 
5 In formal employment 3,041 
6 Unemployed 19,160 
Total  35,713 
Source: Sadomba Demilitarisation, demobilisation, control of trafficking and proliferation of small arms and peace-
building, 2004100 
 
There was no compensation for injuries sustained during the war. Rehabilitation 
programs for the war wounded and handicapped were non-existent. Many of the 
War Veterans did not get even the small assistance packages to which they were 
entitled.101 Their marginalisation at a moment of victory and general optimism 
                                                 
100 Sadomba’s source was Tapfumaneyi (1996). From the data available it is difficult to judge 
demobilisation opportunities according to different factions. 
101 Treatment given to Zimbabwe’s anti-colonial War Veterans is comparable none except 
perhaps the Mau Mau guerrillas of Kenya. Rebels from the Sierra Leonean war, for example, 
‘took part in a DDR programme and were based in so-called “reorientation camps”. As part 
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opened up a gulf between the veterans and the wider society, and is important in 
explaining their enduring sense of occupying an embattled position. Ostracised, and 
in many cases verging on destitution many became alienated and depressed. Young 
has shown how the diagnosis of ‘post traumatic stress disorder’ came out of the US 
veteran’s administration, to deal with ungenerous funding for rehabilitation and 
reintegration, in an America trying to turn its back on a disastrous war (Young 1991). 
The sense of alienation may have been even harder to bear for the Zimbabwean 
veterans, since they were indeed the victors in their own war, and yet lack of proper 
demobilisation and reintegration sent a strong signal that they were now to be 
forgotten. War Veterans felt they were being mocked for their pains. The following 
quotation captures some of the strength of feeling among the War Veterans:  
And the War Veterans became a laughing stock of the country. People would ask you: ‘In 
the first place why did you join the war?’, because very often your child can’t go to school 
and you have to talk to your aunt, brother or whoever, to be given school fees so that your 
child goes to school. ‘You are suffering like this … you have no money to buy beer, the 
child cannot attend school, why did you go to that war? Why …?’ And some would be 
even more cynical and say, ‘If you went to liberate the country who had asked you to? Go 
and tie it back where it was’,102 [and other] such things. (Interview with Qq, former 
ZANLA commander and leader of occupations in Concession, 2001)103 
 
In some cases War Veterans did not agree fully to demobilisation. They were 
intent on continuing with the war to remove the Whites from the land. For example, 
in 1980 some former ZANLA War Veterans in Masvingo, perceiving that the 
nationalist leaders had abandoned the objectives of the armed struggle by not taking 
land from the colonialists, and leaving sacred places under the control of foreign 
settlers, organised to continue the war by attacks on White farmers. They determined 
to embark on this campaign after a series of meetings with the spirit mediums 
headed by one who claimed to be the medium of Nehanda. They were pursued by 
the new security services, arrested and given long prison sentences, averaging 15 
years.104 
 
                                                                                                                                            
of their pre-discharge orientation they received classes in civic education, basic adult literacy, 
reconciliation and psychological counselling. Upon discharge they were given the local 
equivalent of US $300 … ‘ (Peters 2006). In addition, former rebels were trained in different 
skills and were equipped with tool kits to prepare them for economic integration. This was 
not the case for the Zimbabwean freedom fighters.  
102 This is a pun on sunga. In Shona the word ‘liberation’ is kusunungura which literally means 
untie. So Kusunungura is an infinitive verb or noun meaning ‘to liberate’ but also it can be 
used to mean ‘undoing a knot or untie’. So people, especially the so-called ‘born frees’ (i.e. the 
post war generation), played on this double meaning. They were saying ‘If we were tied and 
you are the people who untied the knot why don’t you tie us back so that we untie the knot ourselves 
without your help.’ In effect these youngsters were deriding the concept of liberation that the 
War Veterans and others boasted about as a noble achievement. 
103 This cliché was repeated by many War Veterans that I interviewed, e.g. interviewee P 
(2000) said, ‘… we [were] a laughing stock of the public, especially the so called born-frees [who say] 
“You say you liberated us (kutisunungura) you rather would take us back to the point where we were 
unliberated (tisungirirei patanga takasungirirwa pacho) and it would have been best if you perished.’ 
(See also McCandless 2005). 
104 Personal communication with Cosmas Gonese (1992), leader of the attackers of a White 
farmer in Masvingo. 
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Another way the ex-combatants reacted to the situation was where War Veterans 
were employed in a group (e.g. as Local Government Promotion Officers) it was 
common for them to use the opportunity to organise themselves and discuss issues 
relating to their welfare and the political situation. Outside work they met and 
discussed informally with fellow ex-combatants in recreational centres such as beer 
gardens, and at funerals and similar meetings. Ex-combatants everywhere meet to 
relive their experiences. But in the case of these guerrilla fighters this meant – 
inevitably -rehearsing why they felt the objectives of their struggle were yet to be 
achieved, or to lament that under the new government these objectives seemed as far 
away as ever.105 
 
Those who remained in the army were also faced with problems of integration. 
The absorption exercise was filled with uncertainties and frustrations, and it was 
often slow going for guerrillas, who found themselves re-learning basic skills when 
they had expected a bush to office transition.106 Poor demobilisation benefits and 
total lack of attention to rehabilitation needs of the wounded caused one ex-
combatant to say to Barnes that: 
… as liberators of the people I expected us (ex-combatants) to acquire a moderate kind of 
life, not like we are today. We were made to believe that after liberating the country we 
would be the … defence forces of the people. And also I expected some of our disabled 
combatants to be taken care of in institutions, to be taken care of by the state. (Barnes 
1995: 125-6) 
 
At independence there was no program for the guerrillas dumped in APs, and 
only a few at a time were taken for integration into the Zimbabwe National Army 
(ZNA). The disabled and those who did not qualify for the new army for various 
reasons did not have any clear route forward, and they were only given a ZW 
$400.00 (see Figure 3.2) severance package107 (Tapfumaneyi 1996) prior to the 
launching of a belated main demobilisation program started in 1982. By then many 
had already left the Assembly Points (APs) and many of them could not return 
because they had no information about the developments in APs and others lacked 
                                                 
105 Participant observation Ministry of Local Government 1980-9. For example in 1988 the 
Local Government Promotion Officers held a meeting at Kadoma Ranch Motel and Gweru’s 
Midlands Hotel both of which ended up discussing their general conditions of service as an 
exclusive section of ex-combatants in the Ministry of Local Government. Both the meetings 
were stopped by then Permanent Secretary Mariyawanda Nzuwa. Also interviews with DM 
2000 and Pf 2000.  
106 The Rhodesian army was considered the superior force in technical and tactical 
competence (despite the fact it had lost the war), and Rhodesians officers retrained the 
guerrillas, something the latter did not expect. An additional bone of contention was that the 
ex-combatants did not receive salaries, unlike their Rhodesian counterparts. This is a reason 
so many decided to quit military life, because they felt the system was unfair to the ex-
combatants (Barnes 1995: 122-6). The issue of unfulfilled promises and sustained expectations 
was also presented by B, a White commercial farmer, who said ‘… basically what [War 
Veterans] were doing (in the 2000 land occupations) was actually a national expression of an 
unfulfilled promise … land was a principal party of the whole struggle … And much of the motive 
behind the ex-combatants to fight was to secure land … and then 20 years after independence there was 
no land. So inevitably it was that unfulfilled objective which manifests itself in a desire to fulfil the 
objectives and if no one is going to do it they would do it for themselves …’. 
107 Tapfumaneyi (1996: 58) ‘An initial financial package, in the form of a $400 severance gratuity, 
was available to the first few voluntary demobees. This remained in effect until early 1982 when the 
main demobilisation exercise may be said to have begun …’. 
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the logistics to return (Tapfumaneyi 1996). The demobilisation exercise from 1982 
was also marred by corruption, poor planning and poor records. Resources were 
looted by senior commanders in the army (Kriger 2003) with much intended 
assistance going not to ex-combatant beneficiaries but to relatives of the officers in 
question.108 As a result, many War Veterans found themselves financially crippled at 
a time when they badly needed financial support (Sadomba, F. 1999). 
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Figure 3.2 Annual mean exchange rate, Zimbabwe 1991-2001 
 
Notes: 
The Zimbabwe dollar continued to fall steeply with official estimated year on year 
inflation rate rising to more than 100,000 percent in the first quarter of 2008. 
The parallel market rate was US $1=ZW $36,000,000. 
Source: adapted from Chambati W (2007), (Personal notes) 
 
The sharp rise in 1997 is associated with awarding of War Veterans compensation 
in 1997 after Mugabe was forced to pay unbudgeted funds as part of the truce 
conditions. 
 
In general, the War Veterans left the war feeling they were not given due 
recognition by the state and society in general. They sensed no one felt sympathetic 
for their plight. Q (Interview with Q, a War Veteran holding a degree in social 
sciences and leading occupations in Mvurwi, 2000) put it this way: 
And having been demobilised, [War Veterans] got next to nothing … in terms of 
remuneration. They were given $185 a month for two years. That was it. A total of 
$4,400 was given as demobilising money where you would be expected to rehabilitate 
yourself back into society. And for many as soon as it was finished, that was it … And 
also for the War Veterans to get that so-called gratuity and pension of $2,000 a month 
[in 1997] it was not out of the goodwill of the Party and government. It was after a 
struggle. War Vets actually struggling … making demands, demonstrating against 
government. And government was not willing to part with anything but it later 
                                                 
108 Sadomba (1999: 5) writes, ‘The state policies designed to permanently reintegrate thousands of the 
demobilised soldiers soon fell far short of the basic demands. Corruption, negligence and 
mismanagement by officials that were charged with supervising the process were also partly to blame.’ 
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succumbed to pressure from the War Veterans.109 So you see the government or some 
government and party officials, have some dislike of War Veterans; they have some fear of 
War Veterans. They have some uneasiness about War Veterans. They would want them 
to keep a distance. 
 
The issue of being neglected long remained topical among the War Veterans, and 
at every opportunity they would question why this had to be. At the first occupied 
farm in Beatrice by War Veterans from Chitungwiza, one of the former commanders, 
Gutura was interrogated over this issue, and he answered as follows (Interview with 
P, a War Veteran participating in the 2000 occupation of Beatrice employed in Harare 
Municipality, 2000): 
Boys, even we ourselves did not get anything as soon as people were told to go in 
Assembly Points. And when we went to the Assembly Points things drastically changed. 
People were being taken to the army, the whole system was torn apart and there was 
totally nothing left. There was nothing we could do. 
 
This sense of abandonment is at the core of War Veteran grievances fuelling land 
occupations from the late 1990s. They were simply not part of any process. It was 
apparently expected that they would fade away, or resume some long forgotten 
trade or activity without any account being taken of the asset loss they had suffered 
as fighters. War Veterans were thus bitter about the social and political exclusion that 
they suffered at the hands of government and the ruling party. The rise of the War 
Veterans’ movement is associated with political exclusion from as far back as 1980, as 
another War Veteran, who worked for a parastatal as a security officer, F indicates: 
I was immediately suspended [from ZANU-PF provincial leadership]. This was on the 
grounds that ex-combatants are not allowed to participate in politics. … You see, this is 
where it all started. These people who were in the party structures didn’t want War 
Veterans amongst them because they knew that their [opportunism] would be exposed. 
(Interview with F 2000) 110 
 
Conditions that prevailed soon after independence were inimical to the re-
organisation of the ex-guerrillas. The two parties that had fought for the liberation of 
the country and united during the peace negotiations at Lancaster House did not 
unite as the Patriotic Front during elections in 1980, which were seen by many War 
Veterans as a lost opportunity to end the hostilities between the two elements and 
their armies, ZANLA and ZIPRA (Barnes 1995). Not surprisingly, as an informant of 
Barnes (1995: 125) anticipated, ‘there were signs that at some point there would be a 
lot of fighting between the two parties.’ Fighting between ZANLA and ZIPRA broke 
out at Entumbane, Connemara and other barracks. One ex-combatant blamed Enos 
Nkala, a ZANU-PF veteran politician, for having instigated the fighting, at a rally in 
                                                 
109 Note that Mugabe had refused to give an assent to the bill passed by Parliament and he 
only changed his mind under pressure as discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
110 The Directive to prohibit ex-combatants to occupy any position in ZANU-PF was given by 
the then President of the party Robert Mugabe in 1980 at 88 Manica Road, (ZANU-PF HQ). It 
is said this was after a complaint by Didymus Mutasa (Secretary for Administration) that War 
Veterans were getting all the posts in the party because the electorate obviously preferred 
them (Personal communication with Chimota, then Political Commissar at 88 Manica Road - 
Mutasa passed the Directive through the Commissariate Department). Then became popular 
the ZANU-PF cliché that youth are the leaders of tomorrow and War Veterans were classified 
as youth and could only get into the leadership of main wing of the party through to 
represent the youth wing. 
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Bulawayo (Barnes 1995). It was in the interest of nationalists for former guerrillas to 
be fighting among themselves, and disunited, as will be argued later in this chapter. 
 
Animosity between ZANLA and ZIPRA continued in the post independence 
period, as it had been during the war, thereby reducing chances of the liberation 
forces assuming a single voice. When the fighting just mentioned first broke out 
many members of the former ZIPRA combatant group fled the camps and took up 
arms against the government, using weapons they had cached before and during the 
ceasefire period. The situation deteriorated to a point where it threatened a civil war 
in Matebeleland and part of the Midlands Province. Mugabe used former Rhodesian 
Security Forces to quell the ‘dissident’ disturbances.111 However, this violence 
continued to escalate along ethnic lines, and a special Fifth Brigade was then created 
as a force to clamp down. The Brigade, exclusively comprising former ZANLA 
guerrillas, and specially trained by the (North) Koreans, has lately been shown to 
have carried out ethnic targeting of Ndebele-speaking people in the region (Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace). In their defence, pro-state forces argue that the 
dissidents were ethnically motivated and targeting Shona-speaking people, 
especially those in the civil service. 
 
This trouble had repercussions on the re-organisation of former ZANLA fighters 
as well. During this time, any criticism levelled against the government, the state or 
the ruling class was labelled dissident. Former ZIPRA combatants thought they 
suffered more (Kriger 2003). With Soviet influence, ZIPRA guerrillas organised 
agricultural cooperatives and the Mafela Trust (Brickhill 1995), an organisation 
formed to rebury its fallen heroes scattered in the battle torn rural areas. These 
cooperatives were disbanded and the land and equipment confiscated by the state 
during the period of hostilities. The distinction between dissidents and former 
ZIPRA fighters became blurred. Former ZANLA War Veterans who tried to join any 
other party including ZAPU, as some of the released ZIPA commanders did, were 
labelled dissident. Previous experiences with purges during the ZIPA period 
reminded former ZANLA ex-combatants about the hovering axe of ZANU-PF, 
always too ready to fall on anyone’s neck. Early attempts to organise the War 
Veterans to demand reforms and a better deal encountered these obstacles, as we 
shall see below. 
 
Discovering that doors were closed in the party structures, War Veterans 
(particularly former ZANLA) initiated moves to re-organise a War Veterans’ 
Association. Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (2004: 38)reports that: 
In the early 1980s, War Veterans from ZANLA and ZIPRA made efforts to form an 
organisation that would unite them, look after their interests and ensure that the gains, 
objectives and values of the liberation struggle were defended and consolidated. The 
government and ZANU-PF leadership frustrated these efforts. (Zimbabwe Liberators 
Platform 2004: 38)112 
                                                 
111 Many War Veterans felt the animosity between the two guerrilla armies was fanned by 
politicians. Teresa Barnes (1995: 122) quotes her informant as saying, ‘the whole thing (fighting 
between ZANLA and ZIPRA at Entumbane) was provoked by politicians. I wouldn’t say it was 
provoked by the comrades themselves ... there was a rally organised by Enos Nkala [then senior 
ZANU-PF politician] at White City Stadium, where he actually made some very bad remarks about 
ZAPU and ZIPRA.’ 
112 Another War Veteran (Interview with Pf, employed by Harare City Council and leading 
occupations in Mazowe, 2000) expressed his viewpoint as follows, ‘We finally reached the 
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Margaret Dongo,113 a former ZANLA combatant and Parliamentarian in the mid-
1990s, who ended up forming an opposition party, the Zimbabwe Union of 
Democrats (ZUD), shared the same sentiments in Parliament, when she was quoted 
by The Herald newspaper saying: 
I honestly do not know why there is this mistrust, suspicion and resistance from some 
politicians to this Association. We started the War Veteran Association in 1982 but it 
failed. We tried to resuscitate it in 1985 and again, it was a flop. Finally in 1989 the 
association was born but I tell you it was after a struggle. It was very difficult to form the 
association. The government seems not to trust us, why, I do not know. (The Herald 30 
September 1991)114 
 
Initial regrouping in the early 1980s by former ZANLA combatants was initiated 
by former political commissars from the ZIPA period who thought they could 
influence or assist the party and government to implement socialism. The group was 
composed of a number of former Wampoa College graduates and other ex-
combatants who had received political education in former Eastern Block countries 
such as Romania and Yugoslavia. The Minister of Health, Dr. Herbert 
Ushewokunze,115 also participated in the meetings, held at Mount Hampden, a few 
kilometres outside Harare. The group was soon stopped by leaders of ZANU-PF and 
dissolved.116 
 
The failed Mount Hampden initiative was soon followed by discussions to form 
an association of War Veterans. However, the discussion centred very much on 
sharing power with the politicians, in that War Veterans advocated for a quarter of 
                                                                                                                                            
conclusion that… the objectives of the revolution were totally alien to [the opportunists occupying 
party positions] because they had no idea of where the revolution came from and how it came about. In 
addition they did not want to hear about it …’ See also Selby (2006). 
113 Margaret Dongo joined the liberation struggle as a child soldier at the age of 15 in 1975, a 
typical ZIPA period recruit. She received military training and after independence she 
worked in the Central Intelligence Organisation before getting into full time politics. Her 
challenge of the ‘Old Guard’ in Parliament is reminiscent of the internal struggle between 
War Veterans and ZANU-PF ruling elite and the political thinking of many ZIPA period 
recruits. 
114 Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (2004: 39) believes that ‘The only logical explanation (to 
deliberate frustration of War Veteran efforts to form an organisation) for the leadership … [was]: a) 
their fear that a strong War veterans’ organisation would pose a threat to their own position of power 
and control over decision-making; and b) their awareness that such an organisation would question the 
leadership’s agenda.’ 
115 Dr Ushewokunze, a trained medical doctor and Mugabe phase recruit was different from 
other Mugabe phase recruits in that Ushewokinze sought to integrate in the guerrilla 
movement. He insisted to acquire military training like Tekere and worked in the war 
‘hospitals’, training many combatants as nurses and field medics. After independence 
Ushewokunze is one of the few Ministers (and Edson Zvobgo), from the bush who worked a 
programme of integrating ex-combatants into the civil service, in this case into the health 
sector. He introduced a programme at Harare Polytechnic specifically to upgrade nursing 
skills of ex-combatants so that they would fit into the health delivery system (Personal 
communication, Lenneiye 2007). Zvobgo absorbed former political commissars (mostly ZIPA 
phase recruits) into Local Government and later did the same for a Magistrate programme 
when he was Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. 
116 Personal communication with MT, who participated in the Mt Hampden initiative (1981-
5). 
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parliamentary seats and they wanted to be allowed to be elected into party positions 
and addressing the specific needs of the War Veterans, such as war victim’s 
compensation. However, like the Mt Hampden initiative, this also failed in its 
objectives and the group folded. Nevertheless, informal debate and discussions 
about the position of the War Veterans in society and their role in leading post 
independence Zimbabwe continued among the veterans themselves. What seemed to 
be the major stumbling block was the relationship between the two guerrilla armies, 
ZIPRA and ZANLA. Seminars were organised to discuss these issues and the need 
for unity between the two parties and their former guerrilla armies.117 These debates 
tended to centre on the weaknesses caused by the division between the former 
liberation parties and their armies. However the debates remained elitist and 
scholarly thereby failing to permeate into the rest of the War Veterans. 
 
Unemployed War Veterans also attempted to solve their problems and meet their 
ambitions in a more specific or localised norm, e.g. through forming Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and agricultural cooperatives for purposes of 
self-rehabilitation. For example, War Veterans, chiefs and spirit mediums in 
Masvingo formed the Association of Zimbabwe Traditional Ecologists (AZTREC) in 
1985.118 The founder members of AZTREC were War Veterans who had continued 
with the agenda of taking land from the White settlers after independence but ended 
up in jail for having attempted to remove the White farmers by military force in 
1980.119 Gonese120 and Sub were ZIPA period recruits who had fought in the Gutu 
area during the war. They mooted the idea of forming conservation during their 
incarceration at Chikurubi Maximum Prison where they were serving 15 year jail 
sentences but were released after five years by Presidential Decree. 
 
The association’s goal was to unite War Veterans, spirit mediums and traditional 
chiefs in leading the peasants to rehabilitate sacred sites that had been degraded after 
                                                 
117 Some of these seminars were organised in collaboration with Grassroots Books, a leading 
purveyor of socialist literature with a heavy tilt towards literature from the Communist block 
during the Cold War (Personal observation mid-1980s). 
118 It was later renamed Association of Zimbabwe Traditional Environmental Conservationist. 
119 The decision was reached at Great Zimbabwe when the senior spirit medium who was 
conducting rituals at that ceremony told War Veterans that the spirits were not happy with 
continued ownership of land by Whites and she called for courageous War Veterans who 
would take up the command of the ancestors. Gonese and Sub, offered themselves and 
started on a mission to remove the White farmers, using guns they had smuggled from 
Entumbane Camps. Gonese then was a captain in the new Zimbabwe National Army 
(Personal communication with Gonese 1992-5). Using military force to remove White farmers 
from by War Veterans was not isolated to this case. Adgar Tekere, in 1980 also carried a 
similar operation with his aides on White farmer and killed Gerald William Adams of 
Stamford farm, near Harare. He and his accomplices were acquitted on a legal technicality – 
the Rhodesian Law that protected actions of Ministers in fighting against terrorism was used. 
Tekere’s action was supported by War Veterans at various levels including some Assembly 
Camp commanders like late Chihombe Madhala. Madhala drove to Harare and told Tekere 
that if the state would have him jailed they (Madhala, commanders and War Veterans) in the 
Assembly points had resolved to go out and resume fighting (Interview with AG, a War 
Veteran who was a member of the close security of CIO 2007). Ex-combatants supported 
Tekere because he was seen to be acting in conformity with the agenda of the liberation 
movement. 
120 Gonese is said to have been trained by guerrillas inside the country (Musikavanhu Sector) 
sometime between 1976 and 1977. 
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the war. It started operating in Masvingo Province but had clear national and 
regional objectives. In 1998, the association mobilised spirit mediums from as far as 
Guruve to preside over ceremonies in Masvingo (Participant observation, Masvingo, 
1998). AZTREC also hosted a continental training course on indigenous knowledge 
and development organised by Comparing and Supporting Endogenous 
Development that year.121  
AZTREC’s approach was to articulate African religion and conservation 
philosophy and practices for environmental rehabilitation and protection. For 
example the organisation introduced a program of rehabilitating mapa (burial places 
of chiefs), which according to Shona tradition, are sacred places as they are 
associated to the regional spirits of the land. These places had been degraded in the 
euphoric period at independence when the civil service inherited from the Smith 
Regime was at its weakest and could not enforce conservation laws. AZTREC 
succeeded in initiating conservation these sites including the artesian wells and 
springs (zvitubu) and marambatemwa. The organisation promoted African agronomic 
techniques, encouraging farmers to desist from using pesticides and chemical 
fertilisers. 
 
The activities of the association included planting of woodlots with indigenous 
species in direct contrast to the eucalyptus that was promoted by the Forestry 
Commission, a parastatal that spearheaded government forestry policy. Different 
indigenous tree species were associated with different sacred places and AZTREC 
was keen to restore vegetation that had significance to these places.122 AZTREC 
sought to revive these practices by re-educating the youth and holding traditional 
ceremonies where spirit mediums, chiefs and elders embarked in community 
education (Personal observation 1993-5). 123 
 
 The association attracted attention from all over the world and became a member 
of the COMPAS Network in addition to its participation in various regional and 
international conservation programs. The organisation got funding from the 
European Union Micro-projects, Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV), 
Hivos and Nordic NGOs. AZTREC still operates today. 
 
There were other NGOs formed by War Veterans for land and natural resources 
management based on African philosophy and practices. One such organisation was 
                                                 
121 The course was attended by African countries including Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, 
Tanzania and South Africa. 
122 For example, the muchakata tree is associated with traditional religion in that communion 
with ancestors is done under it and its leaves are used for placing the snuff offered to the 
ancestors. Mermaid pools (dziva renjuzu) and artesian wells have to be surrounded by certain 
water related species like the muonde and the mikute trees. The marambatemwa concept and 
practices were revived. These are places that are considered sacred, identified as such by the 
regional spirits a long time ago. There flora and fauna are kept intact to the extent that if the 
hunted enters such a place the hunters cannot pursue the animal anymore. If one has to eat 
fruits or harvest vegetables from there, special rituals have to be performed including 
clapping hands and reciting praise poems of the territorial spirits as if one is receiving the 
items from someone. Destruction of any flora and fauna is strictly prohibited and is 
understood to cause regional punishment as droughts and disease (Sadomba W. 1996). 
123 I was a member of AZTREC and Deputy Director (1993-5) during which time I coauthored 
the organisation’s literature with Cosmas Gonese, the Director. Two major works were The 
History of AZTREC (Gonese and Sadomba 1992) and Operational Strategy of AZTREC (1993). 
CHAPTER 3 
 
76 
Zimbabwe Resource Centre for Indigenous Knowledge (ZIRCIK), a national NGO 
whose membership comprised organisations that had interest in promoting African 
knowledge in resource management and utilisation. The organisation, formed in 
1996 encompassed such a big NGO as Zimbabwe National Traditional Healers 
Association founded by Professor Gordon Chavhunduka and many others that 
focused on indigenous food processing, cultural and spirit medium groups. ZIRCIK 
had strict principles of self reliance and rarely accepted donor funding. It had 
projects with the World Bank and it contributed in the research on indigenous 
knowledge in education methods. It also worked with The Netherlands Organisation 
for International Cooperation in Higher Education / Indigenous Knowledge 
(NUFFIC/IK-Unit). 
 
In 1997 the organisation focused on formation of a regional organisation Centre 
for Indigenous Cultures in Southern Africa (CICSA), covering 14 members in the 
region. The centre quickly transformed into an international organisation after 
African Americans got interested in it and wanted something wider to include all 
African peoples. This led to the formation African Nationalist Paradigm (ANP) in 
2000. This organisation focuses on promoting African cultures and promoting equal 
relations with other peoples. Owing to its principles of self reliance it bought land 
and established a research centre which also became its headquarters. The centre 
focused on African technologies. ANP started researching on indigenous cattle 
breeds in order to replenish the depleted national herd by selling improved breeding 
stock to new farmers. The organisation became the largest seller of breeding beef 
cattle in Mazowe area if not in the whole of Mashonaland Central province (Mazowe 
Institute of Veterinary Science and Zimbabwe Republic Police records 2007). 
However, as we shall see in the following chapters, organisations formed by War 
Veterans became targets during the Fast Track Land Reform Program by 
government. The farm was taken by the government and subdivided. Operations of 
ANP on the farm were wound in mid-2007.124 
 
Wampoa College graduates formed some NGOs focusing on a variety of 
activities. One such organisation was Management Outreach Training Services for 
Rural and Urban Development (MOTSRUD) founded by a female ex-combatant, 
graduate of Wampoa, in 1987 to provide ‘on the site business management, 
organisation skills training, tillage and transport services to people involved in self-
help125 projects ... associations, cooperatives, youth groups, women’s clubs and 
individuals engaged in subsistence, community services or income generating 
projects’ (MOTSRUD undated flier). The organisation worked on providing services 
to rural peasants in form of transport for hire, marketing services, supplying food aid 
to school children during drought periods to mention but just a few activities. 
MOTSRUD’s objective was to support rural people to be self sufficient and self 
reliant. Its training and education programs covered election education.126 
MOTSRUD’s programs are gender sensitive and capture indigenous knowledge in 
                                                 
124 Participant observer. I was one of the founder members of ZIRCIK, CICSA and African 
Nationalistic Paradigm (ANP) and became the Director of ANP (2000-6). War Veterans who 
were founder members of these organisations were ZIPA phase recruits and many of them 
were Wampoa College graduates.  
125 MOTSRUD’s motto is “Helping those who can help themselves”. 
126 Personal communication with MOTSRUD Director 2005. 
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various degrees. The organisation was funded by Nordic, Australian, Dutch and US 
donors. MOTSRUD still operates even today. 
 
Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa (HRTSA) was formed by a Wampoa 
graduate who pursued studies in law after the war and acquired a Master of Arts 
degree. The regional organisation is currently one of the most prominent in the 
region and is funded by governments and donor organisations. It carries various 
activities related to human rights including election education and monitoring. By its 
very nature HRTSA is an NGO engaged in governance and politics and therefore 
relates closely to the state and other civil society organisations. 
 
Studies by Moyo reveal that during the 1980s when government was pursuing its 
socialist ideology, Organisation of Collective Cooperatives of Zimbabwe (OCCZIM) 
was formed in 1983 with support from the Ministry of Community and Cooperative 
Development. Many of these cooperatives were led by ex-combatants, because of 
their assumed exposure to socialism and general group cohesion among them. This 
was conspicuous in the agricultural sector. Former ZIPRA War Veterans also 
initiated the Zimbabwe Project which carried a number of activities including 
agriculture (Kriger 2003). 
War Veterans sought ways of advancing their political and land ideologies 
through these organisations and as individuals in their various professions whenever 
possible, after being denied opportunities in the ruling party (See box 3.1). Through 
the civil society organisations that they formed they mobilised masses of people and 
sought to influence national policies and internal politics of the liberation movement. 
For example, Gonese took advantage of his AZTREC mobilisation to stage political 
offensive against the ruling elite in ZANU-PF, in Gutu North Parliamentary 
constituency, as we shall see later in this chapter. Similarly, CICSA and ZIRCIK were 
used as platform to mobilise people for land occupation in 2000. CICSA opened an 
electronic forum targeting professionals and academics to discuss the rupture of 2000 
with an objective of mobilising the elite to support land occupations. 
 
These organisations had varying degrees of success at both local and national 
levels. With the change of donor environment from 2000 those organisations that 
relied too heavily on donor support were significantly affected as many became 
financially crippled. Others which did not depend on donor support like ANP grew 
from strength to strength but were later attacked by ZANU-PF elites partly because 
of their War Veteran foundation and partly because of the internal politics within the 
liberation movement. 
 
Organisation of War Veterans at this time was very much scattered and 
isolated.127 There was no national structure for War Veterans and there was division 
                                                 
127 During this time individual and group efforts to resist nationalist alignment and 
discourses were the main tactics of the War Veterans. War Veterans who were employed en 
masse as in particularly ministries and local authorities used their work places and meetings 
to discuss the liberation agenda and mobilise people for land reclamation. For example when 
amalgamation of Rural and District Council was started War Veterans grabbed the 
opportunity to educate Black District Councillors to highlight clauses of the Rural District 
Council’s bill that inhibited resource sharing within the council area, focusing on land 
(Personal observation,Mashonaland Central Provincial Local Government Promotion and 
Training Officer 1986-9, See also Sadomba 1996). Other individual initiatives by War Veterans 
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between ZIPRA and ZANLA War Veterans owing to the animosity between ZAPU 
and ZANU, as highlighted above. The rift reached its climax when Joshua Nkomo, 
the President of ZAPU escaped to United Kingdom in disguise and ZIPRA senior 
commanders (Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuko) were arrested and jailed. 
Negotiations for unity were brokered by the then President Canaan Banana which 
eventually led to a Unity Accord between ZAPU and ZANU was signed on 22 
December 1987 and a new united ZANU-PF was formed. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
include their participation in Parliamentary debates. War Veterans like Lazrus Nzarayebani 
MP for Mutare Urban, and Malunga from Bulawayo who had was elected for at least two 
terms was critical of policies that compromised the liberation agenda with a lot of impact. 
Later contributions by Magaret Dongo and others were very much influenced by these 
debates. Some War Veterans began to contribute to the national newspapers writin both 
letters and contributing to special columns. For example Malachai Madimutsa, a Chitepo 
period recruit, a widely travelled intellectual with ZAPU before joining ZANU during 
Mugabe period, had to be reprimanded by Nathan Shamuyarira for what was termed 
embarrassing articles (Personal communication with Madimutsa, Highfield 1985-6).  
Box 3.1 Retrospective mapping in Malala Village 
The retrospective map made by the Malala Village Community in Beitbridge showed 
the settlement pattern of the indigenous people in the 1920s, how it changed and the 
effect on the environment, leading to the present water and sanitation problems. The 
people were concentrated at the confluence of the Mzingwane and Vembe (Limpopo) 
rivers. This choice of the area reveals deep analysis of land use planning. The soil in 
these places is rich alluvium gaining its fertility from the millennia of organic matter 
deposited from upstream. As three old people explained, it was the most suitable 
land for cropping. Shifting cultivation was the method of farming. Croplands were 
not stamped. They did not practise monoculture and there was no cash cropping 
during that time. There were a lot of bumper harvests. The catchment areas of the 
rivers were intact and the rivers were perennial. The rest of the hinterland which 
comprised marshlands, forests and grasslands, were left for wildlife and grazing. This 
included the drier parts, not suitable for cultivation. This life did not continue for 
long, as shown by subsequent maps. One year the people were just given orders to 
leave the land because it had been bought. Convoys of trucks came to ferry the 
villagers. The old people narrated the story in graphic detail and outlined how the 
area was made a commercial farming area. The people were then driven into the 
hinterland where they live today. More people came from other parts of the province 
to join them and within a few years the land started to fill up. When they arrived in 
that area (Mtetengwe) there were only three homesteads. From the subsequent maps 
one could see how the communities were enmeshed by the cash economy, how the 
environmental problems started to unfold and with that the progressive deterioration 
of living conditions. They were no longer masters of their destiny. From this 
passionate narration the community started to gain a deeper appreciation of its 
history and the origins of their present life. They noticed that the causes of their 
poverty and misery were common, starting with the loss of their economic base; their 
fertile croplands. This developed a great sense of identity, belonging and mutual 
interdependence amongst members. (Sadomba 1996) 
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The year 1987 marked a peace agreement between competing factions in ZANU-
PF. This was a point of accommodation between the civilian politicians dominating 
post independence politics (notably Mugabe and Nkomo) but War Veteran issues 
and political ambitions for the country remained as marginal as before. F. Sadomba 
(1999) sums up the experience of War Veterans before and during the first period 
after independence in the following graphic terms: 
In summary, the manner of the prosecution of the war between 1972 and 1979; the 
ushering in of independence and its challenge of some ZAPU cadres between 1980 and 
1987; and the post independence conduct of demobilisation and civil re-integration by 
politicians and officials has left many minds in anguish. The psychological traumatic 
effect of the above cuts across many sectors of Zimbabwe’s society including Whites, 
Blacks, civilians and soldiers from former three sides. However, while the other sectors 
have sought to alleviate their suffering from both formal and informal sources … only the 
ex-combatants have taken up a crusade that has implications on the future political 
stability of the nation. (Sadomba, F. 1999: 4) 
 
Lack of planning on the part of the liberation movement (ZAPU and ZANU), a set 
of restrictive impositions by the Lancaster House Agreement inhibiting flexibility to 
mobilise financial resources from the economy or donors (Rupiah 1995, Kriger 2003), 
and looting of meagre available resources, rendered Zimbabwean demobilisation 
difficult and unsuccessful. The weaknesses of demobilisation affected the guerrillas, 
but not the RSF. Many guerrillas did not pass through APs,128 and there was no 
proper registration of names or payroll. Guerrilla ranks were not recognised 
(Personal observation, Goromonzi, 1980) 129and this meant that commanders could 
not be used, were unwilling, to establish order. Thus the central point of the above 
account is that demobilisation failed (Kriger 1995, Rupiah 1995, Tapfumaneyi 1996, 
Tapfumaneyi 2001, Kingma 2000; 2002, Kriger 2003) the War Veterans drifted 
onwards with their mindset still dominated by the issues of war, rather than being 
positively reoriented towards an era of peace. 
 
The land and cults of the land activated in the minds of the fighters during the 
war thus became an anchoring theme, while their needs remained unmet. It is during 
this period that the influence of the nationalist leaders, and subsequently of the 
government, over the land movement can first be discerned. During the Lancaster 
House negotiations nationalists conceded the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ condition. 
Moreover, they agreed to leave this clause in the constitution unchanged for ten 
years after independence. These two conditions inhibited land redistribution. There 
was, as discussed earlier, a fast track scheme, but it was too modest in scope to meet 
the needs of all War Veterans. Moreover settler selection during this period did not 
specifically target War Veterans as a category. Registration was through traditional 
structures so this disadvantaged War Veterans who were coming from the bush. 
                                                 
128 Both ZIPRA and ZANLA, suspicious of the ceasefire arrangement, had reserved armies 
outside assembly points, in case the RSF mounted a surprise attack. In the case of ZANLA 
those who arrived in the APs were inexperienced youths while the hardened guerrillas stayed 
outside. ZIPRA had a double problem – fear of RSF surprise attack, and fear of ZANLA 
political domination in independent Zimbabwe, so reserved some detachments of guerrillas 
for possible future military operations. 
129 For example, there was no equivalent of Detachment Political Commissar (my own rank) 
in the conventional system of army ranks, and I was therefore ranked as a private on 
demobilisation. 
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They had no local connections and did not appear in the local registers of the village 
heads and the headmen for them to be considered for resettlement. 130 
 
 In 1981, the government’s target for resettlement was a mere 18,000 households, 
though this was scaled, so that by 1983 the aim was ‘165,000 households on five 
million hectares … [Even so, T]he government’s Riddell Commission of 1981 had 
estimated landlessness and land shortages five times greater than the largest official 
targets’ (Moyo 1995: 118). This shows that, true to the spirit of its Lancaster House 
agreements, the new government underplayed the land issue. It is perhaps 
surprising that the ‘over 235,000 hectares of land acquired for resettlement 
nationwide were not resettled by 1990, in spite of the land demand evident in 
provincial resettlement “waiting lists”’ (Moyo 1995: 122) thereby raising doubts of 
government’s seriousness about land redistribution. Further, this suggests that the 
underplaying of the government hand was a deliberate strategy to create an artificial 
shortage and a politically useful tool of patronage. 
 
During the 1980s peasants in the communal lands increased production of food 
and cash crops. For example, in relation to maize communal land farmers surpassed 
commercial farmers in the 1984 season and maintained this position up to and 
beyond 2000 rupture (Ministry of Lands Agriculture and Rural Resettlement 2001). 
Total output of sorghum and sunflower by communal area farmers were higher 
during this and the previous decade (MOLARR 2001). As the early resettlement 
program of 1980-4 did not specifically target War Veterans this increased production 
by the communal land farmers effectively caused War Veterans to feel more 
neglected and disadvantaged in comparison to the communal farmers. 
 
In addition President Mugabe announced his policy of reconciliation, which as we 
saw, meant reconciliation with settler capital rather than between the races. Under 
this policy any land occupations were cracked down upon with the utmost brutality, 
using the police to nip any land movement activism in the bud (Moyo 2001). Such 
top-down crackdown by government on the land movement formed a striking 
contrast to government’s later behaviour of siding with the activists during the 2000 
occupations, thereby raising questions in both academic and political circles about 
the double standards now apparent. 
 
 
3.4 The War Veterans’ movement from the 1987 Unity Accord 
to the land occupations in 1997 
The decade 1988 to 1999 marked a distinct phase in the history of the veterans’ 
liberation project, with ripples felt throughout the general social, political and 
economic fabric of society. From the Lancaster House Agreement (1979), where the 
interests of the fighters were not represented in the negotiations, to the 1987 accord, 
nationalist politicians were wary of the veterans, and feared potential political 
challenges from a potentially nascent veterans movement seeking to carry on some of 
                                                 
130 My own experiences could shed light here. When I went to join the guerrilla movement I 
was a minor but when I returned I was a major but I did not appear in the village registers 
and could therefore not get benefits that were processed through the system. I therefore had 
to buy a piece of land within the village which was later taken away by the village head and 
given to someone else who was in the village register (Personal observation 1983-90). 
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the ambitions of the liberation war. In part this was a symptom of the Mugabe 
government not yet feeling fully in charge of the political agenda. It feared the War 
Veterans much like it feared challenges from other contenders for power. But by the 
late 1980s ZANU-PF felt itself firmly in the saddle, enjoying dominance of near one-
party rule, and facing only a negligible challenge from the ZANU Ndonga of 
Ndabaningi Sithole. Before the Unity Accord of 1987, the two parties inheriting the 
political legacy of association with the liberation struggle (ZANU-PF and ZAPU-PF) 
vied for power. The government (as we have seen) neglected ex-combatants as the 
opposite side of the coin of its alliance with White capital. The signing of the Unity 
Accord should have increased the grip of the merged ZANU/ZAPU-PF even further. 
But one unanticipated consequence was of the accord was that the War Veterans 
were now able to form a united front, and henceforth for some years the focus of 
opposition shifted to the internal politics of the (enlarged) ruling party. 
 
The Unity Accord was signed on 22 December 1987. Internal political struggles 
were not long in surfacing within the ruling party. 
 
With lively participation by the likes of Nzarayebani and Malunga, criticising 
opportunists in ZANU-PF for neglecting the liberation agenda many now saw a 
chance to become active in national politics. In Masvingo War Veterans mobilised 
peasants to vote against the ZANU-PF Politburo choice of candidate in primaries 
leading to the 1990 general elections. In a nationally publicised showdown between 
Shuvai Mahofa and Cosmas Gonese (a War Veteran) the Politburo candidate lost the 
primaries, humiliating the ruling party in what was seen as a head-on conflict 
between a War Veteran-peasant alliance and the ruling clique. After succeeding out-
voting Mahofa in a crucial election and allies ‘broke into a song entitled Hatichada 
kunyengerera which literally means ‘we are fed up’ (The Herald 31 October 1988). War 
Veteran leader, Cosmas Gonese, spoke out against the imposition of leaders by the 
Politburo saying: 
Cde. Nyagumbo [ZANU-PF Politburo member and Secretary for Administration] must 
not tell us what to do here, ZANU-PF must not be run like a company, it’s for the people 
and Cde Nyagumbo must not talk as if he is a company director. We never voted for Cde 
Mahofa, who was imposed on us and we do not want her. (The Herald 8 January 1989) 
 
This marked the beginning of a new era in the politics of Zimbabwe, with the 
periphery (in this peasants and War Veterans) directly challenging power at the 
centre. War Veterans now became much more active in national politics than before. 
After their electoral success at Masvingo, the War Veterans continued with their 
tactic of organising peasants as their power base to challenge the ruling oligarchy, a 
tactic applied until the land occupation period from 1998. With this tactic the War 
Veterans’ movement expanded beyond ex-combatants, drawing in peasants, youths 
and other political interests. They also organised demonstrations against ZANU-PF 
ruling elite.131 This open defiance increasingly encouraged a number of independent 
candidates to contest elections from 1990 onwards. 
 
                                                 
131 The Herald (15 October 1988) in an item ‘Police step in to stop demo at Gutu’, reported that 
‘More than 200 people gathered in Gutu yesterday to demonstrate against the 8 ZANU-PF Gutu 
representatives who met President Mugabe on Tuesday in support of the area’s MP – Mahofa.’ The 
demonstrators included youths and peasants (see also The Herald 10 August 1988). 
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Edgar Tekere, deposed former ZANU-PF Secretary General and Minister of 
Labour in Mugabe’s first government, opposed the drift of the nationalists towards a 
one-party state, and formed a new political party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement 
(ZUM) - in April 1989.132 Although Tekere had the courage to contest, he was 
unsuccessful in the presidential and parliamentary elections, gaining only three 
seats, and protested that the votes were rigged. Many War Veterans supported 
Tekere, since he offered a clear critique of the policy of sidelining the liberation 
struggle, and complained about the way the independence movement had been 
high-jacked by new-comers (anamafikezolo).133 Tekere’s concerns were closely in line 
with those of the War Veterans more generally. This was the first major challenge to 
the united ZANU-PF party arising from within the liberation movement. It drew 
support not only from the War Veterans, but also from a national cross-section of 
peasants, workers, intelligentsia and the Black bourgeoisie, in contrast to the ZANU 
Ndonga Party of Ndabaningi Sithole.134 However, ZUM was thwarted allegedly 
through ZANU-PF’s use of state power. Its peak was in the 1990 general and 
presidential elections, and subsequently it faded from view. 
 
This was the first internal break away from the liberation movement. Tekere’s 
courage in forming an opposition party and daring to criticise ZANU-PF and 
President Mugabe for neglecting the agenda of the liberation struggle had a 
dynamising impact on the War Veterans.  
These developments should be viewed in a wider context. The steady emergence 
of the War Veterans as a political force offered a challenge to Mugabe’s basic power 
building blocks. Through carefully selective recruitment he had encircled himself 
with acquaintances, relatives, and a range of loyal but often incompetent leaders, and 
now he was for the first time challenged from within in a key area of political 
management - resistance to imposition of functionaries of Mugabe’s choice by War 
Veterans and mobilised peasants. At the same time was coming from without, as 
new opposition parties, following in the wake of ZUM, began to test their chances. 
 
This spelt the beginning of the end of ZANU-PF undisputed political hegemony 
and de facto one party state rule. Secondly, this development also made clear a major 
split in the liberation movement, revealing to all and sundry the gap and antagonism 
between the levels. A new form of conflict, different from the former ZAPU/ZANU 
and ZIPRA/ZANLA split, had become apparent. This time the division was no 
longer along ethnic lines, but one which began to reveal opposed class alignments 
within the liberation movement. Nationalist elites and a rising Black bourgeoisie 
were now increasingly opposed in interest to class of peasants, workers and 
marginalised ex-combatants, as they continued to abuse state and political power in 
order to amass wealth. Thirdly, the challenge from below was increasingly well-
                                                 
132 Edgar Tekere was one of the few nationalists who insisted on getting guerrilla training and 
received it. He is therefore a War Veteran over and above his nationalist status and his 
position was always viewed positively by combatants. 
133 In essence Tekere was attacking the selective recruitment policy of Mugabe. The new-
comers (amafikezolo) he referred to were the hand-picked politicians, usually comprising 
relatives, friends acquaintances and loyalists with no liberation credentials. 
134 Ndabaningi Sithole was the first President of ZANU, who was deposed through the 
Mgagao Declaration in 1975. He then formed ZANU Ndonga which appealed only to the 
three parliamentary constituencies of Chipinga, where it consistently won seats in the post 
independence period, signifying its ethnic cleavage. 
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organised. War Veterans, by now keenly aware of the political character and tactics 
of the ruling oligarchy, started to organise the peasantry to challenge elite power. A 
new political era of oppositional politics had begun, just as the Unity Agreement 
(and the de facto one-party state it heralded) was being celebrated. 
 
The Unity Accord was almost immediately followed by raging debate about 
corruption135 and the plight of ex-combatants, gaining momentum when the issue 
was tabled in Parliament in March 1988. Kriger (Kriger 1995: 156) writes: 
With preparations under way for ZANU (PF) to dissolve their separate constitutions and 
unite, parliamentarians turned to the plight of the nation’s living heroes, the ex-
combatants, in March 1988. The motion on ex-combatants, introduced in parliament by 
a White non-constituency member … Sean Handermark, ended the virtual silence on the 
grim situation of an estimated 25,000 – 35,000 unemployed ex-combatants. 
Parliamentarians who spoke in support of the motion portrayed ex-combatants as poor, 
desperate, disgraced, jobless and roaming the streets, despite their contribution to the 
liberation of Zimbabwe. (Kriger 1995: 156) 
 
The print media now became full of stories of neglected ex-combatants, sometimes 
with pictures like the one below, taken by The Herald (13 December 1990).136 
 
 
 
                                                 
135 ZANU-PF leaders including government ministers and parliamentarians had been 
involved in a major scandal in 1986/87 involving corrupt accessing of manufactured vehicles 
from the only country’s assembly plant, Willowvale Motor Industry. One of the Ministers, 
Frederick Shava who had been convicted and sentenced to a jail term was pardoned by 
President Mugabe who invoked his presidential powers. Corruption had caused internal 
divisions within ZANU-PF, calling for a debate on a leadership code. War Veterans were 
incensed by this corruption, especially considering the neglect. 
136
 The story of this picture by Charles Kabera, a Herald correspondent, was entitled, ‘Sheer 
determination: dollars roll despite disability’. ‘Magureyi (31), wounded in a battle and amputated 
found himself unemployed and his “demob” money in sufficient to cater for his family. He resorted to 
selling roasted mealies … However, the money he made from these sales was insufficient, hence his 
decision to enter the firewood business. “Firewood splitting is not easy for a one-armed man. At times 
if the blow is too powerful the axe springs from my hand, or worse still if the wood is too hard I get a 
lot of blisters, but I have to make money somehow”, he said.’ 
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Figure 3.3 A War Veteran 
Lameck Magureyi, a War Veteran amputated after injury in a battle, found himself jobless and penniless 
after the war and resorted to cutting firewood for sale with his one good arm. He had received no 
rehabilitation support from the government. Magurei was a ZIPA period recruit from Honde Valley, 
Manicaland who joined the war in 1975.  
 Source: courtesy of The Herald 1990 
 
With the Unity Accord signed, a new public debate about the neglect of ex-
combatants starting, and the environment was set for a united War Veterans 
association. It was finally formed in 1989 as the Zimbabwe National Liberation War 
Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). This was an important development in the 
organisation of the War Veterans’ movement because energies were no longer spent 
fighting each other. The change also sharpened contradictions between the War 
Veterans and the ‘Old Guard’ nationalists in the ruling party, as ex-combatants 
began to question their position vis a vis the nationalists and newcomers in the 
liberation movement. However, because of teething problems and resistance from 
the politicians the official inauguration of association only took place later, in 1992. 
 
The first National Executive of the ZNLWVA was weak and ineffective. 
Incumbents included Chris Pasipamire,137 Hebert Matanga and other former ZIPRA 
cadres. However the executive failed to convene a national congress and to hold 
elections for more than four years, despite the provisions of the ZNLWVA 
constitution. They were heavily criticised for poor performance, financial 
mismanagement and failure to fight for the interests of the War Veterans. It was 
                                                 
137 Pasipamire was a Mugabe phase recruit who did not undergo military training (Personal 
communication with MT December 2007) but Matanga was ZIPA phase recruit and former 
political commissar during the Mugabe period. 
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expected the ZNLWVA would operate along lines similar to a trade union in 
protecting its employed members. The leadership was accused of doing nothing 
when War Veterans were targeted for retrenchment, for example, and for failing to 
fight for benefits for War Veterans, including demobilisation funds, reintegration 
training programs, pensions and gratuities. They were ousted at a meeting held in 
the Parliament Buildings in 1992 by a meeting of the provincial leadership convened 
against the will of the national executive.138 A national executive committee led by 
Charles Hungwe139 succeeded the first leadership. The new executive was not much 
more active. It made an effort to meet provincial members and to develop structures, 
but that was about all. A handful of utterances apart, the Hungwe executive failed to 
confront ZANU-PF and the government to demand answers to the problems of the 
War Veterans. The Hungwe Executive was widely seen by the rank-and-file as 
conniving with ZANU-PF. Instead of confronting the party and its president the 
executive argued that War Veterans had to draw the sympathy of the party to attract 
attention to their plight. This committee was then unseated in favour of a new 
executive led by Dr. Hunzvi,140 voted in at a congress held in Umzingwane, 
Matebeleland South Province in 1995. 
 
It is important to recognise that despite this faltering start, War Veterans had 
begun to build a national organisation. The structure of ZNLWVA cut across the 
ZIPRA and ZANLA divide and for the first time there were active structures down to 
the district levels. These became instrumental in organising and mobilising for the 
land occupations, albeit without getting command from the centre, as we shall see 
later in the thesis. The national executive headed a hierarchy of provincial and 
district committees. These became official communication channels through which 
the War Veterans started to pressurise government to look into the plight of the 
many destitute ex-combatants. The immediate reaction of government was to pre-
empt ZNLWVA by forming a board under the Social Welfare Act. A War Veterans 
Board was set up with a mandate to address the problems of War Veterans on behalf 
of government, chaired by Rtd. General Solomon Mujuru (Rex Nhongo), the former 
commander of ZIPA Military Committee who betrayed his ZIPA colleagues and 
aligned with the Mugabe leadership in 1976. Mujuru was the first Black Army 
Commander of ZNA. Due to inactivity it remained a white elephant, because War 
Veterans went about their business as if the Board did not exist and it was little 
known or respected by ordinary War Veterans.141 
                                                 
138 Personal observation (1993) Parliament buildings, Harare. I attended the meeting as part of 
Masvingo delegation and was instrumental to the changing of the old leadership. 
139 A lawyer, and later a Regional Magistrate and a High Court Judge at the time of writing. 
140 Polish trained, the doctor gained popularity when he assessed the injuries of War Veterans 
and awarded them percentages for compensation purposes. Hunzvi also argued in the press 
and in public addresses that War Veterans of Zimbabwe had been short-changed and he 
urged government to compensate ex-combatants for both physical and mental disabilities 
caused by the war. With his exposure of World War II claims during his medical training in 
Poland, he was well equipped to argue the position of War Veterans. War Veterans liked him 
for his courage and articulation of their position. 
141 Mugabe has tried several times to put the War Veterans under the command of retired 
former guerrilla commanders, without success. He still attempts to co-opt their support. For 
example in 2006, in serious in-party fighting, with his continued rule under threat from 
internal contenders, he appealed to War Veterans to back him. But doubting their loyalty 
after badly treating them in the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, he then tried to insist on 
War Veterans being led by former ZIPRA Intelligence supremo, Dumiso Dabengwa, retired 
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An Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) was adopted in 1990 (barely 
a year after the formation of ZNLWVA) and introduced major changes in 
government expenditure, chief among which was the demand to downsize the civil 
service (Kanyenze 2004). When ESAP was full throttle, in 1992, ex-combatants were 
retrenched en masse from many government ministries.142 This coincided with 
extensive lay-offs, as a result of the economic downturn the ESAP was intended to 
address. This double blow made many more War Veterans unemployed, a 
development which strengthened the War Veteran organisation. 
 
In April 1992, ZNLWVA held its inaugural meeting in Chinhoyi, and it invited its 
patron, the incumbent State President, Robert Mugabe. This was a landmark 
meeting. Representatives of War Veterans from all over the country, and from both 
ZIPRA and ZANLA, came and put forward their case in no uncertain terms. War 
Veterans argued that the party had been hijacked, and had degenerated because ‘it 
had been taken over by wolves in sheep clothing’, a reference to the opportunists and 
loyalists filling party and government posts: ‘This is not the same Zanu (PF) that we 
built. This is not the same party we brought home in 1980 upon attainment of 
victory. The party is dead …’ one ex-fighter said (The Herald 25 April 1992). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Army Commander, Solomon Mujuru, retired Army Commander Zvinavashe and former 
dissident leader Andrew Ndhlovu. As these leaders went round the Provinces attempting to 
reorganise War Veterans they came under attack from the ex-combatants themselves, 
rendering the whole effort futile. They had also started to campaign against Mugabe’s 
continued rule causing Mugabe to work against them. Mugabe dropped them and sought the 
support of Jabulani Simbanda who was the properly elected War Veteran Chairman at a 
Congress in Mutare in 2005 but had been booted out of ZANU-PF (by Mugabe leadership) for 
participating in the Tsholotsho saga led by Johnathan Moyo (deposed Minister of 
Information). Sibanda successfully campaigned for Mugabe’s ZANU-PF candidature to stand 
for the country’s Presidency amid internal opposition from. His campaign reached climax 
when he organised a million men and women march in Harare in November 2007. 
142 The most conspicuous targeting of ex-combatants for retrenchment from the civil service 
involved disbanding departments that had recruited mainly ex-combatants in the early 1980s. 
For example the Ministry of Local Government’s Promotion and Training Section employing 
more than 300 ex-combatants, the Department of Youth in the Ministry of Youth Sport and 
Culture, and the Department of Community Development in the Ministry of Community 
Development in the Ministry of Community Development and Women’s Affairs, all of which 
recruited mainly from among former Political Commissars, and particularly from Chitepo 
College, were disbanded in 1990/91. As a transition, the units were systematically moved to 
the newly formed Ministry of Political Affairs before being abolished. Across the whole civil 
service very few, if any departments, were abolished like that. Ex-combatants believed that 
the movement of Mariyawanda Nzuwa from post of Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of 
Local Government Rural and Urban Development to chair the Public Service Commission, 
was intended to purge ex-combatants in the public service. Rumour has it that Nzuwa was 
posted a bullet in an envelope by the War Veterans, during the War Veteran demonstrations 
in 1997. Nzuwa had previously successfully silenced and then purged Local Government 
Promotion Officers, a group of ex-combatants in his Ministry. Local Government Promotion 
Officers wrote a grievance document according to Public Service procedures declaring that 
they intended to meet Mugabe to explain if the Commission failed to address their 
grievances. Nzuwah foiled the move (Personal observation and co-author to the grievance 
document, ‘The Grievances of Local Government Promotion and Training Section’, Harare 1989). 
See also Hammar 2003. 
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War Veterans demanded recognition and one, pointing to the delegates, angrily 
reminded the President and senior politicians that: ‘Everybody in the position of 
leadership is there because we fired guns. None of you could attain positions of 
leadership within the Smith regime. You are where you are because of these people 
here’ (The Herald 25 April 1992). 
 
They demanded Mugabe ‘throw out the rest of the leadership of the country’ (The 
Herald 25 April 1992). At the meeting, the War Veterans threatened the government 
that if it was developing cold feet they would get the land from the White farmers 
themselves, demanding speedy resettlement of peasants, farm workers and ex-
combatants. For the first time in Zimbabwe, the War Veterans were speaking with 
one voice, attacking nationalist politicians and criticising opportunists within the 
liberation movement. A new tone had been introduced that finally addressed the 
complex contradictions within the liberation movement in a settler dominated 
economy. 
 
Economic strife exacerbated by retrenchments, hardships caused by ESAP, adding 
to general neglect, now drove the War Veterans to demand what they believed the 
state and society owed them. They demanded to be compensated for the injuries they 
suffered during the war. They demanded the demobilisation packages they never 
received. They demanded pensions and gratuities. Above all they demanded land for 
resettlement. Their argument for resettlement was based on the precedent of 
compensation previously offered to soldiers recruited to fight the World War I and 
World War II, a topic which they had by now carefully researched.143 
 
The 1990 election saw a number of War Veterans enter Parliament, following 
pressure on the ruling party to allow War Veterans to participate in parliamentary 
elections without hindrance. Some of these new parliamentarians were women, such 
as Margaret Dongo, who became vocal about the plight of War Veterans, and 
challenged nationalists (particularly Nathan Shamuyarira)144, in parliamentary 
debate. The ZANU-PF Politburo decided to drop Dongo from the Party ticket in the 
                                                 
143 Rhodesians who had taken part in World War II were demobilised with resettlement 
packages and education options. The package was heavily funded by the government. ‘Based 
on 1944 budgetary estimates, £44,000 pounds, of which £13,793 was specifically dedicated to the 
“Soldier Land Resettlement Scheme” in the 1945-6 budget.’ (Tapfumaneyi 1996: 24). It also 
involved major policy decisions, such as alienating Black owned land particularly in Nyanga 
and Gokwe, in order to resettle World War II veterans (NAZ S237/1, Suspension of Land 
Alienation during WWII 1940-7). Ex-combatants undertook their own research to inform the 
War Veterans. For example, then Major Tapfumaneyi himself was himself an ex-combatant 
(ZIPA period recruit), and his research was of general interest to War Veterans. 
144 Shamuyarira was former FROLIZI leader who had defected from ZANU after failing to 
oust Herbert Chitepo as leader of the Dare in 1972. He was then recruited by Robert Mugabe 
during the selective recruitment drive of 1976. It is widely believed that Mugabe recruited 
Shamuyarira to strengthen his ethnic group of the Zezuru. Shamuyarira became the Secretary 
for Information and held several Ministerial positions in Mugabe’s government including 
that of Minister of Information. When he resigned from government he was full time in 
ZANU-PF where hitherto he holds is the spokesman of the party and is responsible for 
safeguarding ZANU-PF archival materials which have not yet been released to the public 
since independence. War Veterans view him as a person who hates them and as a sell-out for 
his role in creating FROLIZI. 
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1995 general elections in favour of Vivian Mwashita145, another woman ex-
combatant. However Dongo protested and registered as an independent candidate 
with the support of War Veterans and her constituency. Vivian Mwashita was 
declared a winning candidate but Dongo complained that the votes were rigged and 
took the matter to the courts and won. In a re-run of the elections Dongo won the 
Parliamentary seat, setting a new challenge to the ruling ZANU-PF and giving 
confidence to the electorate that some democratic progress could be made against the 
Mugabe regime, as Masunungure (2004: 166) subsequently analysed: 
This development was significant politically in that even individuals now had the self-
confidence to challenge the ruling party. It demonstrated that though ZANU-PF 
remained omnipresent, it was no longer omnipotent. More importantly, it was a 
harbinger of an incipient opposition movement, which started under the organisational 
name of the Movement of Independent Electoral Candidates (MIEC), under Dongo’s 
chair[womanship]. 
 
Participation of War Veterans in national politics, challenging the ZANU-PF 
ruling elite from within, and using a wide variety of tactics, contributed to the build-
up of a formidable opposition politics in the country over the next few years. From 
internal challenges and struggles, first War Veteran organised grassroots resistance 
like the Gutu North constituency, then Tekere yet again Dongo (both War Veterans), 
political opposition field was widened. Dongo’s strategy to organise independent 
candidates, was clear maturation of opposition politics in Zimbabwe.146 
 
Margaret Dongo is an interesting example of this kind of development. She 
transformed the MIEC into a political party ZUD in 1998. It could be claimed that the 
War Veterans’ movement, with its militant street marches, support for independent 
candidates, and stimulus to the formation of breakaway political parties, also paved 
the way for the mass protests, demonstrations, and riots that finally led to the 
formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). But this is to get ahead of 
the story. 
 
Meanwhile, the ZNLWVA elected Dr Chenjerai Hunzvi’s Committee at a congress 
held at Umzingwane in 1995. The Chairmanship of Hunzvi transformed the 
Association into an active and militant force. Hunzvi was a medical doctor trained in 
Poland, and aware of issues of war victim compensation, having learnt from his 
trainers how they dealt with compensation issues for World War II victims. Under 
his leadership the medical problems of ex-combatants were first exposed. The Herald 
(1 July 1995) reported: 
For [War Veterans], a special help is needed. The Zimbabwe National Liberation War 
Veteran's Association believes there are several hundred men and women still suffering 
from traumatic mental stress, people who were mentally broken by war, and what they 
saw and what they felt. Besides these people, there are those who faced great stress on 
demobilisation; with families dead or uncaring, friends gone and homes destroyed they 
cannot piece the bits back together, and go over the edge themselves. 
 
                                                 
145 Both Mwashita and Dongo were ZIPA period recruits from Manicaland. Here again was 
used a divide and rule tactic. 
146 A number of independent candidates had succeeded in parliamentary and local 
government elections, notably Councillor Mudehwe in Mutare Urban. 
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The association mobilised support from various institutions, until eventually ‘the 
Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, the veteran's association and the University of 
Zimbabwe's faculty of medicine … launched a rehabilitation program for the broken 
men and women for whom the war still has to end.’ (The Herald 1 July 1995). 
Humanitarian NGOs also supported War Veterans and sympathised with them,147 
which also added to the pressure on the government and ruling party to pay 
attention.148 
 
The following year, 1996, the association was instrumental in getting the 
government to enact or amend a number of pieces of legislation which War Veterans 
felt hindered their progress. Sixteen years after Independence, Parliament finally 
enacted a War Veterans Act (1996).149 This provided for the establishment of a War 
Veterans Board, heavily controlled by the Minister of Public Service, Labour and 
Social Welfare. War Veterans viewed the Act as an attempt by the government to co-
opt loyalists in order to regain control over an increasingly militant movement. 
Under Hunzvi’s leadership, the War Veterans disregarded the Act, continuing to 
build the pressure politically, as if it did not exist.150 In addition, the War Victims 
Compensation Act was amended (1996). In the event, pressure caused government to 
release money to compensate War Veterans for injuries. The distribution was badly 
handled, and many non-War Veterans benefited, and relatives of the ruling oligarchy 
in particular.151 After 16 years it was difficult to establish who exactly was qualified 
to benefit from the scheme. Other demobilisation schemes typically supply ex-
combatants with entitlement cards in return for handing over a weapon, and punch 
holes in the entitlement pass when specific benefits are handed over. Even such 
schemes, in the immediate aftermath of wars, where it is more obvious who is to be 
treated, are subject to abuse, so how much more likely was it that compensation 
would be incorrectly directed in the Zimbabwe case? The looting of the War Victims 
Compensation fund angered War Veterans and was one of the factors leading to War 
Veterans street marches and demonstrations in 1996 and 1997. 
 
                                                 
147 For example, in an article entitled Bringing them home from war (The Herald 11 May 1995: 4) 
it was recorded that ‘A P Reeler from the Amani Trust backs the article of 1 July 1995 in The Herald. 
Through research, Amani trust established that over the past 20 years few people have recovered from 
effects of the war physically and psychologically. " …We therefore strongly agree with your statement: 
As a matter of honour, we should do what is required to bring home all those who went to war."’ 
148 The outcome of the tripartite effort is unclear. But it is clear it was too little too late, 
because this should have been planned for prior to independence, as part of the peace 
negotiations. As Sadomba F.C. (1999: 19) notes, ‘there have been no anticipatory programmes to 
train staff, identify extreme cases of PTSD and begin the much-needed rehabilitation of this 
marginalised community. Because of this the ZNLWVA has announced plans to establish a section 
specialising in PTSD within the hospital project that is envisaged. But this will not provide the 
panacea for what was required. National awareness and recognition of the existence of PTSD amongst 
ex-combatants as well as very visible efforts to address the problem through both the formal and 
informal system … would constitute the most effective way of lowering social tensions’. 
149 It defined a War Veteran as ‘any person who underwent military training and participated, 
consistently and persistently in the liberation struggle which occurred in Zimbabwe and in 
neighbouring countries between the 1st January 1962, and the 29th of February 1980, in connection 
with the bringing about of independence on the 18th of April 1980.’ 
150 The Chairman of the Board, who was appointed by the Minister, according to the Act, was 
retired General Mujuru (Rex Nhongo). 
151 For example, one of the most widely published incidents involved a Marufu, brother to the 
First Lady, Grace Mugabe. The corruption also ensnared Dr. Hunzvi (McCandless 2005). 
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Under Hunzvi’s leadership, ex-combatants took to the streets of Harare and 
elsewhere. Such demonstrations against the ruling party, ZANU-PF, had not been 
witnessed before. Ex-combatants were defiant and threatened violence against 
anyone who tried to stop their peaceful demonstrations. They demanded to talk to 
Robert Mugabe in person for two reasons. One was that he was the Head of State. 
The War Veterans had fought for the state. The other was that according to 
ZNLWVA constitution the President of the country automatically becomes the 
patron of the Association. 
 
President Mugabe refused to talk to the War Veterans and he turned a cold 
shoulder to their welfare and other demands. The War Veterans only piled on the 
pressure. When talk was unavoidable Mugabe preferred to send his Ministers of 
Social Welfare, Defence and/or Security for meetings with ex-combatants, held at 
ZANU-PF Head Quarters. On one occasion ministers were held hostage for several 
hours while the women in the meeting presented them with crawling and crying 
babies, a rather effective non-violent means of protest. Politicians seeking election are 
said to be good at kissing babies, but this was beyond a joke. The War Veterans were 
protesting they had no means to feed the children. The ministers were expected to 
find the milk! 
 
Ex-combatants also started to disrupt high level government activities. In August 
1997 they staged demonstrations and disrupted a conference being held at the 
Harare Conference Centre between government and a group of African Americans 
intending to invest in the country. There was a strong rumour that President Mugabe 
had ordered the army to shoot the demonstrators, but that the army (and other 
uniformed forces) refused to carry out the order. Many were War Veterans 
themselves. The uniformed forces in fact informed the War Veterans about the order, 
and their refusal to obey it. They assured the War Veterans of their support 
(Information from G, a Provincial and National Executive member of ZNLWVA, 
who claimed to have been present at the meeting at Police General Headquarters, 
Harare, 1999). The climax of the conflict was the siege of the State House, the official 
residence of the President. At this point President Mugabe, now seriously alarmed 
that his grip on power was slipping, yielded not only to talks but to the demand to 
compensate the War Veterans. This was at the end of 1997. 
 
 
3.5 War Veteran grievances and the truce of 1997 
The picture painted so far shows that the War Veterans did not disperse and 
integrate with civilian society after the war of Independence, but that circumstances 
kept many of them in a condition where they came to rely, for their sense of identity 
and coherence, on an explicit vision shaped during the war (that the struggle was a 
struggle for land) and on a set of coherent grievances around which they were 
increasingly willing to base political action, eventually challenging Robert Mugabe’s 
regime. Summing up the grievances of the War Veterans, it is clear that they reflect 
on a sense that a war-time political vision was being squandered, but also on the 
marginal nature of the life many of them lived in independent Zimbabwe. Neglect by 
the state, poverty, social humiliation, aggressive neo-liberal (anti-liberation) policies, 
settler supremacy and racism helped feed War Veterans grievances. Tapera (Knox) 
Chitiyo’s paper, ‘Land Violence and Compensation: Reconceptualising Zimbabwe’s 
THE POST WAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR VETERANS’ MOVEMENT 
 
91 
Land and War Veterans’ Debate’ is ground-breaking in showing ‘the link … between 
the land crisis and the War Veterans’ situation in Zimbabwe’ (Chitiyo 2000: 1). 
 
The blame to most people lay with the attitudes of an increasingly unsympathetic 
political leadership. This comes out clearly in the testimony of one veteran, 
Simbanda, interviewed by F. Sadomba: 
All [the nationalists] needed were the reigns of power … I still remember in 1984, we 
sent our representative to go and see Dr. Nkomo. The situation had seriously worsened 
… Nkomo actually said, ‘I never moved from one homestead to another saying one, two 
three let’s go to war’. We felt dejected, we felt lost. When we went to war we had given 
up everything. It was just like giving up everything to Christ just like the [Catholic] 
‘sisters and fathers’ do. (Sadomba, F. 2004: 14) 
 
Nationalist leaders were not even diplomatic about the way they treated the 
former guerrillas. This bluntness and denial pained the ex-combatants. It stoked their 
sense of alienation and anger against the ruling nationalist elite. As one of the War 
Veteran leaders rhetorically asked: 
… but when we liberated the country what, did the powers that be do? Those are the 
people we are interrogating and we … demand the promises we made to the people to be 
fulfilled. If we liberated the country why are we not fulfilling our promises? This is our 
major question. We are not in the farms just for farming. (Interview with MDT 2001) 
 
It is ironical that even the opposition to Mugabe tended to marginalise the War 
Veterans. Anti-War Veteran discourse and propaganda intensified,152 as different 
social movements (constitutional, human rights, student, workers etc.) jostled for 
space in confronting the state. When the War Veterans forced the government to pay 
the $50,000 back pay from demobilisation funds to its members, there was an outcry 
that the War Veterans had brought the economy to its knees. Feared by the 
government, they became scapegoats for the opposition movement for democratic 
change. 
 
‘The controversy surrounding gratuities has refused to go away. War Veterans are 
still haunted by it to this day, as if it was not justified. Incidentally, former Rhodesian 
soldiers are still receiving their pensions, partly in foreign currency’ (Zimbabwe 
Liberators Platform 2004: 39, see also McCandless 2005: 300).153 This put social 
                                                 
152 The so-called ‘born frees’ – i.e. youth born after independence - challenged the War 
Veterans saying that War Veterans were too old to stand up to them (the youth). They 
confronted War Veterans during their marches, resulting in several clashes that left many on 
both sides injured (Personal observation, Harare central business district 1999-2000). 
153 World War II ex-servicemen were given land for resettlement leading to the expulsion of 
more than 100,000 Africans from absentee landlord properties in European areas. McCandless 
(2005) quotes Rtd. Maj. Gava, ZNLWVA Director in 2003 saying, ‘The [former] Rhodesian 
Security Forces were still getting pensions and this became known to the War Veterans who began to 
see that there were different pay scales for Europeans … While one person [War Veteran] was fighting 
for liberation and another was going to school, the liberation fighter missed the appropriate time that he 
should have gone to school. While that critic bought goods and a [residential] stand in Rhodesia that 
fighter who went to war for years had no opportunity to do that. That critic has led a normal healthy 
life, and has not experienced the pain and hard conditions of the bush – disease, rain downpours – that 
liberation fighters went through. It is only people who are short-sighted and short-minded who think 
that reinstating War Veterans in civilian life is equated to a prize. We are saying somebody has lost 
time and that social justice must prevail.’ 
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pressure on the War Veterans, who were increasingly becoming social outcasts in the 
eyes of independent media and the opposition movement.  
 
It is worth noting a couple of specific components of this social exclusion. When 
War Veterans demonstrated in the streets for payment of War Victims compensation, 
gratuities and demobilisation funds, the Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions issued 
no statement of support, contrary to what it had done in other previous strikes by 
doctors, nurses and civil servants. A second example is the wave of literature 
celebrating the exploits and daring of the former Rhodesian forces, contrasting with a 
paucity of material on the exploits and heroism of the War Veterans. This sense of 
social isolation became so extreme that some War Veterans began (ironically) to 
express the fear that one day they would be declared war criminals for having 
participated in a liberation war. As P (working in the City of Harare) states: 
… whenever you met a Comrade that you knew or one you once worked with or an 
acquaintance who was a Comrade you would ask, ‘But Comrade, how do you see these 
political developments?’ And the Comrades would tell you ‘If we are not strong then we 
are gone. At the end we will be declared criminals. We all will be declared undesirable 
elements’. That we concluded … all of us … But is fighting a liberation war a criminal 
activity …?. (Interview with P 2000) 
 
War Veterans felt threatened and they found it imperative to reorganise 
themselves for personal survival. D (Personal communication October 2007) argued 
that if the War Veterans do not do something to distance themselves from the actions 
of ZANU-PF ruling oligarchy they will be painted with the same brush, and when 
time comes they will be attacked by the people, as if they – the War Veterans – were 
part of the oligarchy. This intensified sense of social isolation, it is argued here (cf. 
Richards 1996), has forced the War Veterans to rely more and more for their self 
worth on acting as a group, and this has in turn rekindled the visions that once kept 
them alive in the bush. Their alliance with the spirit guardians of the land has not 
been forgotten. Eventually land occupation has served as a safety valve for pent up 
feelings of social exclusion. Occupation of farms is, thus, a way of restoring lost pride 
and lost dignity for the War Veterans. They want to reclaim their social status as 
liberators and so decide that leading the occupation of ‘settler White farmers’, and 
giving land to Black people, would do exactly that. 
 
However Robert Mugabe will be judged in the long run, there is no doubting he is 
an astute politician. He realised at the end of the 1990s that the War Veterans were in 
a dangerous and deeply alienated mood. If he opposed the War Veterans and the 
MDC he would be fighting a battle on two fronts. The survival of the ZANU-PF 
oligarchy required a deal to be struck with one or other party. He chose to try and do 
a deal with the War Veterans, but later.  
 
The truce he made with the War Veterans included a number of issues. Ex-
combatants argued they were due demobilisation money at $4,000 a year backdated 
for 17 years. They also presented the issue of hospital fees for themselves and school 
fees for their children. But the land issue – the one that engaged the ideological gear – 
was not far behind. Ex-combatants thus demanded ‘that the 5 million hectares 
targeted by the government of Zimbabwe, be acquired at once’ (Moyo 2001: 6) and 
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threatened to move on to the farms if government did not resettle them alongside the 
landless peasants for whom they had been fighting. The Chronicle reported that: 
Ex-fighters threaten (ed) to occupy White farms … War Veterans were stating that 17 
years after the liberation struggle they had still not been resettled and they vowed they 
would move onto White-owned commercial farms if the government did not resettle them 
by July 1998. (The Chronicle 22 August 1997)154 
 
This is how, according to Moyo: 
… War Veterans took center stage, [and] … brought back … the land redistribution 
initiative … to the centre of the development debate, now couched in the more popular 
arena of liberation and nationalist discourses. (Moyo 2001: 2) 
 
Mugabe ordered lump sum payment of ZW $50,000 and subsequent monthly 
pension of ZW $2,000 to each War Veteran out of government coffers and the 
amount, unbudgeted, was paid without even parliamentary approval. A gesture of 
pure populism, the money was ‘found’ by taxing workers. Mugabe also agreed to 
award free medical services to the ex-combatants and to cover children’s school fees. 
On the issue of land Mugabe agreed that 20 percent of all land for resettlement and 
residential purposes would be given to ex-combatants as a matter of policy. The 
street demonstrations by ex-combatants ended as the agreement was executed. 
However this triggered anger and mass demonstrations by the workers who footed 
the bill through their increased taxes, an action widening the gap between the 
workers (led by Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)) and society in general 
on the one hand and ex-combatants on the other. As Sadomba wrote later: 
Since the grants had not been budgeted for, funding the demobees became problematic 
and in order to raise funds, the Minister of Finance had to introduce special taxation by 
the end of 1997. However, the attempts by the Minster were met with stiff resistance by 
the workers and public who went on demonstrations and strikes to express their 
displeasure. The displeasure by the workers and public clearly showed that there was an 
underlying feud between the demobees and the society at large [who] saw the ex-
combatants as a separate and ‘exclusive class’: a class that could not be effectively 
reintegrated into them. On the contrary, the demobees saw themselves as the ‘liberators’ 
who had been marginalised economically, politically and socially but whose efforts in the 
struggle had brought about independence [and had] to be recognised. (Sadomba 2004: 17) 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has offered an historical sketch of the emergence of War Veterans’ 
movement from the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979 to the point of occupations 
in 1997, when a truce with the government was negotiated. The position of guerrillas 
was not represented during cease fire and peace negotiations, and (perhaps as a 
result) no proper planning was done for the future reintegration of the combatants. 
This lack of preparation was the first indication to the War Veterans that their 
struggle was largely in vain; the liberation struggle had been hijacked by nationalists 
more intent on gaining the benefits of the post conflict peace than in addressing the 
objectives of the liberation struggle. The chapter has also discussed various setbacks 
to the early emergence of the War Veterans as a coherent force in Zimbabwean 
                                                 
154 The Chronicle 22 August 1997. See also The Herald 20 August 1997 and The Chronicle 21 
August 1997. 
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politics. These included the failure of ZANU-PF and PF ZAPU to unite soon after 
independence. War Veterans continued to fight each other after independence along 
partisan lines, conveying a picture to the country that fighters spelt trouble. 
 
A Demobilisation Directorate was eventually formed in 1982, but many War 
Veterans had become frustrated with the wait, and left the army, thereby losing their 
benefits. What they took with them was a mentality formed in the fighting in the 
bush. It is easier to disarm a fighter than to ‘demobilise’ the combatant’s mind and 
emotions. When the Directorate was finally formed and demobilisation started, 
much of the money was corruptly administered, or simply stolen, leaving entitled ex-
combatants with nothing. Many became destitute. 
 
The 1980s was a difficult period for the War Veterans in that former ZIPRA and 
ZANLA only united after the Unity Accord was signed in 1987. This period was 
dominated by ZIPRA and ZANLA trying to settle war time scores. This in-fighting 
expanded into incidents of dissidence, to which the state reacted by forming the Fifth 
Brigade, composed exclusively of former ZANLA combatants, and reportedly 
responsible for many atrocities against civilians apparently along ethnic lines. During 
this time War Veterans pursued the liberation agenda in a disjointed fashion as 
individuals, groups of civil servants or local authority staff, leaders of NGOs, 
contributing to press and as parliamentarians. Their focus was to find a platform for 
tabling their grievances, with the land issue ranking high on the agenda. They used 
some of these organisations to mobilise peasants to rebel against the elites within the 
united ZANU-PF, for example in Gutu North. This led to more organised internal 
rebellion by the grassroots against ZANU-PF elites leading to the formation of ZUM 
and finally ZUD. 
 
However, War Veterans eventually united and formed ZNLWVA, (after the Unity 
accord of 1987), when destitution of many War Veterans was put on spotlight by a 
White MP, Hundermark. ZNLWVA had a faltering start, but which gained 
momentum after further retrenchment of War Veterans during the 1990-2 period, 
when ESAP was adopted. The Hunzvi Committee from 1995 transformed the War 
Veterans into a militant organisation and started to demand recognition, pensions, 
compensation and gratuities. ZNLWVA demanded land for resettlement. The stage 
was set for an alliance between the War Veterans and the land movement. War 
Veterans, through their internal struggles with the ZANU-PF oligarchs, developed 
enough confidence and awareness of political tactics to cultivate a front with other 
political actors and confront the authorities. Street demonstration was the main 
tactic. The War Veterans mobilised peasants, urban and farm-workers and the 
unemployed. When a truce was reached with President Mugabe, War Veterans 
immediately started to lead peasants and farm workers to occupy mainly White 
owned commercial farmland, after a series of threats to government that if 
government would not honour pledges on land reform the War Veterans would take 
matters into their own hands. The period 1988 to 1998, was therefore a period in 
which the War Veterans regrouped and gained political power, forcing President 
Mugabe to concede to their demands. 
 
But the land issue was more a practical concern. The veterans suffered from social 
ostracism. Neither government nor civil society understood how the experience of 
fighting in the bush had shaped their mentality. Social disdain forced the War 
Veterans back to basics. They had fought in the hope of liberating the land of 
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Zimbabwe from White settlers, and safely leading a Black peasantry back on to that 
land. Marginalised in post war society, they would once again rally, and march to 
glory, by seizing the land. They chose their moment well. The alliance between 
ZANU-PF elites, nationalists and White commercial farmers had finally broken 
down (Selby 2006).155 What then happened, and the further development of the 
tangled relationship between the War Veterans and the Mugabe regime, is the 
subject of the following chapter.  
                                                 
155 Selby puts it thus, ‘Communications between White farmers and the state deteriorated 
significantly and any trust that had developed during the 1980s was lost. Decreasing consultation with 
the CFU during the drafting of the Land Acquisition Act [1992], political interference in land 
identification and controversial land allocations fuelled doubts across the farming community. Among 
government officials, CFU strategies were seen as confrontational. … Illusions of indispensability, 
scepticism over government’s ability to proceed with reform, and a focus on the opportunities of ESAP 
all contributed to a collective myopia.’ 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ROLE OF THE WAR VETERANS IN THE EARLY LAND 
OCCUPATIONS (1998-2000) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed how groups of War Veterans articulated, in the late 
1990s, a claim for access to land as part of a compensation package for their 
contribution to the liberation war. This chapter discusses how this claim at the 
political level worked out on the ground in concrete land occupations. The chapter 
describes two crucial, early occupations, in Svosve (Marondera District) and 
Chikwaka (Goromonzi District), and the mobilisation of people and cultural 
resources by groups of war veterans. These occupations heralded a new era of 
agrarian struggle in the country. We shall examine these occupations in detail to 
trace the actors, mobilisation techniques, strategies and tactics and interaction with 
various institutions including the state. Most data were obtained through interviews 
with participants of the land occupations, particularly key informants with a war 
veteran background, and by using filed court documents. This chapter contributes to 
the debate among scholars about the continuities and discontinuities in Zimbabwe’s 
land occupations and the extent to which the land movement was driven by 
exogenous forces, i.e. the political regime, or was rooted, during specific historical 
periods, in locally-grounded, economic, political, and historical claims. 
 
 
4.2 The occupations in Svosve and Chikwaka (1998) 
Both Svosve and Chikwaka areas occupy communal lands in the Province of 
Mashonaland East. The communal lands in both these districts experienced land 
pressure with high population density, poor soils and poor infrastructure (Moyo 
1995). They lie adjacent to prime agricultural land with fertile soils, abundant 
rainfall, highly developed infrastructure with a good network of roads, a railway 
line, telecommunications and wide distribution of electricity. Land conflicts between 
White commercial farmers controlling the prime agricultural land and the African 
population living on the adjacent communal lands persisted throughout the colonial 
period, spilling over into the post independence period.156 Land was a hotly 
contested resource and Africans continued to claim land that the commercial farmers 
possessed in a variety of ways including ‘poaching’ firewood and thatching grass, 
and through claiming space to erect monuments to their heroes (Interview with DM 
2000). 
 
                                                 
156 One of the major campaigns by peasants of Chikwaka during the war was to reclaim land 
from the surrounding farms. They harassed the farmers, destroying their properties and 
taking away livestock. For example in 1978 peasants invaded and drove away about three 
hundred cattle and distributed them amongst the villages (Personal observation 1978-9). At 
one time when farmers resisted to leave the farms peasant youth captured the farmer’s wife, 
Y. 
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In early 1998 some War Veterans from Harare went round the country to agitate 
Chiefs and Headmen to reclaim land that was held by White commercial farmers. 
When going round the country they covered several chiefs in Midlands, 
Matebeleland South, Masvingo and Manicaland Provinces, and ended up in 
Marondera, in Chief Svosve’s area. These Harare War Veterans were led by K, a 
former Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) High Command member 
(Personal observation 1975-80, Mozambique) who had left the army in 1997 (at the 
time of interview K was an unemployed War Veteran cashiered from the Zimbabwe 
National Army (ZNA)). They took four days to convince a handful of local War 
Veterans of the Svosve area about the need to occupy White commercial farms in 
order to force government to distribute land. With the cooperation of these few local 
War Veterans, K and the other Harare War Veterans approached the peasant leaders 
in the area, including Chief Svosve himself (Interview with K 2004). ‘Land hungry 
villagers from rocky Svosve communal area … continued to pour onto nearby 
Marondera commercial farms that they say were once occupied by their ancestors, 
despite government attempts to stem the tide.’ (The Herald 23 June 1998)  
The group of local and Harare-based War Veterans talked to Chief Svosve, his 
headmen, village heads and the spirit mediums, who welcomed the idea. The latter 
performed traditional ceremonies to gain support of the spirit world according to 
Shona religious beliefs (Interview with K 2004). Through traditional leaders, with 
Chief Svosve in the forefront, about 20 villages were mobilised (including, according 
to The Herald newspaper of 23 June 1998, the villages falling under headmen Gonye, 
Hwenjere, Zinatsa, Chibanda, Badza, Toto, Masangomayi, Gambiza, Chikosha, 
Chapendama, Jera, Choto, N’andu, Mupazviro, Mumvuma, Chihwehwete, 
Muchemwa and Mareverwa).157 The grievance of the peasants was mainly that the 
farms they were occupying were homes of their ancestors and they were moved by 
the White farmers when they took the land during colonial invasions. A key person 
in the Svosve occupations, Ben Mudzingwa, narrated the history of their movement 
to The Herald newspaper reporter in an article entitled ‘Land Hunger Unleashes mass 
exodus’, saying, ‘they were forced off their land by White minority regime and 
moved to Rushesha rea. From there they were further moved over Whinimbe to 
Muswatimire until they were dumped on Mafuramhepo Mountain, their present 
home.’ 
 
The villagers organised different modes of transportation including lorries and 
ox-drawn carts to carry out the occupations. The first group ‘... moved on to Igava 
Farm’ and four days later ‘others followed on to Ruwari, Daskop and Homepark 
farms’ (The Herald 23 June 1998, Interview with S 2004). The main base that 
functioned as a springboard and command centre for the occupation of other farms 
was at Igava Farm (Interview with K 2004). The villagers brought adequate food 
supplies and as soon as they occupied they mapped the area, excavating 
archaeological evidence like remains of mud huts, grinding stones and grave sites in 
order to construct evidence for their claim that they were the autochthons. 
Families [were] moving onto the farms which they claim[ed] were previously occupied by 
their ancestors before being forced out by White settlers. An elderly woman at Daskorp 
Farm showed an old grinding stone which her mother used when they lived there. Some 
                                                 
157 The role of traditional leaders was also recognised by other sources, for example: ‘The Chief 
… sabhukus and the sub-chiefs set a date and announced that everyone who is able bodied should get 
into the surrounding farms where they were moved from’ (Interview with S, a War Veteran 
running a beer outlet in Harare, 2004). 
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of the villagers indicated their forefathers’ graves to the reporter. They all clearly 
remember where their former homes stood. (The Herald 23 June 1998) 
 
They then erected huts, dug pit latrines and wells, vowing not to return to the 
‘barren’ communal lands. The first reaction of the government was to use force and 
warn the villagers that they would face the wrath of the law. However occupiers 
were defiant and vowed to stay. The government responded by sending a high-
powered delegation headed by one of the state’s Vice-Presidents, Simon Vengesai 
Muzenda, who was also Vice President of the Zimbabwe African National Union 
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. The delegation went to persuade the occupiers to 
vacate the farms. The occupiers, nevertheless, continued to be defiant until police 
were sent to disperse them, targeting War Veterans who were the ring leaders 
(Interview with K 2004, Interview with M, a female War Veteran and trader, 2006). 
The War Veterans were threatened with arrest and imprisonment and to escape this 
they fled the area. 
 
Our second case is an early occupation that took place in Goromonzi, about 30 km 
from Harare (see Figure 4.1). There, peasants, War Veterans and farm workers 
occupied farms of the Enterprise community of White settlers. This occupation was 
different from the Svosve occupations on the Marondera farms in that local peasants 
and local War Veterans initiated the occupations jointly, while War Veterans and 
youth from Harare only joined by ‘invitation’. This is because the local War Veterans 
and traditional leaders were very active in relation to land struggles. 
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Figure 4.1 Goromonzi District 
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The planning for occupations of Goromonzi Farms had begun in July 1998. Chief 
Chikwaka and his followers were believed to have visited Neptune Farm, on 
reconnaissance (Letter from Lombard to Husluck, Director of Commercial Farmers 
Union (CFU), 5 November 1998).158 Planning included arranging dates and venues, 
writing posters, placards and banners. Registration took place of all community 
members who were going to take part in the occupation (Interview with M, a female 
War Veteran, was self employed in Harare as an informal trader in hardware, 2005) 
as well as of the participating War Veterans. Organisational structures were formed 
for the occupations. The local War Veteran committee was led by three powerful 
women, the late Ester Chimboza (Chairwoman), her Secretary, KK and another 
committee member MM. Although there were also men in the committee, some of 
whom were high ranking district civil servants; women leaders were more active and 
senior. 
 
War Veterans from Harare joined the local organisation. According to K 
(Interview 2004) he was ‘approached by the girls [female War Veterans] from Goromonzi’ 
to take part in the land occupation after the Svosve occupations had been 
successfully suppressed by the state. It is most likely that K was approached by 
Chimboza and her colleagues because they knew about K’s involvement in the 
occupation of Marondera farms with the people of Svosve. Other War Veterans from 
Harare gave different stories of how they were recruited into the movement by the 
local people and local War Veterans. A common thread in these stories is that War 
Veterans from Harare frequented Juru (Bhora) Growth Point, a rural centre at the 
border of the area of commercial farms and Chikwaka communal lands. Female War 
Veterans emphasise that they went there to buy cheap farm produce, including beef. 
Male War Veterans say they mainly went there for casual drinking. It follows from 
the interviews that Juru Growth Point became an informal convergence place for 
War Veterans. 
 
Through these gatherings the local peasants from Chikwaka communal lands 
incited the War Veterans against the owner of Oribi Farm nicknamed ‘Shiro’.159 The 
peasants taunted160 Harare War Veterans by narrating how Shiro brutally tortured 
                                                 
158 Letter from Lombard PMJ to Hasluck D, Esq. Dated 3 November 1998. This letter and 
several other documents referred to in this section pertain to evidence given in the High 
Court, case HC 14192/98. The documents were attachments to the plaintiffs' affidavits. There 
was communication between the farmers and their Security Company (Lombard being the 
Director) and there was also communications with the Director, Commercial Farmers Union 
(a Mr Husluck). All these letters and documents provide details of how the farmers handled 
the occupations of 1998 in Goromonzi. 
159 In Shona traditions it is common to incite a fight between two people teasing and 
challenging one (usually the stronger) individual to fight. For boys, two small earth mounds 
the size of a fist, are made on the ground and allocated to the two potential fighters to 
symbolise respective breasts of the two’s mothers. One of the fighters is challenged to flatten 
the other’s mother’s ‘breast’ after which a fight ensues. The presentation of the stories of 
‘Shiro’ resembles this Shona tactic of incitement. There is of course often exaggeration by 
those fanning the fight. 
160 In Shona traditions it is common to incite a fight between two people teasing and 
challenging one (usually the stronger) individual to fight. For boys, two small earth mounds 
the size of a fist, are made on the ground and end allocated to the two potential fighters to 
symbolise respective breasts of the two’s mothers. One of the fighters challenged to flatten the 
other’s mother’s ‘breast’ after which a fight ensues. The presentation of the stories of ‘Shiro’ 
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and threw guerrillas and war collaborators into a disused mine shaft during the war 
(Interview with D 2000, K 2003, FGD 2005). 161 War Veterans took up the challenge 
and started to organise the occupation of Oribi Farm. The organisation was at two 
levels. Firstly, they organised the war veteran movement that included War 
Veterans, youth and other collaborators by ‘spreading word around in Harare’ 
(Interview with DM 2000). Secondly, they ‘organised the Village Heads of Chief 
Chikwaka’ (Interview with DM, Harare War Veteran leader self employed as a 
building contractor and former Resettlement Officer, 2000) and mobilised as well 
Chief Chikwaka, the local councillor, and the villagers. Estimated figures of between 
200 and 300 people at the peak of the occupation of Shiro were given by both farmers 
and occupiers (Interview with S 2000, Letter from Lombard to Hasluck 2000). An 
alliance between the peasant land movement and the War Veterans movement was 
apparent. 
 
Oribi Farm was targeted for occupation because of the alleged poor war history 
and racist attitude of the farmer, named Connor (‘Shiro’). The farm employed 60 
male and 45 female employees (and produced) seed and commercial maize, soya 
seed and commercial soya, seed wheat and commercial wheat and potatoes (Connor 
Affidavit 1998). 
Occupation of Oribi Farm took place on 2 November 1998. That morning the War 
Veterans sent an advance party to inform the farmer about their intentions: 
(a) to occupy the farm, and to mark out fields for occupation by their landless followers; 
(b) to remain on the farms until government paid attention to their demands and to 
regard these lands as belonging to ‘people’ and that they [occupiers] would not be moved 
(High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98). 
 
Previous occupations led by peasants were usually clandestine, without any prior 
warning. The occupation of Oribi Farm marked a new approach, consisting of 
warning the farmer before the occupation. War Veterans-led occupiers were 
introducing new tactics and were prepared openly to confront both the state and the 
White farmers. 
One description of the occupation was given in the files of a court case: 
…a procession of some 30 to 40 people, men and women, proceeded from Juru Heroes’ 
Acre [the Heroes Acre for Juru Growth Point] … carrying placards saying ‘SHIRO we 
want our land’, ‘SHIRO, we want our farm.’ (High Court of Zimbabwe 14120/98) 
 
The use of placards and the direct confrontation with the farmer in this manner 
was unusual. The approach was more militant than previous land occupation 
approaches, and the occupiers openly alleged war time atrocities by the farmer. In a 
few days the occupations spread to other farms in the areas, owned by the Enterprise 
Community, and the number of occupiers swelled (Interviews with DM 2000, K 2004, 
M 2006). 
 
When the procession arrived at the farm of Connor they established a base at the 
local Heroes Acre. In the evening some occupiers went to see Connor at his 
homestead, situated a few hundreds of metres away, but he refused to come out in 
                                                                                                                                            
resembles this Shona tactic of incitement. There is often exaggeration by those fanning the 
fight. 
161 The story alleging Shiro threw people down a disused shaft was widely known during the 
war (Personal observation, Mangwende Detachment February to May 1979). 
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the darkness. The occupiers then left and retired to the Heroes Acre where they 
continued singing revolutionary songs and dancing. The following day, the 
occupiers began to cause work stoppages (Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe 14210: 
6), prohibiting dipping of cattle and stopping women from packing silage bags. 
 
A well planned program was followed for each day of the occupations. The next 
day they planted the Zunde raMambo (Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe 141210/98). 
The Zunde raMambo ritual will be discussed in detail below. The next step focused on 
the Heroes Acre program and involved fencing and construction of a tomb of the 
unknown soldier with materials demanded from and supplied by the Ministry of 
Home Affairs. The occupiers had demanded these materials at a meeting where they 
clashed with the ministerial delegation. The final step was ‘to get into all the 
neighbouring farms of the Boers around here to awaken them about our struggle 
(Chimurenga chacho chatokura)’ (Interview with D 2001). Connor himself also 
described what happened:  
[A] large crowd of people [who] left the Heroes Acre and started moving along the main 
road towards my homestead’ …. [One of the War Veteran leaders]… beckoned his 
followers to come up to the lands. A group of approximately 200 people started to spread 
out over the lands and began to mark out fields in all unplanted lands (Connor, High 
Court of Zimbabwe 14120/98).  
 
The rest of the farm was subdivided and parcelled to the occupiers, and other 
farms within the locality were occupied. 
 
By 12 November the occupiers were in full control of all areas of the farm. They 
also spread into the neighbourhood and their influence went far beyond, to 
Chinamora Communal lands where the people planned to occupy Munenga Farm. 
The occupation of another farm, owned by a Mr. Forsyth, took place in a different 
way. Forsyth expressed it as follows:  
They erected a temporary shelter with poles and canvas just outside the gate … [a 
spokesman of the occupiers] ordered me to continue farming operations as normal and for 
all my employees to continue working in their usual manner’ (Forsyth 14192: 7). 
 
One possible reason why the occupiers did not harass, intimidate or stop work at this 
farm was that the farmer had no history of racism or poor relations with the workers.  
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Figure 4.2 Chikwaka people (Goromonzi) ploughing the Zunde raMambo field 
War Veterans provided the seeds. Ploughing the zunde was a symbolic act to indicate 
that the land was returning to traditional authority and management. 
Source: Photo, courtesy of The Herald 
 
The occupations in Goromonzi were a serious signal to the authorities, who then 
responded very quickly to this new aspect of the Land Occupation Movement of 
Zimbabwe and activism by the War Veteran Movement. The government and ruling 
ZANU-PF worked out strategies to respond. They decided to send a delegation of 
senior nationalist politicians to evict the occupiers. Minister Joseph Msika led the 
delegation to Goromonzi on 6 November 1998 and held a meeting with the occupiers 
lasting several hours (Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe 14210: 9). The meeting 
ended in a confrontational atmosphere with the occupiers in a defiant mood. The 
message of War Veterans presented in the meeting was a mixture of references to the 
liberation war and to the current situation of social injustice relating to access to land. 
DM (Interview 2000), the spokesperson of the occupiers, ended his address to the 
White farmer by saying, ‘We are here to tell you that this farm is no longer yours. … 
Please can you get off our land’? The occupation of Oribi inspired a wave of 
occupations on surrounding farms, as Table 4.1 shows. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of 1998 occupations by Svosve and Chikwaka people 
Date Farm Incident Leaders 
19/06/98 Igava Svosve villagers inform farmer of their intention to occupy 
Harare War Veterans; local 
War Veterans, Chief Svosve 
and other traditional leaders  
20/06/98 - 
23/06/98 
Daskop and 
Homepark 
Villagers trickling in, carrying their belongings Same as above 
02/11/98 
Oribi (Shiro) 
and 
Stockholm 
 
Information ‘that the War Veterans would move on to the 
Heroes Acre/Oribi Farm on … 2 November 1998’ had arrived 
a week earlier. A Nissan sedan dropped people from Harare 
at Heroes Acre. Chief Chikwaka addressed people at Juru 
Growth Point. 30 to 40 men and women demonstrated with 
placards saying, ‘SHIRO we want our land’. Provincial 
Administrator’s office announced a meeting to be held on 6 
November 1998. 
 
Chief Chikwaka and 
Councillor Chigora; local 
district committee of War 
Veterans supported by 
Harare War Veterans: 
Mutingwende, Rtd. Col. 
Muzhambe, 
03/11/98 
Oribi and 
Stockholm 
 
Mr Connor empties a drum of water that one of the invaders 
was fetching for the rest of the group. The occupier reports 
this to the police who start an investigation. 
 
Local War Veterans, Chief 
Chikwaka 
05/11/98 Oribi  
 
The Officer in Charge Juru ZRP approaches the group at 
Heroes Acre and tells them they are not disciplined and 
should stop their activities. Occupiers’ leader tells this officer 
that they were to plant maize for ‘Zunde raMambo’. Connor 
told the planting was to commence and 150-200 people 
proceeded to plant 1.5 ha of certified seed. The occupiers’ 
leaders announced that the next day the rest of the people 
would plant on fields parcelled out to them. 
 
Harare War Veterans, David 
Mutingwende 
Rtd. Col. Muzhambe 
10/11/98 Chinyika  
Ridged and fumigated lands prepared for tobacco by the 
commercial farmer is parcelled out in 70 m2 for individual 
use. A part of Oribi farm is also pegged for individual plots.  
- Prince Derere 
- Ester Chimbodza 
- War Vet. (Mwanza ward, 
Chinamhora 
10/11/98 Strathlone  
 
Claim made at Strathlone Farm that all farms in the area were 
now being controlled by occupiers. 
 
9 males 
10/11/98 Colga  
 
The owner was warned that there would be demonstrations 
at Colga Farm store. 
 
Prince Derere 
Rtd Col. Muzhambe 
11/11/98 Melrose 
 
White farmer argued that the ‘country was governed by laws 
… to be complied with’. Ordered them off the farm. Phoned 
legal practitioner. 
 
Unspecified War Veterans 
11/11/98 Devonia 
 
War Veterans told the farmer that they would plant maize on 
12/11/98 
 
Unspecified War Veterans 
No date 
given 
Mashona 
[korp] vlei 
Calm occupation Unspecified 
No dates Ivordale 
 
Calm occupation 
 
Unspecified 
4/11/98 Ivanhoe 
 
A farm worker calling himself Charles Hunzvi directs 
occupation operations 
 
Unspecified 
7/11/98 Frascati 
 
Member in charge warned that on 9/11/98 occupation would 
take place 
 
Unspecified 
10/11/98 Munenga 
 
Information that people from Denda area of Chinamora 
intend to move on to Munenga Farm (i.e. 20 km from 
Oribi/Shiro) on 23/11/98 
 
Unspecified 
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Note: The farms shown in this table were occupied in Marondera and Goromonzi in 1998. 
Gromonzi occupied 10 farms in total but the total number of farms occupied in Marondera 
could not be determined in this research. 
Source: High Court Affidavits: High Court of Zimbabwe 14192/98, High Court of Zimbabwe 
14210/98, Interview with Mutingwende, 2000-4 
 
The series of occupations at Oribi and other farms was stopped after White 
commercial farmers O.P. Connor (Pvt. Ltd) and J.G. Forsyth (of Forsyth Trust) 
applied, on 13 November 1998, for High Court orders to evict the occupiers. The 
orders were addressed to Harare-based War Veterans leaders David Mutingwende 
and Colonel Khumalo among other respondents. The orders were granted, 
instructing the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) to evict the occupiers and restrain 
the War Veteran leaders. Armed with these High Court orders the Zimbabwe 
Republic Police raided the occupiers and their shelters were torched. Most of the 
occupiers fled into the mountains while some of them were arrested including Esther 
Chimboza (Interview with K 2004). Other War Veteran leaders like Khumalo and 
Mutingwende were prohibited immigrants in Goromonzi Farms by order of the High 
Court. 
 
The action of the police force to evict the land occupiers led, in turn, to a response 
from the occupiers. ‘Goromonzi villagers [went to Harare] to demonstrate outside 
Ngungunyana Building, [the Head Office of the Ministry of Lands] on 19 November 
1998’ (The Herald 20 November 1998, see Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3 Goromonzi villagers demonstrate outside Ngungunyana Building 
(Head office of Ministry of Lands and Agriculture) in Harare against eviction 
orders 
The villagers were ordered to vacate farms they had invaded recently. One of the banners 
reads ‘Ivhu kuvaridzi varo’ which means ‘Land to its rightful owners!’ The first line of the other 
banner partly says ‘Pasi nevapambi vemapurazi’ which means ‘Down with thieves of farms!’  
Source: courtesy of The Herald 20 November 1998 
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4.3 The mobilisation of people for the early occupations 
According to the resource mobilisation theory (Foweraker 1995) a social movement 
cannot succeed if it fails to mobilise resources to sustain itself. These resources are 
both material and non material.162 This section describes the involvement of different 
kinds of people in the occupations. It will be argued that the involvement of war 
veterans led to modes of operation, mobilisation, and organisation that have their 
roots in the experiences of the liberation war. War veterans mobilised existing 
traditional structures of organisation, local government councillors, and so on. The 
next section will describe the role of cultural resources intimately linked to the 
mobilisation of the people as described in this section. 
 
The first notable element is the use of zoning and organisational structure on the 
occupied farms. When occupiers spread to other Enterprise Farms of Goromonzi, 
they ‘divided the whole area into small operational units … [and] decided who was 
going to take which farms’ with a structure to coordinate the occupations (Interview 
with SS, a War Veteran working in a parastatal, 2004). The zoning and organisational 
structure of the occupations were based on guerrilla war experiences. War Veterans 
divided themselves up into sections and assigned each other operational areas 
during the guerrilla war of the 1970s. They assumed war time command structures 
and military style bases with command posts that acted as springboards for 
occupation of surrounding farms. 
 
A second notable element is the effort to unite different groups of peasants as well 
farm workers. Mobilisation of various social groups included the use of traditional 
forms of governance to put pressure on people, as well as intimidation. The peasants 
of Goromonzi and Svosve, who formed the largest part of the occupiers, had 
different economic status. The poor peasants generally came from the communal 
lands. They owned small pieces of land, often about an acre, and had no children 
working in town to supplement their incomes. Some of them augmented their food 
by picking crumbs after harvest (Letter from Lombard to Husluck 6 November 1998, 
Forsyth High Court of Zimbabwe, 14192/98) ‘[W]omen from Mwanza Ward in 
Chikwaka … were permitted by the farmer, R. Brown, to glean wheat dropped in the 
land by the combine harvester …’. Rich peasants were mainly from Juru Growth 
Point, the business centre that bordered with Shiro’s farm. These were people with 
bigger holdings than the poor peasants and they supplemented their income from 
commercial activities with established commercial shops. Some of the rich peasants 
moved around in ‘pick-up truck (s)’ and ‘double cab vehicles’ when they participated 
in the occupations. 
 
Other participants in the occupations were petty traders who sold fruits, 
vegetables and second hand clothes to locals and travellers, and poor seasonal farm 
workers who complemented their livelihoods from small plots with work on the 
adjacent farms like Melrose Farm (High Court of Zimbabwe affidavit 14192/98:7). 
There were youths too, mainly teenagers, young men and women from Chikwaka 
                                                 
162 Many of the material resources were mobilised by the War Veterans. Many of the vehicles 
used were from local War Veterans and War Veterans from Harare. Vehicles of local leaders 
like the Rural District Councilor and the participating civil servants were also used in the 
occupation process (Interview with DMT 2000). The seeds for the planting of the Zunde 
raMambo were bought in Harare by the War Veterans. 
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Communal Lands who joined the occupations. Some were unemployed school 
leavers and others were farming on their small family plots, sharing with the rest of 
the family. These youths were active in the occupations and instrumental in the 
process of mobilisation since they gathered the villagers and were sent out on 
specific operations such as frustrating the farmer (Letter from Lombard to Husluck 5 
November 1998). Youth maintained the general security of the area, intimidated farm 
workers (threatening to throw them out of their houses) and forced work stoppages 
at the farms (Letter from Lombard to Husluck undated).163 
 
The reaction of farm workers to the mobilisation of people for the occupations 
varied. Farm workers in both the Svosve and Goromonzi comprised both farm 
workers commuting from communal lands and farm workers living permanently on 
the farms. Both groups of farm workers had varying participation in the occupations. 
Some farm workers took part and at times actually led the occupations. Others were 
neutral and undecided on how to act. Yet others openly resisted the occupations and 
refused to join the occupiers. There were conflicts between some farm workers who 
appeared to be on the side of the farmer and the occupiers, resulting in assaults, 
work stoppages and intimidation. An illustrative case is the occupation of Shiro’s 
farm in Goromonzi. The 60 male and 45 female employees on this farm fell into two 
broad categories of resident and non resident workers. There were also skilled 
workers, such as clerks and machinery operators and general workers. In addition 
the category farm workers also included hired security guards of private companies. 
All these played different roles in the occupation of Shiro. The decision to occupy 
this farm was partly based on information provided by farm workers about the 
brutal habits of this particular farmer (Interview with Muchaneta, female War 
Veteran, 2005) and farm workers’ stories of ill-treatment. 
 
Those who lived on the farm were in a significantly different position from 
seasonal workers and non-resident but permanent workers residing in Chikwaka. 
Residence would determine the nature of organisation of the farm workers. For fear 
of risking their jobs or persecution by the farmer the resident farm workers, whatever 
their employment position, did not want to appear to be supporting the occupiers.. 
Their choice was either to hide their feelings or to carry out only covert operations as 
individuals. The non-resident workers had a different position. Farm workers who 
were also part-time peasants from Chikwaka Communal Lands were subjected to the 
village government besides the government of the commercial farmers. In his 
founding affidavit (High Court of Zimbabwe 14210), Connor said he received a 
report from his manager that female farm workers from Chikwaka Reserve were 
‘intimidated by the Kraal Heads to occupy commercial farms and to support the 
cause of the liberation struggle or they would be evicted from the Communal Lands 
that they lived on’.164 Collective social pressure – in this case on worker-peasants – to 
conform to the group will is a common feature of governance based on traditional or 
                                                 
163 This letter was probably written on 5 November 1998, judging from the contents. 
164 This was written by the farmer for purposes of High Court proceedings and therefore 
demands a closer look. It is possible that the mobilisation approach and methods used by the 
‘Kraal’ (Village) Heads were not particularly tailored to the commercial farm workers but 
were general to all inhabitants. In this case the action or inaction of the commercial farm 
workers should not be distinguished from the rest of the peasants who occupied Shiro. Chiefs 
and ‘Kraal’ heads often use these kinds of threats to secure conformity from their inhabitants 
in a variety of cases. 
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customary rules. Eviction from the area is in fact a common punishment for deviants, 
in the administrative procedures of customary governance. Chiefs and Headmen 
gain their power from administering such punishments. 
 
Both the occupiers and farmers battled for the hearts and minds of the farm 
workers because they constituted a critical group in the conflict. Both occupiers and 
farmers at times used coercion to solicit support from peasants and the farm workers. 
Tactics could be physical, mental or economic. Connor claimed that farm workers, 
‘did not in fact obey [the occupiers]… [and] have been supportive of me and 
resentful of the illegal occupation and behaviour of these illegal occupants…’ 
(Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe affidavit 14210). War Veterans remember that at 
times they intimidated farm workers. At Shiro War Veterans intimidated the Clerk 
and Secretary of the farm in order to get confidential documents circulating in the 
White farmer community to prepare for economic sabotage in the country. The two 
farm workers cooperated but clearly ‘shaking with fear; so they accepted under 
duress.’ (Interview with SS, War Veteran, 2001).165 The War veterans felt the need to 
have the farm workers on their side, but it turned out to be difficult to mobilise those 
that lived on the farm. First, farm workers could not easily be mobilised from within. 
With state of the art communication equipment and good transport, the security 
company, Bateleur Ventures was very efficient. Any attempt to enter the farm 
compounds to mobilise the workers was intercepted. There was tight security of 
armed guards and dog handlers who patrolled the farms, using techniques 
developed from the military Agric-Alert of the war times (Letter from Lombard to 
Husluck 5 November 1998). Because farm workers had no wider idea of what was 
going on, they tended to base their action on the reaction of the farmer to the 
occupations. ‘I sense that they are now looking to me to do something to end this 
siege of the farms’ (Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe 14210). The settler farmers had 
enjoyed power over 17 years of independence and seemed invincible. Farm workers 
must have felt that occupations would threaten their jobs. Yet it is relevant to note 
that farm workers did not actively resist the occupations when they began. 
 
Sources from both sides confirm that War Veterans intimidated, harassed and 
assaulted individual farm workers with specific knowledge or skills that occupiers 
could benefit from. Farm workers were ‘interfered with’ and ‘ordered not to dip’ 
cattle and ‘female workers … were approached … and told to report to Heroes Acre 
(Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe C14210/98: 6). ‘[F]arm labourers have been 
intimidated by what has already happened on Oribi and the neighbouring farms and 
are petrified of similar incidents taking place on Melrose and Devonia North Farms’ 
(Forsyth, High Court of Zimbabwe 14192: 10). Evidence from the interviews with 
War Veterans also suggests that the War Veterans did not sit down to ‘conscientise’ 
the farm workers. ‘We need this secretary so that we can continue to have these 
faxes’ (Interview with DM 2000). When they had to get the services of the clerk, War 
Veterans said to him, ‘You know, if you don’t give us information, you have 
destroyed your future and that of your children. There is information that we want 
you and the secretary to give us’ (Interview with DD 2001). Another War Veteran 
recalls what was said to a farm worker: ‘[W]e want all the information that is being 
faxed from UK. So your career would end if you hide the information’ (Interview 
                                                 
165 The clerk and the secretary at the farm were ‘forced’ to carry out espionage by the War 
Veterans. They supplied the War Veterans with vital information relating to strategies of 
economic sabotage which the latter then used in targeting farms for occupation. 
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with CC 2000). These cases suggest that the War Veterans themselves considered 
farm workers would not automatically collaborate with the occupations out of 
conviction or ‘loyalty’ to the cause. 
 
There were also farm workers who supported the occupations openly and, in 
some cases, led groups of occupiers. One such recorded case (Letter from Lombard to 
Husluck 5 November 1998) was of one farm worker who joined the occupiers in a 
leadership position at Shiro’s farm. He operated under a pseudonym and was 
believed to have participated in assaults on some of the other farm workers at Shiro. 
 
A third notable element in the mobilisation process was the role of women. 
Women from Chikwaka who worked at Oribi farm were warned by the sabhuku 
(appointed village head) not to sell out the movement (High Court of Zimbabwe 
14192/98, High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98) and they ended up participating in 
the movement. Women played key roles in the occupations. Some peasant women 
were leaders, and made decisions on various issues including ‘punishing’ male farm 
workers whom they considered obstacles by assaulting them (Fax from Lombard to 
Husluck 3 November 1998): 
Information has been received from the assaulted cattle guards that a woman is the key 
figure in the assault that took place. This was the same in the assault case of Tuesday 3rd 
November. 
 
The assaults involved beatings, forced singing of revolutionary songs and 
crawling in dirt. Women were also in the forefront in taking pieces of land when this 
was parcelled out to the occupiers. They participated in the planting of maize on the 
Zunde raMambo. They took the lead in singing and dancing at Heroes Acre and were 
also deployed in the bases at occupied farms.  
 
The Goromonzi occupations reveal a number of features characteristic of the 
mobilisations for the occupations in 1998. There was significant mobilisation of 
peasant populations from the communal lands. War Veterans (e.g. Colonels (retd.) 
Muzhambe and Mutingwende) took the lead in some cases and introduced or 
allowed the use of liberation war style forms of organisation and means of putting 
pressure on people. At the same time community figures (e.g. local councillors) and 
traditional leaders (e.g. Chief Chikwaka and various the village heads) played 
significant roles in agitating the peasants and seasonal farm workers. Local War 
Veterans, especially women (as mentioned, e.g. late Esther Chimboza) led 
occupations alongside War Veterans from Harare. The next section will discuss how 
use was made in this mobilisation process of various cultural resources. 
 
 
4.4 The mobilisation of cultural resources 
The movement that arose during the early occupations period built upon, re-used, 
re-interpreted, and melded different cultural resources and symbols. These included: 
1) Political narratives concerning war credentials which included or excluded 
certain persons from the liberation war history 
2) The re-interpretation of heroism and the symbolism of the Heroes Acre 
3) The performance of the Zinde raMambo ritual that rooted land occupation in past 
collective forms of land use 
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4) The use of body movements in dance and music to stir specific emotions and 
reshape form and content of war history 
 
4.4.1 Reclaiming history: war credentials 
As Norma Kriger (1995) argues, the government of Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF elites 
have relied on ‘war credentials for legitimacy’ and draw on the history and symbols 
of the liberation struggle to construct their power base. In the post colonial history of 
Zimbabwe this appropriation and monopolisation of war credentials is a continuing 
political battlefield (Kriger 1995; 2003). When War Veterans started to lead the land 
movement in 1998 it was imperative for them to break the political hegemony of the 
government and to present their own interpretation of war credentials by 
appropriating symbols and performing rituals rooted in the liberation war. War 
veterans represented themselves ‘as the conscience of the nation and the 
embodiment of the ideals of the liberation struggle’. They argued that the revolution 
had been betrayed by the ruling Nationalists, saying that the elites had abandoned 
the poor who fought the liberation war (McCandless 2005). The spokesman of the 
Goromonzi occupiers, a self employed former Resettlement Officer and graduate of 
Wampoa Political Academy during the liberation war, expressed the issue as 
follows:166 
We want you [the ruling elites] to know our resolve today and we want you to get this to 
Mugabe. … When we took over the country you took the ZANU-PF that fought the war 
and put it aside and you formed another one for yourselves that is full of the bourgeoisie, 
opportunists who got in through corruption, tribalism, regionalism and nepotism. … The 
ZANU-PF that fought the war is the one that you see of these parents [peasants and farm 
workers] and us [freedom fighters], who are absolutely poor and at the bottom of the 
social ladder. But the people who used to tease us when we were fighting the war of 
liberation are the very people you now wine and dine with today. We want to tell you 
that if you so wish to send the army and the police … call them, then the war starts right 
here and now, in your presence. You are here as rebels aren’t you? (Interview with DM 
2001) 
 
This was how DM remembered (during the interview) his response to the address 
made by Minister Joseph Msika to the occupiers when he visited Goromonzi. Joseph 
Miska had intended to use the history of the war to persuade the occupiers that they 
had to listen to government orders to vacate the farms. The spokesman of the 
occupiers objected, arguing that he (the Minister) was not qualified to lecture the 
occupiers on liberation war history as they (the occupiers) and not the elites had 
fought that war and knew its history better. Interpretations of the history of the war 
and its objectives differed between the elites and occupiers. Occupiers articulated 
their own history to de-legitimise the ruling class of ZANU-PF, while at the same 
time justifying their occupations. The excerpt above illustrates the extent of the 
divisions and tensions between the ‘poor’ at the ‘bottom of the social ladder’ and the 
elites within the liberation movement. 
 
                                                 
166 This information is corroborated by the findings of Erin McCandless (2005). MacCandless 
did her research from 2001. Her study is based on interviews with War Veterans - mainly the 
leadership of ZNLWVA, among other sources.  
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4.4.2 The symbolism of Heroes Acre 
The symbol of a Heroes Acre originates from local notions about burial rites and sites 
associated with dead guerrillas and recruits (so-called refugees). How burial in the 
battlefield took place depended on circumstances. At times the bodies were buried in 
shallow graves or caves, or the remains were simply hidden in thickets. War time 
burial ceremonies combined traditional rites and military customs. A burial generally 
consisted of traditional prayer, with snuff (bute) used for supplication (the spirits). 
After that a ZANLA anthem (Moyo wangu watsidza kufira Zimbabwe – My heart has 
vowed to die for Zimbabwe167) was sung while the clenched right fist or gun was raised 
in the air. The political Commissar then said words to give strength to the other 
guerrillas, emphasising that death is a common occurrence, but differs in its 
significance – this was the death of a hero, a freedom fighter. The place of the burial 
then became sacred to the combatants, and memories of such sites served to 
configure histories of the struggle at variance with those of the elite.168  
 
In Shona religion death involves rituals and rites of passage (Bourdillon 1990) 
concerned with connecting the dead to the spirit world. The burial place is 
considered sacred and libations are usually undertaken there for a variety of 
purposes. For example, if there are problems in the family caused by the spirit of the 
dead, supplication is made at the grave of the deceased. It is therefore important for 
the living to know where their family members are buried.169 However, during 
periods of crisis – such as a guerrilla war - unknown or unidentified people may die 
and are buried in mass graves such as the mine shaft at Shiro. An area like this 
becomes sacred and the Shona treat it with both fear and respect. The symbol of 
Heroes Acre was therefore deeply rooted in both Shona traditions as well as the 
guerrilla war practices. 
 
The symbolic value of the Heroes Acre at Shiro’s farm was important in the 
occupation. In the early 1980s, soon after independence, Chikwaka people succeeded 
in forcing the government and the White commercial farmer to cede one and then 
two acres of Oribi Farm, to fence it off and preserve it as a sacred place in honour of 
the fallen heroes of the liberation struggle. They named this place the Heroes Acre, as 
if it were a national shrine where heroes are buried. Demand to establish the Heroes 
Acre by the people of Chikwaka in the early 1980s was based on the argument that it 
was cultural affront and unjust to allow the perpetrator of murder to continue 
‘owning’ the sacred place where the remains of war victims were mass buried. 
                                                 
167 The lyrics were: My heart has vowed/ To die for the liberation of Zimbabwe/ Until my spear has 
resurrected Zimbabwe/ In mountains and rivers shall I sleep/ I grief perishing of my people  
168 Personal observation, Chaminuka and Takawira Sectors, 1978. I participated in the burial 
of Felix Chitepo (real name, Sigauke) at Dengu Village in Bindura, where this ritual was 
followed. This ritual was not followed when a burial of deceased guerrillas took place under 
pressure of a battle. At the rear a gun salute was fired. This was avoided in the battlefront. 
169 It is also believed that if the relatives of the deceased do not know where the remains of the 
deceased are buried the deceased’s spirit makes visitations to the family members or gives 
problems to the local community where the remains lie. In 2005 traditional religious 
ceremonies presided over by chiefs and spirit mediums were held countrywide to cleanse the 
whole country, in the belief that national problems were associated with failure to cleanse the 
spirits of those who died during the war of liberation. It is even claimed that the abundant 
rainfall of that year was a sign that the ceremonies were received by the ancestors. This is a 
token of the strength of local beliefs concerning the land and the importance of correct burial. 
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Despite the policy of reconciliation, the people of Chikwaka considered that the 
farmer had to be dispossessed of the piece of land surrounding the Heroes Acre, at 
very least. They involved the government, which appeared to understand the 
cultural argument of villagers, and the owner of the farm did not ‘object’ to the 
proposition (Connor affidavit). 
 
4.4.3 The Zunde raMambo ritual 
The Zunde raMambo is a long established tradition in Zimbabwe which was engaged 
by the war veterans as cultural capital. Zunde can loosely be translated as a collective 
field. Mambo means Chief. Zunde is also applied at household level to ensure food 
security for the extended family and in polygamous marriages. Subjects of the Chief 
work in the zunde field in work teams. The system involved organisation of inputs 
and labour and centralised storage and distribution. Zunde was a means of securing 
social security that guaranteed relief to needy community members during times of 
extreme hardship or calamity.170 The Zunde is generally practised as a powerful ritual 
in rural community organisations, arousing cohesive emotions. 
 
The Zunde is also performed at the family level, especially in large joint and 
polygamous households.171 Food reserves are stored in times of crises so that the 
various household members rely on these reserves when their own food stocks run 
out. The Zunde, as a ritual with wide social and economic appeal to the community, 
was considered an important mobilisation tool in the occupations.  
 
The work of the Zunde, like other agricultural collective performances, was an 
important social undertaking. The production process was designed along similar 
lines as the work-feast (nhimbe). Beer drinking, singing and eating provided the 
setting of zunde for planting, weeding and harvesting. The occasion was also used for 
‘casual’ interaction between the ruler and his/her counsellors. For example, the zunde 
provided an opportunity for group voices to be raised in criticising the deviant social 
behaviour of individuals or poor leadership of the chief. This would be done through 
typical songs whose themes carried such messages (kurova bembera). During the 
process every citizen assumed immunity and could not be punished by the ruler for 
such criticism. Using the zunde in the occupation process was both a way of ‘going 
back to the roots’ by defying modern organisation, and also a way of providing 
freedom of expression through song and dance to the occupiers. Performing the 
                                                 
170 During the war political education with recruits very much centred on building egalitarian 
social structures to advance socialist practices (Gutsaruzhinji) and the Zunde raMambo was a 
typical example widely referred to as an indigenous institution based on egalitarian ethics. 
Peters (2006) reports that RUF rebels in Sierra Leone exited from their own war firmly fixed 
on collective farming as a way of redeeming their communities. 
171 In this case the head of the extended family, normally a man, manages the Zunde (as 
opposed to the household granary, in which case the production process is managed and the 
produce controlled by the individual senior wives of the household heads). Men do not 
control the dura (granary), over which the woman exercises authority and responsibility 
(whether in a polygynous union or not). In Manyika custom, at the death of a woman the dura 
was demanded by the wife’s agnatic relatives as a symbol and expression of control over her 
produce. Failure to deliver it would be punishable by paying a ‘beast on hoof’, as this would 
be interpreted as having used the woman as a slave during her life time (Sadomba, W. 1999a). 
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Zunde raised the position of the chief and emphasised traditional models of local 
governance. 
 
War Veterans used the Zunde in order to gain the support of the chief, by adopting 
the traditional custom that elevated him. Chief Chikwaka came in his regalia to 
preside over the Zunde ritual and he struck the first blow with his hoe to officiate the 
occasion. This was greeted with much ululation, singing and whistling. At the same 
time the Zunde united the land occupiers in action reducing the police to ‘mere by-
standers’ (The Herald 16 November 1998). Collectively, 14 ha of land was planted 
with maize seed. The planting of the Zunde signified that the occupation enjoyed the 
blessing of the chief, and War Veterans seized on this to galvanise his subjects for 
mobilisation. Subsequently, individual plots were then marked for household 
production. After completion of the Zunde ritual the movement was prepared for the 
occupation of Goromonzi. The participation of the chief in the Zunde planting excited 
the occupiers to such an extent that they broke into frenzy and advanced on the 
homestead of Connor, the farmer. They were stopped by the War Veterans who, at 
that moment, feared the situation might get out of hand. ‘Effervescence’, to use the 
term assigned to the phenomenon of ritually-induced excitement by Durkheim, was 
induced by the performance of the Zunde. 
 
The performance of Zunde raMambo was a turning point in the occupations led by 
War Veterans. It marked a new level of alliance of the War Veteran Movement and 
the Peasant Land Occupation Movement. The farmer, Connor, in his evidence, 
remarked that the occupiers ‘erected a banner across the access road to my 
homestead. This banner consisted of a white cloth approximately 2 m long and 1 m 
wide on which was written ‘Zunde raMambo Chivake’ (HC affidavit). The banner 
suggests that the Zunde was not an impromptu performance but something for 
which the occupiers had planned. 
 
In the later occupations (to be discussed in Chapter 5) the Zunde has been adopted 
as government and ZANU-PF, in a bid to mobilise the grassroots through the 
traditional leadership of chiefs and headmen. As we shall see in the coming chapters, 
the Fast Track Land Reform aimed to co-opt or neutralise the land movement and 
diffuse the powers of War Veterans, and to develop the chiefs as a powerful rural 
tool of governance allied with government capable of controlling peasants and war 
veterans. What began as local protest from below involving War Veterans and 
peasants has become a tool of ‘indirect’ rule for the government. 
 
4.4.4 War time pungwes, song and dance 
War Veterans conducted ‘pungwes’, which were all-night-long gatherings for political 
mobilisation and education punctuated by singing and dancing similar to those held 
during the armed struggle. War Veterans resuscitated the war spirit to invoke 
militancy in the followers through singing revolutionary songs, politicisation and 
shouting of war time shouting slogans, as the farmer Connor remarked, ‘They 
[occupiers] were … singing revolutionary songs and beating drums’ throughout the 
night (High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98: 10 affidavit). Occupiers also made 
gestures and noises arousing war spirits. In the songs they threatened O’Connor with 
a mixture of ‘shouting,’172 ‘whistling’ and ‘ululating’ (Interview with DM 2000).173 
                                                 
172 High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98:6 (Founding affidavit). 
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The occupiers selected particularly those songs whose themes were land and 
courage, and connected the occupation to the liberation struggle (Interview with 
Muchaneta, female War Veteran, 2005). For example, the following songs were sung 
and occupiers danced and drummed: 
 
We Black people, owners of the land174 
We Blacks, owners of the land 
Of Zimbabwe ... 
Are pushed into mountainous terrains 
 
Children of Zimbabweans, the Black power 
We ought to unite 
To liberate our country 
 
The fords that we crossed 
Oh the fords through which we crossed 
Were full of tears and blood175 
 
Fire your gun Chaminuka 
Fire your gun Chaminuka176 
Your time is ripe 
To liberate your country 
Fire your gun. 
We meet in battle 
And immerse in Takawira’s177 blood 
That was spilt for our land 
Our blood will mix 
 
Get your planes and ship 
Go back to your lands of origin 
We are tired of you Boers178 
                                                                                                                                            
173 Interview with DM 2000 – 2004 (some of the songs which were sung were: Bereka sabhu 
tiende pasi neDzakutsaku and Tinoda nyika yedu Smith/ iyeiye hee ahee/ Iyeiye toda nyika yedu. 
Vanamukoma vauya vanamukoma vauya. 
174 Its Shona version is Vanhu vatema varidzi venyika, veZimbabwe/ Tosundidzirwa mumakomo X2 
Vana veZimbabwe, hondo yevatema/ Tinosungirwa kubatana. This song’s theme is land 
dispossession and land hunger suffered by the Africans moved from fertile low-lying flat 
land into rocky and marginal mountain lands. 
175 This is a refrain. In Shona the lyrics are: Mazambuko ayo takabva nawo / Azere misodzi neropa. 
The song describes the nature of hardships suffered during the liberation struggle, thereby 
arousing the spirits of the occupiers by invoking those memories. It was particularly relevant 
to the situation at the farm of O'Connor considering the stories of brutality during the war 
attaching to this particular farmer (‘Shiro’). 
176 Chaminuka is considered, by Shona people, to be the greatest national spirit of the 
Southern African region. The lyrics (in Shona) of ‘Fire Your Gun Chaminuka’ are: Ridza gidi 
rako Chaminuka/ Yave nguva yako/Yekusungura nyika/ Ridza gidi rako/Tichasangana 
mukurwa/Neropa raTakawira/ Rakapararira nyika/ Tichasanganiswa/ Tora ndege nengarava/Udzokere 
kwako/Taneta nezvenyu mabhunu/ Muno muZimbabwe  
177 Takawira was the veteran nationalist killed by the Rhodesian government and now a 
national hero buried at the Heroes Acre. 
178 The derogatory term ‘Boer’ means White coloniser or land grabber (derived from the 
Dutch word for farmer). 
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Here in Zimbabwe179 
 
Fatherland was colonised 
Fatherland was colonised 
Let’s go and fight 
To take it back (x 2) 
 
Chorus 
This land, this soil 
Of the Black people 
Of Zimbabwe180 
 
Fatherland was usurped 
Lets go and fight 
To take it back (x 2) 
 
 
 
It would be fair to summarise by saying that these songs were strongly anti-
colonial and anti-settler in tone, and in many cases highlighted the theme of land 
dispossession and land hunger, the suffering of the indigenous people as a result of 
landlessness, and the agenda of liberation. Songs of the liberation war, at times 
modified to suit the current land occupations, were a common approach both in the 
early War Veterans-led occupations and in the later (2000) occupations, as will be 
discussed further in the following chapter.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated how the early occupations were organised. War Veterans 
mobilised peasants, local traditional leaders, local politicians, local youths and 
themselves during the early land occupations. It has also showed that although there 
was a national structure of War Veterans in the form of Zimbabwe National 
Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), the land occupations at this early 
stage were not initiated by this organisation, but had the character of local and 
isolated initiatives, linked horizontally rather than vertically, as seen in the case of 
the Svosve and Goromonzi occupations. Thus at local level the War Veteran district 
committee members collaborated with individual War Veterans from Harare without 
going through the provincial and national channels. Individuals were approached 
depending on their skills and motivation. The early occupations can be considered 
                                                 
179 Another song of a similar nature had these lyrics: The Whitemen came (Vachena vakauyawo)/ 
Clad in sheep’s skins (Vakapfeka nguo dzehwai)/ Pretending to be holy (Voita sevakanakisa)/ But evil 
at the core (Asi mumoyo vasina)/ Toiling then started (Nhamo zvino yazotanga)/ Oppressing 
Zimbabweans (Kudzvanyirira mhuri yeZimbabwe/ We are like slaves (Kuita sevatapwa isu)/ And who 
enjoys our wealth? (Hupfumi hwedu hwodyiwa nani?/ [It is enjoyed] By other countries far away 
(Nedzimwe nyika dzekunze)… 
180 The song, ‘Fatherland was colonised’ in Shona was, ‘Nyika yababa yakapambiwa’ and had the 
following lyrics: Nyika yababa, yakapambiwa/ Handei torwisa tiitore x2 Nyika iyo, nyika iyo nyika 
iyo nyika iyo/ Nyika yavatema veZimbabwe/ Ivhu rababa, rakapambiwa handei torwosa/ Tiritore. Ivhu 
iro, ivhu iro, ivhu ir,o ivhu iro,/I vhu ravatema veZimbabwe. 
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initiatives undertaken by local agents drawing on local structures rather than 
something planned and executed from outside drawing on hierarchical organisation. 
Land occupations, it is here argued, began from below and then became subject to 
control from higher levels, including eventually the state. This local element – as 
catalyst to the current process of land reform in Zimbabwe - has not been given 
proper weight in the often bitter and polemical debates about responsibility for these 
changes. 
 
It was in these early occupations that we see for the first time War Veterans 
articulating their reasons for occupying farms and for approaching White farm 
owners directly. It is important to note at this period that violence was only an 
incidental element in farm occupations, mainly involving minor assaults and threats 
of violence. There was a correspondingly strong emphasis on negotiation. But 
although War Veterans claimed that their objective was to attract government 
attention through occupation, in reality they actually occupied and distributed land 
for use. This was thus more than a demonstration, and as such it attracted the 
intervention of the courts, seeking to defend state-sanctioned property regimes of as 
great an interest to Black elites as to White farmers, which is one reason the 
negotiations could not be allowed to bear fruit.  
 
War Veterans framed the problem of lack of access to land and the right to claim 
the land in terms of anti-colonialism and liberation war. They employed war-time 
forms of organisation (including intimidation and pungwes) and sentiments and 
ideologies through songs and dance and references to the Heroes Acre in order to 
agitate potential occupiers. They also mobilised local forms of social organisation by 
involving chiefs and ritual modes of engagement such as the Zunde raMambo. This 
is perhaps more than a point about means; the struggle to control the legacy of the 
war is as crucial an aspect of events as actual control of land. It is in this regard that 
we see the incomplete demobilisation of War Veterans as an important part of the 
story. 
 
Finally, there is the important issue of the response of the state. We have seen that 
the state and ZANU-PF ruling elite were, at this stage, openly against land 
occupations, for the reason that they judged it in their interest to continue an alliance 
with White farmers. The placatory delegations sent to occupiers had (in reality) one 
mission, to chase the occupiers from the farms to await lawful resettlement. This 
caused confrontation between the occupiers and the government organs. Eventually, 
as we shall see, a governing elite sacrificed its allies, the White farmers, in defending 
its own claims to control both land and state. The details of this development, and 
the interactions it involved between the land movement and the government, will be 
discussed in Chapter 7 when we look at the land movement in terms of political and 
institutional arrangements. In Chapter 5 we will discuss the War Veteran-led 
occupations of 2000. The chapter will analyse how occupations were organised, and 
draw attention to both continuities and discontinuities between early and later 
occupations. As we shall see, the 2000 occupations caused the position of the state to 
shift, thus also causing the land occupations to be different. 
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CHAPTER 5  
THE ROLE OF THE WAR VETERANS IN THE LATER LAND 
OCCUPATIONS (2000–2004) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A day after the announcement of the February 2000 referendum results 
(resulting in a majority ‘No’ vote), War Veterans occupied a derelict farm in 
Masvingo belonging to a White farmer.181 This triggered a wave of occupations 
at a moment when land reform had become a central issue in national politics. 
Several authors (Hammer and Raftopolous 2003, Feltoe 2004, Selby 2006, Alexander 
2006) have concluded that these occupations were instigated by the Zimbabwe 
African National Union Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF) as a political move, in order to, among other reasons, weaken or break 
the coalition behind the ‘No’ vote in the referendum. This coalition represented a real 
political threat to an otherwise firmly entrenched regime. In this chapter we will 
explore to what extent the wave of occupations can be considered solely or mainly 
the product of a top-down political strategy. It will assemble evidence to suggest that 
a more nuanced view would need to include the political orientation, organisation 
and definition of objectives of those actually engaged in the land occupations. This 
more nuanced view questions the picture of the fast track land reform as a 
homogeneous process, and of ZANU-PF as an actor with a single political aim. The 
case material aims to bring out some of the key internal contradictions and 
differences associated with the land occupations of 2000. 
 
The chapter focuses mainly on material relating to the occupation process in 
Nyabira, Mazowe and Matepatepa (See Figure 5.1 and 5.2), to highlight some of the 
diverse factors that have played a role in land occupations. Mazowe is an area north 
of the capital city of Harare. The administrative district of Mazowe includes the 
eastern parts of the capital, where it shares the borders with Zvimba District. In the 
east of Mazowe, lies a strip of land called Matepatepa which falls partly in Bindura 
District. Nyabira is an area in the west of both Mazowe and Harare. It lies in Zvimba 
District of Mashonaland Central Province. All three areas are located in agro-
ecological region IIa (Vincent and Thomas 1962) which is endowed with high rainfall 
(average of more 750 mm/annum) and rich soils, making them suitable for mixed 
farming. Tobacco, maize, wheat, flowers, and citrus are some of the major crops 
grown. In addition, there is floriculture, beef production and dairying activity. The 
proximity to Harare, the capital city, especially of Mazowe and Nyabira, allows us to 
discuss the urban influence on the land movement. Second, communal lands (areas 
reserved for Africans since colonialism), peri-urban areas (semi-urban centres within 
commercial farming) and rural commercial farms are all present in the region. 
                                                 
181 The early occupations described in Chapter 4 were followed up by others throughout 1999 
but these were not as widely publicised as the 1998 ones (Retrospective community mapping 
and focus group discussion with Machirori occupiers, 2005; Focus group discussion with 
Goredema group 2001 (Sadomba 2004). 
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Thirdly, the presence of military barracks, like Inkomo, makes it possible to ask 
questions about influence of the military on the land occupations.  
Nyabira, being a peri-urban area about 30 km from Harare, was totally 
surrounded by commercial farms. The population of the area was mainly engaged in 
petty trading (including commercial sex work), agriculture, processing of 
agricultural products such as tobacco, and transportation (especially working for 
Zimbabwe Railways and at Prince Charles Airport). Inkomo Barracks and a police 
station are also situated in Nyabira. The Nyabira case shows diverse backgrounds 
among key participants in the land occupations: external War Veterans from Harare, 
War Veterans from Inkomo Barracks, Nyabira police, railway workers, community 
leaders (including the local councillor and ZANU-PF leaders), and farm workers. 182  
 
Mazowe is an administrative district north of Harare. It has three semi-urban 
centres: Mvurwi, Concession and Glendale. Government district offices are located in 
Concession which has a high and low density suburb, primary and secondary 
schools, a police camp, a district hospital, railway station and Grain Marketing Board 
silos. The district has a highland and a valley – Mazowe Valley with the conspicuous 
Mazowe citrus plantation and processing plant for an orange drink that exports to 
international markets. In the eastern side of the district is Chiweshe, a communal 
land dominated by the African population. Lying in natural region II, Chiweshe has 
good potential for agriculture only for the overpopulation resulting in high pressure 
for land. 
 
Matepatepa lies in Bindura district but is adjacent to Chiweshe Communal Lands. 
It is a rich agricultural area in natural region IIa with good soils and high rainfall. 
Proximity to Chiweshe Communal Lands makes the area an easy target for 
occupation by the people of Chiweshe Communal Lands. Tobacco, flowers and other 
horticultural crops were grown in Matepatepa. Many farm workers of the area had 
permanent homes in the communal land of Chiweshe. 
 
As in the early occupations (see Chapter 4), the occupations of Mazowe, 
Matepatepa and Nyabira brought together activists from different social strata with 
different strategic and political interests of groups. War veterans were involved, but 
also sections of the peasantry, and some coalition-shifting farm workers. Below, we 
will first discuss the political and organisational role of the war veterans, in 
mobilising political and material resources for the occupations, for which they 
interacted with forces within ZANU-PF. Then we look at how peasant modes of 
organisation and belief systems contributed to the land occupations. Finally, we 
discuss the mobilisation of farm workers, and the conflict of interest this implied. 
 
 
                                                 
182 A baseline survey carried out by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies revealed this 
diverse background of Nyabira population. 
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Figure 5.1 Mashonaland West Province 
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Figure 5.2 Mazowe and Matepatepa 
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5.2 Organisation and mobilisation by War Veterans 
5.2.1 Distribution of personnel, district coordination and zoning 
Although War Veterans were quite widespread, as discussed earlier in this thesis, 
they were not evenly distributed. Harare, being the capital city, had a high 
concentration of War Veterans, while in rural areas they were generally few in 
number in any given locale. In this section we examine how the War Veterans 
managed to distribute their numbers as a strategy to provide leadership to the 
scattered occupations of Mazowe, Nyabira and Matepatepa areas. We shall begin by 
tracing how War Veterans got into Mazowe and Nyabira from elsewhere. Central 
Matepatepa had one war veteran leading the occupations. There were also some war 
veterans from Mt. Darwin, in the north of Matepatepa (Participant observation, 
Matepatepa, 2000; Interview with War Veteran C, leader of Matepatepa occupations, 
2000). P (Interview with P 2000)183 came to Mazowe via the Harare Provincial office 
of War Veterans, where a meeting was held to assess deployment, after Mazowe had 
requested reinforcement for occupations already initiated. Ch said: ‘P, we want 
people to go to Mazowe where we have a request that Mazowe needs reinforcement 
because ex-combatants are too few to carry out farm occupations.’ (Interview with P 
2000) This is how P and many others ended up in Mazowe. 
War Veterans were few in number184 and could not have managed to take over the 
farms without the participation of peasants, farm workers and sections of the urban 
unemployed.185 Numbers were too small; in fact, even to staff the leadership of a 
movement engaging in national activism. In Mazowe and Nyabira, the War Veterans 
had to recruit reinforcements from outside, in order to adequately supply leaders of 
teams and groups (Interview with D 2001): ’this is why we decided to get 
reinforcement from Harare. So I would phone, especially every weekend …’.  
 
Ironically, Mvurwi turned to Mazowe for reinforcement,186 making the matter 
even more complex, as Tt, a War Veteran in Concession (Interview with Tt 2000) 
described: 
                                                 
183 The first invasion coordinated by P was on a government property known as Imbwa Farm, 
leased to a Black farmer. This was in Beatrice, south of the city of Harare. While at Imbwa 
Farm, P was sent to get more information about other occupations elsewhere. There he was 
asked by Chino to join a group that was going to invade Mazowe because that district had 
requested for reinforcement. P went back to Imbwa farm to inform his colleagues of the 
developments and later joined the Mazowe group. Their first invasion was on Somerset Farm 
in Concession. 
184 To illustrate the numbers, when occupations started in 2000 only ten War Veterans were 
present (six women and four men) (Interview with Mk, woman War Veteran, 2000). We were 
just ten. Some were from Mazowe. Other War Vets in Mazowe go to work, so the few of us who are 
unemployed and people from Chiweshe went to the farms …When we started male War Veterans were 
only six out of the ten of us. So at M Farm we were six female War Veterans… 
185 When groups of War Veterans met in the operational zone, occupying farms (Interview 
with Ss 2001) ‘We told them that we were aware that they (Comrades from Harare) were coming at 
this place that time and we had actually come to join them. We also told them that we were the War 
Veterans in Concession. … We worked well with the Comrades from Harare.’ 
186 Mvurwi, in the northern part of Mazowe District, obtained War Veteran reinforcements 
from Mzarabani for specific days during the Easter period of 2000, and made a push 
southwards, occupying farms with the aid of farm workers (Interview with DT 2000): ‘The 
WVs from Mzarabani were forthcoming. We agreed at Easter that we would team up together. We 
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Comrades from Mvurwi appealed to me saying ‘Please do something … we are 
overpowered in our area…Can you assist us in whatever way possible’. This is why 
therefore I turned to Centenary [the district next to Mazowe]. I went there several times. 
We had to negotiate with the War Veteran leaders in that area for them to give us 
reinforcement. And they agreed to reinforce us. I also went to Mount Darwin … in my 
old Mercedes Benz187 to ask for reinforcement because everybody knows as well as I do 
that there are more WVs in Mzarabani [and] more WVs in Mt Darwin, unlike this area. 
This is why I turned to these two areas for reinforcement. 
 
This appeal for additional personnel introduced a change in the organisational 
tactics of the movement in Mazowe, from a loose, locally based organisation to a 
more centralised structure. The situation demanded a centralised approach to 
coordinate reinforcement to weak areas where occupiers faced resistance. At one of 
the meetings where both Harare and Mazowe War Veterans were present, Chiro188, a 
War Veteran who was also member of Central Committee of ZANU-PF, declared 
that D was the coordinator for Mazowe area. From then on the occupations were 
coordinated at the District (Interview with Tt 2000). 
 
Later, coordination became more ramified. Six zones were established in the 
Mazowe area to coordinate activities. Two zone commanders were selected in a 
meeting of War Veterans held at Glendale (Participant observation, Glendale, 2000). 
The zones were as follows: Mvurwi area, Concession, Mazowe South, Nyabira, 
Glendale and Matepatepa. In some cases the zone commanders were from both 
Harare and Mazowe. In Matepatepa there was only one zone commander, who 
requested for reinforcement at that meeting, and I ended up joining him with three 
other War Veterans. This is how I ended up in Matepatepa, which was originally 
outside my research area. The zone commanders were responsible for solving 
problems faced by occupiers in the different farm bases of the area. They also kept a 
register of occupiers at each base and were responsible for maintaining discipline in 
their areas. Reports for each zone were presented at the Saturday meetings of War 
Veterans (Interview with zone coordinator Pf 2000, Participant observation 2000): 
The War Veterans meetings started when DTM [the War Veterans’ leaders] … called for 
a meeting of the district War Veterans and said it was not good that we operated 
differently, without a common approach [and] without meeting and discussing. He called 
for meetings to be held every Saturday or every Sunday. The purpose of the meetings was 
to share problems faced and to determine the way forward. That is when the issue of the 
zones came up. I was then partnered with Mk for zone 5. So I would come with others 
from Harare and Mk organised people locally and we teamed up and went to [occupy] 
farms. 
 
It is important to note that this particular hierarchical structure emerged in 
response to organisational needs, and was not predetermined by external forces. In 
addition, the organisational structure was not elaborated beyond the express need 
for it. In particular there was no attempt to link to the existing structures of the 
Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA).  
                                                                                                                                            
would spend the whole Easter together, which is exactly what we did. We ransacked all the farms: 
Forester Estates, as far down as near Tsatse, very close here. We went also to farms around Mvurwi. 
We were now winning the battle.’ 
187 This was an old car probably more than 20 years and did not depict the War Veterans’ 
status. 
188 This is not his real name. 
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5.2.2 Meetings 
Meetings were important in the organisation of the occupiers. Before the eruption of 
the 2000 occupations, War Veterans used to meet almost every month to discuss 
various issues relating to their interests. These meetings were the basis for organising 
land occupations in Mazowe, as Mk (Interview with Mk 2000), a woman coordinator 
of the occupations in Glendale, Mvurwi and Concession, said: 
We used to hold meetings every Saturday. If not we would make sure that we had our 
monthly meetings every 8thwhen we got paid our pensions and everyone got money at 
Glendale, so we then held our meetings on that day. This was far before the NO vote. The 
meetings were called by the Chairwoman. In most cases the meetings were about our 
welfare. We discussed that the money we were getting was too little and we tried to 
discuss what we could do about it. We also talked about problems of school fees for our 
children. So we agreed that the meetings were important, in that they would make us 
share our problems. The meetings were also helpful in that whatever was decided from the 
top we would get it there. 
 
At Concession, a meeting with youth, peri-urban workers and the unemployed 
was held to advise how to get into the farms, convened by the War Veterans at 
Dandamera (Interview with Dd, the convener, who was also a member of the 
ZNLWVA provincial executive, 2000): 
And we called for a meeting at Dandamera189 … where we told our people and advised 
them what others were doing and that we could do the same in this area, and everybody 
agreed that, ‘it is good … let’s go and take our land.’ And off we went. 
 
Meetings were also held in Harare for recruitment and mapping out of strategy. 
Covering mostly Nyabira area and part of Mazowe, War Veterans formed an 
organisation, Nyabira Mazowe Association, by recruiting people from Harare; its 
purpose was to occupy farms (Interview with DD, District Secretary for ZNLWVA 
who led occupations in Nyabira, 2000): 
So I organised Comrades in my district in which I held the post of secretary [of 
ZNLWVA]. We agreed as a committee to call for a meeting with the agenda of going to 
occupy farms by force (jambanja190). We went to join the others who were in those places 
already. 
 
5.2.3 Committees and task groups 
Farm committees represented the occupiers and farm workers at each of the 
occupied farms. At a higher level there was a coordinating committee. War Veteran 
Ff explains the structure in the following words (Interview with Ff 2002): 
The structures of our association are as follows. We began at first by establishing the 
main committee that oversees all the activities of the farms invaded by comrades ... So 
there was the understanding that never mind that we were taking land from the 
Whiteman, we needed to reflect to the government that we were also organised in mind 
and in practice as we undertake the invasions. So when we established the main 
committee, we noticed that we had to be very clear of who was at which farm. That’s the 
main committee to which I was elected chairman. 
 
                                                 
189 High density area of Concession, an urban centre of Mazowe. 
190 ‘Jambanja’ was the word used to describe the occupations (meaning ‘use of force’). 
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At times these committees within the land occupations movement were linked 
‘with the lower tier level of the ruling ZANU-PF. Minutes of the Coordinating 
Committee of Nyabira Mazowe dated 4 April 2000 hints at links with ZANU-PF: 
The committee further recommended that planning department, War Veterans’ 
Association (WVA) district Committee and ZANU-PF district be part of implementing 
agents and overseers to this program.191 
 
Some groups in the land movement were assigned specific tasks. When War 
Veteran Pf started occupations in Harare South, reconnaissance teams negotiated 
with the farmers ahead of a bigger group that followed to occupy. This team also 
furnished the bigger group with information about the area and the nature of 
response of each farmer. This is said to have avoided bloody conflicts (Interview 
with Pf 2001). Likewise, the Nyabira Mazowe Association had standing committees 
(Interview with War Veteran leader D, 2000-4): ‘We have got another [Committee] on 
administration that [does] … registration and allocation. The committee structure has 
the Chairman’s department (administration), secretariat, treasury, planning, 
transport and security departments.’ 
 
The Planning Department of the Nyabira Mazowe Association was responsible for 
surveying and producing layout and land use plans for occupied farms. The security 
department handled security issues related to occupations.  
  
Although in most cases the War Veterans follow operational modes derived from 
their experiences during the liberation war, in some cases they built on experience of 
civil society organisation, as distinct from political and military organisation. In 
Mazowe south, for example, the types of bases established reflected ways of 
operating within civil society, as will be indicated in the next section. 
 
5.2.4 Establishing bases 
Derived from guerrilla war experiences, the concept and function of the ‘base’ was 
crucial for the land movement. Bases became focal points for operations in the 
occupied farms. A base was a place where the commander of the group leading the 
occupations in the area would be located (in most cases the commander was a War 
Veteran, but occasionally was a male youth appointed by the War Veterans). From 
the base, smaller camps would be established at the occupied farms, and these were 
mainly commanded by youths. The function of the base was to monitor and 
supervise the farms under the jurisdiction of the group. The commander received 
reports from each of the farms and attended to the problems faced. Orders or 
instructions were issued from the base, and where a need arose the base would also 
communicate other groups or other areas in the larger landscape of farm occupation. 
The use of bases was a guerrilla strategy which divides a group into small 
operational units (sections of 12 guerrillas on average) and makes it self-sufficient 
and independent. Likewise, it was thought that the farm occupations should be 
largely independent, as is illustrated in the following quotation (Interview with BP 
2000): 
…we went there to establish our base. We said we don’t want to operate from 
Chitungwiza - we want to fight our war from the farms themselves. All Comrades should 
                                                 
191 Minutes of the Coordinating Committee held at ZANU (PF) Provincial offices on 4 
September 2000. 
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know that the issues of farms should be sort[ed] out from within the farms themselves, 
not elsewhere. … Then we stayed there. 
 
At times the bases were located in farm buildings, but in most cases a more 
distant defensible position was chosen, in case of counterattack. 
 
There were variations in the bases, influenced by dominant characters in the 
group. For example where youth and peasants dominated and there were no War 
Veterans, usually party structures were assumed, but where War Veterans were 
present they formed a military structure. For the military type of base there was a 
commander, a political commissar, and security, logistics and medical officers. 
Where civilian structure was adopted there was a chairman, political commissar, 
secretary, treasurer, etc. In some bases created by peasants, a pattern reflecting 
‘traditional’ village governance was assumed, with the village head at the top. 
However, these bases were found in the minority of cases where peasants 
predominated among occupation activists. Peasant bases were mainly centres for 
coordinating clan occupiers or occupiers from the same village. In contrast, War 
Veterans bases acted as focal points for coordination of occupation activities across 
several farms in the area.  
 
5.2.5 Communication 
War Veterans used various modes of communication. Communication was 
important to avoid clashes, to ask for reinforcement, and to inform the main bases 
about developments. The channels of communication were both formal and 
informal. War Veterans communicated effectively, via a variety of means: ‘Even 
nationwide … such that what we do here can be known in a few hours by people in 
Bikita or Chiredzi or Bulawayo, if we want that to be done at a national level.’ 
(Interview with DM, self employed War Veteran, 2000) The occupiers made effective 
use of technology such as cell phones. At a meeting of Nyabira Mazowe Association 
held on 10 July 2000, the minutes read: 
…that most members have cell phones and the telephone bills of Administration 
members’ accounts are so high. [money] has to be put aside for communication 
[purposes]; i.e. letters to members, telephones, fuel, etc.; but some members are requested 
to exercise due care in the use of public funds and make sure accountability and 
transparency prevails all the times. 
 
Communication between the War Veterans in Harare and Concession was by both 
land line and cell phones (Interview with F 2001): ‘We exchanged notes on what we 
had achieved that day. And we also exchanged our telephone numbers. And so from 
that time on I would contact them.’ 
 
Informal communication also took place in many situations. Whenever War 
Veterans met, at funerals, at drinking places, at work places and so forth, they 
discussed their plight and what to do about it. The land issue would always come up 
during such discussions. As P said (Interview with P 2000): ‘There was no meeting 
held to analyse and strategise operations.’ In other words, the established 
networking of War Veterans provided ample opportunities for informal exchange of 
information and analysis, without need for special meetings.  
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5.2.6 Social mobilisation and political education 
War Veterans had learnt about the importance of mobilisation in the guerrilla war 
and some of this knowledge was apparent in mobilisation for land occupation. 
Expanding the movement became an important issue, since farms were extensive 
and occupation demanded a growing number of committed activists. War Veterans 
recruited peasants, farm workers and urban residents using different forms of 
mobilisation in order to widen the appeal of the land movement. One of the methods 
of mobilisation was to hold all-night political education campaigns (pungwes) and 
day time rallies. Both reflected war-time techniques for mobilisation. Pungwes had a 
number of effects on both potential participants in the land movement and on the 
White farmers. On the one hand it inspired the occupiers by rekindling the emotions 
of liberation, especially through singing songs from the war. On the other hand these 
events showed that something was ‘brewing’, and thus tended to weaken the 
farmers’ resolve to resist. 
 
Mobilisation was not necessarily by persuasion, during the war or in the 
occupation movement. In certain cases occupiers were coercive, and education 
followed later or never at all. For example at one farm, if occupiers met a suspected 
Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) supporter preparing for a rally for their 
movement president, Morgan Tsvangirai, they abducted the person there and then, 
and confiscated any food that had been brought for the rally. This was also used as a 
tactic of mobilising people, as Mk (Interview with woman, War Veteran leader, 2000) 
said: 
After 12 midnight we forced [the MDC supporter] to pick the kapenta fish. This challenge 
was very encouraging to the masses from Chiweshe around Bell Rock area, who became 
more resolute. They followed us and we gave them the kapenta fish and a lot of other food 
stuffs. The rest we gave to the youth in the bases. That is [one of the] reason[s] that 
converted the farm workers of that area. 
 
Political education was an instrument the War Veterans used to recruit different 
classes of people to the occupation movement. War Veterans ran classes for male and 
female farm workers, peasants, and youths about the occupations. One War Veteran 
(Interview with Q, a former political commissar during the war and leader of 
occupations, 2001) explained that their group prepared political education messages 
that aimed to transform people they encountered into conscious supporters of the 
land movement: 
When we address the ex-combatants at the farms, we do not just address them aimlessly 
in a disorderly fashion. We conscientise [i.e. offer political education to raise awareness] 
every single Comrade so that he/she understands our aims and objectives. What is the 
cause of us being in that farm by way of ‘invasion’? … People had to understand that 
what we were doing was… to redress the imbalance of land distribution. We were 
repossessing our land and the reason for us to go into those farms through force or 
confrontation is because of resistance of the Boers. They were given enough time by the 
government of the day, 20 years to establish equitable distribution of land but they 
resisted. 
 
The intensity of education and messages differed from one group to the other. 
War Veterans were given groups to lead, or coordinated activities based on their 
experience and ability to mobilise people. Selection for leadership: ‘…was generally 
based on the fact that these people were going to be instrumental in mobilising people as 
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Commissars. This is why people like myself were elected. It was like these people have the 
capacity to mobilise, organise people.’ (Interview with DT 2001) 
 
Political education was also seen as a prerequisite for forming structures, as stated 
by DM (2000): ‘… we conducted the elections to establish committees after addressing [the 
people]. After the address both occupiers and farm workers, understood what was expected of 
them, the farm workers who had been at the farm also understood what their future was.’ 
 
Perhaps this implies a naïve faith in the power of propaganda. The class interest of 
farm workers did not necessarily coincide with the interests of those who hoped to 
become the new owners, but one of the long-lasting legacies of the guerrilla war, to 
which this focus on education points, was belief in the value of asserting a common 
discourse as a means of bonding a group for the struggle ahead. The point we wish 
to make here is not that the faith of the land occupiers in this kind of ‘class education’ 
was well placed, but that it is evidence that the occupations of 2000 were still in some 
sense an enactment of modalities of struggle associated with the guerrilla war, 
suggesting that events were more complex than the party-inspired opportunism 
some have supposed.  
 
5.2.7 Resource mobilisation192 
Transport 
There are several contrasting views presented about transportation of occupiers. 
Some analysts argue that there was a high government participation in the land 
occupations based on organisation of transport. Feltoe (2004: 199), for instance, 
argues that: ‘The rapid expansion of the process required considerable pre-planning 
and logistical support and it was clear that there was substantial government 
involvement. The farm occupiers were transported in an assortment of government 
vehicles.’ 
 
In what the present researcher observed, however, the mobilisation of transport 
seemed to be a much more chaotic process, with a high level of active involvement of 
local people. Even if the means of transport originated elsewhere, its requisitioning 
was primarily the work of local organisers. For example, at least some occupiers 
across all three case study areas (Mazowe, Nyabira and Matepatepa) organised their 
own transport. War Veterans emphasise this in their accounts. DD (Interview with 
DD 2000), who mobilised resources from the elites in Harare, said: ‘This is when we 
                                                 
192 Resource mobilisation theory argues that the success of a social movement is based 
primarily on ‘mobilising of sufficient resources to maintain and expand the movement’ (Foweraker, 
1995: 16). As a result a movement has to acquire resources and has to competitively position 
itself in a vantage position to gain resources required for its sustenance including 
‘advantageous exchange relationships with other groups’ (Foweraker, 1995: 16). This theory has 
received a lot of criticism mainly based on the fact that it ‘employs narrowly instrumental 
rationality which bridges a rigid means/end model [and thereby] falls far short of universal or complete 
account of collective action …’ (Foweraker, 1995: 17). Another criticism of the resource 
mobilisation theory is (understandably) that the actor is stripped of the ‘social context’ when 
emphasis is laid on the ‘rational’ and focused interest in material advantages associated with 
movement membership. This makes it difficult to explain the behaviour of actors not 
apparently based on such ‘rationality’ at all (Foweraker 1995: 17). This does not mean, 
however, that practical ‘resource management’ is unimportant in rendering social movements 
operational. 
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started to organise for transport from the people who had money and vehicles, our 
own people who understood our cause, and we told them that we wanted to get to 
particular farms.’ 
 
But it is also clear that multiple factors were at play in determining specific 
outcomes. Mk, a woman War Veteran (Interview with Mk 2000) working in Mazowe 
central, said; 
We were given our own Datsun 120Y by another mupositori [member of a certain 
African Apostolic Faith sect] who offered us the vehicle so that we had means of 
transport. We promised to reward him with land when the program succeeded. The 
Mupositori was [also] a member of ZANU-PF so he gave us the 120Y.193 
 
Occupiers also used their own personal vehicles, and organised transport in a 
variety of ways. Some doubtless felt it was to their advantage to use their own assets 
in this way, but for others they were making a conscious sacrifice to the cause: ‘That’s 
where I had my Land Rover completely destroyed. I drove it everywhere carrying 
people.’ (Interview with F, a self employed War Veteran from Harare, 2001) 
 
Peasants also did the same. Some of those with cars donated them for use by 
occupiers. One group used its own transport to go and occupy Gomba.194 Farm 
workers involved in occupations sometimes commandeered vehicles from 
commercial farmers. This diversity of means of moving around contradicts Feltoe’s 
picture of top-down pre-planning. The picture painted above suggests more a social 
movement grasping at whatever means came to hand, even if partly aligned with 
ZANU-PF. It does not confirm the notion of the party ‘bussing’ its supporters to an 
event executed according to a centrally-devised plan.  
 
Food 
The provision of food also reflects a similar combination of local and higher level 
resource mobilisation initiatives. Food was essential in the process of occupations. 
War Veterans could prove their leadership if they succeeded in getting food to the 
occupiers. They used various means, including paying for it, or requesting it from 
the occupied White farmers as donation, as well as by applying pressure or using 
outright force:  
People complained that they were hungry and the farmer gave us one carcass from the 
cold room and he also gave us eight 25kg bags of maize meal [corn flour] for us to cook 
sadza [thick porridge commonly made from corn flour]. We even took some of it to Dun 
and Sun, the other bases because we could not consume everything there. (Interview with 
K, a youth from Dandamera, 2000) 
 
The methods of requesting or pressuring the farmers varied according to 
circumstances (Interview with M, woman occupier from Mvurwi, 2000): 
                                                 
193 At local levels many ZANU-PF members, as actors of the liberation movement, took part 
in the occupations and at times used their resources for this purpose as in the quotation 
above. 
194 Gomba is about seven kilometres north of Harare. The place is significant in that that it is 
where Charwe, the spirit medium of Nehanda lived when the First Chimurenga war of 
resistance was fought in 1896-7. Nehanda spirit medium together with Kaguvi, were captured 
and hanged in Salisbury. Gomba is a Shona name depicting a valley as the place is, lying 
between a range of mountains. 
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At J, and at K’s farm we ate beef. We ate whatever we could get at the farm; if there were 
cattle we ate beef if there were chickens we fed on that. Also when the elections were 
announced I contributed more than $700 to buy food for [occupiers]. We went to the 
councillor and demanded fire wood. The youth started to celebrate. We went to the team 
leader of the central committee to celebrate at his business premises and he contributed 
crates of soft drinks. We went to the hospital to see M and we celebrated and the nurses 
threw money at us. We also came to the shops here and the shop owners threw money at 
us. We were singing Chimurenga songs. 
 
This last quotation suggests links of mobilisation of food from different sources 
and its sharing, with the expression of emotions associated with victory among 
members of the movement. The acquisition and provision of food was thus more 
than a utilitarian matter. Sharing of food during occupation became a recurrent 
celebration of popular power. 
 
Money 
It would have been almost impossible to carry out the occupations without money to 
buy food, fuel, and other necessities. Money was also needed by the occupiers to 
support the teams established at the bases. These were both youth and War Veterans 
guarding occupied farms from small makeshift but secure or defensible shelters. 
Money was collected from War Veterans, well wishers and those who wanted to 
participate but could not manage to attend the actual occupations. For example, 
employed workers and professionals paid money for the sustenance of the occupiers 
in the farms, and in this way sought to acquire a stake in the ongoing events. The 
money was collected at meetings, and in some cases a register of contributors was 
kept. In other situations membership fees were charged, as in the case of the Nyabira 
Mazowe Association.195 
 
Some analysts (e.g Feltoe 2004, Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 2004) suggest that 
the government supplied resources to occupiers, and see in this proof that the 
occupations were simply a government project. The above data on money and food 
seemingly contradict this interpretation. The land occupiers were in quite important 
respect self-financed, or at least financed by well-wishers. They coerced food in many 
cases, but again this was often or largely on their own initiative. The War Veterans 
also make it clear in their testimony that it was not government money that made the 
occupations possible: 
Those days what happened is that you (any ex-combatant who wanted to be involved in 
the land issue), would wake up in the morning and just go to at the gathering point 
where contributions were made there. If this exercise had been funded by the government 
it would have paid a lot of money, ex-combatants are the ones who actually sponsored it 
themselves. (Interview with P, a War Veteran from Chitungwiza, 2000) 
 
War Veterans were well organised in the capital city and had better means of 
communication and a relatively well-funded community from which to mobilise 
                                                 
195 The Nyabira Mazowe Association members paid monthly subscriptions to sustain their 
organisation’s farm occupations. When they realised that people were organised through the 
formation of Nyabira Mazowe Farmers Association, they started making all sorts of unsubstantiated 
claims that we were selling land. It was proved that members of the Association pay their monthly 
subscriptions and [this is] not selling land. (Interview with M 2003) 
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resources. This community included sympathetic intellectuals and professionals, 
members of the petty bourgeoisie and workers. The War Veterans from Harare were 
also relatively better off, in terms of economic status, than their rural counterparts. 
Some of them were employed in the private sector, many working in parastatals, and 
others were self employed, being mainly engaged in petty trading at Mbare Musika. 
The bulk of the War Veterans from elsewhere were unemployed and these were 
cushioned by those with income when money was required for land occupation 
purposes (Participant observation 2000-2).196 
 
Written documents confirm that much money came from the War Veterans’ 
individual contributions. For example, the minutes of the coordinating committee 
representatives held on 7 August 2000 at Muti Builders Offices state: 
Members had to be conscientised that there are subscriptions needed from all farms 
wishing to be represented … in self-contained plots $300 per head. Everyone pays $50 
monthly towards administration … Each farm must have its Chairman, Secretary and 
Treasurer who will be responsible with the running of the day to day activities on their 
farms including ensuring payments of subscriptions by individual members. The 
treasurer has to have a receipt book for each farm and in turn receives a receipt from the 
Association’s Treasurer upon surrendering funds from members.  
 
This does not mean that there was no money from politicians and the government 
to support the land movement. In fact, such contribution was actively sought. For 
example, F (Interview with F 2003) sought money from sympathisers and politicians: 
I personally went to ask for money from Cde Msika197 but he did not give us the money. 
… When we failed to get money from the party we went to Mackay farm and congregated 
all the Comrades from the farms: Spar, Mackay, Barrier, Pama, Nochikabar, Walley, 
Greenheights, Bramfield , Penrose, Ballinety, Bellilie, Nognov, Little England, 
Muvururu, Lilifordia, Landscape, etc … They all came and we addressed them. 
 
The sources of funds had run dry and the War Veterans pressed the ruling party 
for funds to sustain the occupations (Letter, addressed to ZNLWVA and ZANU-PF 
12 April 2000).198 War Veterans mobilised money wherever they could, and from 
anyone possible, to ensure that occupiers did not abandon farms because of hunger: 
We are now approaching the last crucial phase in farms where it is highly important to 
constantly visit and boost the moral of farm labourers [occupiers] and our comrades 
camped in these farms... We have exhausted our pockets now … there is need for back-up 
before it is too late. 
                                                 
196 War Veterans collected money for (food and other necessities) from those War Veterans 
and others who could not live in the occupied farms owing to various conditions including 
employment (Participant observation 2000–2).  
197 ZANU-PF and State Vice-President. 
198 Another document illustrating the continuous search for money within political circles 
is a letter dated 12 June 2000 addressed to Chairman of ZNLWVA, Chenjerai Hunzvi, ZANU-
PF Mashonaland West Provincial Chairman, Mashonaland West Governor, ZANU-PF 
Secretary for Finance, Emmerson Munangagwa, Mashonaland West Member of Parliament S. 
Mugabe and Chief Gava. In this letter, entitled, ‘Complaint to non-equitable distribution of funds’, 
the association states: We have written to express our greatest concern regarding our failure to get 
any cent since we occupied the farms in Nyabira. Through our coordinating committee, we have 
exhausted all channels, but to no avail since February, 2000. The wording seems to suggest that the 
occupiers acted without prior support from the government and party, but in the clear expectation that 
such support ought to be forthcoming.  
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The collected money was used for a variety of purposes, including paying hired 
professionals to produce cadastral maps for demarcated farms and recommend land 
use plans for settlers, travelling and subsistence allowances (Interview with DM 
2000): 
We were subscribing $250 per week and then $250 per month per person … By July we 
had spent $442,000 we actually wrote to the government and the ruling party that we 
have contributed so much on our own despite the fact that you are not giving us any 
financial help. This is just the amount we used on the farms alone, excluding fuel, 
subsistence etc. 
 
War Veterans, operating in central Mazowe, lobbied ZANU-PF politicians for 
financial contributions. They targeted candidates contesting for the 2000 elections. 
They also sought to pressurise ZANU-PF politicians sympathetic to their cause 
(Interview with Mk 2000) to finance some of their operations: 199 
At that point we were called back to get some money. Chi [a senior ZANU-PF politician] 
used to leave money at Gweshe shops for us. So when he noticed that the $500 per day 
that he was leaving there was not being collected, he started to trace and got the 
information that we had been arrested. He asked the Governor to intervene. … We were 
fined $500 each for common assault which Chi reimbursed. 
 
These data suggest that indeed that there was at least some government 
involvement in financing land occupations as Feltoe (2004: 199) claims. But it may be 
wrong to jump from this evidence, which needs to be more fully assessed, to the 
conclusion that the government was funding the land occupation movement. Some 
officials linked to the regime co-funded the occupations, although their contribution 
may turn out to be small in relation to a pattern of nationwide occupations. In other 
cases state resources were used by individual officials without authority or approval. 
For example, in a Provincial Stakeholder Dialogue meeting of Mashonaland East, one 
District Administrator, a War Veteran complained that his job was on the line 
because of using government vehicles for occupation of farms. During the 
occupations I met many War Veterans using government, army, air-force and 
parastatal resources without explicit permission. For example, Chinotamba, a War 
Veteran was subsequently grilled by the Harare City Council for leaving work to 
take part in the land occupations without permission from his employer. But in other 
cases the resources of private companies were also used without permission, and it is 
unlikely that these employers were supporting or sanctioning the occupation 
movement, far less explicitly funding it.200 The picture presented here is of a 
movement driven from below, with all kinds of opportunistic adaptations by 
superior authorities. But the evidence of a centrally-organised campaign planned and 
funded by the regime is largely lacking.  
 
                                                 
199 For example, KK (Interview with KK 2000) said: ‘Kr [local MP candidate] gave us $3,500 for 
petrol and food. Then we left.’ 
200 Focus group discussion in Nyabira, 2005. In that focus group there was one company 
employee with a field, but coming from another province (not Mashonaland West). He 
narrated how he got a field by using his company’s resources during the occupations and this 
is how he was identified as one deserving land, despite his origin. In the Nyabira Mazowe 
Association many members are professional WORKING in banks, industry and parastatals, 
and during the occupations they used their employers’ resources (participant observation 
2000-6). 
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5.3 Peasant organisation; the role of spirit mediums 
For peasants, occupations were less a spontaneous act and more a further step in a 
protracted inter-generational struggle with the White farmers to regain traditional, 
ancestral lands. Occupations had a long history before and after independence in 
1980. For example, efforts of the Hwata people (who claim to be autochthons) to 
return to Shavarunzwi Hill in Gomba date back to before the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland (1953) (Focus group discussions, 2002): 
Even the Smith regime knew it. They discussed the issue even when Smith was still in 
power. It has actually passed but it failed because of the [liberation] war. Mr 
Mashonganyika [who was part of the delegation] said that in 1954 there is a committee 
from the government of the Whites that actually had agreed that 10 families had to come 
and settle back in their area. 
 
In some cases peasants also negotiated with farmers independently to gain access 
to their shrines and to be allowed to perform religious ceremonies on land controlled 
by White farmers. In Gomba one White farmer whose family had owned the land 
from 1902 (ownership passing from his grandparents) complied with peasant 
requests and even assisted them during the ceremonies. The original owner donated 
cattle when the Hwata people came annually to perform religious ceremonies. This 
was continued by two generations of his heirs (now jointly owning the farm with 
their father) up to the occupation period in 1999. Throughout the 1980s the farmer 
(Mr. T, the second generation owner) accommodated the spirit medium (Nehanda I) 
so that she could take care of the shrine of Shavarunzwi Hill201 was accommodated 
(Interview with RN, former farm manager, 2004; Focus group discussions, 
Goredema, 2004): 
…he [White farmer] was saying that …Ambuya [Nehanda, who came from Chiweshe 
with Hwata people in 1998] should stay in Shavarunzwi. And the White commercial 
farmer gave the entourage of this Mbuya Nehanda cattle. I witnessed their coming [in the 
post independence period] so many times during the past years. They started coming here 
in 1985 when I had just arrived. He used to give them cattle … 
 
Below we will discuss two levels of mobilisation involving aspects of Shona 
religion. The first level is through what might be termed spiritual ‘direct action’, i.e. a 
spirit medium intends to occupy land for her own social group. The second level is 
through the use of a system of shared religious beliefs in the process of recruitment 
and education of potential participants.  
 
In Gomba, Nehanda Spirit Mediums did not move to occupy Gomba as 
individuals but as groups. This is understandable from the Shona religious 
perspective. A medium is always surrounded by people who have various duties 
                                                 
201 The spirit of Nehanda originated from Nyamhita, a daughter to the founder of the Mutapa 
kingdom, Mutota. Nyamhita became the great female ancestral spirit after having 
participated in an incestuous ritual with Matope, her brother, according to custom to 
consolidate the emerging Mutapa kingdom. ‘Matope gave the district of Handa… to his sister-wife 
Nyamhita, who for that reason became known as Nehanda i.e. the ruler/owner of Handa’ (Mudenge 
1988: 41) There are now many spirit mediums who claim to be possessed by Nehanda. In 
Gomba 3 mediums occupied Lowdale and adjacent farms. from the 1980s, but at different 
times and with different organisational backing. Nehanda I was from Musana Communal 
Lands, Nehanda II came from Chiweshe and Nehanda III came from Guruve. 
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and functions. Some act as intermediaries when the medium is possessed by the 
spirit and is in a trance. The assistant to the medium is the one who explains this 
possession and what it portends to the people consulting the spirit and who also 
keeps a record (usually based on memorising what the spirit said).202 There are also 
groups of people who stay with the spirit medium to perform such functions as 
brewing beer, an important ingredient on occasions when people gather round the 
oracle. Only old women and/or young girls – i.e. females beyond or not yet capable 
of conceiving - are allowed to brew beer associated with the spirit world. Evoking the 
spirit, including singing and playing the mbira, is performed by a musical group 
known as vaimbiri (Interview with Z 2005).203 Another functionary keeps the 
‘accessories’ or instruments used by the spirit medium. These include a Black and 
white cloth, and a small axe called gano or the tsvimbo (knobkerrie). In addition there 
are also men and women in the medium’s entourage who perform basic chores such 
as cooking for the medium, slaughtering sacrificial beasts and farming. Furthermore, 
due to the seniority of the spirit of Nehanda the medium demands always to be 
flanked by lesser regional spirits.204 In addition, the medium’s family group, the 
children, husband some nephews and nieces are also part of the entourage. National 
or regional duties do not break the ties with the domestic group. 
 
The spirit medium therefore operates with a number of families in attendance, 
depending on the seniority of the spirit and the circumstances of deployment. The 
support to Nehanda I (who came from Musana Communal Lands) by the 
commercial farmer mentioned above involved ‘setting up a [whole] village’, and 
proved to be an ‘expensive’ venture for the farmer concerned (Interview with farmer 
BT 2004). The medium’s extensive social base is important to understanding the 
mobilisation of the various Nehanda Mediums involved in occupying Gomba. The 
farmer did not fully understand the social implications of inviting the medium back 
on the site. ‘Then they ended up becoming too many - that is when T [a White 
commercial farmer] said that he only wanted the spirit medium to live in her 
mountain.’ He then consulted the ZANU-PF offices to try and establish which was 
the authentic Nehanda, in the hope of driving off those he considered fakes 
(Interview with RN 2003). 
 
                                                 
202 This function is quite widespread in Shona spirit possession and is most conspicuous 
where the medium is also a healer. A person called makumbi assists the healer by interpreting 
and explaining instructions given by the possessed healer. The makumbi also performs the 
functions of receiving and psychologically preparing the client or caregivers for the healing 
process (Sadomba 2000b). 
203 Z was one such singer and dancer for the spirit of Nehanda during the 1970s. The medium 
was taken to Zambia by the Guerrillas in 1972 and Z, then a young girl who had not yet 
reached puberty, remained one of the singers until the death of the medium in Zambia. In 
some of the African Christian churches with a strong syncretist element, such as the Johanne 
Masowe Chishanu, there is also a group of vaimbiri veMweya (in this case they are singers for 
the Holy Spirit). They specialise in singing to help the prophet to become inspired (i.e. 
possessed) by the Holy Spirit. I have participated in and researched upon Johanne Masowe 
since 1998. 
204 The Nehanda Spirit of the 1970s was flanked by Chidyamauyu Spirit, whose medium is 
the one who carried the Nehanda medium out of battle in Mozambique before crossing into 
Zambia (Interview with Z 2005; Interview with K 2004) Chidyamauyu, the youngest of the three 
(mediums), was charged with the care of the old Nehanda[the] feeble and weak (David Lan 1985: 5). 
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However, the support offered to the spirit medium by this large social group is 
not unconditional. For example, Nehanda Medium II was living in Chiweshe with 
the Hwata people when she was first possessed by the spirit in 1997 (Focus group 
discussion, 2002). The spirit through its medium masterminded a new wave of 
occupations of Gomba during the early occupation period (1998). Events took a new 
turn (Focus group discussion, 2002) in 1999: ‘when she said “Carry me I want to go to 
my land where I was beheaded”. But people did not pay attention and they refused 
because they could not understand how they were going to settle on the Whitemen’s 
farms.’205 
 
This was not the first time Nehanda had demanded to return to Gomba. 
Nehanda’s medium had tried to pressurise her people to go to Gomba but they had 
developed cold feet. On this day she protested against her followers and decided to 
walk from Chiweshe to Gomba, more than 60 km away (Interview with B 2001, 
Focus group discussion 2002): ‘… [so she] just bade farewell and told people that she 
was going to her land. When she was a distance away, we [the entourage] then 
decided to follow her.’ 
 
Nehanda’s actions here should be put in a correct perspective. In Shona custom, 
the behaviour of Nehanda is known as kuramwa. This can be translated as ‘to become 
impatient’. The Nehanda medium was fed up with the response of her followers 
when they refused to go and occupy Gomba. When a spirit medium reacts in this 
manner it could signal punishment from the spirit world for disobeying orders. This 
punishment is usually experienced in the form of natural disasters such as famine, 
epidemic or environmental catastrophe. When Nehanda’s entourage did eventually 
decide to follow her, these concerns will have been in their mind. They then 
persuaded her to board a vehicle to travel to Gomba, which she only reluctantly 
accepted. But ‘before Ambuya [the Nehanda medium] went into the car, people who 
were [just] six metres apart were drenched in rain.’ (Focus group discussion, Hwatas, 
2003) Needless to add, perhaps, this was seen as supernatural intervention. 
 
 
 
                                                 
205 Refusal of the Hwata was based on considering the legal issues and government policies 
on land. They knew that the commercial farmers had freehold title to their farm land. They 
therefore did not see the logic of the spirit in deciding to settle. In effect, the medium gad 
envisaged or anticipated the coming period of farm occupations. This ‘far sightedness’ is a 
good illustration the kind of role played by mediums in triggering, motivating and mobilising 
occupations. 
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Figure 5.3 Author with some of the aides of Nehanda 2 
From left to right; author, two aides of Nehanda and two relatives of Chief Hwata 
Source: Photo by Tsuneo Yoshikuni, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Nehanda aides brewing ceremonial beer 
This was to mark return of Chief Hwata. Hwata Chiripanyanga, the last chief to rule 
Gomba, was captured and hanged together with Charwe, the medium of Nehanda 
spirit in 1897. Since then the territory was owned by settler farmers. The white, blue 
and black dress materials are typical for Shona spiritual regalia.  
Source: Photos by Tsuneo Yoshikuni, 2002 
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But the claims to land by spirit mediums were not enough, by themselves, to 
spark off a large land movement. It was the new political and economic 
circumstances in the late 1990s and early 2000s, interacting with the established 
religious context that made a large land movement possible. The second level of 
mobilisation through Shona religion involved the mobilisation of youth, men and 
women outside the circles of religious adepts. This had the character of a religious 
revival, in which latent ideas and knowledge were brought back to life in highly 
charged emotional circumstances. For example, Hwata traditional leaders and spirit 
mediums recruited their sons and daughters in professional and high level 
government service. The newly enthused included the Registrar General, a 
Chemistry Professor working in the University of Zimbabwe, and many others 
(Focus group discussion, Goredema, 2004). Representatives of six clans descended 
from the sons of Shayachimwe206 occupied Gomba. The process of mobilisation was 
through rituals and ceremonies performed at Chiweshe, before the occupation 
commenced in 1999 (Focus group discussion, Chief and Mediums, 2002): 
The boys (War Veterans) who took land came afterwards. We had already spent quite 
some time on reclaiming our land when the Whites were still in power. Mbuya207 
[Nehanda] was demanding the return to her place. The War Veterans came when we 
were already settled at the current homestead. Beer was finally brewed and a ceremony 
which called all [the] people and [some] Ministers, was performed to demonstrate that 
Mbuya had returned to Gomba. 
 
Another instance of this kind of religious activism is the lead offered by a spirit 
medium, Sekuru Mushore, in the occupations in Nyabira area. Mushore occupied 
Nharira Hills, starting as far back as the 1960s, as explained below. One could 
classify this as a typical occupation tactic by peasants, (Munyaradzi 2003: 3): 
…the conflict dates back to the 1960’s, when Sekuru Mushore came to the hills to 
maintain his ancestors’ graves and to appease his ancestors. Through a gentlemen’s 
arrangement, the farmer allowed Sekuru Mushore, together with some of his aides, to 
temporarily stay at the hills to conduct their rituals. However, attempts by Sekuru 
Mushore and his aides to establish permanent homes resulted in their swift removal by 
the then-farm owner, Mr. Hinde. Mushore is said to have continued to visit the Hills on 
a regular basis with his aides to conduct rainmaking ceremonies at the site. However, in 
1993 he moved to the hills permanently to stay there with his family. 
 
Shona religious rituals were particularly important in rallying villagers to the 
occupations. Chiefs and spirit mediums organised meetings to prepare the people. I 
managed to attend some of these all-night ceremonies (biras)208 in this part of the 
Chiweshe Communal Lands, and so have some idea of what this aspect of 
mobilisation involved. At one occasion the local Chief and the spirit medium had 
jointly convened the bira. First, lengthy spiritual communion, supplication and 
                                                 
206 Shayachimwe, Gutsa and Nyamhangambiri were three brothers who fled from their father 
Nyashanu of the Shava totem living in Buhera in the east. They sought refuge in Seke and 
later conquered the Mbari (living at present day capital of Harare area) and Zumba people 
(living in Gomba). According to Beach they migrated about the 17th Century (Beach 1980); 
additional information from focus group discussions with Hwata group (2002) and Zumba 
group (2002), and interview with a Zumba spirit medium (2003). 
207 Mbuya literally means grandmother but is used as an honorific prefix to the spirit’s name, 
irrespective of the age of the medium. 
208 A bira is a religious ceremony where spirits are invoked and then appeased. The bira 
involves singing, dancing (particularly to the mbira) and all-night beer drinking.  
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offerings were performed. The Chief and other old men and women then explained 
to the possessed medium that the community was sending people to go and ‘reclaim 
the land from the usurpers’. The spirit, through its medium, set rules for doing this and 
gave instructions on what ceremonies and actions had to be performed before 
occupying. There was much clapping of hands, singing, drumming and dancing, 
including ululations. Even school children participated in these all night long 
ceremonies. The volunteers and selected candidates were given snuff by the spirit 
medium and words of encouragement. The snuff was to receive the blessings of the 
spirit and to weaken the White farmers. Prohibitions included abstinence from sex in 
the occupied areas. 
 
Such meetings were attended by adult men, women and male and female youth. 
This was a cross-section of the composition of the occupiers. It was able bodied men, 
women and youths who were selected to carry out the occupations. The remaining 
members of community (mainly children and older people) collected food and other 
necessities for the occupiers. These would be brought to the occupiers by people 
given that duty by the community. 
 
 
5.4 Involvement of farm workers 
In Matepatepa there was significant mobilisation of farm workers by peasant 
occupiers. Some of the farm workers were from the same communal lands as the 
peasants (Chiweshe Communal Lands) and they commuted from these peasant 
villages to work in the commercial farms. Others were part-time peasants, having 
been given land by the local authorities in adjacent communal areas. These people 
were strategically useful, since they could give useful information about the farms, 
the farmers, and activities in the area. These farm workers were sometimes given 
tasks by the communities in which they lived. These included working under cover 
for the occupiers, providing food and other necessities and communicating with the 
village leaders when occupiers encountered problems that required attention of the 
peasant coordinators. 
 
In Mazowe, farm workers living on the urban fringe, alongside unemployed 
youths, accepted mobilisation by War Veterans, thus constituting an element in the 
initial manpower moving on to farms to engage in further mobilisation and engage 
in planning further occupations. War Veterans in fact relied on mobilising these 
amenable ‘local’ farm workers to occupy farms in the surrounding areas.209 But in 
other cases War Veterans saw farm workers as a threat (seeking to protect their jobs 
by defending the land or property of their employer) and were thus anxious to 
immobilise them, where they could, to prevent counter-attacks, something that 
happened often, indicating that the farm workers had their own competing views 
about the land occupation movement, perhaps tending to be negative where they 
lacked local connections (Sadomba and Helliker, forthcoming). War Veterans report 
                                                 
209 This group of farm workers from commercial centres like Concession was so important to 
the movement that they were given land for housing, with at least an acre for tillage, in 
Dandamera. Not only were they significant as an occupation force but also in continuing to 
provide skilled and unskilled farm labour for the new settlers. They organised themselves 
into skill-based (weeding groups with experienced foremen) work teams to provide services 
to new and inexperienced settlers  
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how important they viewed it to mobilise farm workers, because weight of numbers 
mattered in the actual occupation process (Interview with Tt, leader of the Mvurwi 
occupations, 2000): 
So it would be massive … You can imagine five hundred people approaching a 
homestead, the dogs can’t stand. Not only five hundred, we were much more than that.210 
You would initially start when there was a hundred or so, initially - but as you attack 
this farm, mobilise the farm workers there. When you go to the next farm, you go with 
them and to the next, you take them [with you]. 
 
Farm workers were certainly decisive in the outcome of the occupations as small 
units of occupiers were easily repelled between February and April especially in 
Mazowe, before mobilising farm workers and reinforcements from neighbouring 
districts. The strategic significance of farm workers in the occupation process has 
been neglected. Their contribution has often been ignored, or worse, deliberately 
misinterpreted, as if they were in all cases, and without further evidence, victims 
without agency (Raftopoulos 2003, Selby 2006, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO 
Forum 2007). Empirical data suggest, however, that the position of farm workers was 
complex, and fluctuated throughout the occupations. Some were coerced, or came 
under enormous pressure to conform with the plans of the War Veterans, but others 
continued to weigh the balance of forces, considering their own interests at each 
point in time, and made strategic and tactical manoeuvres to position themselves 
advantageously in the struggle for land (Sadomba and Helliker, forthcoming). 
 
Some farm workers, for example, were (as noted above) only partially landless, 
retaining a toehold in the peasant economy, and seized opportunities to align 
themselves with the occupations in the hope of gaining more land. Further fieldwork 
and a more differentiated analysis is now needed, to replace some of the snap 
judgments made at the time, in which it was assumed that farm workers were all but 
universally supporters of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. Here it 
is suggested that enough evidence already exists to conclude that many were (at 
least) strategically calculating in intent, and intentionally aligned themselves with the 
occupation movement where it suited their requirements.  
 
In many cases when War Veterans went into the farms, they did not prioritise 
mobilisation of farm workers, who were thus frequently left without any clear 
understanding of the objectives of the occupiers. Only later, when War Veterans 
realised the cost of neglecting farm workers, were attempts made to apply war time 
techniques and to mobilise farm workers through ideological instruction.211 Some of 
this education was effective, since some farm workers later became active 
participants. This active agency can be demonstrated through some of the (negative) 
                                                 
210 White farmers report smaller groups of occupiers. At another farm the White Farmer 
(Interview with Uu 2004) said ‘I think we have to make [the number] between 70 and 100 people. 
That’s my estimation’. 
211 In Matepatepa seasonal farm workers from Chiweshe Communal Lands were mobilised 
during peasant mobilisation but permanent farm workers, not residing in Chiweshe, were not 
subject to this mobilisation and experienced friction with occupiers when occupations started 
(Personal observation Benridge Farm, 2000). This was the same with the farm workers in 
Mazowe but different from the Nyabira area. War Veterans in Nyabira targeted farm workers 
for mobilisation from the onset and promised to share the land with them. Farm workers here 
became willing participants in the movement from the outset (Interview with occupation 
leader DM, a War Veteran, 2000). 
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data provided by critics of the land movement. For example, a published human 
rights violation report on commercial farms launches into the familiar line that farm 
workers lacked agency, asserting first that ‘widespread human rights violations were 
inflicted upon … Black farm workers by agents of Zimbabwean President Mugabe’s 
government during the seizures of White-owned farms from 2000 to 2005.’ 
(Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and Justice for Agriculture Trust, 2007: 2). 
But the report’s empirical data then goes on to show that farm workers ranked third 
after War Veterans and ZANU-PF supporters, and thus ahead of any state agency, 
including the police, army and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), in the 
perpetration of violations on both commercial farmers and (other) farm workers 
themselves. This might suggest that farm workers had divided interests and that a 
substantial number had forged an alliance with peasants and War Veterans of the 
liberation movement. The report’s authors, however, fail to consider this possibility, 
and simply re-assert the view that farm workers were passive victims as a group.212 
To consider farm workers, en masse, as opposed to the land reform via occupation is 
to ignore the data presented above. Not unlike Marx’s view of the peasantry, there is 
a tendency for opponents of occupations to treat the farm workers as an inert ‘sack of 
potatoes’, rather than as a complex social formation, affected internally by many of 
the contradictions of property, wealth and political alignment affecting the wider 
Zimbabwean agrarian formation. In imposing unthinking victimhood on this group 
rights activists sometimes say more about their own ‘class sympathies’ than about 
the complex and rapidly shifting alliances ‘on the ground’ during the occupations.  
 
In several cases farm workers occupied farms on their own initiative (Rutherford 
2003). Workers’ committee and sometimes ZANU-PF structures were used to 
organise such occupations. In Concession farm workers held meetings and decided 
to occupy one of the four farms of the White commercial farmer. They used 
structures of the workers’ committee to mobilise people for the occupation. However 
they were stopped by the District Administrator, when they went to register as 
occupiers of the farm (Interview with D, former foreman, 2001). In some cases there 
was clearly a clash of interests between farm workers and other occupiers. For 
example, in Gomba the occupation was spontaneous and the whole community of 
farm workers took part. Farm workers had not been allocated land by government, 
which had divided the farm between peasants, War Veterans and the former White 
farmer. Farm workers decided to occupy land that had been allocated to both the 
White farmer and the new settlers. When they were not given land they used all the 
tactics of occupation, including stealing produce from the new settlers. When 
peasant settlers tried to stop them the farm workers resisted and repelled the settlers, 
as NR, a former farm manager, (2004) recounts: ‘So this year they tried to stop us and 
we said we will all die here fighting (pano apa tichafira pano nhasi). We ploughed 20 
hectares.’ 
                                                 
212 The preliminary report is based on questionnaire responses of 184 (97 percent success rate) 
former commercial farmers, covering key areas such as ‘violations against farmers [and] farm 
workers, use of the justice system to protect farmers and their rights, damages and losses incurred and 
loss of support services to commercial farm workers’ (Ibid: 5). The effect of the questionnaire is to 
operationalise the notion of ‘violation of human rights’ so that it encompasses almost any 
activity associated with the occupation process. For example, it included violation of the 
‘rights’ of cats, dogs and baboons (both pets and wild) in the assessment. Even so, the data 
indicate that farm workers ranked third in terms of active participation in occupation, thus 
clearly revealing that not all farm workers were passive victims. 
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Farm workers had grown militant and, drawing upon their work team structures, 
were well organised. 
 
Clearly, in many situations the organising War Veterans did not view farm 
workers as their first allies. War Veterans considered that farm workers lacked 
information on what was happening, and that this limited their participation in 
occupations and rendered them easily recruited by farmers and the opposition MDC 
to resist occupations. However, the role of farm workers in the land occupations has 
been judged solely on the basis of this initial response, ignoring their role afterwards, 
once they were more thoroughly mobilised into the movement.  
 
War Veterans developed activities to educate farm workers in many locations. 
Coercion was often the initial step to induct farm workers into the occupations. But 
this was later followed by attempts at educating them about the land movement 
(Interview with DM 2001). ‘Initially we would force them then when they come to us 
we educated them. Then they understand.’ DT coordinating occupations in Mazowe 
District (Interview with DT 2000) said: 
So we established our base there and we addressed the farm workers. We addressed the 
teachers from the school and we told them what the whole thing was about. The nature of 
my address was to remind them about our [Zimbabwean] history, the taking of our land 
by the colonialists and that now we wanted to take the land back. And that the draft 
constitution which was rejected by the people actually had a provision by which we 
would have peacefully acquired land through the normal legal channel. But given that the 
draft constitution was rejected there was no other channel through which that could be 
done other than to force our way through. 
 
Another example of how pressure was applied comes from Centenary. 213 One 
War Veteran who came from this area as reinforcement to Mvurwi described the 
situation as follows: (Interview with Mz 2003) 
We would commandeer the tractors and the lorries that belonged to the farmers and take 
with us even the farm workers. First of all we would gather them by force, then politicise 
them, and they would go with us. So it would be massive. Like when we left Forrester A, 
the HQ for Forrester Estates … we spent the night there politicising the people, then the 
following morning we took the farm workers, [in] lorries and the tractors. We took 
everybody to … other farms. Now it was more massive, because there were 37 War 
Veterans who came from Mzarabani alone. 
 
In sum, mobilisation was not through education and persuasion. As in most 
guerrilla movements, education was combined with pressure. However, it would be 
incorrect to assume that whenever and wherever pressure was used the subjects 
were brought in line solely by force and fear. The process of education and 
involvement in the struggle were still viewed (under the influence of War Veterans) 
as transformative opportunities in regards to the land movement. Occupations (as 
education through doing) themselves had an impact on the thinking of the actors.214 
But one of the most effective mobilisation technique used by the War Veterans on the 
                                                 
213 District adjacent to Mazowe Administrative District. 
214 Foweraker (1995: 49) makes a similar comment when he writes that: ‘… individual 
participation is a “potentially transformative experience” which can create loyalty to the movement 
and commitment to the cause. The transformation does not happen naturally but through mobilisation, 
struggle and face-to-face encounters.’ 
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farm workers was to assure the workers that they would continue in their jobs and 
have more bosses to employ them. This was generally quite effective although it also 
depended on the degree of confidence the workers might have in the capacity of 
inexperienced War Veterans to continue with commercial production. War Veterans 
said to the farm workers (Interview D, War Veteran leader from Harare, 2000): 
farm workers who are willing to stay behind with the comrades and landless masses here 
at the farm, will be accommodated when the farmer goes … So when they go, you (farm 
workers), would not be out of employment because these people who are getting in as new 
settlers need employees. For that matter they are many more than this one Whiteman. 
 
In the propaganda of the land movement, farm workers were promised land and 
work, but their position would generally remain different from the other occupiers, 
as clearly illustrated by what DM said (Interview with DM 2000): 
… we told (farm workers) about our coming into the farm. We promised them that they 
would not lose employment because they were now going to be having a lot more bosses 
than the one they had. There were now 44 bosses… And the Whiteman would never for 
one day give a piece of land to the workers even if one had worked for a whole life there 
with children and grand children. …but for those of you who will be working on this 
farm for comrades, they will have their own plots here. We would employ them and 
secondly we would reserve an area for them when we do the pegging. ‘We will reserve 
land that we will honour our obligations that we will give you a piece of land, but we will 
not give you the same 40 hectares. Can you manage that?’215 
 
In a number of cases of which we are aware the promise of access to land made to 
farm workers was then not fulfilled. This was not always the fault of the occupation 
leadership, but due to the intervention of higher authority. In focus group 
discussions at Witchens (2005) and Lilifordia Farms (2006) farm workers confirmed 
that War Veterans pegged land for them but that the District Administrator took it 
away from them and either settled other people, or the land remained vacant. 
According to some farm workers (Focus group discussion, Lilifordia Farm, 2005), 
occupiers feared that if farm workers became part of the movement the good pieces 
of land that were available would be taken by the farm workers because of their 
proximity to the site and knowledge of the ground. 
 
It follows from what has been presented above that the position of farm workers 
was therefore far from uniform or static, as several researchers and analysts have so 
far presented (cf. Moyo and Yeros 2005).216 The relationship between farm workers 
and occupiers varied from place to place, and changed as the occupations developed. 
 
 
                                                 
215 It is worthwhile to note that the group of War Veterans that organised occupations for 
Nyabira was led by War Veterans who had taken part in the early War Veteran-led 
occupations in Svosve and Goromonzi, and therefore had acquired experience of how to 
handle farm workers. They had seen the need to mobilise and work together with farm 
workers from the beginning. One of the most influential of this group of War Veterans 
leaders had graduated from Wampoa (Chitepo) college in 1977. He explained that he was 
taking land occupations as a way of advancing his socialist ideas by giving land to the tillers, 
especially the workers. 
216 Moyo and Yeros (2005: 191) argue that ‘War Veterans had an ambiguous, even arrogant posture 
towards farm workers, viewing them as incapable of nationalist political consciousness’. 
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5.5 Reaction of the White commercial farmers 
Nor was the reaction of the White farmers to the occupations fixed and immutable. It 
also developed over time. At first some farmers snubbed the occupations, dismissing 
them as an over-reaction to the failure of the government-sponsored draft 
constitution. Later, they were forced to address a serious challenge to their business 
and way of life.217 In the section below an attempt is made to capture some of the 
dynamic of these changing positions.  
 
War Veterans did not have the idea to chase away commercial farmers violently 
from the outset, as suggested by some researchers (Feltoe 2004: 197). Initially, they 
were interested to try and negotiate with the White farmers, and even to get 
agreements to share land with the White farmers. Often, they first saw their task as 
enforcing government policies of ‘one person, one farm’ (and thus to acquire 
properties from those who broke the rules) and to ensure compliance with limits on 
maximum farm sizes.218 Accordingly, the approach was to debate and negotiate with 
the White farmers, in the hope of arriving at a mutually agreeable decision, around 
government stated policies. This spirit of compromise was abandoned, however, in 
cases where a farmer was known for his or her racist attitudes or for disregard for 
community welfare.219 DMT (Interview with DMT, a War Veteran from Concession 
and former government health officer, 2000) summarised the approach of the 
occupations as follows: 
I have a number of … documents signed, to say can we share. My farm is about 800 
hectares arable. You take 400 and may I remain with 400, please. They [the documents] 
are all over the place. Even the maps, he would draw the maps showing which land would 
revert to the War Veterans and which land would remain with the farmer.220 
 
                                                 
217 I draw this conclusion from reaction of farmers in a phone-in radio programme on Radio 3. 
Many farmers phoned and they snubbed the occupiers. 
218 Table 1.2 Government proposed farm sizes for resettlement models 
Agro-ecological 
zone/Natural Region 
A1 (ha) A2 
  Small-scale 
(ha) 
Medium-scale 
(ha) 
Large-scale 
(ha) 
Peri-urban 
(ha) 
I 12 20 100 250 
IIa 15 30 200 350 
IIb 20 40 250 400 
III 30 60 300 500 
IV 50 120 700 1500 
V 70 240 1000 2000 
 
 
2 to 50  
Source: Government of Zimbabwe (2001) 
219 In Concession for example, the first farm to be occupied was AKW: ‘Because he is socially an 
unacceptable element. He is very racist. The farm workers… who work for him [and] the local people 
here talk about him and naturally he was the first target of this area’ (Interview with DTM 2000). 
Next to this farmer was his son who was growing roses in green houses (among other 
activities). Farm workers and the surrounding community pleaded that the son be spared 
because he was good to the community and his workers. He was left intact by the War 
Veteran-led occupiers. The farm was later taken during the ‘fast track land reform’ (Interview 
with Mk 2000; Interview with farm worker D 2002; Participant observation 2000-2). 
220 This view was corroborated by many War Veterans interviewed in the study area. For 
example Pf (Interview with Pf 2000) said, ‘The process was that we first negotiated with the 
farmers and entered into written agreements before even occupying.’ 
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The period during which War Veterans remained open to negotiation lasted from 
February up to the election period in June 2000. According to several informants, the 
White commercial farmers reacted opportunistically to the whole process: 
But when we then returned to implement the agreements, the elections were on. Then the 
farmers changed and they were now saying they signed under duress. We then realised 
that these people were dishonest and they were not serious. We were just wasting our 
time. (Interview with PF 2000)221 
 
The War Veterans accused the White farmers of mobilising farm workers and 
MDC supporters to fight off War Veterans and other occupiers.222 They also disliked 
the legal measures taken by the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU). The CFU 
managed to get High Court judgments in their favour from March 2000.223 Dumiso 
Dabengwa, former Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) intelligence 
supremo, and Minister of Home Affairs during the occupation period, sent police to 
evict occupiers in March and April 2000. Joseph Musika, who was acting President 
while Mugabe was out of the country, did the same. In August, Minister of Lands, 
John Nkomo, announced that occupations had to stop. At Balineety Farm in Nyabira 
the White farmers jointly wrote a strongly-worded letter to the War Veterans after 
Minister John Nkomo had ordered occupations to stop. The War Veterans replied 
with equal vehemence (See Appendix 3). These developments gave the impression to 
the White farmers that the state was going to evict the occupiers, and so many 
farmers then felt they could renege on earlier agreements with land occupiers. Many 
War Veterans then began to see negotiation and dialogue as a waste of time, and 
attitudes became more openly confrontational. 
 
Reading the two letters, it seems clear that for the preceding six months (i.e. from 
February 2000) the occupations were mostly ‘peaceful and non-confrontational’ and War 
Veterans had made ‘numerous visits … with requests to see…’ (Townsend’s letter to 
Nyabira Mazowe association, 16 August, 2000). The White farmers did not respond 
to a reply by War Veterans dated 18 August 2000 defending their position. Any 
further attempts by the land movement to open dialogue proved fruitless. Instead, 
the commercial farmers reported to the police and informed their organisation, the 
CFU, and Minister John Nkomo. This infuriated the War Veterans, something that 
can be noted from their response. The War Veterans then typically asserted that ‘It is 
                                                 
221 War veteran DMT (Interview with DMT 2000) described it in similar words: This is why 
after elections farmers would take us to court and say, I signed this under duress. … Quite a number of 
farmers were now saying they signed under duress. [inaudible] He even appealed to the High Court. 
Some of our Comrades were served with summons to appear before the law courts. 
222 For example, DTM (Interview with DTM 2000) said, ‘…each time they [the occupiers] would go 
to invade farms … a day or two later … the MDC would team up with farm workers, with everybody, 
from two [or] three farms, to come and attack our bases. So naturally they [the occupiers] would run 
away. Many … sustained very serious injuries through the attacks of the MDC … [M]uch later … it 
became very evident to the White farmers that… war veterans, and their support of ZANU-PF, began 
to appear as invincible. And they began to realise that they would not win in terms of continued 
support for the MDC [i.e.] openly supporting by sending farm workers to the MDC meetings. It 
became evident that you just can’t do that because people would be beaten up. Beat up the farmer 
[inaudible] beat up some of these strong supporters of MDC. And it spread all over and when actually 
it spread then it became clear that offering assistance would not work.’ 
223 High Court judgements against occupations were made on 17 March 2000, 13 April 2000, 
19 April 2000 and orders issued for occupiers to vacate farms and/or for the police to evict 
them. 
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our birth right to demand to share one farm while you remain with [the other].’ 
(Nyabira Mazowe War Veterans’ letter, 18 August 2000) Despite the vehemence 
running through the letter, the main point comes out clearly in paragraph 12, in 
which the war veterans repeat again that farms should be shared, and that they 
should not be accused of starting violence. It seems important to emphasise that the 
War Veterans still saw the issue in terms of taking ‘spare’ land, and not as an attempt 
to end White commercial farming. 
 
In the run up to the 2000 general elections were (held in June), many White 
commercial farmers continued to believe that the occupations would be reversed, 
either because the MDC was going to win, or because they believed the government 
and ZANU-PF only supported the occupations as an election stunt. Given the actions 
of Cabinet Ministers and other members of the ZANU-PF elite this was not an 
illogical expectation. The War Veterans, in fact, made an equivalent analysis of the 
regime’s position on land, and pushed for more radical moves (Interview with DM 
2000): 
… we told them [member of parliament candidates] that if government was saying ‘land 
to the people’ as a political gimmick we were, on our part, serious. So we asked them to 
forward people from their constituencies through their district structures to us for land 
allocation in order to demonstrate to everybody that opposed the land reform that we were 
serious. 
 
The White farmers interpreted the position of the government and judiciary as 
supportive of their position. Signals from government Ministers, decisions by the 
courts, and the belief that the opposition was in fact gaining an upper hand caused 
White farmers not to retreat from or not to enter into deals with War Veterans. 
However, a revision of the regime’s position towards the land movement was in the 
making. Already at a meeting of the ZANU-PF Politburo held on 18 February 2000 
President Mugabe, a wily political realist quick to realise that the land movement 
had become a force to be reckoned with, took his first open steps to make an alliance 
with the War Veterans.224 Mugabe now shifted his position from merely condoning 
the occupations (Feltoe 2004: 200) to one of unwavering support. His sense that War 
Veteran radicalism now had teeth drew him into a much stronger anti-White stance 
than before. 
 
But as time went on the anti-White rhetoric intensified so that, in ZANU-PF 
propaganda, the White farmers became the ‘enemy of the people’. The numbers of 
expropriations of White commercial farmers was drastically increased, as the 
government implemented its fast-track resettlement program. By the time of ZANU-
PF congress in December 2001, the president was clearly fighting the White farmers.  
 
                                                 
224 Interview late Washington Chipfunde (2000-5) personal adviser of Dr. Hunzvi and 
Consultant to ZEXCOM, a company of ZNLWVA. Chipfunde said that Hunzvi was invited to 
the meeting as a special guest and at the end of the meeting President Mugabe asked Hunzvi 
to lead the elections campaign and gave him a special position in the Central Committee for 
that purpose. Jabulani Sibanda, the current (2008) ZNLWVA chairman, was co-opted back 
into ZANU-PF after suspension, to play a similar campaign role to endorse Mugabe as 
ZANU-PF candidate for the presidential elections of 2008. Mugabe won the candidature at a 
ZANU-PF congress held in November 2007 suppressing internal descent from the former 
ZAPU and Mujuru factions. 
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In September 2001 the matter of land occupations was brought to the Supreme 
Court, where the CFU was challenging the legality of the fast track land resettlement 
program. The court ordered the government to comply with the earlier High Court 
(HC) and Supreme Court (SC) decisions, but the executive refused. At this point the 
judiciary was now fully sucked into the land conflict. President Mugabe said on 14 
December 2001: ‘The courts can do what they want. They are not courts for our 
people and we should not even be defending ourselves in these courts.’ (Feltoe 2004: 
205) 
 
In the end, the land occupations escalated without options of dialogue. The 
opportunism of the White commercial farmers must be held to be at least partly 
responsible for the closing down of more peaceful opportunities for resolution of the 
land conflict. New efforts to start dialogue through initiatives by organisations like 
Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiatives came too late, since the occupations had by 
now built a political momentum of their own, and no results were forthcoming. One 
White commercial farmer summed up what in his opinion was the root cause of the 
White farmers’ rejection of dialogue about sharing the control over land (Interview 
with BT 2004): 
Some of the people I worked with were … living in a land … (inaudible) their style of life 
continued forever without any attachment. They thought that they were immune to any 
form of interference in their life…The life they spent … They had allowed themselves to 
fall into some form of complacency which said, ‘We are who we are. There can be nothing 
without us therefore we cannot be touched.’… That’s how people might be perceiving 
their life, their role in the country and I might maintain is that certainly a lot of farmers 
that I know would explain that … ‘Well, no one can touch us, now we are too important 
we contribute too much to the economy, without us the country will collapse.’ I think I 
stand by that assessment that I have about them. 
 
If BT is correct in his assessment, plausible in regard to the other evidence here 
cited, then the reaction of White farmers is perhaps not unexpected. Their identity, 
social and economic privileges, and entrenched ideas about their social and economic 
position in Zimbabwe held them back from strategic interracial dialogue with people 
who demanded access to land at a key moment in the country’s history. 
 
In the new context the government quickly put up a structure and a program to 
control and co-opt the land movement: the Fast Track Land Reform Program 
(FTLRP). The FTLRP was spearheaded by civil servants who took over the leadership 
role of War Veterans. The contradictions and struggles that emanated are discussed 
further in Chapter 7, where the thesis will pay attention to linkages of the land 
occupation movement. We shall discuss how War Veterans were systematically 
pushed out as leaders of the occupation movement and ZANU-PF stalwarts and 
opportunist young Turks gained control. Mugabe managed to co-opt the leaders of 
War Veterans, using all sorts of tactics, including harassment of unyielding 
ZNLWVA executive members.225 Where the War Veterans’ approach had been to 
negotiate and share the land, the new occupiers, led by civil servants, had a different 
approach, i.e. to totally displace the White farmer and to take entire farms for 
                                                 
225 For example the hardliner, Andrew Ndhlovu, former dissident leader and national 
executive member of ZNLWVA, was imprisoned and then released about two days before the 
Mutare congress of ZNLWVA in 2005 (Personal observation 2005).  
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themselves, and not for redistribution to the land hungry.226 In short, the radicalism 
of the War Veterans – a survival from the war of liberation - was pushed aside as the 
politics of the elite assumed control of the land movement. 
 
 
5.6 Spontaneity, horizontality and localisation 
The material presented above allows us to prepare some conclusions about the 
particular role of the War Veterans in the later occupations. First of all it has to be 
stated that War Veterans build the movement jointly with peasant activism. Peasant 
occupations, led by traditional leaders and spirit mediums with minimal or no 
participation by War Veterans, were clearly a recurrent, long-term phenomenon, as 
can be noted from both the Gomba occupation by Nehanda-led groups and the 
Nharira occupation by the Mushore group. The claim over Gomba, peasants argued, 
was on-going, from the time the land was taken after the defeat of the Hwata in the 
late 1890s (Interview with Nehanda Spirit medium 2002, Interview with Bungu Spirit 
medium, 2002, Focus group discussion, Goredema, 2002-3). This supports the idea 
advanced by this thesis that peasant land activism is a kind of continuous 
background to the more highly visible eruptions as described in this chapter. But 
then, in the context of a rebellious program built by the War Veterans, these longer 
term claims for land by peasants themselves became more aggressive and resolute.  
 
Peasant dominated occupations led by War Veterans assumed a slightly different 
approach from those led exclusively by local peasant leaders. One common 
characteristic shared by the early War Veterans-led occupations and the 2000 
occupations was that they both were spontaneous, localised and had a horizontal rather 
than a hierarchical structure. Each isolated local group proceeded with its own set of 
rules vision and command structure, and only occasionally communicated with 
others in times of need. Having been ignited by the rejection of the draft constitution 
the 2000 occupations unfolded in a dramatic fashion, but had clear linkages with the 
early 1998 occupations. Some analysts have argued that the 2000 land occupations 
were ‘spontaneous’ (Feltoe 2004, Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003, Zimbabwe 
Liberators Platform 2004) Spontaneity connotes ‘suddenness’ and severally rising 
actions from below, following the ‘No’ vote in the February referendum. Many War 
Veterans interviewed agree with this picture, claiming that ‘no one can say I am the 
one who sent people there’ (Interview with War Veteran Pf, who later became one of 
the zone commanders in mid 2000). MT (Interview with MT 2001), a War Veteran 
who coordinated occupation in Mazowe and Matepatepa, was clear that: 
The whole thing was spontaneous.227 There was no central point that gave any 
direction, not even the party, not the government, not the leadership of the War Veterans 
                                                 
226 I put it to one dispossessed White farmer that they were myopic in failing to accept the 
approach of War Veterans to share land in the first place and he argued that in Shamva they 
went into similar agreements but that these could not be implemented because ZANU-PF 
chiefs disrupted the whole thing when they eyed those farms (discussion with Gl, travelling 
to Concession and back, 2006). 
227 Emphasis mine. Spontaneity can here be perceived as a pun with double meaning. The 
nationwide occupations of February 2000 were sudden and not vertically organised and 
therefore can be termed spontaneous. However this spontaneity is based on a long term 
development of the land movement from colonial times and in this case this was not 
spontaneous. 
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– it was spontaneous … no central directing, organising platform … It is not Dr. 
Hunzvi who is the Chairman of the War Veterans’ Association, who gave direction. It is 
not the President, Cde Mugabe - the President of the party and government. It is not 
anybody … For example, here in Mazowe, nobody told us to do anything. … We decided 
it on our own. … We simply organised the local people here and a few War Veterans and 
then we went to demand land from Akwoods.228 
 
The land occupations can thus be characterised as relatively isolated and 
disconnected, with variation reflecting the nature and characters of the occupying 
group and its linkages with surrounding institutions. Boundaries of groups and their 
overlaps were determined by mutual negotiation between and amongst the War 
Veterans groups. The boundaries kept shifting as the groups adjusted in order to 
achieve effectiveness, considering terrain, manpower and level of resistance to the 
occupations. To the extent that one can speak of a central coordination it was rather 
ad-hoc and oriented towards local situations. DMT, (Interview with DMT, a War 
Veteran with a degree in political science and administration, 2000) who coordinated 
land occupations, said: 
Initially I had told [Harare War Veteran]) that they should not encroach on farms in this 
area, that Mazowe Citrus would become the boundary with the people from Harare, that 
they would operate in that area in Mazowe South and the people near Concession, and 
Glendale, would operate in the other farms. But when it became apparent later on that 
there was not sufficient force for this area, I then changed and would ask them to come as 
far as Concession. So every weekend I would ask them to come. ‘And as you come let us 
join hands, our next target this time is A,’ then we would go there. ‘The next is B, and we 
go together. Just like that, this is how we were doing it.‘ 
 
It is possible to read too much into evidence that ZANU-PF people and 
infrastructure were used. For example, occupations were organised by War Veterans 
in Harare at the ZANU-PF provincial office located along Harare’s 4th Street. This is 
where occupiers assembled, organised resources and launched occupations from 
with War Veteran leaders directing operations. However, as soon as each group left 
Harare, they operated independently and as local conditions dictated (Participant 
observation, Harare, 2000). The plot theory of history is always tempting, but the 
evidence reviewed in this chapter confirms that although land occupation draws 
upon the cultural and experiential background of both War Veterans and peasants, it 
initially bubbled up in spontaneous ways ‘from below’. The idea of a carefully 
organised ‘stunt’ by the ruling party is not consistent with the evidence here 
assessed. It was only when the occupation movement had begun to assume an 
unstoppable momentum of its own that an alarmed political class moved in to 
control it. By an irony, those who eventually acquired land through seeking to 
control this spontaneous land occupation movement, are members of a political class 
that earlier did little to redistribute it. This is not a recipe for agrarian peace. 
 
 
                                                 
228 Dr. Hunzvi’s statement is very clear about the role played by ZNLWVA (The Standard 15-
19 March 2000), ‘I must categorically state that I am not and was not responsible for the occupation of 
farms.’ Many researchers have erroneously dressed the ZNLWVA in borrowed robes giving 
them credit for organising land occupations. For example, Moyo and Yeros (2005: 189) claim 
that ‘The land occupation movement was organised by the War Veterans’ Association.’ This needs 
correction, as the association, in its official capacity did not organise occupations but they 
were organised at local level outside the structure of the association. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
The way the occupations started and spread after the government sponsored 
referendum was rejected illustrates the widespread demand for land by the 
marginalised, and confirms that government had little or no control over 
occupations. In fact at the time occupations began, the War Veterans were still 
fighting ZANU-PF, the state and President Mugabe. Attempts to co-opt the land 
movement came soon afterwards, but this was not easy to achieve, considering the 
horizontal, emergent, unsupervised structure of the occupation movement.  
 
This chapter has offered key evidence to address the research question about 
continuities and discontinuities in the land movement at different periods. The 
occupations of 2000 were not immediately premeditated, and surprised even some of 
the participants in the way events took off, as they did in February of that year. They 
were, in Durkheimian terms (cf. Durkheim 1995 [1912]), ‘effervescent’, and carried 
along many in the emotion of the moment, even where their interests were perhaps 
not best served by joining in (e.g. some farm workers). As with the 1998-9 
occupations, the events of 2000 drew upon local structures and ad hoc initiatives by 
War Veterans and community leaders. The War Veterans’ Association did not initiate 
the occupations, nor did the central structure of ZANU-PF or organs of the state. In 
Nyabira, Mazowe and Matepatepa occupations were organised horizontally rather 
than vertically, with each local group employing its own tactics, determining its own 
boundaries of operation, and mobilising its own manpower and resources. As a 
result, the occupations took very varied forms, depending on the group composition 
and War Veteran leadership. However, common to all the occupations were basic 
approaches, such as establishing a local command structure and central 
administrative bases, and mobilising peasants and farm workers. In this sense, 
occupations of the year 2000 were similar to the early occupations of 1998-9. The pool 
of ideas came from the war years. We can say that the institutional capital, like the 
War Veterans themselves, remained only partially demobilised!  
 
The main difference between early and later occupations is the manner in which 
government and the ruling ZANU-PF influenced them, as we shall see in the next 
chapter. The shifting relations between ZANU-PF, the state and President Mugabe 
impacted upon the land occupations in a variety of ways. In 2000 the state position 
shifted in three major ways. Some state officials and organs opposed the movement 
and tried to reverse, it but in vain. Later, with the unwavering support of the 
movement by President Mugabe, the state participated in the land occupations, and 
mobilised its own groups, carrying allegedly violent campaigns. After this, the state 
worked against the land occupiers, and instead supported a new group of ‘Young 
Turks’, i.e. ZANU-PF politicians and relatives of the powerful elite. This argument is 
developed more fully in Chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 6 
TECHNOCRACY AND AFRICAN LAND USE: 
TECHNOLOGICAL CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES IN 
ZIMBABWE’S AGRARIAN TRANSFORMATION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Zimbabwe’s land occupation movement challenged the legacy of settler colonisation 
in other ways than just ownership of the land (Sadomba 1999a; 1999b). The occupiers 
challenged the legitimacy of the settlers in all respects, and this meant raising the 
question of technology229. At least from the time of White agricultural ideologues 
such as Alvord, (an agricultural missionary who promoted ‘scientific techniques’ and 
condemned African beliefs and agricultural practices) the way the land was managed 
had been a contentious issue between Whites and nationalists. The settlers justified 
their ownership through their (supposedly) advanced techniques. The land 
movement proclaimed an African sense of custodianship. Technological 
consequences were implied. This chapter examines what this has meant, at least in 
the short term (i.e. the last decade or so). Land redistribution and occupation 
introduced new contradictory elements into the government policy framework for 
agriculture, and technology choices were now imbued with all the contradictions and 
competing interests apparent in the land struggle. Indigenous and received 
agricultural philosophy and techniques openly clashed as arguments swayed back 
and forth between small and large scale commercial production, household food 
security and sovereignty and national economic demands, and old and the new 
perceptions of the agrarian technological agenda. In this chapter we discuss land 
redistribution in the context of policy, technocracy and technology, in order to 
review continuities and discontinuities within Zimbabwe’s agrarian transformation, 
as apparent in the set of occupation case studies upon which this thesis has drawn. 
 
The land occupation movement was a challenge to the status quo in several 
different ways. It directly challenged the settler property regimes and indirectly it 
challenged the legacy of colonial, capitalist production relations and modernist 
agriculture, as we shall see in this chapter. The land movement sought to change the 
structure of ownership of land by redistributing it to the landless and marginalised 
peasants, farm workers and War Veterans. In general, it aimed to establish small-
holder farming communities as opposed to large scale commercial enterprises, the 
latter having been a characteristic feature of the settler era. This change entailed a 
different technological thrust. The resurgence of the War Veterans’ land movement, 
and its success in forcing a reluctant state to break up and redistribute large scale 
commercial farms, increased the intensity of debate as to the merits of elite and 
                                                 
229 Among the literature on recent land reform in Zimbabwe, a paper by Chaumba, Scoones 
and Wolmer (2003) is noteworthy for having raised debate about technological issues on 
newly occupied African farms, and in pointing out the danger of re-appplying established 
land use planning methodologies. The present chapter rises to the challenge issued by these 
authors in focusing upon radical technological alternatives for Zimbabwean small-holder 
land use.  
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grassroots perceptions and practices, and between competing technical notions based 
in Western scientific and indigenous African agricultural practices. 
 
This chapter on the technological consequences of the land movement describes a 
struggle mounted by the land movement to challenge an entrenched technocratic 
order, and inappropriate government technology policy towards small-holder 
farmers. As discussed earlier, Alvord continued to rule Zimbabwe’s small-holder 
agricultural policy from the grave. Agricultural policies focused on the master 
farmer, and the demonstrator remained largely intact after independence and a myth 
of racial technological superiority was transmuted into a doctrine that a scientific 
elite knew best, despite lack of empirical evidence in many areas to support the 
assumptions of Alvordism. 
 
 
6.2 Contextualising technology shifts 
Agro-technology is never a truly independent variable. It interacts with its context. 
The natural resource base (soils, rainfall and so forth) are obviously important. But 
technology also interacts with its social and institutional environment. Techniques 
that might work on similar land in other parts of the world may unexpectedly fail if 
labour lacks the skill, or peasant farmers have other aims in life than meeting the 
needs of a highly unstable international market for commodities. The land 
movement justified its actions in terms of social justice, with the implication that 
Zimbabwe would have to modify its policy of reliance on large-scale commercial 
farms. The technology system had been configured to meet the needs of these larger 
farmers; now it would have to shift its focus towards the needs of a much larger base 
of smaller-scale semi-commercial farmers. The upheaval in land ownership regimes 
in Zimbabwe has been too recent to attempt a full-scale interpretation of 
consequences in terms of technology and technology-support services (i.e. research 
and extension). What the present chapter attempts is to trace some of the moves of 
the major actors, e.g. the kinds of technology strategy pursued (or envisaged) by 
major players, notably land occupiers and government. Conditions allowed only for 
impressions rather than sustained fieldwork based analysis, but a major resource for 
this study is my own experience. I was involved in trying to run an occupied farm, 
and so am able to act as my own ‘informant’ to some extent. The big picture may 
change as others study the transformation process over time, but the experience and 
testimony stemming from the initiative with which I was associated is offered here as 
a resource for future further analysis and debate. The first task attempted, however, 
is a framing of technological issues as they presented themselves during different 
phases of the recent land transformation. One way of understanding this 
transformation is to pay attention to the changes that took place during three phases 
- the occupations, and the fast track and Murambatsvina phases of the land reform 
process. These phases are linked to distinct policy frameworks and technology 
thrusts that continue variously to impact on farm management and farming systems 
in Zimbabwe. 
 
6.2.1 Periodising technology changes 
TECHNOCRACY AND AFRICAN LAND USE 
 
153
In Chapter 5, we saw that the period between 1998 and 2001 was the occupation 
phase, followed by the Fast Track period from 2001 to 2005 and the Murambatsvina 
period, still ongoing (2008).230 
 
6.2.2 Social context of technology of the occupation period 
The occupation phase was marked by rapid shifting and cyclical changes in alliance 
of forces with conflicts between the White farmers and occupiers. A timeline analysis 
reveals that in the nationwide occupations of 2000, the first wave of occupiers was 
organised mainly from outside the farms by War Veterans. This ignited peasant 
mobilisation (with or without War Veterans) to occupy farms bordering communal 
lands or interior farms. During this initial phase leading peasant and War Veteran 
activists failed (in a number of cases) to target farm workers for mobilisation, and 
White farmers took advantage of this strategic lapse to begin to mobilise farm 
workers instead. This explains the initial conflict between farm workers and 
occupiers. However, in other areas, farm workers initiated occupations, or were 
direct targets of mobilisation by outside occupiers.231 The later period of the 
occupation phase was different, and more emphasis was placed on mobilising farm 
workers for occupations. 
 
It is important to understand the variation in composition of the main occupation 
groups because this determined the nature of the conflicts between occupiers and 
White commercial farmers, and had consequences for the immediate aftermath of 
occupations. A number of tactics were used by occupiers to establish authority over 
occupied land, and these tactics were resisted by White farmers in a variety of ways, 
including ploughing in the fields that occupiers had cropped and chasing organising 
Movement of Democratic Changes (MDC) supporters and farm workers to chase 
occupiers away. The most widespread action of occupiers was to negotiate with the 
White farmer to share the land. At times the negotiation might involve claiming a 
whole farm in cases of multiple farm ownership. In other cases the negotiation 
involved subdividing a single farm, if it was larger than government regulated 
maximum size.232 These negotiations were followed up with written agreements 
                                                 
230 I periodise War Veteran-led occupations of Zimbabwe in these three phases. The 
occupation period (1998-2001) is the time when the land movement was in control of its own 
destiny to some extent, albeit with varying degrees of conflict with the state. During this 
period the main conflict was between movement and the White commercial farmers. The 
second phase, the fast track, was marked by a clear strategy by ZANU-PF elites in 
government to control the land movement. The Murambatsvina phase was a crackdown on 
the land movement, using state force to intimidate War Veterans. It was characterised in 
particular by demolition of houses built on occupied lands in the outskirts of urban areas. 
231 For example in Gomba, the Hwata and Zumba people who occupied land on grounds that 
they were autochthons, then excluded farm workers and War Veterans. In Matepatepa, 
peasants from bordering Chiweshe communal lands mobilised seasonal farm workers who 
had homesteads in the communal lands. In peripheral Nyabira area War Veterans from 
Harare mobilised farm workers from the onset, having learnt lessons about the role of farm 
workers from their participation in the 1998 occupations. In central Nyabira agro-industrial 
area, seasonal and commercial sex workers, with a few War Veterans working at the railways 
complex, occupied surrounding farms. (for further examples of farm worker occupations see 
also Rutherford 2003). 
232 It is important to note that during the occupation period occupiers tried to adhere to 
government policy on farm acquisition which was based on one household per farm and 
fixed (maximum)|farm sizes for each agro-ecological region. However occupiers also 
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where farmers ceded their rights of ownership of certain pieces of land or whole 
farms (Personal observations 2000, Interview with P, War Veteran leaders of 
occupations, 2000, Interview with DTM 2000, Interview with Mrs. Kaurudza 2000). 
These negotiations were followed by specific actions to establish the authority of the 
newcomers. New farmers started to crop the areas reserved for them and build to 
build shacks for accommodation. 
 
6.2.3 Social context of technology change during Fast Track 
The Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) (2001-4) following on from the War 
Veterans’ led occupations (1998-2001) culminated in redistribution of large scale 
commercial farms, to the predominant benefit of small farmers. An analysis of the 
outcome of land redistribution can shed some light on the variety of interests and 
perceptions of agrarian transformation and the struggles among interest groups 
within the land movement. Table 6.1 shows the nature of distribution by 2004.  
                                                                                                                                            
included in their criteria the relations of the farmer with the surrounding community and 
with his or her farm workers. 
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Table 6.1 The new land ownership structure 
Farms/Households Area 
Farm class Land tenure numbers % of total Hectares 
(million ha) 
% of total Farm size 
(ha) 
Communal 1,100 000  16.400  15 
old resettlement 72,000  3.700  51 
A1 140,866   4.236  32 
Smallholder 
Sub-total 1,312,866 98 24.336 72.8 19 
Old SSCF 8,000  1.400  175 
Small A2 13,000  1.429  110 
Small to medium 
Scale commercial 
Sub-total 21,000 1.6 2.829 8.5 135 
Medium-LargeA2 1,500  0.900  600 
Black LSCF 1,440  0.900  625 
White LSCF 1,377  1.200  871 
Large scale 
Commercial 
Sub-total 4,317 0.3 3.000 9 695 
Company 743  1.400  1,884 
Church 64  0.041  641 
Parastatal 153  0.600  3,922 
Corporate estates 
Sub-total 960 0.1 2.041 6.1 2,126 
Transitional Unallocated   1.239 3.6  
Total  1,339,143 100 33.445 100 N/A 
Source: Moyo 2005: 21 
 
Notes 
Peasants: land sizes range between 1 and 30 ha, depending on natural region, with family 
arable land ranging from 0.2 to 5.0 ha, plus common grazing land. ‘Communal’ land and A1 
are of the same tenure type; the former refers to pre-existing lands, the latter to resettlement 
lands. 
Small and middle capitalists: comprise ‘old’ farmers from the colonial period and ‘new’ Black 
farmers, including those with post independence allocations on ‘small-scale commercial 
farms’ and the fast-track beneficiaries. ‘Small capitalist’ farms range between 30-100 ha, 
depending on natural region, while ‘middle capitalist’ farms range between 40-150 ha, again 
depending on natural region. 
Large capitalists: farms range between 150 and 400 ha in NR I/II to 1,500 ha in NR IV. 
Corporate farms: range from 1,000 to 1,500 ha, but few are near the lower hectarage mark. 
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A closer examination of this table reveals that about 98 percent of the land was 
allocated to the groups categorised as peasants. The land movement largely drew its 
membership from this category of people. This category was the biggest in terms of 
population size resettled, but looking at the land area occupied received the smallest 
per capita share. The smallest farmers are 98 percent of land holders, but settled on 
only 72 percent of the land, whereas 7 percent of small to medium holders owns 9 
percent of the land, and large scale farmers (only 0.3 percent of all farm enterprises) 
own as much as 9 percent of the land, with corporate estates, comprising only 0.1 
percent of all farm enterprises, owning 6 percent of the land. This skewed land 
distribution represents the outcome of a century of colonial history, with government 
efforts at agro-technical support biased towards the larger land owners. When the 
land movement began, forcibly to change the facts of land concentration on the 
ground there was a spiralling fall in production. According to the World Bank (2006: 
38) the fast track ‘transitional period, when new farmers took up plots, saw a 
drastic reduction in total area under crops, such that in the 2002-3 season the 
total area under commercial cropping decreased.’  
 
During the fast track period there was rapid distribution of land, but largely or 
entirely on technocratic grounds. A planning section was set up in the Ministry of 
Lands and Agriculture during the occupation phase, and during the fast track period 
it was active in demarcating and allocating land via district lands committees, 
chaired by the District Administrator, the most senior civil servant in the district. The 
committees, and the ministry, failed to consider a number of pertinent issues when 
planning this settlement exercise. For example, when determining which farms 
would be demarcated into small holder (A1) schemes or large scale (A2) farms there 
were no set criteria to consider the actual properties of each farm. A blanket zone of 
farms was reserved for each of the land holding categories.233 This undermined the 
interests of land movement activists, who chose specific farms for their settlement 
based both on social needs (e.g. proximity to their communities) and on often quite 
detailed agricultural plans for the future. For example some land movement actors 
chose farms to occupy with future plans for dairy or beef production in mind, but 
technocrats subdivided farms and allocated them with complete disregard for the 
infrastructure or suitability of the soils and other resources for the agricultural 
production ventures settlers had in mind. One technocrat later reflected that this 
approach was a mistake, since it failed to pay attention to farm infrastructure, and 
the potential and suitability of soils for any desirable future development (Zawe 
2006). In effect, it was a ‘carve up’ without regard for agro-ecology or agro-
technology. 
 
Government agricultural policy continued to repeat its established focus on large-
scale commercial farming. Finance, technology choices, research and extension all 
made effort to resuscitate a wounded commercial agricultural sector. Again 
                                                 
233 Meeting held between some members of the District Lands Committee, the Provincial 
Governor and the National Task Force in August 2000. When the then Governor, Eliot 
Manyika, was asked by the Minister chairing the National Task Force, Ignatius Chombo, at 
the first meeting since the beginning of 2000 occupations, held in the District Administrator’s 
office, and committee members indicated a boundary to separate area reserved for A1 from 
A2 farms. This was a general boundary determined only by proximity to communal lands. 
(Personal observation, in attendance – District Lands Committee and National Task Force 
meeting held at Concession, April 2000). 
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according to the World Bank (2006), a number of public financing schemes have been 
implemented since the start of the FTLRP to jump-start production on old and new 
farm settlements, including the Grain Marketing Board crop input scheme, ARDA 
irrigation fund, ARDA and Livestock Development Trust livestock support schemes 
and more recently, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Sector Productivity 
Enhancement Facility (ASPEF).  
 
What needs to be noted is that this attempt to resuscitate the commercial farming 
sector was not matched by urgent new efforts to provide equivalent support to 
small-holder settlers. Whereas before the government had under-invested in peasant 
agriculture, it now failed to invest in the rank-and-file of the land occupation 
movement. An elite bias, apparent even in the independence struggle - as argued in 
earlier chapters - endures today in government circles, even when faced with the 
facts of mass action in relation to land occupation. 
 
Government policy during this period continued to focus on the export market, 
thereby effectively continuing its Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) 
practices of encouraging and supporting farmers through institutions like the Export 
Processing Zone which gave concessions to export producers including and 
especially in agriculture. Floriculture for example, benefitted a lot from this 
arrangement: 
Between 2000 and 2005, farmers and agricultural firms could access, through the RBZ 
revolving fund, [investment capital from] a general incentive scheme targeted at the 
productive and export sectors of the economy. Under the scheme, producers could access 
funds at concessionary interest rates (set at 15 percent and 5 percent for the productive 
and export sectors respectively), with loans being channeled through agro-processors or 
through commercial banks … In August 2002, the RBZ provided a US $178,000 … 
Facility through Agribank for tobacco seedling production for all farming sub-sectors at 
an interest rate of 25 percent. (World Bank 2006: 57) 
 
Intended crop input support up to the end of this period continued to enhance a 
trend towards large scale commercial export agriculture, at the expense of food 
security and sovereignty. For example input support for maize was 35 percent of 
total support costs whereas tobacco had an average of 92 percent input support costs 
over the five year period to 2006 (World Bank 2006).  
 
6.2.4 Social context of technology during Murambatsvina 
The Murambatsvina period (2005 to date) has been characterised by use of state 
physical force to thwart the land movement. State agents, in a swift and surprising 
move, started to destroy houses built by land movement activists led by War 
Veterans who had taken over farms in the outskirts of towns and cities and 
distributed plots to the urban homeless. This was in 2005. The armed police and 
army moved in and destroyed these shelters for the urban poor with bulldozers, 
while in the agriculture sector the government was financing large scale commercial 
farmers in the hope of increasing the area of export crops above average. For the 
2005-6 season, however, the cropped area in resettlement areas was expected to 
increase to more than the historical cropped area as the government adopted a target 
oriented model dubbed Command Agriculture, to meet minimum production 
requirements (World Bank 2006: 38). The sector was militarised and the Zimbabwe 
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National Army ‘commanded’ distribution of inputs, tillage and other agricultural 
activities in a scheme dubbed ‘Operation Maguta'.234 
 
However, even with this determined thrust, the stark bias towards large scale 
commercial farming sector remained. Reserve Bank financing was inversely related 
to farm size. A1 farmers, occupying 98 percent of the resettled land, got at most one 
eighth of the funds, with the balance going to commercial farmers on A2 farms235: 
… in the 2006 budget the Government indicated that about ZW $1 trillion will be 
allocated for 2005-6 season crop input finance to support A1 and communal farmers 
whilst A2 farmers will be supported by ASPEF which the RBZ allocated ZW $7 trillion 
and other private financing schemes (World Bank 2006: 59) 
 
About 20 percent of the current tractors and 28 percent of combine harvesters 
have been imported since 2000. Table 6.2 shows the number of tractors and combine 
harvesters imported from 2000 to January 2008. Table 6.3 shows cumulative 
machinery acquired from phase one to three of the Farm Mechanisation Program 
(Gono 2007, 2008). Although the actual cost of machinery was difficult to obtain, it is 
clear that the value is highly skewed in favour of the A2 farmers, in all the three 
phases of the Farm Mechanisation Program. With high inflationary pressures 
generated on the national economy by such a project (estimated at more than 100,000 
percent) which is accompanied by heavily subsidised fuels, seed, chemicals and 
fertilisers, the poor are subsidising the rich. 
 
Table 6.2 Tractor and combine harvester imports 2000–2008 
Organisation Tractors Combine harvesters 
ARDA (2004) 432 24 
ZIADA (2004) 268 - 
RBZ/MAEMI and ZFDC 2,125 85 
Total 2,829 109 
 
Source: Ministry of Agricultural Engineering, Mechanisation and Irrigation Strategy Framework 
(forthcoming) 
 
                                                 
234 Maguta is a Shona word literally meaning ‘you(second person plural) are well fed’.  
235 N.B. there were other private financing schemes in addition to the ASPEF scheme. 
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Table 6.3 Agricultural implements and equipment bought under 
the Farm Mechanization Programme. Progress up to 10 March 2008 
 
Source: African Institute of Agrarian Studies data base (2008) 
                                                 
1
 Small to medium enterprises.  This is a different category from the A1, A2 and 
Communal farmer.  This category is more of agro-industry although grinding meals 
can also be used at the farm level for different purposes.  National transport and 
health institutions also do not strictly fall under farm mechanisation. 
2 Farm Mechanisation Programme 
Sub-programme Target group Machinery, 
equipment or 
implement 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Total 
Tractors 925 1,200 500 2,625 
Combine harvesters 35 50 20 105 
Ploughs 586 800 460 1,846 
Disc harrows 463 800 470 1,733 
Planters 71 300 95 466 
Boom sprayers 241 300 205 746 
Vicon fertiliser 
Spreaders 
78 300 230 608 
A2 farmers, 
large scale 
commercial 
farmers, 
agricultural 
Institutions 
Hay balers   10 10 
     0 
Scotch carts  45,000 33,000 78,000 
Cultivators  20,000 26,200 46,200 
Planters  1,000 1,000 2,000 
Ploughs  50,000 50,000 100,000 
Harrows  70,000 60,000 130,000 
Knapsack sprayers  70,000 47,000 117,000 
Farm 
mechanisation  
Smallholder 
farmers 
Chains  200,000  200,000 
       
SME1 development  SMEs Grinding mills   3,000 3,000 
       
Electric generator  Farmers and 
small towns 
Generators   5,000 5,000 
       
Motor cycle supply  Extension 
workers 
Motor cycles   680 680 
       
Borehole Drilling  Not clear Borehole drilling rigs    10 10 
       
National Transport 
Enhancement  
Health 
institutions 
and the public 
Buses   300 300 
       
Heifers   3,000 3,000 National herd 
Restocking 
All farmers 
Bulls   120 120 
National bio-diesel  FMP2 
beneficiaries 
Diesel (liters)   100,000 100,000 
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6.3 Agricultural technology during the occupation period236 
In many farms occupiers stopped all farming activities by the White farmer in areas 
which had been agreed to be reserved for occupiers. Some of these areas had been 
prepared by the White farmer for various activities. Some farmers resisted this 
attempt to halt activities on land claimed by occupiers, and conflict inevitably 
resulted, taking different courses according to the composition of each group of 
occupiers at the farm. In most cases, occupiers took over land and started to prepare 
for planting, mostly the staple maize, if land was not prepared already. This was the 
predominant situation in 2000. Threatened degeneration towards bloody violence 
tended to result from the mixed signals from government (Presidency, Police and 
Judiciary), and when the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) went back on 
agreements, to reclaim severed land. Some commercial farmers even went to the 
extent of ploughing over areas planted by land occupiers, burying green crops in a 
bid to reclaim ownership (Personal observation, Duncombe Farm, 2000).237 At times 
commercial farmers sought to destroy occupiers’ crops by spraying herbicides. There 
were also severe retaliation measures by occupiers involving the destruction of 
commercial crops and threatening White farmers with violence. Conflict resolution 
usually involved mediation by the Zimbabwe Republic Police. 
 
These were the main challenges that occupiers faced in the initial period covering 
the year 2000. Farming operations in the 2000-1 season were generally constrained by 
the issues just outlined. This was the beginning of the wider breakdown of White 
commercial farming, and with it, the breakdown of established agricultural service 
institutions including marketing, insurance, credit, input supplies and extension 
services. Where occupiers planted prepared land they often did not have inputs and 
unless they could acquire these from the former commercial farmer – sometimes they 
did - yields were very low; only a few managed to buy adequate fertilisers, pesticides 
and seeds. Those who had land which was not prepared did not have equipment and 
draught power to work the land, and subsequently it lay fallow. In some cases the 
occupiers used hoes and the area worked was only sufficient for subsistence 
cropping. During this period occupiers introduced crops that were not traditional for 
the commercial farming sector, such as small grains, pumpkins, cane and a variety of 
vegetables. There were also several ways of organising operations. Some operated on 
a cooperative basis and combined their resources to achieve economies of scale. 
Others brought in kinsfolk to supplement their own efforts with cheap labour 
(Personal observation 2000).238 With all these challenges, coupled with tenure 
insecurity, and escalating costs of production, agricultural production generally 
began to fall. 
 
The challenges of 2000 provided good lessons to the occupiers about what was 
required to sustain agriculture, and in the following year occupiers started to prepare 
                                                 
236 This section draws on personal experiences and observations. I participated in the 
occupation of Mvuradona Farm which was one of the 4 farms owned by the commercial 
farmer. The farm was 297 ha, with only about 20 ha of arable land, the rest being a range of 
mountains. Only two of us were finally settled after another two, who had been allocated 
plots there, rejected the offer for reasons of inadequate arable land. 
237 The Duncombe issue was later solved with ZRP mediation when occupiers had retaliated 
with destroying the farmer’s tobacco. An agreement was entered into whereby the farmer 
gave part of his maize crop to the occupiers in compensation. 
238 At Umvuradona, three War Veterans combined resources and worked as a cooperative. 
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for the season early. Many started to negotiate with commercial farmers so that they 
would get assistance. Some commercial farmers were supportive and helped with 
land preparation and inputs. The Gs, at Concession, for example, worked with the 
occupiers and prepared their lands, a continuation from pre-occupation of their 
desire to help the Black communities (Personal observation 2003). Cooperation 
between commercial farmers and occupiers was quite common as both farmers and 
occupiers believed the future of agricultural development lied in cooperation 
between the big and the small. Cooperation was also seen as beneficial by the White 
farmers in order for them to continue operations like mechanised tillage (Zawe 2006) 
 
Some occupiers went further in establishing good relations with White farmers.239 
At one farm in Concession where the commercial farmer was a renowned seed 
producer of hybrid maize240 and soya beans, he agreed to assist the new farmers by 
training them in seed production. The idea came about because in the previous year 
(2000) occupiers and the commercial farmer established good relations, and the two 
sides agreed on a farm plan that would not interfere with seed production. New 
farmers agreed not to crop commercial maize because it would contaminate the seed. 
In addition they gave up part of the land that the White farmer and occupiers had 
both resolved would be for occupiers. The farmer facilitated registration with 
SEEDCO, a seed company that he had been working with for many years. 
 
He also agreed to train and assist with resources where need arose until the new 
farmers graduated as seed producers. This was important because normally it took 
about four years probation for a farmer’s seed to be accepted and certified. With the 
new arrangement, where operations of the new farmer were directly under the 
supervision of a qualified seed producer, the seed company was persuaded to accept 
the seed without waiting for four years. For the project to be viable the commercial 
farmer offered to sell irrigation equipment, including aluminium pipes, sprinklers 
and an 80 horse power diesel engine and pump, to the new farmers on terms through 
a legal agreement entered into with the assistance of the farmer’s lawyers. This 
project was to start in the 2002-3 season but was nipped in the bud when the 
commercial farmer abandoned his business after being violently dispossessed of the 
third farm during the fast track period (Personal experience 2000-2).241 
                                                 
239 The cooperation between farmers and settlers was quite widespread although in some 
cases it was out of fear on the part of White commercial farmers that their land would be 
taken if they did not show compliance. In some cases there is evidence of good will, but in 
others farmers were clearly uncooperative. Examples of good cooperation were noted on the 
Collingwood, John Saul, Ramahori and Lowdale farms. These farmers assisted new farmers 
with land preparation, and sometimes inputs, and especially with agricultural advice. 
Examples of poor cooperation were noted on the Wood and Duncombe farms. This category 
of farmers was antagonistic to the new farmers and at times they destroyed crops and 
engaged in various forms of sabotage (Personal observation 2000-5, interviews with farmers 
and new farmers at Rocky Mountain 2001, Lowdale 2002 and Dorking 2003). 
240 In 1983 the farmer won an international award for seed production in Canada (Personal 
communication with H, 2000). 
241 The violent dispossession involved organisation of thugs from Chiweshe who came at 
night in a two ton open truck and harassed the farmer, although he was waiting to vacate 
after the expiry of a 90 days notice to stop farming. The farmer was ordered to take nothing 
but his personal belongings (clothes and utensils). All farm equipment was left behind, 
including the irrigation equipment that been transferred by legal agreement to the new 
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This case suggests that there was some scope, as the occupations matured, to 
address the historical lack of government technological support for small and 
medium-scale farmers, as mentioned above, by some kind of informal mentorship 
approach. As we shall now see, the opportunity was foreclosed by the government's 
intervention during the fast-track settlement period. During the 2000-1 season new 
farmers from the land occupation movement concentrated on food production for 
household consumption. Government had not allocated land to the new farmers, and 
farmers had neither inputs nor equipment. Food crops grown by the new farmers 
were more diverse than those of the commercial farmers. For example, during the 
2000-1 season we cropped about 6.5 ha with about 5 ha of maize and 1.5 ha of millet 
and groundnuts. The commercial farmer had never before grown millet. We grew 
the crop for long term food security purposes. Millet is easier and cheaper to store for 
long periods. It does not require pesticides, as weevils and other pests do not destroy 
millet grains. In addition millet does not easily deteriorate in quality. We harvested 
about a tonne. In 2002, when maize began to be in short supply, the millet was our 
main source of food. 
 
 
6.4 Agricultural technology during the fast track  
The fast track created both opportunities and problems for the new farmers. This 
period, characterised mainly by the final exit of commercial farmers and state 
allocation of farms to new settlers, disrupted the emerging relationships and 
activities of the occupation period (Interview with DM 2003). With government and 
ruling party agents in control, there were new waves of occupations on occupied 
farms, termed ‘jambanja on jambanja’ by Nyabira Mazowe Association, which started 
to remove land movement activists from the farms (see Chapter 7). This affected 
farming patterns, disrupting both emergent social relations of production and 
farming operations. However, some new farmers seized the opportunities created by 
the fast track process. There was pressure on these new farmers to produce under 
conditions of scarce and expensive inputs, and in an environment of harassment by 
the bureaucracy and party officials. Where relations had been established with 
former White farmers, the new farmers were condemned as ‘sell outs’, and were 
forced to cease their cooperation with commercial farmers. 
 
Owing to this pressure, the new farmers had little chance to acquire new skills 
from commercial mentors, or to disengage from previous activities and turn to 
farming in a phased transition They now found themselves torn between demands 
immediately to meet expected production levels and the contingencies associated 
with winding up their previous engagements. In question was the issue of moving 
from one occupation to the other, considering the difference in earnings especially 
where people had established jobs or professions to attend to and were 
breadwinners. New farmers found it difficult to access household labour in these 
cases. No attention was paid by government bureaucracy and policy makers to the 
reorganisation of household labour, and government production expectations were 
highly optimistic as a result. Coupled with the yet uncertain tenure security 
situation, the opportunity cost of moving labour from other sectors seemed daunting 
                                                                                                                                            
farmer but was still physically in the commercial farmer’s possession (Personal experience, 
2000-2). 
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to many new farmers, unable to calculate what they might lose or gain, and overall 
production fell more sharply than the government had anticipated. 
 
When the land movement occupied farms, there was no official allocation of land 
to the occupiers, who agreed among themselves to share the pieces of land they 
acquired from the White commercial farmers. Land allocation to new farmers was 
sometimes quite orderly. Under Nyabira Mazowe Self-Contained Farmers 
Association, for example, the association raised money from its members and 
engaged professional surveyors and former planners from the Ministry of 
Agriculture. A cadastral survey was undertaken and layout plans were produced, 
with appropriate land-use recommendations made to farmers through the Planning 
Committee. Plots had uniform sizes and specific plots were reserved for farm 
workers. This heightened tenure security as opposed to areas where allocation was 
more haphazard. However when the fast track reform started the planning by 
Nyabira Mazowe Association was disregarded by the government planners. 
Spontaneous local organisation was undermined by a rush to assert state control of 
the land occupation process.  
 
Government policy on agricultural technology remained little changed despite a 
nationwide transformation of land ownership. Emphasis remained on sustaining 
commercial agriculture geared for the export market at the expense of domestic food 
needs and needs of local agro industry. This policy orientation dates back to the 
1920s and the era of Alvordism. The decades of Alvordism (1920-50) attempted to 
link African as well as White agriculture to international commodity production and 
markets, and this demanded a heavy handed bureaucracy to instruct African farmers 
to abandon established (subsistence-oriented) productions systems and replace them 
with ‘western scientific agriculture’, the principle advantage of which was that it was 
a technological system geared to earning export revenues (an income stream readily 
tapped by the regime). 
 
One instance of the kinds of changes thus induced was that Africans were 
required to grow maize at the expense of small grain staples, a transition more or less 
fully accomplished in many areas by the 1950s. Tastes accommodated the change, as 
did the technology. Agronomic techniques, tools, storage facilities, food processing, 
preparation and consumption patterns rapidly evolved to suit the new economic 
order and Rhodesian culture. Food diversity shrank, as did bio-diversity, owing to 
mono-cropping, and increased reliance on pesticides and chemical fertilisers. The 
‘doctrine of the plough’ became a ‘gospel’ and a means to spread not only 
agricultural technology but also and especially Christian ideals (Alvord undated, The 
Gospel of the Plow). Livestock production was similarly affected, and inclined to 
exotic breeds of cattle, pigs, chicken and goats. Indigenous breeds were disregarded, 
and little attempt was made to improve them not withstanding arguments that they 
might prove better adapted to the rigours of an African environment and more 
resistant to disease. Alvord died in 1959 but continued to rule technology policy for 
small-scale farmers in Zimbabwe from the grave (Sadomba 1999). Even now, 
government has failed to think through the consequences of the ongoing shift in land 
ownership, and stays firmly within the thought patterns established during this era. 
In other words, there has been little if any thought given to what kinds of agro-
technological changes might be more appropriate to the new land occupation 
scenario, and rather unsurprisingly agricultural production levels have plummeted. 
This is more (it is here suggested) a product of ill-designed support policy than an 
CHAPTER 6 
 
164
inevitable consequence of the actual occupations themselves, as suggested by the fact 
that rapid adaptation was ongoing, fostered by mentorship by White farmers and 
experimentation by the land occupiers themselves, until this was halted by the ‘fast 
track’ process. The skill formation process was disrupted, and government had no 
contingency plan. The regime continues to cling to the ghost of Alvord.  
 
Government continued to promote cash crops like tobacco, wheat, cotton, and 
soya beans, and livestock breeds, but at a time when the settler established food 
chain was collapsing. The centralised boards of the Agricultural Marketing Authority 
began to run into many problems and they could not function effectively. Yet the fast 
track program measured farm production in the narrow terms of producing food to 
appeal to European tastes, targeted for sale to the marketing boards. Failure to 
supply to the marketing boards was considered as failure on the part of the settled 
farmer, and this then became a criterion to weed out disfavoured activists of the land 
movement, as will be discussed in the concluding chapter. Because of adverse 
economic conditions and flawed policies, agriculture, measured by these market 
oriented crops, continued to decline: 
Tobacco, wheat and oilseed production declined due to a reduction in the areas planted on 
the transferred land, limited financing of new farmers and their skills in the immediate 
production of specialised commodities. Loss and withdrawal of farm machinery and 
irrigation equipment affected plantings for most crops (Moyo 2007). 
 
However there is also a largely untold story about the struggles that new farmers 
addressed in the agrarian transformation. Many sought to sustain commercial 
farming activities as recommended by the government even under drought 
conditions in 2001-2. This drove settlers to jostle for government supplies of seed, 
fertilisers, fuel, irrigation equipment and pesticides. But beset by corruption, 
manipulation of systems by politicians and general scarcity, the distribution was 
inefficient and the inputs often went to regime favourites. In the farms labour 
migration, especially of skilled and semi-skilled manpower, was high.242 
 
All these factors adversely affected agricultural production and were challenges 
faced by the new farmers. In this section we look at how some occupiers grappled 
with the challenges. I shall here draw extensively on personal experiences in 
discussing the determination of courses of action, the process of decision making and 
outcomes. 
 
6.4.1 Case studies on changing farming systems 
Facing the challenges just sketched some the land occupation movement began to 
adapt to the new demands. First they wanted to be represented in the governmental 
structures of fast track land redistribution, in order to influence decision making in 
land allocations. Second they sought to protect the interests of the movement by 
ensuring that the productive capacity of its members was raised through input 
                                                 
242 For example when H, the commercial farmer, was leaving, he recommended 16 of his hard 
working skilled farm workers who were trained in seed production, irrigation, cattle 
ranching, land preparation and so on. He talked to the farm workers on this issue but when 
he left only I managed to retain only two ranchers and recruited another four. Some left for 
the rural areas; others were not permitted to work for me by the new farmer TM, who had not 
taken over the residential compound of the farm workers. 
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distribution targeted to land occupiers. Related to this, there was interest to address 
food supply in a situation of collapsing White commercial farming agriculture. 
Although the horizontal (non-hierarchical) structure of the land movement was a 
successful tactic during the occupations,243 it proved disadvantageous during the fast 
track redistribution, in that it was inadequate to confront the heavyweight 
government bureaucratic institutions administering the fast track reform. The 
movement seemingly required organisational weight to match the fast track 
structures. Thus, where robust organisational structures were formed such as the 
Nyabira Mazowe War Veterans Farmers’ Association (later the Nyabira Mazowe Self 
Contained Farmers Association) it was much easier to confront the governmental 
machinery and to sustain the movement. The association transformed from an 
occupation organisation into an agrarian association with wider objectives in terms 
of accessing inputs needed for farming. Mashonaland West Mining Agricultural, 
Residential and Tourism Syndicates (MwMART) succeeded the Nyabira Mazowe 
Association. MwMART became a national organisation, spreading into all provinces 
of the country (Participant observation244 2005-8, Personal communication with DM, 
leader of land occupations and MwMART, 2007). 
 
The Centre for Indigenous Cultures in Southern Africa (CICSA), an organisation 
formed by War Veterans who founded the Zimbabwe Resource Centre for 
Indigenous Knowledge (ZIRCIK), advocated on behalf of land occupations, and 
introduced online debates targeting internet users. Members of CICSA formed a 
broader organisation that then began to assume an international character called 
African Nationalistic Paradigm (ANP). This organisation had an agrarian vision and 
program (described below) aimed at addressing the fast track problems and 
problems of Zimbabwean agrarian transformation more generally. ANP advocated 
for promotion of African technologies and agronomic techniques in the fast track. 
This called for a different farming system with a greater indigenous content, as 
described below. 
 
A case study of Jambanja Farm245 
One approach of the activist veterans was to lead by example. The movement tried to 
set up systems to transform technologies and techniques for other farmers to learn. It 
therefore encouraged long term planning of plots so that farmers would consciously 
engage in agrarian transformation in a besieged economy.246 In this section a 
particular farm planning exercise, is offered as an illustration. The plan was executed 
at Jambanja Farm, an A1 establishment according to the fast track classification of 
plot sizes. I prepared the plan, based on extensive discussion with other occupiers 
and War Veterans and it reflects the views of the group. It was prepared with 
                                                 
243 Horizontal organisation was appropriate for speed, effective administration of small and 
flexible units of occupiers and the state could not control the movement. 
244 I joined MwMART and became Chairman for the Legal and Training Committee from 
2005. 
245 This section of the chapter refers to a twenty five year (2000-25) agricultural plan of 
Jambanja Farm, ‘Twenty-five Year Development Plan for Jambanja Farm’ (2005), which is a 
piece of former Mvuradonha Farm in Concession. Extracts from the plan are in italics. 
246 In 2001, I delivered a lecture delivered at a seminar organised by the University of 
Zimbabwe, Department of Agriculture entitled ‘The role of indigenous knowledge in a 
besieged economy’. 
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intention of influencing the movement by demonstrating a specific vision of agrarian 
transformation. 
 
The document entitled ‘Land Dispossession: Forced abandonment of an 
agricultural research centre in Mazowe,’ (Sadomba 2006, see Appendix 4), 
summarises problems that had to be solved by a new agrarian approach. All further 
quotations in this section come from this source. The basic argument is as follows: 
Land redistribution benefited the Black majority and caused a backlash from both 
settlers and metropolitan governments thereby affecting the agriculture established 
under the colonial systems. Institutions of agriculture developed to this point cannot 
serve current agrarian transformation because the socio-economic and political 
environment during which they were nurtured has changed. New systems, 
technologies, techniques, institutions and extension approaches need to be 
developed to support this new dispensation. This calls for mayor efforts in research. 
 
Mission statement and objectives 
The mission statement of Jambanja Farm was: ‘to provide geographic space for creation of 
a home that will be capable of fulfilling the material and spiritual requirements (based on 
Zimbabwean culture) of the present family and the generations to follow and to make positive 
contribution to the national development of Zimbabwe and Africa in general, through 
maximum utilisation of the land resource’ with the objectives outlined as follows: 
• To provide security of a home with housing and recreational facilities in order to fulfil 
social needs of the family members, recognising that Zimbabwe is the country where 
family members have unhindered citizenship 
• to undertake agricultural production to provide adequate, healthy food at all times to the 
members in particular and the nation at large, in general. 
• to preserve the environment by carrying out tested methods of agronomic techniques and 
using appropriate technologies 
• to focus on production of African food stuffs in order to manage balanced diet for the 
family’s health and the nation in general and to contribute to national food security and 
sovereignty 
• to provide the economic requirements of the family by producing surplus for market, 
adding value through agro-industrial processing and agricultural research in various 
areas where the family has interest 
 
The document assumes the activists were concerned more for the welfare and 
social reproduction of their households than abstract national interests and 
international trade. In fact, the preoccupation of the land movement was to address 
immediate food security requirements and economic and social security needs of the 
kin group. This localisation of ambition does not necessarily mean however that 
national objectives were to be ignored; in effect, the argument is that by 
strengthening the family level the nation is also strengthened. By decentralising food 
security and food sovereignty to the household level, the burden of top heavy 
bureaucratic governmental institutions would be done away with. This is an implied 
criticism of institutions such as the Grain Marketing Board, Dairy Board, Tobacco 
Marketing Board and Cold Storage Commission, all formerly part of the Agricultural 
Marketing Authority created in the 1930s. These organisations were highly 
centralised, with only a handful ofdepots scattered around the country for domestic 
storage and distribution of produce or international marketing. Not only was the 
system inefficient and expensive but it was infested with corruption. The mission 
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statement claims that decentralisation of food security through household food 
planning would have positive national impact food security and sovereignty. With 
hindsight it can be stated that what it does not explore is how those without access to 
land were to benefit from this re-emergence of agrarian family structure as an 
alternative to commercial centralisation. 
 
The layout and land use plan of Jambanja 
In contrast to the blueprint farm planning by government officers, the plan for 
Jambanja was more localised in orientation, and considered detailed variation of land 
potential, taking into account water, soil and natural forests. The plan states that ‘the 
land use of Jambanja is generally divided into three component parts following the relief, soil 
types, the flora and fauna of the farm’. In the following paragraphs we examine the 
proposed land use pattern of the farm. 
 
The mountain 
‘Covering about 75 ha … mountain … divided into … mountain proper (rocky and steeper) 
and the foothills (gentle). The mountain is ideally suited for preserving flora and fauna. In the 
mountain proper, wild fruit trees … tree species of medicinal value … (i)ndigenous 
[hardwood] timber … fuel wood [trees] will be grown in the mountain. Natural forest will be 
conserved … [and] a forest and wildlife preservation policy will be designed ... The mountain 
can also be used for pasture of big (cattle) and small ruminants like goats and sheep … Wild 
animal species will be preserved and others added for food and recreational purposes.‘ 
(Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Foothills 
‘[I]ntensive conservation works (terracing) are required especially closer to the mountain 
where the gradient is steeper. [Exotic] fruit trees (such as avocado pear trees, peaches, mango 
and citrus) … [and] indigenous fruit trees (like mizhanje, mitohwe, misekesa, mitsubvu and 
mitamba) will be grown to satisfy dietary needs of the family and the Zimbabwean market at 
large. In addition, foothills will have jatropha plants … [for] fuel needs self-sufficiency’. 
(Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
The mountain and foothills areas were not utilised by the farmers, and 
agricultural extension workers did not plan for these areas which were considered 
non-arable and excluded from farm utilisation. New farmers, however, used these 
areas in a variety of ways and harvested forest products. Based ultimately on 
Alvord’s methods, agricultural extension prohibited use of these areas by new 
farmers, rather than providing assistance in how to manage them without destroying 
them. The areas were used by both farm workers and new farmers. 
 
Potential arable dry land 
‘The foothills of the mountain also constitute potential arable land measuring at least ten ha 
but requiring (terracing) conservation works. This virgin land will be used for cropping. 
Trees will be cut at the height of one and half metres … [without] stamping … so that the 
root system of the cut trees … prevents erosion …and renew[s] the soil. The fields will be 
used in rotation with the rest of the farm with at least four years of fallow after four years of 
continuous usage. Seasonal crop rotation … will be done.’ (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
Again, potential (as opposed to actual) arable land (to allow for fallowing) was 
not considered by government planning officers. This effectively under-estimated the 
amount of land required by and thus allocated to new farmers. Jambanja farm plan, 
by contrast, gives details of how such areas were going to be utilised, recognising the 
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potential of these areas and envisaging how bio-diversity might be maintained. Arex 
officials advise farmers to stump cropping areas, and then to carry out mono-
cropping, based on use of chemicals for fertiliser and pest control. Fallowing 
techniques not only improve soil and water conservation but can also have 
advantages for pest control (in reducing concentrations). 
 
Current fields247 
‘The current fields have been continuously ploughed for more that a decade now. They were 
completely stumped to allow European type of agriculture and were subjected to heavy doses 
of chemical fertilisers and pesticides. Some time is needed to cleanse these fields of the 
chemical residues. The general strategy is to start by growing legumes that will not demand 
any further chemicals but will improve the nitrogen in the soil. … A deliberate approach to 
reintroduce trees in the cleared field will be adopted.’ (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
By 2007, trees in these fields had grown to an average height of one and half 
metres. These were mostly acacia species which are original indigenous trees of the 
area. In addition, about 200 avocado trees and 100 mango and 20 guava trees were 
planted along contour ridges of the currents fields in the 2007-8 planting season. 
Other trees planted include indigenous fruit trees and fruit species (e.g. twisting fruit) 
indigenous to the equatorial region, but introduced from Malaysia. 
 
The vlei 
‘The low-lying vlei areas are suitable for such crops as sugar cane, bananas and others that 
are not affected by excessive water. There are patches of miunga dominated bushes which will 
be preserved... African …techniques for vlei cultivation will be employed for soil and water 
conservation [in these fragile environments]… Flood irrigation will be developed for the area 
and will be used to ensure cropping throughout the year… [R]ice … wheat … yams 
(madumbe), tomatoes, tsenza, leaf vegetables, potatoes, sweet potatoes (mbambaira) etc will be 
grown in the vlei. Fodder for cattle will also be grown especially along the river system. The 
vlei will also be used for cropping early maize to be sold green. Orchard trees will be grown in 
open spaces.’ (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Government policy and extension has previously totally prohibited cropping in 
vleis, following on from the promulgation of the Natural Conservation Act (1941). 
However, there is evidence to suggest that African farmers had developed 
sustainable techniques of farming these fragile but potentially useful wetlands, and 
that colonial policy forced an abandonment of these local techniques (Sadomba 
1999). The ban was extended by the post colonial government. According to the 
Department of Agriculture Research and Extension Services, vleis should not be 
cropped and they are not planned for. The Jambanja document, by contrast, proposes 
a carefully managed return to a local African pattern of usage. 
 
The depressions 
‘It is important that good designs of and mechanisms for harvesting water from the 
mountains are developed. Small dams and weirs will be constructed at strategic points along 
the depressions to harvest rain water and run off. This water will provide moisture for the 
crops in the depressions for the greater part of the year. Banana plantations, for income 
generating purposes, will be developed as they need minimum soil disturbance and they 
quickly colonise the area’. (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
                                                 
247 These are fields opened and cropped by the White commercial farmer. 
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Residential accommodation and agro-industrial complex 
‘… Houses, sheds and agro-industrial buildings will be constructed ... Residential houses 
will be developed to suit the requirements of the family. There will be workshops for the design 
and production of agricultural machinery. There will also be sheds and store houses for 
equipment and crops... in addition space for cattle pens, pigsty and aviary for birds will be 
reserved. Recreational facilities as swimming pool, tennis courts and other sporting facilities 
will also be located in residential premises.’ (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Discussion on Jambanja 
Current resettlement policy emphasises on traditional commercial agriculture and 
does not consider other social uses of land. The plan for Jambanja illustrates some of 
the wider aims of many land occupation movement activists, in seeking for a greater 
variety of use of land than for commercial agriculture alone. It illustrates the gap 
between the government's technocratic perceptions on land use (shaped by its long-
time alliance with White farmers) and the perceptions of some of the new farmers. 
The gap will not be easily closed, however, because government continues to use 
Alvordian methods and criteria to determine the degree of land utilisation, 
disregarding other uses of space and resources. Production is therefore measured in 
terms of how much a farmer is delivering to the Grain Marketing Board at the end of 
each season without calculating any return to land in its role as a tool of social 
reproduction. The orientation towards mono-cropping has also limited government 
extension towards crops, and diverted attention away from the possibility of other 
land uses such as wild life conservation, indigenous forestry management, fruit 
growing, eco-tourism and agro-industrial development. The tendency of extension 
workers to view land purely as a space for cropping is limiting, and disqualifies 
farmers with diversified land use interests. A productivity discourse dominates the 
current debate about land use in Zimbabwe, advanced by both professionals and 
academics and tends to neglect more holistic African approaches to land use. In this 
regard, it can be stated that there is a conceptual conflict between Western scientific 
and indigenous African land use perspectives. This conflict becomes clear in 
government policy for allocation of A2 farms. Government demands submission of a 
cash flow statement to determine allocation, yet this will not capture these other uses 
of land aimed at social reproduction and cultural development in the Zimbabwean 
family group. 
 
In commenting on government policy as an artefact of White farmer agriculture 
mainly oriented towards international markets at the expense of domestic food 
requirements, social reproduction and growth, Moyo (2005: 19) observes that: 
…Large Scale Commercial Farmers in Zimbabwe produced over 80 percent of all 
predominantly exported crops (e.g. tobacco, beef, tea, etc), except cotton with 75 percent 
produced by peasants, and of the high value food and agri-industrial commodities (dairy, 
beef, oils, fruits, and vegetables), which met domestic markets (middle class urban 
‘demand’), while the peasants produce over 70 percent of the lower value staple foods, 
(comprising the consumption of peasant and working class wage –goods), such as maize , 
small grains and peanut products, and ‘indigenous’ fruits, herbs and vegetables. 
 
Land activists associated with ANP seek a break with the past 100 years of 
technically-focused thinking about land-use in Zimbabwe. Whether the land activists 
can sustainably implement their alternative vision remains to be seen. 
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6.4.2 Agrarian changes more generally 
A major question arising from studying Zimbabwe’s land occupations concerns the 
degree of success of the movement? What instruments can be used to measure 
success or failure of the movement? Was land transfer from White settlers to the 
Black indigenous population seen by the occupiers as an end in itself or a means to 
an end? If indeed the movement just aimed at transferring land from the Whites to 
Blacks then it might be judged successful and occupiers’ objectives achieved. 
However, continued internal conflict within the liberation movement, and the land 
movement specifically, suggests that redistribution is better regarded as a means to 
an end, and this is often what the occupiers themselves believe. These beliefs 
embrace envisaged equitable access to land (see Chapter 6). Occupiers also widely 
hoped that land occupations would be a route to poverty alleviation, household food 
security, and effective reproduction of an African family-based way of life. These 
ambitions include social as well as economic criteria for success and failure. It would 
be imprudent to judge the outcome of the land occupations at this stage since long-
term empirical studies will be required, stretching over at least several decades (cf. 
Kinsey 1999a; 1999b), observing developments in the agrarian transformation of 
Zimbabwe over the last eight years, as a participant, does appear to shed some light 
on some specific aspects.  
 
 So far, scholars and analysts have tended to judge the land occupations through 
data relating to agricultural production and productivity trends from 2000, i.e. 
according to narrow economic criteria (Raftopolous 2003, Sachikonye 2005, Selby 
2006) and have concluded occupations proved largely futile. However the World 
Bank (2006) and Moyo and Yeros (2005), following the same economic model of 
evaluation, has argued that decline in production trends have to be viewed in a 
disaggregated way, since some sectors declined, others were constant and yet others 
show a general improvement.  
 
When War Veterans took over leadership of the land movement for a period, a 
widespread motivation was to recapture and revive the liberation agenda abandoned 
during the period of alliance between settler capital and the nationalist ruling elite. 
Owing to different ideological perception within the War Veterans’ movement, 
visions on land as a cause for and result of liberation, also differed. Many War 
Veterans subscribed to the idea of Gutsaruzhinji,248 meaning to satisfy the aspirations 
of the majority. This doctrine, based on socialist theory, argues that majoritarian 
rights supercede individual rights and access to resources, especially land. In the 
Zimbabwean context this majoritarian doctrine (instead of supporting a move 
towards, e.g. State ownership) has merged with older African communitarian ideas, 
about family, homestead, kin group and the rights of the rural collectivity. With state 
assistance, removal of White commercial farmers and settlement of Africans 
                                                 
248 This concept, articulated during the liberation struggle and emphasised during the ZIPA 
period, was discussed by one War Veteran who was one of the leaders of a movement for 
reclamation of diamond resources in Marange (Interview X, July, 2007). The War Veteran 
who was critical of ZANU-PF nationalists who were using state apparatus to deny the local 
population access to the diamond resources asked a rhetorical question, ‘Is this the 
satisfaction of the majority (gutsaruzhinji) that we talked about as policy of ZANU?’ 
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achieved wide distribution of land to the majority. However, in spite of this, War 
Veteran and land occupiers continued to fight against ZANU-PF stalwarts, some of 
whom continue to believe (apparently) in a kind of state socialism, but a majority of 
whom are convinced believers in the doctrine of private property and individual 
success, once they have been able to achieve this condition through use of state 
power. 
 
Linked to the communitarian/majoritarian concept – a significant view among the 
War Veterans, and hence a reason for their continued opposition to the mainstream 
in ZANU-PF - is an emphasis on decentralisation linked to enthusiasm for an 
evolving African agriculture as opposed to Alvordian ideas of modernisation, 
centralisation of services, and demand for huge infrastructural investment. Food 
security would necessarily become (according to the communitarians) a household 
concern. This change contradicts the approach through which the food security of the 
nation is to be measured more or less by the amount of grain delivered to and stored 
at the national depots. Statistics based on reserves in such depots thus (according to 
communitarians) offer only a very partial and biased picture of success or failure in 
the agrarian sector. Land redistribution empowered households to control of their 
own food security and widened the variety of crops grown in the former commercial 
farms (AIAS survey 2006). Again, this broadening of diversity of food crops is not 
necessarily reflected in aggregate figures equating agricultural items considered 
important for export. After occupation, settled farmers shifted land use patterns in 
ways that offered enhanced food security according to the communitarian view of 
things.  
 
For example, 32 percent of the respondents in a sample of 308 households in a 
baseline survey carried out by African Institute of Agrarian Studies, confirmed that 
maize was cropped at the relevant farms by the White commercial farmers before the 
FTLRP. However after the program, maize land use had increased to 44 percent of 
cropping. This can be compared to a major non-food cash crop, tobacco; 32 percent of 
respondents said tobacco was the preferred crop previously but this had fallen to 16 
percent. Land used for cattle ranching, mainly embarked on for export to the EU, by 
commercial farmers, shifted from 10 percent before FTLRP to 1.7 percent. Again, it is 
significant that 50 percent of the shift of land from ranching went to maize (AIAS 
survey 2005). In addition a wider variety of food crops is being cropped in the newly 
resettled farms and this is in effect a sign of the return of the land to African 
agriculture more on the lines associated with the period before the full impact of 
settler colonialism (Sadomba 1999). Ironically, it was Emery Alvord who was one of 
the first to recognise the significance of this point ‘Food for Natives comes from great 
many sources. They have a great many more varieties of foods than do Europeans.249‘ 
(Alvord 1929). Other food crops mainly used traditionally as sauces and relish, like 
                                                 
249 Alvord, 1929, Agricultural Life of Rhodesian Natives. NADA 7:pages 9-16 He gives a list of 
some of the common crops grown that he knew but the list was not at all exhaustive. 
Currently there are food crops that were not grown by commercial farmers that have been 
introduced by the indigenous farmers, e.g. millet, rainfed sugar can, variety of pumkin and 
harvest of wild vegetables like black jack (nhungunira), derere, wild spinash (bowa sena), and 
insects like termites (ishwa), White ants (majuru), larvae (madora) etc. (Personal observation, 
Mvuradonha Farm, Concession, 2000-8). This was not source of food in the commercial 
farming areas before the land reform and access of these foods goes to the Harare market. 
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sugar beans, groundnuts, cowpeas and round-nuts which grow and are consumed 
like ground nuts, also gained area, whereas non traditional crops such as sunflower, 
wheat, and paprika lost ground. This suggests that land redistribution may have 
enhanced food sovereignty, as people shifted land use towards food crops and away 
from export markets.  
 
Many occupiers viewed land redistribution as only the beginning of a much 
longer process to reinstate the social and cultural position of the indigenous 
population. Land was seen by some as a vehicle to bring to centre stage African 
religion and land management institutions. In this regard, occupiers often started to 
involve institutions associated with the chief and the spirit medium in the 
administration of the reclaimed lands. During occupations, as has been illustrated 
(Section 5.3), spirit mediums sometimes played a critical role in organising 
traditional leaders and communities, and in spearheading occupations. The spirit 
which possesses the medium is considered to be that of the progenitor, and therefore 
ancestor of the chief. In that sense the medium is senior to the chief when it comes to 
governance. 
 
The spirit, through the medium, commands the chief on how the land is to be 
administered. However, the spirit medium, because of his/her centrality in African 
religion, is an institution confronted both by Christian missionaries and colonial 
authorities. The spirit of opposition was (correctly) seen to lie with the spirit 
medium. As a result, the chief was co-opted into the colonial administration, but the 
spirit medium was not, and this situation continues today, the present Government's 
rise to power notwithstanding. The occupation movement, by contrast, has tended to 
reconfigure the position of the spirit medium, and it can be claimed that most newly 
settled farmers conform to the institution to varying degrees. This has resulted in 
performance of biras convened by spirit mediums, such as one observed in Gomba 
during fieldwork. It has also resulted in recognition and renovation of sacred sites 
that had lost their value during occupation by White commercial farmers. The 
specific mediums are now consulted about the administration of those areas 
(Personal communication, Sibao, 2006, Interview with Pt 2007). Increased recognition 
of the spirit medium is thus tending to change the religious landscape of the country. 
It is difficult to predict, at present, however whether the land movement will manage 
to persuade government to recognise the renewed strategic significance of spirit 
mediums and sacred sites as plans to rule the land from which the Whites have 
finally been excluded progress. 
 
So far, it is the position of the chief that has been entrenched. The chief's role, 
traditionally, was to administer land on behalf of ancestors and to provide resources 
to the less privileged in society including those who suffer unforeseen calamities 
(Sadomba 1999a, 1999b, 2000a). Occupiers resuscitated the zunde ramambo concept, as 
described in Chapter 4, engaged the svikiro spirit mediums and revived the bira 
ceremonies. Learning from the role played by traditional leaders in occupations, the 
government has opportunistically elevated the social and economic position of 
chiefs. But this is very much in line with the co-option of the institution during 
colonialism, with chiefs increasingly widely viewed as agents of the ruling party to 
mobilise the electorate in their areas to vote for the party. It is possible to anticipate 
that the unresolved tensions between the ruling political elite and many in the land 
occupation movement might eventually play out in opposition between spirit 
mediums and government-backed chiefs, perhaps generating some of the anti-chief 
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violence seen in African war zones where conflict reflects unrecognised agrarian 
tensions (Chauveau and Richards 2008).  
 
The single biggest weakness of the communitarian vision is what to do about 
those who have no realistic access to land in the immediate future before agrarian 
reform has impact on industrial development of the country. Focus on food 
production, security and sovereignty removes attention and investment in industrial 
development at least in the initial stages of agrarian transformation although 
horizontal and vertical linkages of agricultural production are likely to have 
multiplier effects on industrial growth.250 ‘Self reliance’ and ‘back to the land’ 
messages may work for those with access to land, but Zimbabwe has a large 
population of workers and the unemployed with no direct land access who need jobs 
immediately. Many are migrants to the country. Communitarian visions can – when 
pursued to excess – either lead to schemes such as in Cambodia under the Khmer 
Rouge to force urban and professional workers back into the villages to labour on the 
land, or (as in some African countries) fuel cries for (African) migrant ‘foreign’ 
workers to be repatriated (e.g. Cote d'Ivoire). As shown in previous chapters, the 
War Veteran-led land occupation movement has been conscious to some extent of 
this issue, in that it sought to mobilise workers as well as peasants in the land 
struggle. Some thereby became new farmers. But the issue of land access and land 
rights for farm and urban workers will continue to dog the Zimbabwean land 
activists if their vision of a just and sustainable communitarian vision of ‘back to the 
land’ is ever to be fully realised. 
 
                                                 
250 The second and third phases of the 25 year plan of Jambanja has ideas of agro-industrial 
development mainly focused on food processing of produce at the farm and the surrounding 
areas. In a document to the District Lands Committee (see Appendix 3) a example forward 
linkages of industry and farming according to ANP vision is described as: “I influenced some 
scholars to take MSc. research … [in] Food Science and Technology [for one] … and BSc. in food 
science and nutrition [for another] ... Professor C’s (now with Fort Hare in SA) interest in studying 
local breeds was as a result of many discussions and his involvement with our research projects. We 
had started designing researches on indigenous food like different mutakura mixtures in order to 
develop precooked and canned mutakura for specific nutritional requirements for people like lactating 
mothers, AIDS patients, diabetic patients and so on. This project is current although it has had 
personnel disturbances.” (Mutakura is a whole grain diet of different mixtures. Usually 
groundnuts, round nuts (nyimo), maize, are mixed in different proportions and cooked. 
Mutakura can also be cooked with beef, pork and any other meat to both flavor it and 
increase nutritional value). 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION: THE LAND MOVEMENT IN ITS WIDER 
POLITICAL CONTEXT  
 
The main part of this thesis has looked at the 2000 land occupations, focusing on 
their organisation, mobilisation, strategies and tactics. These chapters also analysed 
different approaches to occupation, as led by peasants, farm workers and war 
veterans. It has been argued that land occupations were complex in organisation and 
tactics. This final chapter will attempt to position the land movement in relation to 
the Zimbabwean political context, and specifically the different political and 
institutional arrangements that have shaped and have in turn been shaped by the 
land movement. Particular emphasis will be placed on the role played by the ruling 
the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party and 
opposition Movement of Democratic Change (MDC), as well as by civil society 
organisations. As already noted in Chapter 4 the development of the War Veteran 
Movement has been affected by its interaction with the state, and ruling party 
(ZANU-PF). The War Veterans were often regime loyalists, in the sense that they had 
fought for the president's faction in the war, but relations soured later. By the time of 
the occupations conflicting interests had reached the level of open antagonism. 
 
It would be wrong to imply the relationship between War Veterans, the state and 
President Mugabe was ever simple and unidirectional; it was in fact complex, with 
many twists and turns. It involved complicity as well as contradictions, alliances as 
well as antagonisms, authority as well as subordination, inclusion as well as 
exclusion. To round off this account of war veteran activism in regard to land we 
need to explore more of this complex interaction, by paying attention to the wider 
political and institutional environment of the land occupation movement. 
 
Foweraker (1995: 63) postulates that ‘social movements are shaped by their 
political and institutional context as well as shaping that context in some degree’ (see 
also Benford and Hunt 1992). This statement links to the second research question of 
this thesis ‘What forces evolved around the land issue and how did the land 
movement interact with these forces?’ This chapter provides an opportunity to 
address this question. 
 
 
7.1 Relations and interaction with ZANU-PF and the state 
The relationship between ZANU-PF and the War Veterans has been a subject of 
debate among academics and political analysts. One school of thought argues that 
the War Veterans were ‘bought out’ by ZANU-PF in 1997 (a specific piece of 
evidence concerns the granting of $50,000) per each ex-combatant as unpaid pension 
since independence. This leads to the conclusion that War Veterans were co-opted as 
agents of ZANU-PF (Personal communication McGregor 2005). This chapter will 
suggest that the co-option thesis is too simple. During the early occupations (1998-
February 2000) attempts may have been made to co-opt the War Veterans, but these 
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attempts had not yet succeeded. The turning point in the relationship between 
ZANU-PF and the War Veterans reflected a process of change in Zimbabwe’s 
political, economic and social life as a whole. That change, as this thesis argues, took 
almost a decade to reach a climax, leading to the occupations at the turn of the 
Millennium. Only after the referendum, and specifically after the first ZANU-PF 
Politburo meeting held a week after the referendum, was there any reconsideration 
of trying once again to co-opt the War Veterans by ZANU-PF and President Mugabe. 
 
Relationship between the state, ZANU-PF and the land movement can also be 
discerned from the interactions with the Zimbabwe National Liberation War 
Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). In 1999, Dr. Hunzvi, the Chairman of ZNLWVA 
spent some time in custody and under restriction.251 The allegations levelled against 
him included serious criminal offences (planning the murder of top ZANU-PF 
officials, and looting of War Victims’ funds). Many War Veterans interpreted these 
trumped-up charges as a pretext by ZANU-PF elites to try and get rid of a militant 
chairman. When he was brought to court War Veterans demonstrated in High Court, 
disrupting the proceedings by singing revolutionary songs and standing on and 
banging table-tops (The Herald 19 February 1999). The state was reduced to making 
fatuous threats. ‘[S]ix of those on the hit list … warn[ed] Hunzvi … to watch out’ 
(Eastern Star 5 March 1999). There were even allegations that Hunzvi was on the pay 
roll of an opposition party, ZANU-Ndonga, led by Reverand Ndabaningi Sithole 
(The Financial Gazette 25 February 1999). These allegations and actions against the 
Chairman of War Veterans illustrate are a sign of the bad blood between the ruling 
party elites and the War Veterans at that stage. 
 
By July 1999 open conflict had broken out between the War Veterans and the 
government, ruling ZANU-PF and President Mugabe. Some War Veterans locked 
out a group of visitors including one senior ZANU-PF member, former Air Marshall 
Josiah Tungamirai, a member of ZANU-PF Politburo, accusing him ‘of being one of 
the top party officials and an oppressor’, as reported by Zimbabwe inter Africa News 
Agency (Ziana 13 July 1999). The conflict escalated further to the point where the 
ZNLWVA contemplated disown Mugabe (The Herald 9 July 1999): ’Chenjerai Hunzvi 
stated that the association would disown President Mugabe as its patron if he 
refused to ... discuss their demands for $500,000, land issue and funeral grants… .’ 
 
Mugabe refused to meet the War Veterans. Moreover (The Herald 15 July 1999) he 
also refused: ‘…to give his assent on … [the] War Veterans Amendment Bill [that] 
would have allowed ex-combatants to claim $500,000 gratuities and $2,000 monthly 
pensions … .’ 
The level of conflict between the War Veterans and the ruling party had reached a 
climax. Meanwhile, however, power struggles also raged in the association and 
attempts were made to overthrow Hunzvi by a faction led by Cosmas Gonese and 
others (Personal observation, ZANU-PF Headquarters, 1999).252 
                                                 
251 Hunzvi was restricted by a court order and was not allowed to travel 40km outside 
Harare. According to The Herald (16 February 1999) ‘Muzenda distance[d] himself from Hunzvi 
[after] Hunzvi had addressed a meeting which was a breach of one his bail conditions and claimed that 
he had [the] acting president (Muzenda)'s consent.’  
252 I attended the meeting, which was poorly organised, and operated no screening of the 
delegates to ensure equal representation of the all provinces. For example, I only managed to 
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Power struggles were threatening the organisation with collapse as Hunzvi vs Gonese 
Cosmas. Hunzvi had been replaced as president by Moffat Maradhwa in an emergency 
meeting253 of 10 provincial executives. (The Herald 14 March 1999) 
 
The power struggles that rocked the association during this period were viewed 
by many War Veterans as infiltration of the organisation by the state’s Central 
Intelligence Organisation. A number of times, Hunzvi’s credentials were questioned 
and former commanders of Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) like 
Dumiso Dabengwa threatened to vet Hunzvi afresh, claiming to doubt his (Hunzvi’s) 
war credentials (The Financial Gazette 25 February 1999). The issue of vetting Hunzvi 
and attempts to discredit him for not being a trained guerrilla is based on a 
difference of understanding among commentators about the nature of the (War 
Veteran) Movement, as opposed to holding the status of ex-guerrilla. War Veterans 
(i.e. trained ex-combatants making up the bulk of the movement) tended to bother 
less about whether one had received military training as by a potential member's 
orientation and class leanings within the liberation movement; in short it was an 
emergent quasi-political organisation seeking to continue the agenda for which many 
War Veterans felt they had fought the war. War Veterans were satisfied with Hunzvi 
as long as he represented their interests and had the courage to lead them against the 
government, state and President Mugabe for their presumed abandonment of the 
ideals of the liberation struggle. This factor needs to be taken into account in 
assessing these key actors in the land movement. The movement has been accused of 
insincerity on the grounds that many of its participants were too youthful to be War 
Veterans. Although this is undeniably the case, it should also be understood that as a 
political grouping in the making it sought to mobilise youths, professionals, workers 
and peasants for an ongoing struggle. Trained ex-combatants formed the nucleus of a 
movement with a larger agenda than veteran welfare issues alone. 
 
Another attempt to control this rising force in the land was to try and enlist the ex-
fighters as a reserve force; the tactic (and the threat it was meant to contain) are 
clearly spelt out in the following press report (Daily News 28 July 1999): 
In a bid to contain the restive war veterans the Ministry of Defence … announced that 
more than 50 000 of the ex-fighters [would then] constitute a reserve army and [would] 
take orders from the defence forces commanders. [General] Zvinavashe [the army 
commander] said, ‘Ex-combatants are people capable of controlling and using weapons 
and we cannot just leave them to do what they want on the streets. The security of the 
state would be at risk if nothing was done to control them’. 
 
Zvinavashe voiced an underlying fear of the government; the War Veterans had 
access to powerful ‘cultural capital’ and posed a potential threat to the state. The 
reply of the War Veterans to this was simple, ‘pay us, if you want us as a reserve force’ 
(The Standard 22 August 1999). 
 
Meanwhile War Veterans had already started to organise land occupations (since 
1998) expressive of their oppositional relationship with the state and ZANU-PF, as 
illustrated by the cases of Svosve and Goromonzi (Chapter 4). In both cases 
                                                                                                                                            
get in because I was a personal friend to one of the executive members, but I did not represent 
anyone, and was not an office bearer of ZNLWVA. 
253 I attended the meeting at ZANU-PF Headquarters. It was not properly constituted, since it 
lacked representation of the Provincial Executive members. 
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delegations of senior ZANU-PF politburo members and government officials were 
sent to remove defiant occupiers254 through deploying riot police and the Central 
Intelligence Organisation (CIO) (Interview with K, an unemployed War Veteran 
participating in both Svosve and Goromonzi occupations in 1998 and 2004). Details 
of the interaction between Goromonzi occupiers and government help illustrate the 
nature of relationship between the land movement and political institutions during 
this period. 
 
At Heroes Acre on Shiro's farm (Chapter 4) government Ministers ‘... Sekeramayi, 
Murerwa and Msika, Governor Karimanzira and a Senior Police Officer [believed to 
be the Senior Assistant Police Commissioner for Mashonaland East Province]’ 
(Connor, High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98: 6) came from Harare escorted by a 
lorry of armed policemen and another truckload of police dog handlers with 
Alsatians. The CIO also came, but separately. The delegation addressed the occupiers 
and the meeting ended in a confrontational mood, because according to Muchaneta, 
a self employed female War Veteran from Harare (Interview with Muchaneta 2005), 
Ministers were ‘being boastful and did not respect the occupiers’, for example when 
Minister Joseph Msika: 
… talked, his hands were in the pockets.255 Then he started talking with that approach of 
using force to say that we ought to leave the place unconditionally and no one would 
disobey the order. Then the women Comrades who were there said, ‘Iwe (You - without 
respect)! Take those hands out of those pockets!256 … This is where it starts from, lack of 
respect for us. Do you fail to reciprocate our respect to you?’ 
 
War Veterans were by now growing more aggressive, and one of them S, an 
unemployed War Veteran from Warren Park in Harare, angrily advanced towards 
the delegation (Interview with QQ 2000): 
… like an arrow to where they [the Ministers] were sitting. Then he went in front of 
Murerwa, and he said ‘Down with you, thieves!’ (pasi nemi, makumbavha evanhu) … 
and when CIO elements tried to stop him, the crowd thundered ‘Leave him alone! Leave 
him alone! Leave him alone!’ 
 
This form of direct confrontation between the elements making up the occupation 
group, the state and ZANU-PF stalwarts, was unprecedented at the time. Such open 
challenge to state authority by poor, Shona-speaking rural people, it is submitted, 
was only conceivable in the context of a rekindling of the war induced mentality of 
the War Veterans.  
 
 At the time this incident was exceptional. In general the local police pursued their 
duty of maintaining law and order. Many Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) members 
were sympathetic to farmers and cooperated with them (Forsyth, High Court of 
Zimbabwe, 14192: 6). Further engagement between state organs and the land 
occupation movement involved the judiciary. Farmers took the matter to the High 
                                                 
254 Top ZANU-PF members are also top Government Ministers. Muzenda was both the Vice 
President of ZANU-PF and Vice President of the state. Msika was National Chairman as well 
as the powerful Minister of Lands and Resettlement. He is now the state and ZANU-PF Vice 
President succeeding veteran nationalist Joshua Nkomo. 
255 A sign of disrespect in Shona culture. 
256 It is considered rude and disrespectful to speak with hands in pockets. 
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Court.257 The Lawyers for the Applicants, the law firms of Etherstone and Cook and 
Gill, Godlonton and Gerrans made urgent applications ordering War Veteran leaders 
and their followers to vacate the occupied farms in 24 hours. With the order granted, 
police then raided the occupiers, torching temporary shelter and scattering the 
occupants in the nearby mountains. Some of the leaders and youth were arrested. 
Amongst them was the Chair of the local War Veterans, the late Esther Chimbodza, a 
woman who had been very active in organising occupations. Occupations stopped 
when these people were arrested. Other leaders from Harare were given prohibition 
orders and never went back to the area. But the fire continued to smoulder.258  
 
Since 1997, the Heroes Day and Heroes Acre were marked by demonstrations and 
bitter verbal exchanges between War Veterans and the ruling party. Just before the 
Heroes Day in 1999, three War Veterans were arrested at the ‘national shrine in 
anticipation of a demonstration [and] police officers were also deployed … around 
the city … preparing to clash with the former fighters who had said they wanted to 
meet Mugabe’ (Ziana 11 August 1999). In response to the War Veterans demands in 
his Heroes Day speech, Mugabe said that ex-combatants were ‘no better than the rest 
of Zimbabweans’ (Daily News 12 August 1999) and they had to ‘realise that [there 
was] a population of twelve million whose interests … were equally important’ 
(Ziana 11 August 1999). Hunzvi, the War Veterans leader answered back saying 
President Mugabe ‘should not be so cheap a politician. As Head of state, we did not 
expect him to brush us aside. We do not want to be abused or treated like fools’ 
(Daily News 12 August 1999). Acrimony between the ruling party and the land 
movement continued unabated throughout 1999 up to the referendum conjuncture in 
2000. 
 
However, in the last quarter of 1999 bitter exchanges subsided. This was also the 
period when the National Constitutional Assembly, a coalition of civil society 
organisations, gave birth to the MDC; a development which affected both the ruling 
party and the War Veteran creeping into the entire land movement and ZANU-PF 
was directly affected, as we shall clarify below. Events were rapidly moving towards 
a new constitution amid protests and demonstrations by the civil society movement 
and the new opposition political party against what they claimed to be a flawed 
process. Government finally decided to hold a referendum to decide the fate of the 
draft constitution and: ‘…with unprecedented speed, a referendum Bill was 
published in December 1999 and was passed into law within a matter of days and 
now exists as the Referendum Act (Chapter 2: 10).’ (Madhuku 2000: 55) 
 
The Chidyausiku Commission was meanwhile drafting the constitution but it was 
not clear what the next step would be as government was silent for long whether a 
referendum would be held to decide on it. When the draft constitution was finally 
out War Veterans staged a demonstration, which according to the association’s 
Chairman of Harare Province, Douglas Mahiya259 was for (Daily News 12 January 
2000): 
                                                 
257 High Court of Zimbabwe 14210/98. 
258 Interview with J 2003. 
259 Chinotimba, another War Veteran leader (The Herald 12 January 2000): ‘We are here because 
we want to show our allegiance to the President over the land issue. When we went to war the 
main reason was to reclaim our land and so to buy it back with money when we bought it with our 
blood already is unfair.’ Chinotimba’s statement also shows the first public signs of cooptation 
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… demanding amendments in the draft constitution section dealing with land 
redistribution. The section [said] government [would] compensate farmers whose land 
[would] have been acquired but the war vets demanded that no compensation be paid. 
ZNLWVA Harare branch Chairman, Douglas Mahiya [said], ‘We are saying the price of 
the land has been paid by the blood of the people who died during the war. 
 
At Corner House War Veterans petitioned both the British High Commissioner 
and the Minister of Justice, Emmerson Munangagwa expressing their sentiments 
against Section 57 (1) of the first draft constitution. When Munangagwa addressed 
the War Veterans they threatened to mobilise the electorate to vote against the draft 
constitution if the land clause was not changed. Munangagwa who claimed to have 
phoned President Mugabe promised that the clause would be changed that afternoon 
through Presidential powers. The section was then changed accordingly. 260 
 
This was another major victory for War Veterans where the President conceded to 
their demands. He made this shift because, as Hammar and Raftopolous (2003: 7) 
argue: 
 He was aware of the veterans’ political capital in relation to their primacy in 
Zimbabwe’s national liberation history, and reluctant to face losing their support of the 
prospect of an even more violent challenge from them as threatened, he yielded to their 
demands.261 
 
It is more prudent to view the change by the President to Section 57 of the first 
draft constitution in this light rather than as ‘unilateral’ or as effected by ‘Zanu (PF) 
inner circle … not interested in the people’s opinion and democratic process’. War 
Veterans should be viewed as a pressure group occupying democratic space during 
constitutional drafting; they were part of the civil society (Moyo and Yeros 2005). 
 
The referendum was on 11 February 2000. Both War Veterans and the White 
settler community were interested in the outcome of the referendum because it 
would define the position of the land issue. The MDC, whose first congress was held 
on 30 January 2000 two weeks before the referendum, was eager to use it as an 
opinion poll as expressed by one prominent founder member of MDC (E-mail from 
H 11 February 2000) who wrote: 
The first test of the amount of support of the MDC will be shown in the Referendum. 
Whilst ostensibly the referendum is only about a new Constitution in reality it may also 
be an opinion poll. I believe that we will know the result of the general election in the first 
hour of voting in the Referendum. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
of the War Veterans. The demonstrations were not specifically in solidarity with the President 
but just against the land clause in the draft constitution (Participant observation, Corner 
House, Samora Machel avenue, Harare, 2000). 
260 Constitutional Commission,The Draft Constitution: with amendments and clarifications, 
dated 19 February 2000. 
261 The war of liberation is the one used by the ruling oligarchy to legitimate its power, as 
Kriger (1995: 139) observes; ‘The governing elite might reasonably have expected that drawing on 
the recent war of independence for symbols of legitimacy and national identity might capture the 
popular imagination. The war had claimed an estimated 30 000 to 80 000 lives and had contributed to 
the liberation from colonial rule, thus making it an important emotional symbol and source of 
legitimacy for the governing elite.’ 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
181
The MDC, composed of the a broad and in some eyes opportunistic alliance of 
employers, civil society organisations, White commercial farmers, student activists 
and workers, started to organise for a ‘No’ vote against the draft constitution. In an 
email with layers of addressees262 written on 14 January 2000, the organisers 
instructed youth to go ‘round door to door DURING WORKING HOURS … [and] 
one of these people to be stationed at a local clinic or school at all times, including 
weekends … to ensure that domestic workers are registered’ to vote (Email dated 14 
January 2000 from Mr. N to commercial farmers and others). 
 
The most critical question that faced the President and the state was whether the 
War Veterans, with their recent resurgence, were a political liability or asset. Could 
he manage to contain the MDC without the help of the War Veterans? How could he 
deal with the rebelling War Veterans? These were nagging questions as Mudenge 
(2004a) later confirmed. 
The government was faced with a dilemma; whether to deploy the police and/or 
army to evict them and risk a bloody confrontation with former combatants, or 
negotiate. The army and police are headed by former combatants and many of their 
officers, men and women are former combatants. 
 
There seemed to be two options for handling the war veterans. One was to deal 
with them ruthlessly by force thereby silencing them, a strategy which had proved 
unworkable since the 1997 climax because many War Veterans were employed by 
the state, especially the uniformed forces, and it was unlikely that they would 
support that option. The other was to co-opt them. Neither option was easy. Without 
powerful opposition, War Veterans would not be an asset to ZANU-PF and Mugabe. 
The problem however, was to determine level of support of the electorate and a 
referendum seemed the best answer. 
 
When the referendum was finally held on 11 and 12 February 2000, the ‘No’ vote 
prevailed. For the two rival political parties, the referendum had completed its 
purpose. What was left was to draft steps forward. For War Veterans, the 
referendum was a dismal failure because the issue of land could not be resolved 
constitutionally as DTM (Interview with DTM, a former government health officer 
and leader of occupations in Mazowe, 2000) said263: 
… after the [draft] constitution was rejected in the referendum … was highlighting how 
government wanted to solve the issue of land, that’s the starting point where many 
people including myself picked up the issue of land. Then the situation had presented 
itself. Yes there were many issues which were featuring at the time but land was one of 
the major ones. 
 
Soon after the announcement of the referendum results War Veterans occupied 
White owned farms. The first group of War Veterans to get into the farms occupied a 
                                                 
262 The email was coming from one of the 39 addressees who in turn circulated it to ten others. 
This rather geometric progression in the distribution of emails disseminated information 
swiftly. 
263 That the ‘No’ vote in the draft constitution was an immediate cause to the occupations, was 
expressed by many War Veterans (Interview with Pf 2000; Interview with DM 2000; Interview 
with Nomatter 2005; Interview with Muchaneta 2006) ‘For me to get into the land movement I 
was pained by when we were defeated in the referendum by the NO vote...’ (Mrs K, 2000, 
Concession) to mention a few. 
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derelict farm in Masvingo. The case was broadcast by the only television station in 
the country. It was only a matter of days before War Veterans occupations spread 
nationwide like veldt fire. Although government played a part in the occupations, as 
argued by many (Hammar and Roftopolous 2003, Harold-Barry 2004) it is dressing 
government in borrowed robs to say it (Feltoe 2004: 198-9) ‘was quite clear that these 
farm invasions were planned and orchestrated by the leadership of ZANU-PF.’ 
Government, ZANU-PF or ZNLWVA did not have any control during the 
occupation period from 1998 to late 2000. 
 
However, both War Veterans and President Mugabe realised mutual benefit that 
would be gained from an alliance. War Veterans (Alexander 2003: 97): 
… knew that they risked becoming targets of state violence … Sheltering under the 
umbrella of ZANU-PF was a sensible strategy … [resulting in] the interaction between 
the needs of politicians for a constituency, of people for land, and of the government for a 
means to pressure donors. 
 
Alexander captures an important point. DTM, a War Veteran intellectual who led 
occupations in Mazowe (Interview with DTM 2000) illustrated the point even more 
clearly saying: 
Some people have been saying the land issue has been on the agenda because ZANU-PF 
wants to use it to gain some political mileage. But I, as well as my colleagues, War 
Veterans, we have a genuine desire to have the land issue resolved once and for all now. 
That [political mileage] would be a benefit rather than the main objective. It would be a 
downstream benefit. What we want to do is actually to give land to the people. If ZANU-
PF as a party is going to benefit by that, well, there is nothing wrong with that. But it 
will be wrong for anybody to assume that we are doing this so as to bolster the position of 
ZANU-PF. That is not the case. We genuinely want to resettle people. And the poverty 
that is quite abundant among our people can only be ameliorated… rectified… corrected 
if people get land. There are no jobs in town, there are no jobs in industry and most of our 
people are on the land 
 
DTM supports and elucidates the view by Alexander above, that has been ignored 
by academics who reject the social movement theory. Indeed the land movement and 
ZANU-PF supported each other at various levels but they remain separate in 
identity. 
 
The alliance between the land movement and ZANU-PF was conspicuous in the 
campaign for the 2000 general elections as DTM recalled (Interview with DTM 2000). 
‘We were campaigning for the party but it was both the party should win and also 
land to the people.’ War Veterans were neither ambivalent of the duality of the 
outcome of land occupations (those occupations effectively put ZANU-PF as a party 
in a vantage election position) nor did they lose focus of objectives of the land 
movement. War Veterans saw downstream benefits to ZANU-PF precisely as the 
cause and basis for alliance or mutual support. War Veterans were also clear that 
before they spearheaded the land occupations in 1998, ZANU-PF (Interview with 
DM 2000) ‘lacked that desire [and] dynamism … to resolve the [land] issue on a 
much broader case… there was no seriousness on the part of [ZANU-PF] …[despite] 
some constraints … principally, the Lancaster House constitution. But much more 
could have been done.’ War Veterans knew that, without force, ZANU-PF was not 
willing to redistribute land but they also knew that the party could use the state 
against them which would make the occupations even more difficult. 
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In Nyabira the relationship between ZANU-PF ruling elite (Chefs) and occupiers 
was sour in February 2000. Faced with this situation War Veterans responded by 
becoming more militant and radical in dealing with the ZANU-PF ‘Chefs’. They 
besieged the ZANU-PF provincial offices in Harare around March 2000 (Interview 
with DM, self employed War Veteran leader in Nyabira, 2001): 
… closed the ZANU-PF provincial offices [during] a Prolitburo meeting … to draw 
attention to our demands. After that we went to the ZANU-PF HQ and told the 
President [Mugabe] that if he did not send his representative we would … lock ZANU-
PF offices … in Harare. [This] forced him to send to us Comrades Msika and Mutasa264 
[for negotiations]. 
 
Such clashes with ZANU-PF elites were common especially at the beginning of 
the 2,000 occupations. The elites did not think the occupations would succeed and 
they were opposed to them. This put the two groups in direct confrontation and 
occupiers sealed off occupied farms from the politicians and declared that ‘No senior 
politician was allowed into the seized farms as some of them were pro-Whites.’ 
(Meeting on Penrose Farm 2000). The belief that elites were still in alliance with 
White farmers caused War Veterans to be even more militant. 
 
As we can see, alliance between the land movement and ZANU-PF was not 
sudden, smooth and consensual. President Mugabe was the only top leader of 
ZANU-PF who unequivocally backed the occupations when they started after the 
February referendum; others either doubted or openly opposed them. Home Affairs 
Minister, Dumiso Dabengwa who was also a member of ZANU-PF Prolitburo, gave 
orders for War Veterans to stop occupations in early March and this was vehemently 
criticised by War Veterans and Mugabe. In April, Vice President Musika, acting as 
State President, instructed police to torch and destroy shelters of occupiers and evict 
them and this again was denounced by War Veterans and President Mugabe. As late 
as May, Dabengwa was insisting that the War Veterans had to be ordered out but 
once more Mugabe backed the War Veterans. ZANU-PF and the state definitely had 
their own vested interests in the land reform but it is erroneous to consider them as 
the initiators or even major players or the command centre of the land occupations 
(Alexander 2003). 
 
 
7.2 Interaction with the opposition movement (1998-2006) 
The land occupation movement also linked with the constitutional movement, labour 
movement (later developing into MDC) and civil society movement. This section 
explores these interactions and relationships and analyses in what way they 
contributed to the process of radicalisation265 of the land movement. During this 
period there was heightened activity of different movements against the state 
including strikes by both industrial workers and civil servants, recording a total of 
232 strikes in 16 sectors of the economy. 
 
                                                 
264 Interview with DM 23 February 2001. DM was talking to the author who was the 
interviewer but most of his information was in direct speech. At times this is translated in 
indirect speech to reduce confusion.  
265 The term radicalisation in this thesis is taken to mean revolutionary action that aims at 
empowering the poor and the marginalised permanently. 
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These strikes owed much to the climax of the War Veterans’ movement. The 
manner in which the War Veterans staged the street demonstrations and their open 
challenge to the state, President and ZANU-PF elites was unique. Their success was 
even more astounding. ‘The victory of the war veterans had its own contagious effect 
on other groups, notably the ZCTU’ (Masunungure 2004: 169). It was during this 
period that the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) was set up in May 1997, at 
the height of War Veterans demonstrations led by Morgan Tsvangirai who later 
became the President of the MDC. Responding to awarding of money to War 
Veterans ‘ZCTU confronted the state head-on with respect to its measures to fund 
war veterans’ payments’ (Masunungure 2004: 170). This action was contrary to the 
usual support that the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) gave to other 
movements that opposed government and the ruling ZANU-PF. ‘The ZCTU called 
for a nation-wide strike for 9 December 1997’ (Masunungure 2004) against 
government proposed levy to raise money for the fund. Under pressure, Mugabe 
withdrew the levy. 
 
War Veterans were bitter about the action taken by ZCTU because the ZCTU had 
supported strikes by doctors, nurses, teachers and industrial workers, for more 
money. It also supported students’ strikes for higher pay-outs which also burdened 
the fiscus although it differed in magnitude. War Veterans did not understand how 
ZCTU organised workers against them yet former Rhodesian soldiers had been 
enjoying the same benefits and the labour organisation did not complain about it 
before. The move of ZCTU was supported by independent media. The effect was that 
the War Veterans suffered social isolation and ridicule from the general public 
because they saw War Veterans to have been paid undeserved funds and they 
(public) considered them to be the cause of the economic strife that they suffered. 
War Veterans lost a lot of their dignity and respect as they were publicly ridiculed. 
This was the beginning of a rift between the labour movement which later 
transformed into a powerful opposition party, and the War Veterans’ movement. 
 
The ZCTU was the leading and strongest of the Civil Society Organisations (CSO) 
and therefore its political position was critical to the whole opposition movement so 
a study into how and why the ZCTU took the unusual position of allying with 
capital and White farmers is important. Analysts consider this alliance as an ‘unholy 
alliance between ZCTU, employers and White commercial farmers, who have been 
angered by the government’s designation of farms’ (Masunungure 2004: 171). To 
War Veterans the alliance further widened the already existing gap between them 
and the emerging opposition. 
 
When the MDC was finally formed at the end of 1999, the gap between War 
Veterans and the opposition the contradictions between the two were antagonistic. 
‘By this point, the White commercial farming and business sectors had allied with the 
NCA and an emerging opposition movement in campaigning for a ‘No’ vote in the 
referendum’ (Hammar and Roftopolous 2003: 10). War Veterans considered MDC to 
be a party formed by the western governments and White settlers when both saw 
that ZANU-PF was advancing its liberation agenda through the compulsory land 
acquisition. It was claimed that (Mudenge 2004a: 10): 
A month before the New Labour Party was voted into power in Britain … European 
Trade Unions had already selected Morgan Tsvangirai, then Secretary General of the … 
ZCTU, as their candidate for the President of Zimbabwe [and] the Danish Trade Union 
Council posted Georg Limke in late 1996 to … turn trade union movement in Zimbabwe 
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into a political party. Therein lay the evolutionary roots of the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC). 
 
In two detailed documents entitled ‘Western Socialists' view of ex-liberation 
movement governments’ and ‘Zimbabwe's land reform program (the reversal of 
colonial land occupation and domination): Its impact on the country's regional and 
international relations’ Mudenge (2004a, 2004b), then Foreign Minister, presents 
detailed information of the formation of the MDC. He claims that the formation of 
the MDC involved the Rudolph Trauber-Merz Director of Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation in Harare and gives evidence of the party’s external funding from 
Western sources, economic sabotage and planning for civil unrest in order to remove 
the ZANU-PF government. 
 
Some of the intercepted documents proposed to create artificial shortages of basic 
necessities266 to cause social unrest and referred to bloody coups and horrible 
executions of dictators around the world like an email entitled, ‘The immediate future 
in Zimbabwe’ (written by a White MDC founder member, 29 January 2000), referring 
to ZANU-PF leaders as ‘frightened old men’ partly reads: 
They no doubt have nightmares of Ceausescu, Hitler and Mussolini267 and their 
unlamented ends … Sir Aboubakar Tafewa Balewa of Nigeria was put against the front 
door of his house and shot, with the main gun of a tank … The MDC is committed to the 
removal of Mugabe and Zanu-Pf by democratic means and through the ballot box. If they 
should fail, the anger of people is such that only the one alternative remains. I have lived 
through one civil war268, and do not wish to see another. But a minority cannot loot a 
country, suppress the majority and expect this to be accepted forever … 
 
A document like this frightened the War Veterans. The historical references 
clearly painted a powerful imagery of vengeance. The downfall of the leaders 
symbolises and epitomises the crumbling of a political edifice as opposed to defeat of 
just an individual. War Veterans, considering how Morgan Tsvangirai had organised 
a strike to protest the $50,000 demobilisation given them, believed the MDC 
identified War Veterans as part of the ruling clique and they would be killed 
indiscriminately as ZANU-PF criminals as PF said in the above excerpt. These 
sentiments were strengthened by the fact that the White members were at the centre 
of fomenting ideas of insurrection and vengeance which was interpreted as a 
reorganisation of the Rhodesians using the MDC as a front. 
 
The email advised on the immediate course of action which was to organise 
people to vote ‘no’ in the referendum. The authors of the email echoed a strategy 
drafted in Europe and discussed at a meeting held on 24 January 1999 at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs at Chatam House on the theme ‘Zimbabwe – Time 
                                                 
266 According to DM (Interview with DM, self employed War Veteran from Harare who 
participated in the 1998 occupations, 2000) one of the documents in his possession was clear 
that ‘White settlers decided to create artificial shortages far before the referendum. They thought if 
people started to feel the pinch of shortages of basic necessities …would cause social unrest.’ 
267 Ceausescu, and Mussolini were executed by a firing squad but it is the celebration of Sir 
Aboubakar that shows MDC was anticipating horror and naturally War Veterans were 
frightened by such threats. 
268 This extract shows that MDC was ‘not committed’ to democratic means of gaining power 
and it was advocating for a ‘civil war’ if they failed to win through constitutional means of 
the ballot. 
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for Mugabe to Go?. It considered the following options for removing Mugabe: 
military coup … elections … upheavals in the streets and through manoeuvres 
within the ruling party, ZANU-PF.’ The United States focused on using the Civil 
Society Organisations, in an initiative spearheaded by Dr Chester Crocker. MDC and 
the NGOs were funded from European and United States sources. British and 
American politicians and businessmen formed the Zimbabwe Democracy Trust 
(ZDT) and funding for the MDC came from the Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy (WFD)269 (Mudenge 2004a). 
 
The MDC identified itself with the White farmers and publicly denounced land 
occupations.270 A War Veteran leader in Mazowe explained the role of MDC 
(Interview with P, a peasant War Veteran, 2000): ‘…In April, at Easter our Comrades 
from Mvurwi, came under severe pressure from the opposition. They were 
outnumbered being only about seven or so in that area and … the MDC would team 
up with the farm workers, … to attack our bases.’ 
 
With this background, land occupiers led by War Veterans were against MDC 
supporters and they did not cooperate with them in getting land. At one farm near 
Harare leaders of the land movement in Nyabira, ‘were told that there were MDC 
members who had come with Learnmore Jongwe271 and they [were] asking to be 
given land by Comrades (War Veterans) for settlement’ (Interview with M, an 
unemployed War Veteran, 2001). This shows that some MDC politicians also 
participated in land occupations, contrary to popular belief. War Veterans articulated 
their relationship with the MDC according to them (Interview with DM, a Wampoa 
graduate and leader of occupations in Nyabira, 2000): 
We told our Comrades we were not opposed to the fact that MDC members and their 
supporters should get land … but we disagree with their mind that occupations will 
destroy the economy. If they say we are destroying the economy why do they come 
seeking land from us? …They should first go back and tell the public that they are now 
clear …what Comrades are doing is correct … the truth is an MDC member deserves to 
get land. The only bad thing is that MDC people have been given the wrong ideology and 
if the MDC member understands what we are doing and openly announces that he/she 
was lost there is no reason for denying that person land. 
 
Reinforcement was got from Muzarabani (a truck load of 37 War Veterans), 
Harare a group headed by Pf and from Mt Darwin who occupied north Matepatepa 
(Participant observation 2000). The position of farm workers changed when 
occupiers used all means to gain their support using tactics that included both 
violence, education and mob psychology, forming crowds of more than ‘five 
                                                 
269 In 2001 the US government enacted the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act 
(2001, PL 107-99) which was largely viewed by War Veterans as advocated for and even 
drafted by the MDC and this widened the gap between ex-combatants and the opposition. 
When the Act was seen to be, ‘consistent with the International Donors’ Conference on Land 
Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1998, or any 
subsequent agreement relating thereto’ (ZIDERA, Section 4 (d) (3)) War Veterans interpreted 
this to mean a proposal to reverse the land situation in Zimbabwe to pre 1998 ownership 
structures and to buy land from White commercial farmers for resettlement which they did 
not accept. 
270 Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC President described occupiers as mushroom sprouting 
everywhere in a chaotic fashion. 
271 MDC spokesman and member of Parliament in 2000. 
CONCLUSION 
 
187
hundred (500) [farm workers]’ to occupy a single farm (Interview with DTM, a War 
Veteran leader who was a civil servant working in Mazowe, 2001). 
 
 
7.3 Effect of government FTLRP on the land movement 
In 2000 the government introduced a new program for resettlement that aimed at 
regularising or legitimising the occupations. The effect however turned negative to 
the land movement as the FTLRP ended up highly controlling the movement as it 
aimed by establishing a centralised command, with state structures, acquiring land, 
planning for it, providing basic infrastructure and allocating it to beneficiaries. A 
National Task Force with Provincial and District Land Committees as lower organs 
was set up to manage the FTLRP. 
 
7.3.1 The structure 
The structures were chaired by the Ministry of Local government with the ministries 
of Lands Resettlement and Agriculture, Home Affairs (police) and Defense (army). 
At Provincial levels the committee was chaired by the Provincial Governor and at the 
district level it was chaired by the DA. At both the provincial and district levels the 
committee had War Veteran representation but not at the national level. Another 
addition to the local level structures was the inclusion of the Rural District Council 
and District Development Fund (DDF) in the district land committee. 
 
The process of Fast Track Resettlement involved launching272 of the program by 
the National Task Force in each district which entailed giving a go-ahead to the 
District Committee to identify farms for A1 and A2 settlement and recommend them 
to be listed for compulsory acquisition by the state. The National Task Force was 
responsible for gazetting the farms and publishing them in the local press. The 
process of land use planning for those farms would begin and the then Agritex 
Department would produce layout plans followed by the physical demarcation and 
allocation by the committees. The district committee only had jurisdiction over A1 
settlement schemes. The A2 allocations were left for the provincial committee. 
 
7.3.2 Devised tenure systems 
There was a dual land tenure system and land use pattern devised for the settlement. 
First, was the A1 scheme that was and spatial extension of the colonial Tribal Trust 
Lands to decongest them. These were based on small arable plots for households and 
a common grazing area for the village (hence this was known as villagised scheme). 
Maximum farm sizes were set differing from one agro-ecological region to another. 
 
Then there were A2 schemes that aimed at propagating commercial agriculture 
and leasehold tenure system. This settlement scheme was by qualification. People 
had to apply in English by writing a project proposal complete with cash flow 
projections and indicating the agro-ecological region for the area applied for. The 
                                                 
272 This step was delayed in Mazowe causing War Veterans to be restless and apprehensive. 
They demanded to speak to Chombo (Minister of Local Government and Chairman of the 
National Task Force for Land Reform) who had come to attend a celebration party for Dr. 
Kruneri for being elected Member of Parliament. 
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proposal also had to show the nature of production at the proposed farm and the 
applicant had to declare his/her asserts (immovable and movable) including bank 
statements to prove one’s financial strength. Selection of the beneficiary was 
supposed to be based on this ‘academic’ exercise and an insignificant number of the 
occupiers could ever satisfy these requirements. 
 
A2 resettlement was earmarked for large scale commercial farming. To 
demonstrate government priority on this scheme, allocation for A2 was done by the 
Minister of Lands and Agriculture himself through an offer letter signed by the 
Minister’s own hand to the beneficiary who had to accept or decline the offer. An 
offer letter specified the conditions of lease with a 99 year expiry period. However, a 
lot leaves to be desired for the fairness of the lease agreement considering that the 
new constitutional amendment that restraints individuals from litigation against the 
state decision to take away land. This effectively gave the state powers to take away 
the land despite the fact that the lease continues to fulfil all the requirements of the 
agreement. 
 
Owing to the decentralisation of the A1 allocation model, access was easier to 
occupiers who could go and address the Lands Committee on matters of concern. 
This was not so with the A2 model which required one to travel to Bindura and 
Harare to solve an issue or present a case. When it came to the Harare level the 
whole country converged on the Minister’s office with different matters to present 
ranging from designation anomalies, allocations, disputes, administrative 
complaints, proposals to give land to government by individual commercial farmers, 
and so forth.273 
 
7.3.3 Experience of Mazowe, Nyabira and Matepatepa areas 
The process was that War Veterans and councillors submitted names of farms that 
were occupied and recommended them to the District Committee for designation 
(Sadomba 2000a). However the criteria by occupiers to target farms were abandoned 
and a more wholesale approach was adopted sometimes imbued with corruption. 
This had some negative effects in some cases. For example, a farm owned by a couple 
in Concession, the Gs, had been spared for occupation because the couple served the 
community in many ways. The couple was Board members for the local District 
Hospital. They contributed a lot for the development of the hospital including 
sourcing funds for an administration block. They also donated computers to a local 
secondary school, linen and beds to clinics. During the occupations, the farm was 
spared by the occupiers for this reason. 
 
During the FTLRP, the farm was demarcated to accommodate six settlers because 
it exceeded the maximum farm size for NRII – 350 ha. War Veterans advised the Gs 
to comply with government policy of sharing excess land and they cooperated. Six 
settlers were allocated land and the Gs lived well with the settlers, assisting them in 
production. However, when the farmer and the new settlers started to produce, all of 
                                                 
273 I visited the Ministers office several times from 2000 and met all sorts of people with all 
sorts of problems. For example, a White farmer wanted to give the rest of her farm to 
government for resettlement purposes after determining what land she wanted to remain 
with and she was referred to the Minister for that. That same day, there was also a 
representative of a seed company who had come to see the Minister on proposal of supplying 
seed to the newly resettled farmers. 
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them were removed and the farm was allocated to one person, allegedly with close 
connections with the high offices of the land. War Veterans, youth, local community 
and farm workers staged a protest demonstration and forced the new incumbent out 
under police escort. As a counter, the demonstrators were dispersed a few days later 
by police from Harare Support Unit Depot in combat and riot gear and the settler 
was reinstated and he took everything there. A protest march to the city (60 km 
away) that had been planned by the land movement was only abandoned by the 
demonstrators because it coincided with an international conference and they 
thought journalists would take advantage and exaggerate the problems of the land 
reform. This is just one of many such examples.274 
 
Occupiers of the farm were identified through a list from those who controlled the 
occupations. At this time the War Veterans had zoned the whole of Mazowe into six 
operational areas. The commanders of those zones were responsible for giving the 
names of the occupied farms and the list of occupiers (Interview with Pf 2000): 
This is how land is allocated. We were selected as field officers and our job is to go to each 
farm and determine its size. Agritex goes to demarcate it. If say they conclude that 35 
people will be allocated, then we compile the names of the people who will get the plots. 
We select names from the district and the list of names from Harare. If there are too many 
people for the farm to accommodate, we occupy another farm to accommodate the excess 
number. 
 
Other beneficiaries came through the DA from the Rural District Council (RDC) 
based on the waiting list for resettlement. Conflicts over allocations arose based on 
the two lists. War Veterans demanded their 20 percent of land for resettlement that 
they had forced the government to adopt as policy during the turning point at the 
truce with Mugabe. Peasants were listed through the DAs office and there was no 
specific policy for farm workers most of whom hoped to be allocated land at the 
farms that they had worked and that they had participated in the occupation 
(Interviews with farm workers Davison 2002 and Mwale 2005). 
 
In Mazowe district the conflict over sharing occupied lands manifested itself in 
the Lands Committee. There were many conflicts between the occupiers and the 
government authorities, the ruling ZANU-PF and individuals with influence. The 
conflicts were based on manipulation of the FTLRP and attempts to evict the 
occupiers or exclude them from benefiting in the allocation process. Below, is a 
discussion of the different conflicts and their contexts. 
 
When the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) was being implemented, the 
District Lands and Resettlement Committee275 controlled land distribution and in the 
process started to sideline occupiers targeting War Veterans as the leaders (Sadomba 
2000a). War Veterans were represented in the District Lands Committee by only one 
person out of about fifteen people. Land occupiers felt that the skewed 
representation of actors was a way of weakening the movement as they could not 
influence decision making. Moreover, the rest of the committee members were top 
                                                 
274 Participant observation 2003. 
275 The District Lands Committee was comprised of Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), army, 
Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), District development Fund (DDF), Local 
Government, War Veteran Chair person, Council Chairman and a Chief (Interview with 
Gurure 25 April 2002). 
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ZANU-PF leaders and government officials perceived to be under instructions from 
other influential political leaders like the Governor and Ministers (Interview with K, 
self employed War Veteran, 2000). In July 2000, the District Administrator (DA) and 
a War Veterans representative had a confrontation over discrimination of leaders of 
occupiers (Interview with DMT, a War Veteran leader of occupations and former 
civil servant working at the district offices, 2001): 
The first District Land and Resettlement Committee first met in July and … I was not 
allowed to attend meetings. I suspect some people feared that I would … predominate the 
meetings because most of the members … did not participate actively in the previous 
[land occupations] campaign. And so they knew very well that this was the guy who was 
spearheading the whole thing and if he should come to the meetings I [would] dominate 
the business of the committee and so the best thing was to leave [me] out. 
 
Ejecting candidates chosen by War Veterans weakened the land movement. Civil 
servants like the DA, who did not participate in the land occupations were given the 
‘prerogative to decide who to invite’ to committee meetings and had powers to bar 
individual representatives from attending meetings (Interview with late Gurure, 
former civil servant in charge of the Fast Track Program 2000, Interview with DA 
2000, Interview with DTM 2001). War Veterans encouraged their candidate to force 
his way into the meetings in a move that created antagonistic contradictions between 
the land movement and government organs and the DA would threaten to call off 
the meetings whenever the War Veteran insisted to attend.276 
 
During the FTLRP, there was increased participation and control by ZANU-PF 
class of young capitalists. These were rich businessmen labelled ‘Young Turks’ who 
were rapidly accumulating wealth like Phillip Chiyangwa, (then ZANU-PF 
Chairman of Mashonaland West Province), Xavier Kasukuwere (now Minister of 
Youth) and Mutumwa Mawere (a business tycoon who later went into exile after 
falling out with the ZANU-PF nationalist ruling class). In many cases they employed 
‘unwarranted code of conduct’ (Meeting of War Veterans 27 April 2002) in the 
FTLRP. The main strategy by the ZANU-PF stalwarts was to displace the War 
Veterans and hijack the land movement using all sorts of tactics including ‘feet 
dragging’, ‘divide and rule’, ‘imposition of leadership’, ‘use of state power’, 
‘sidelining’, ‘intimidation’ and ‘cooptation’ (War Veterans’ Association Corruption 
document 2004, Provincial Stake Holder dialogues, 2004, Interview with DM 2000-6, 
Interview with Muchaneta 2006). 
 
On 18 December 2000, a landmark meeting was held between War Veterans 
leaders and Ministers. The aim was to consolidate state and ZANU-PF control over 
the occupation movement. This was done by removing any doubts that the new 
structures were in charge of land redistribution and the land movement had to 
relinquish power or face the wrath of the state. Conflicts that followed were about 
                                                 
276 Representatives of Nyabira Mazowe Association were also sent out of District Lands and 
Resettlement Committee meetings (Mazowe District Resettlement Committee 5 December 
2000). War Veterans, believed the new Governor (Manyika) was also part of the civil service 
ploy (Interview with MK, a female unemployed War Veteran leader who was also a ZANU-
PF provincial committee member 2000). At another meeting War Veterans threatened to beat 
Manyika up, and the meeting became chaotic. The result was that controversial War Veterans, 
according to the implementers of the FTLRP, were weeded out and only the acceptable 
characters were allowed to be part of the decision making structures in the FTLRP. 
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the resistance of the land occupation movement to relinquish power or getting co-
opted. 
 
Committees of FTLRP, civil servants, Ministers and ZANU-PF stalwarts started to 
bring in new beneficiaries to take land that had been occupied by the land movement 
actors (Meeting, Royden and Muzururu farms, 15 August 2002): 
They managed to do this by bringing new names on Farms taken through JAMBANJA 
leaving out those who participated in the actual repossession. He [Comrade M] stressed 
that government should allocate land to those on the land first and then those who did 
not participate in the land invasion [afterwards. 
 
There were new waves of occupations instigated by ZANU-PF stalwarts and civil 
servants. These transposed occupations were termed ‘jambanja on jambanja’277 by the 
occupiers to distinguish them from land movement occupations. These subsequent 
waves of occupations also included co-opted members of ZNLWVA national 
executive (Meeting Governor Manyika and Nyabira Mazowe, 31 December 2001; 
Meeting and elections, Zvimba District War Veterans’ Association, 27 April 2002). 
This shows that ZNLWVA, as a body, was not necessarily part of the land 
movement. The situation was much more complex and demands closer scrutiny of 
different actors to distinguish the identity of the movement. 
 
War Veterans became more and more irritated by the greed, nepotism and 
selfishness of ZANU-PF ruling class (Meeting, Zvimba District War Veterans’ 
Association, 27 April 2002): 
The meeting noted with concern that there are big fishes involved and politics at play in 
these unplanned settlements. It is high time war vets show the authorities that selfishness 
and nepotism will never be given a chance. We fought hard to retain the party in 
government and we will guard jealously [against] those officials who … take war vets 
and the party for granted.278 
 
This shows that War Veterans were prepared to continue the fight against the 
politicians who were hijacking the land movement and they did. 
 
By 2004, the problems had not yet been solved. War Veterans were still fighting 
against ZANU-PF nationalist politicians and civil servants who were under the 
influence of the politicians (War Veterans’ Association Corruption document 2004): 
There are unending problems caused by our ruling party high ranking officials working 
in cahoots with corrupt technocrats in the Lands Ministry’s provincial and district 
offices… an organised clandestine grouping meant to derail this agrarian reform through 
… destabilisation of land occupiers… 
 
The corruption document was written and handed over to the Minister of Lands, 
the Governor of Mashonaland West, and the CIO. This suggests that War Veterans 
believed their allegations to be true and they were determined expose the corrupt 
state officials and ZANU-PF stalwarts. 
 
                                                 
277 Meaning invasion of farms already occupied by land movement actors. 
278 Meeting, Zvimba District War Veterans Association 27 April 2002. 
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During the Fast track period War Veterans were worried that politicians were 
using the state machinery particularly the police to displace occupiers as argued in 
the corruption document (2004: 6): 
Arrests of land occupiers have been orchestrated and well planned [by politicians] so 
much that strategies are made to create crimes where war veterans have been fast-tracked 
to cells, court and jail. It’s a well organised syndicate of officials from the mass that is 
used (abused of course), police details who arrest, magistrate and his public prosecutor 
who make sure you have gone to jail. 
 
The police also used brutal force to evict peasants from the farms during the 
occupation period as RM (Interview with RM 2003) a former cross border trader who 
was the Secretary in a committee of peasant led occupiers of the Zumba clan said: 
We pursued the issue further three more times but we discovered that he (District 
Administrator) was not interested to talk to us and he was hiding something from us … 
So when we came back to live in our shelters, we were pained that the Assistant DA 
whom we had told our story was the one who led the Police (Black Boots Unit) to burn 
down our shelters. They just said we had trespassed and illegally settled on the area. … 
We were given no time to respond and they told us long back that we were supposed to go 
out of that area long before. When we tried to answer them that we didn’t know about 
that message Mrs D called out for the police to hurry up and burn the shelters. We were 
given 10 minutes to take out our belongings. And of course we only managed to take out 
a few items the rest were burnt inside including fertilisers, clothes, seeds, blankets, just a 
few things were not burnt. 
 
These people and others who occupied the Gomba area, were harassed by the 
ZRP, arrested, beaten up and verbally abused (FGD with Zumba women occupiers at 
Ingleborough Farm, 2003,279 (Interview with Nehanda, spirit medium, 2001, 
Interview with Zumba, spirit medium, 2001, See also Fisiy 1992). Just like the War 
Veterans felt, peasant led occupiers were bitter that they were used to take over land 
and afterwards they were being chased away by ZANU-PF elites to accommodate 
their relatives. This feeling was well articulated by one cross border trader, a woman 
who led the Zumba clan to occupy their native land Gomba, about seven kilometres 
from Harare (Interview with RM 2002) who said: 
What I want to say is that if we are saying the country is liberated I expect that we 
should be free people. There should not be any person who should oppress anyone because 
the oppressors should only have been the Whites who colonised us. Those are the people 
whom we fought against to liberate ourselves. After fighting them and driving them out 
it means we as the Black people should live in freedom all of us and we should enjoy the 
wealth of the country without oppression. There should not be anyone who takes the 
mind of the British and use it on another person like her/himself. I also plead that Father 
Mugabe gives us access to him to present our grievances. If this was possible we would 
always be at his feet presenting our grievances. Unfortunately he is surrounded by the 
powerful that deny us access lying to him. President Mugabe has a good heart but the 
people he surrounds himself with and those in the ruling circles are the corrupt ones like 
                                                 
279 One woman in that FGD (2002) said, ‘They (Police) were… scolding us saying things that 
should not be said, the very things we wear clothes for. They had noticed that we were not going to be 
moved. One of us had … his fridge, sofas, display cabinets all of which were destroyed that he cannot 
buy anything like that again because of the price hikes. He gave-up and left. …Lorries were driven over 
bags of maize tearing them apart, destroying them. When I tried to scoop the maize, I was hit by a 
sjambok and left everything there.’ 
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some of these who are now being apprehended280… My heart burns with desire to get to 
President Mugabe and say to him… that we are suffering from oppression here but there 
is no access to him. That is what is in my heart. 
 
The peasant woman here expresses bitterness against President Mugabe’s ruling 
clique but she is careful to exonerate President Mugabe himself. This could have 
been affected by President Mugabe’s lone support for occupations against his ruling 
clique. Occupiers invariably felt President Mugabe was a person. 
 
One of the major sources of confusion to academics and analysts is the position of 
the President in the land reform. He kept changing his position and was unwavering 
only after February 2000. The first shift was made by the President in June 1998. 
‘Mugabe defended (occupations) stressing that force should not be used to evict the 
land hungry.’ But this was short lived as barely a month or so after he ‘reversed his 
position in August warning of stern government action’ (Alexander 2003: 97). And 
indeed occupiers were brutally evicted by the police, burning their (occupiers’) 
shelters as we have seen of the Goromonzi case. 
 
After the referendum President Mugabe hardened his stance against the White 
farmers progressively as Masunungure (2004: 176-7) and Feltoe (2004: 200) observe: 
In early April 2000, the president said no white commercial farmer would be chased 
away from Zimbabwe …But as time went on the anti-white rhetoric intensified and 
… in December 2001, the president was really on a warpath…281 
 
The shifts caused by a number of factors including agenda of the opposition and 
the civil society movement of regime change, heightening onslaught of Britain and 
the United States on the President, and continuous pressure from the land movement 
not to retreat on land redistribution. Strategic shift by the War Veterans and Mugabe 
constituted important survival strategies for both parties with obvious mutual gains. 
On one hand, War Veterans seemed to avoid ‘state violence’ against them as 
Alexander (2003) aptly argues. On the other, the President realising their political 
capital, did not want to antagonise the War Veterans. The actions of War Veterans 
and the President were ‘based solely on cost-benefit calculation’, contradicting 
assertions by the resource mobilisation theory (Foweraker 1995). 
 
War Veterans at times thought that Mugabe uses them for his convenience and 
did not want to share political power with them as a civil servant, an intellectual who 
was a leader in the land occupations (Interview with DTM 2000) observed: 
I thought following the pronouncement by the president that it was the War Veterans 
who had saved the party, to me it followed that he was going … even to promote and 
create a conducive environment where the War Veterans would be fitted into various 
government structures because it’s not enough to acknowledge that ‘These are the people 
who saved the party.’ And so what are you doing about them…? If you are not doing 
anything you … are just paying lip-service. War Veterans are now saying: ‘There’s no 
way we can continue to be used as cannon fodder … enough is enough’. They would 
want to participate actively in decision making processes. 
 
                                                 
280 Referring to the arrest of Dr. Kruneri (Minister of Finance) and James Makamba, a top 
ZANU-PF member. 
281 Emphasis mine. 
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This quotation shows that War Veterans feel they are used by President Mugabe 
and they are bitter about it. The question remains whether they think they can do 
anything about it. Many academics and analysts have not considered this 
ambivalence in the relationship between the War Veterans and the President which is 
a critical omission. 
 
The Provincial Chairman of War Veterans summed up the relationship between 
the land occupiers that were led by War Veterans and the ruling party in a parable as 
follows (Provincial Dialogue for Mashonaland West Province 2004): 
When Jesus was crucified, a blind man came and pleaded, ‘Jesus, bless me with sight, 
please.’ Jesus blessed the man who gained sight instantly. When the healed man, amazed 
by the first sight of the world, looked up at Jesus on the cross, he discovered what he 
thought had not yet been seen by those who had sight all along. He announced this 
discovery saying, ‘That nail is not deep enough - he might escape!’ pointing to the nail 
driven through Jesus’ hands into the cross. This is how we, war veterans, are treated all 
the time. 
 
This ‘parable’ captures the feelings of actors of the land movement throughout the 
history of the liberation movement.282 After independence the liberation movement, 
under the leadership of nationalist ZANU-PF elites, was abandoned and an alliance 
of ZANU-PF ruling class and settler capital was forged and War Veterans were 
relegated. In what to War Veterans seemed to be history repeating itself the land 
movement actors were sidelined by the ruling elite during the FTLRP. The 
Presidential Land Review Committee (Utete 2003: 35) observed that although War 
Veterans were happy that the government at last ‘had heeded the call for land 
redistribution … [however] their members had not benefited as promised … [and] 
land was allocated on regional lines…’. On-the-ground perceptions of unfairness, 
regionalism, tribalism and nepotism were a source of conflict between, on the one 
hand, ZANU-PF stalwarts and a rising bourgeoisie, and on the other, land movement 
actors. 
 
 
7.4 The Murambatsvina period 2005 to date 
Operation Murambatsvina, carried out from May 2005, was largely seen by War 
Veterans as victimising land occupation movement actors. The operation destroyed 
‘illegal’ structures that had mushroomed in urban areas including extra buildings 
located in private stands, home and backyard industries and houses build by land 
                                                 
282 Farm workers also felt that the FTLRP had benefited the wrong groups, as RN, (Interview 
with RN, a former farm manager and occupier, 2004) explained, ‘People who are really farming 
are those from Harare. People from the communal lands are not farming because they do not have the 
capital. The farm worker is not farming because he doesn’t have capital also. But if we look at the 
beneficiaries of this programme they are not the people who should be getting the benefit because you 
see that one comes in his Pajero, with one tractor and this and that. But now a person like me from the 
reserves hoping to do something here finds myself without capital. I cannot farm. I am not getting what 
I expected… those who are benefiting are the well-to-do... People came from the communal lands 
hoping to get Government assistance. That person is land hungry. The farm worker is land hungry. I, 
as a manager, have the knowledge and skill of farming but don’t have the land. I applied but did not get 
one.’ 
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occupiers on land ceased during the occupation period. Figures of the affected 
people have been controversial. Moyo and Yeros (2007: 115) argue as follows: 
… they have magnified the tragedy, claiming, in a UN report, that some 700,000 persons 
were displaced (UNO 2005). A more rigorous analysis would have placed the number of 
displaced at a much lower number, possibly between one-half and one-third the UN 
estimate. For the UN team that conducted the inquiry employed a shoddy methodology, 
relying largely on the ‘evidence’ of unaccountable civil society organisations, rather than 
doing the more demanding research that was required. 
 
The report by the United Nations (UN) envoy, Annah Tabaijuka was also 
castigated for poor methodology because the mission relied on ‘unaccountable civil 
society’, ‘simply doubled’ up figures of an earlier UN estimate that was also 
questionable. 
War Veterans who led occupations of farms surrounding urban areas had formed 
housing cooperatives and distributed the land to needy urban workers. These turned 
out to be the main target of the operation and the structures were erased to the 
ground by bulldozers. 
 
Although Operation Murambatsvina was largely seen as an urban operation it did 
not end or start in the urban areas. Before, during and after the operation land 
movement actors had running battles with the police and government forces. For 
example in Gomba, both the Zumba and Hwata people were brutally attacked by the 
police in a bid to force them out (Interview R 2004, cross border woman trader who 
was one of the leaders of Zumba people): 
 
So when we came back to live in our shelters, we were pained that the Assistant DA 
whom we had given our story is the one who led the Police (Black Boots Unit) to burn 
down our shelters. They just said we had tresspassed and illegally settled on the area. We 
were given 10 minutes to take out our belongings from the shelters. They were just 
scolding us saying things that should not be said, the very things we wear clothes for. 
They had noticed that we were not going to be moved. … They were throwing away 
things. Heavy vehicles … were rolled over [my] bags of maize and tearing them apart 
and destroying the contents. When I tried to scoop the maize, I was hit by a sjambok and 
left everything there running for safety. 
 
The Operation Murambatsvina of 2005 was seen by many War Veterans in the 
land occupation movement as ZANU-PF elites’ consolidation of power – a process 
that had started with the fast track. As the land movement proved much stronger in 
the occupied farms the state turned to the easier urban settlements for political 
solving both political and local government problems of unplanned development. 
According to War Veterans (Interview with Mucha, a woman War Veteran who was 
self employed and was a member of Tongogara Housing Cooperative, 2006) the 
operation was aimed at demonstrating to the War Veterans and the public that 
ZANU-PF elites were still powerful and would not hesitate to use the state 
machinery against the War Veterans. One informant said that War Veterans in the 
occupied farms anticipated that the operation was going to be extended to them and 
the land movement was taking measures to defend occupied lands and this could 
have sparked an armed resistance. 
 
Murambatsvina was a continuation of what had been started in FTLRP. The state 
and ZANU-PF elites decided to suppress the land movement by force after realising 
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that it (land movement) could not be co-opted. The War Veteran struggle had now 
reached a new development in terms of class alliance. This time it had reined in the 
urban working class in a move that would reconfigure the Zimbabwe’s class politics 
and power with unpredictable consequences to the ruling elite and bourgeoisie. The 
alliance forged by peasants, urban working class, farm workers and War Veterans, 
based on land occupations, was highly threatening not only to ZANU-PF, President 
Mugabe and the state but also albeit less conspicuously, to local and international 
capital. It was therefore clear that this new alliance had to be ruthlessly destroyed 
and the state did not hesitate to take action.  
Raging battles between War Veterans led occupiers and waves of occupiers that 
were sent by ZANU-PF elites were enough evidence that the War Veterans were 
eager to see land redistribution to the poor. This was contrary to the party stalwarts 
and Black bourgeoisie. Murambatsvina therefore marks a temporary triumph of the 
bourgeois class and elites over the poor peasants, farm and urban workers and War 
Veterans who would hit back in the 2008 general and presidential elections. 
Murambatsvina signalled the breaking of the marriage of convenience between 
the forces of the liberation movement, which had brought the nationalists back into 
the fold. As one War Veteran said, ‘we shall meet at the election period’ (Interview 
Muchaneta 2000 a woman War Veteran trader at Mbare (Market) Musika). The 
weapons for the Murambatsvina victims were now the ballot papers. 
The Mugabe regime, after Murambatsvina had to seek for other partners and 
forge yet a new alliance through which it would sustain its grip on power. They 
found this in the traditional authority, chiefs, headman and village heads. In their 
judgement these would substitute the war veterans in the alliance. From 2005 the 
state started to devolve power to the chiefs giving them more authority over judicial 
matters, making them commissioners of oaths accompanied by many fincancial and 
material benefits. Each chief was given a brand new twin-cab vehicle, a farm with 
elegant farm house, a computer and a state funded secretary and messenger. The 
mechanisation programme spearheaded by the Reserve Bank in 2007, the 
Agricultural Support Productivity Enhancement Facility (ASPEF) targeted traditional 
leaders as specific beneficiaries and distributors of inputs. Indeed war veterans were 
sidelined and substituted by traditional authority but this also increased inflationary 
pressure and more and more people plunged into abject poverty. 
 
The new strategy for the state and ZANU-PF was to use the chiefs to regiment the 
rural electorate in preparation for the following general elections. Mugabe intended 
to contest for the presidency in a bid to continue as leader of the country for more 
than 30 years although he had ealier promised to hand over power to someone else. 
However, it was clear that opposition from within and from outside, was becoming 
more determined against him. Murambatsvia was also an inadvertant strategic error 
on the part of ZANU-PF, the state and Robert Mugabe, as the 2008 events later 
showed. The dispersal of urban land movement actors through Murambatsvina had 
a catalystic effect on the rural voting pattern. Murambatsvina victims, most of whom 
relocated in the rural areas (both resettled farms and communal lands), became a 
strong mobilising force against the elite, bourgeoisie, the ruling oligarchy and 
President Mugabe. 
 
The land movement, now an alliance of urban workers, farm workers, peasants, 
and sidelined war veterans was decisive in the 2008 harmonised elections. War 
Veterans sought to to be more active in politics than ever before, during these 
elections. They elisted to participate in elections for urban and rural constituencies 
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but were weeded out by the ZANU-PF machinery during primaries and afterwards. 
Some war veterans resisted and went ahead to register on the party’s ticket, thereby 
splitting the vote with disastrous consequences to ZANU-PF. The anti-elite struggle 
within the liberation movement seems to have given MDC and advantage as the vote 
then swayed to them. Aggregated votes for both MDC- Tsvangirai (99 seats) and 
MDC (10 seats) had a resounding success over ZANU-PF which got only 97 seats in 
the first electoral defeat in almost a generation. For the presidential election, Robert 
Mugabe got 43 percent of total votes cast against Morgan Tsvangirai’s 47 percent. 
However, neither satified the constitutional requirement of obtaining more than 50 
percent of total votes cast to be reistated as president. A run off has been set for 27 
June 2008 in a violent post electoral atmosphere.  
 
Even with this electoral victory for the MDC, a deeper analysis would reveal more 
complex activities under the surface. The victory for MDC does not necessarily mean 
an embrace of the political programme of that party and abandonment of the 
liberation agenda. To many the common enemy was the elite, whether in ZANU-PF 
or MDC but this political group could be dislodged by first removing Mugabe and 
his henchmen who had grown very powerful283. The vote expressed for the first time 
a new and developing alliance of workers and peasants. This view was analysed by a 
former ZIPA Commander and founder member of the MDC (Discussion with MDZ, 
2008). He illustrated that even within MDC, the struggle between the elite on one 
hand and on the other, peasants and workers was heated. This was shown by the 
poor performance in Midlands by MDC-T, expressing discontent by the workers. The 
elections of 2008 can best be seen as of the lower classes against the elite although 
this view has not been accepted by some analysts. Murambatsvina had speeded the 
common alliance of progressive forces of the liberation movement but ironically 
under backing a party that is seen as serving the interests of capital than their own 
class interests. However in this equation inflation, hunger and other problems played 
an important part. 
 
 
 
7.5 Post Murambatsvina: withering away of the land 
movement? 
We have seen how the land movement evolved and developed throughout the 
colonial period and how it became the foundation of nationalism. We have also seen 
how the two were the most prominent forms of struggle against colonial rule and 
further how the liberation war was the ultimate outcome of those struggles which 
were then under the umbrella of the liberation movement. This movement, as we 
have seen had many more movements within it namely the peasant land movement, 
                                                 
283 Some War Veterans who had been urged by the ZANU-PF politburo in the 2008 elections 
chose to be independent or to join Simba Makoni, a challenger of Robert Mugabe presidential 
candidature from within ZANU-PF. They saw this as a better alternative than the MDC 
which was western backed. So these War Veterans had a double task of fighting the ZANU-
PF elitse and the MDC Hoping to have representation of the grassroots in the new political 
structure. The other motive of the War Veterans was to split the critical MDC vote so that by 
losing western countries would not use MDC as leverage. Without this strategy MDC would 
have got a clear victory over ZANU-PF which many of the War Veterans feared, as argued in 
this thesis.  
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the farm worker movement, the nationalist movement and the guerrilla movement. 
Conflicts and alliances before and after independence within the liberation 
movement were also discussed and how these led to the rupture of the 2000 land 
occupations. 
 
The occupation period that covered a four year period from 1998 to 2002 had 
multiple alliances forged which ultimately resulted in a political united front of the 
liberation movement against a united front of the opposition and the civil society 
movement. But alliances within the liberation movement soon fractured as class 
contradictions sharpened in the struggle for land redistribution. The state, ZANU-PF 
and President Robert Mugabe again turned against the land movement and started 
to crush it through Operation Murambatsvina. The liberation movement was once 
more divided along class lines although the struggle remains latent owing to state 
repression. With all these shifting positions of the government, Mugabe and ZANU-
PF in relation to the land movement and the liberation movement in general, the 
burning question is, what was the reaction of the land movement to all these 
influences by the state and ZANU-PF? One school of thought argues that: ‘…many 
observers’ analyses [are] that the ‘war vets’ association was actually taken over by 
the Central Intelligence Organisation in preparation for the 2000 invasions: this is the 
state incarnate.’  
 
Moyo and Yeros (2005) offer a different view. They argue that the land occupation 
movement survived beyond February 2000 and continued until: 
… the war veterans’ association … bec[a]me a source of weakness for the movement … 
[it] emerged as a ‘single issue’ movement, focusing exclusively on the immediate question 
of land repossession and not on longer-term political economic questions, particularly the 
post-fast-track phase. (Moyo and Yeros 2005: 190) 
 
 
The authors argue that because of the perceived ‘single issue’ weakness War 
Veterans, as leaders of the movement, consequently failed to build: ‘…self sustaining, 
democratic peasant worker organisational structures, with a view to preparing for 
longer-term class-based political education and ideological struggle.’284 (Moyo and 
Yeros 2005: 190) 
 
What logically followed was the ‘withering away of the land occupation 
movement’, according to Moyo and Yeros (2005). There are two issues that Moyo and 
Yeros (2005) raise here. One is the organisation of the land movement for 
sustainability purposes and the other is the current state of the movement. 
 
Was the land movement co-opted or even negated by the state before the 2000 
elections as David Moore (2004) argues? This question has sufficiently been dealt 
with in Chapter 5 and this chapter. The conclusion is that the land movement 
continued beyond 2000 elections and it was not co-opted nor was it then negated. 
                                                 
284 Moyo and Yeros can be excused for having been writing at the heat of the moment, before 
some issues had fully evolved or before enough empirical data had been collected. Their 
position Moyo and Yeros (2007) recognises as in previous works that War Veterans managed 
to sustain ‘unique organic links’ in the countryside which enabled them to mobilise for 
occupations. However, the authors do not fully explain what happened to these links. 
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Has the land movement itself ‘withered away’ because of all these influences by the 
state? We shall examine this question as we conclude this book. 
 
We shall begin by assessing organisational structures that developed during the 
land movement because this is a critical factor in sustaining the movement. In 
discussing the issue of organisation of sustainable structures for the land movement 
a number of issues have to be taken into account. One of the main propositions of 
this thesis is that there is a complex embryonic relationship between the War 
Veterans and ZANU-PF as a party. Another is that there are many ZANU-PFs within 
ZANU-PF with class, ethnic and generational cleavages. As a result even the 
embryonic connection between the War Veterans and ZANU-PF is not a single 
umbilical code but many. Therefore multiple patterns of alliances can be formed 
between the two.285 
 
As we have seen in turning point section, when War Veterans came out of their 
cocoon from 1988 they fought with ZANU-PF elites for cultural capital accumulated 
through the liberation war. They claimed heroism and its redefinition; they claimed 
the metaphors and symbolic images of the war. However, as they did this they did 
not want to lose the gained cultural capital by forming another party or organisation. 
They would rather battle it out with politburo selected candidates like Mahofa in the 
Gutu saga, push Mugabe to throw away his Ministers like at the Chinhoyi meeting 
but they wanted to remain identified as ZANU-PF.286 War Veterans feared losing 
something by moving out of ZANU-PF. As a result War Veterans used structures of 
ZANU-PF in competition with ZANU-PF elites and nationalists.287 
 
It is this fluidity of the land movement as a component of the liberation 
movement, that allows War Veterans to access ZANU-PF structures in as much as 
ZANU-PF has access to War Veteran structures depending on the objectives, and 
tactics at given times. This is the complexity of the liberation movement that needs to 
be critically evaluated in order to appreciate certain strategies and tactics, 
continuities and discontinuities, of the land movement. 
 
Moyo and Yeros (2005) recognise other grassroots organisations that War 
Veterans have access to like traditional structures. However there are also 
organisations which War Veterans have formed arising from the land movement, for 
example the Nyabira Mazowe Farmers association. This was formed by War 
Veterans in early 2000 to, inter alia:  
                                                 
285 As when War Veterans forged an alliance with peasants from 1997 to occupy land or when 
War Veterans, now leading the land movement, itself lower echelons of the liberation 
movement, forged an alliance with the ZANU-PF elites to campaign for 2000 general elections 
and 2002 presidential elections. 
286 For example notice how even Margaret Dongo was herself apprehensive, in one of the 
controversial parliamentary debates, of being anything else than ZANU-PF although she 
proceeded to form her own party shortly afterwards, ‘At some stage we were labelled ZUM 
supporters and some even wanted to start forming a new party. Cde Dongo emphasised that the ex-
combatant fought for the struggle under ZANU-PF and would remain ZANU-PF.’ (Ziana 30 
September 1991) 
287 The land movement mobilised peasants across ZANU-PF structures. The ruling party’s 
structures were used by the War Veterans in organising the movement on the ground 
although the same War Veterans were fighting with ZANU-PF elites at the top. 
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• To foster, encourage, promote and advance the establishment, maintenance, 
development of farming activities undertaken by the War Veterans and other 
landless masses of Zimbabwe, and in so doing, improve the economic and 
social status for the previously marginalised owners of the Zimbabwe …. 
• To communicate, exchange information, or become associated or affiliated 
with other organisations, not at war with Zimbabwe; for the benefit of 
economically empowering the Association’s members. 
• To present the views of members to government, local authorities, 
institutions, associations and other bodies in and outside Zimbabwe on any 
matters directly or indirectly affecting members and the capacity to conduct 
business. 
• To encourage and promote development of socio-economic and financial 
systems which appreciate the problems of the members in their endeavour to 
empower themselves through sustainable farming activities. 
• To provide farming business counselling services through the Planning 
Department of the Association to its members. 
• To communicate, improve and pass constructive comments when proposed 
changes to legislation are made known. 
• To act when required, as arbitrator in any matters concerning members’ 
enterprises and industry in general. 
• To enter into and become a party to any contract or agreement (Constitution 
of Nyabira Mazowe Self-contained farms Farmers Association, undated). 
 
In fact after the Fast Track this association transformed into a more powerful 
organisation, Mashonaland West Mining, Agricultural, Residential and Tourism 
Association (MWART) (see Mwart Agro syndicate constitution).288 Mwart and 
Nyabira Mazowe Association have managed to defend their members against 
evictions by ZANU-PF elites and civil servants as discussed above. They continue to 
provide services to their members and other victims of corrupt officials according to 
their constitution. 
 
War Veterans in Mazowe also formed another organisation, the African 
Nationalistic Paradigm (ANP). This NGO was registered as a public Trust with the 
following objective: 
… to preserve, promote and develop spiritual and material cultures of the African people 
and to facilitate positive contribution… by articulating African thought, values, 
practices and technologies that can assist in solving problems faced by … humanity 
(Constitution of African Nationalistic Paradigm, 2001 as amended 2005) 
 
With this objective the organisation established a centre in Concession for research 
in African biotechnologies and agricultural machinery for support to the agrarian 
reform. The organisation bought a farm from a White farmer in 2001 and started a 
research project on the indigenous Tuli breeds because of its commercial and 
adaptation advantages. The organisation mobilised the University of Zimbabwe, 
Henderson Research Station and Mazowe Institute of Veterinary Science which 
participated in the researches. They also started researches on a breed that has 
features of a wildebeest found in Chiweshe Communal It sold about 400 cattle to 
                                                 
288 Participant observation (2003-8) I was a member of Mwart heading the Legal and Training 
Committee. This is but one organisation amongst many. 
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new farmers for breeding. Above all the organisation members invented and 
patented two agricultural machines for furrowing and ridging in order to promote 
African agronomic techniques using modern equipment. However the farm was 
suddenly subdivided by the district and Provincial Committees when the project had 
just started to bear fruits.289 This shows that War Veterans have continued to organise 
and they have insight into sustaining the land movement although the organisation 
takes different shapes depending on different sets of factors. 
 
When the FTLRP started to have effects on the ground it met serious resistance 
from the occupiers as discussed in this thesis. At times there were physical clashes 
between the occupiers and state organs resulting into arrests and imprisonment of 
the War Veteran leaders (Interview with DM, self employed leader of occupations in 
Nyabira, 2004). Relations between the state, ZANU-PF and the land movement 
continued to sour because of divergent views about the direction and destiny of the 
land reform program. When the FTLRP was in the hands of civil servants and elites 
within the ruling party and private sector had access to the structures and processes, 
they worked hard to redirect the movement and steer it off its original course as 
defined by the occupiers. Here we look at the ultimate objectives of different 
occupiers and their evaluation of the outcome of the Fast Track. 
 
Coming back to the issue War Veterans’ vision beyond the land repossession, 
some War Veterans leaders ended at land repossession but others had ideas beyond 
that. For example some War Veterans had socialist ideas gained from the time of the 
guerrilla war and they were keen to apply them through the land movement. The 
actually saw themselves as the vanguard in what they considered a class struggle 
between the bourgeoisie and ruling oligarchy. In Mazowe and Nyabira alone there 
were seven War Veterans who were either graduates of Wampoa College or were the 
lecturers there. And out of the seven, three were leaders in the occupations one of 
them being a woman. These commanded vast areas and when the movement 
centralised its coordination they became coordinators thereby widening their 
influence in the land movement. Amongst themselves they also discussed intensely 
(Participant observation, Mazowe, 2000-6). 
 
Probing one of them on his visions and interpretation of the situation DMT 
(Interview with DMT, intellectual War Veteran employed as civil servant and 
leading occupations in Mazowe, 2000) explained that: 
… the national democratic revolution was not completed. We are now in the process may 
be of realising this stage. But in my case, I have ideals which go far beyond that. Like you 
are aware I have Communist ideals, I would want a society that is free of exploitation of 
man by man. I would love to have a situation, a society where classes within society are 
narrowed. The haves and the have nots, that distinction should be narrowed as much as 
possible if not completely done away with. The state should own the basic means of 
production on behalf of the majority of the people. These are the ideals that I think go far 
beyond what the ideals of a national democratic revolution would entail, because it ends 
here. People share the land, people have been given the means to go into industry and 
commerce and this revolution is complete. But there would still be differences in terms of 
wealth, in terms of stratification of society - we have those who have and those who don’t 
have and so forth. I would want to go a step further. 
 
                                                 
289 Participant observation, founder member and Chairman of ANP (2001-6). 
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As a result, although Moyo and Yeros (2005) might be correct when they point out 
that War Veterans did not mould ‘self-sustaining, democratic peasant-worker 
organisational structures with a view to preparing for a longer-term class-based 
political education and ideological struggle’ they have understated the ideological 
clarity and objectives of some influential War Veterans. The better view is to look at 
this as a class struggle between the ‘haves and have nots’. The intention of these 
ideologically motivated War Veterans and other occupiers was to not just take land 
from the White commercial farmers and end by giving it to the Blacks but they 
wanted the land to go to the landless and the needy and it was not a racial issue. 
Farm workers also expressed clearly what they felt was the objective of the land 
occupation movement and were critical about how this was derailed through 
government intervention. DN (Interview with DN 2001), a former foreman at a farm 
in Concession whom I quote at length had this to say: 
Fear strikes us but we realise that we are the victims here because … to tell you the truth 
… we the [Black] people want our land but [also] we want all of us to survive. The land 
… is for all of us. …You know that when we are at meetings we say (inaudible) one 
cannot have land that stretches from here to that end …But there is this other program of 
section 8 [that] allow[s] one person to be like a White man … it is says, you have no land 
here, go away then only one person is left who shall just be like the White man. So this is 
where we notice that things are bad. It’s now twisted at this point. … We here at the 
compound would share 8 acres, 5 acres, 6 acres that will be enough for us. We can 
survive our whole lives here. We were confident that we would get our own share of land 
while we work for a wage … to sustain my life. But P and others changed later. They said 
they were not going to give us any field. This program does not give the farm workers 
land. Then we asked, ‘What about the houses?’ Then they said we could keep that for 
some time and we left our properties and came here. Then they followed us up and took 
the keys from us … Even up to now we don’t greet each other. I want my house… They 
[civil servants] are being paid by the government, aren’t they? What about us who are 
being chased away from these houses? … This is where this program is wrong. It is 
causing a lot of suffering to farm workers … I end up saying that had I known I would 
not have supported the [land occupations] program. If we can be 6, 8 of us thinking the 
same thing like this, what will come into our minds here? … Land is now given to a 
person who is at the DA’s, sitting in an office but I, who stumped, cannot get the land. I 
moulded the bricks for the sheds to be there, I constructed the dam and now what are you 
saying? This grievance! That’s the major complain in the farms. It will not just die off 
like that. It is getting very bad in all these farms. There are a lot of people who are crying 
fowl about it. 
 
Another farm worker a former manager in Gomba, RN (Interview with RN 2004) 
evaluated the outcome of the Fast Track program as follows: 
And if you actually look at it the people who are really farming they are those who are 
coming from Harare. People who really came from the communal lands are not farming. 
They do not have the capital. The farm worker is not farming because he doesn’t have 
capital as well. But if we look at the beneficiaries of this program they are not the people 
who should be getting the benefit because you see that one comes in his Pajero, with one 
tractor and this and that. But now a person like me coming from the reserves hoping to 
do something here I find myself with no capital. I cannot farm. I am not getting what I 
expected …those who are benefiting are those who were well-to-do already …people came 
from the communal lands [because] that person is land hungry. The farm worker is land 
hungry. 
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The aggregate effect of all these views by the land occupiers is that they certainly 
had ideas beyond the Fast Track and in fact Fast Track stopped them from 
implementing their vision of land reform. It seems clear to occupiers that their 
objectives went beyond repossession of land from the White farmers but to give it to 
the landless peasants, farm workers and War Veterans; people who wanted to make 
a living out of the land. It is also clear form the tone of the informants that there is 
still bitterness and dissatisfaction about the outcome of Fast Track. 
 
This thesis argues that the land movement is still vibrant and is far from 
‘withering away’ despite efforts by the state to thwart or to co-opt it. The prognosis 
that ‘there would remain only a minimum of organised political structures among 
the peasantry to exercise influence over the post-redistribution phase of agrarian 
reform’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005: 193) does not seem to be supported by facts on the 
ground. On the contrary as discussed in this chapter, there is formidable challenge 
from the land occupiers to the ruling oligarchy and petty bourgeois opportunists. 
Evidence for this ongoing struggle is corroborated by the new political tactic of war 
veterans to enrol as candidates for the March 2008 elections and how they were 
systematically weeded out by the ZANU-PF ruling elite (Personal observation 
2008).290 The alternative view suggested by this thesis is that the land occupation 
movement of Zimbabwe expresses a higher level of struggle against Africa’s post-
colonial settlerism and neo-colonialism. 
 
 
                                                 
290 Many war veterans had registered to compete in the primary elections in order to become 
parliamentary candidates through the ZANU-PF ticket. However there was systematic 
elimination of war veterans by the ZANU-PF ruling oligarchy through various means. One 
was that the ruling elites demanded that for a candidate to qualify for primaries one had to be 
at least five years as a Provincial level office bearer. Considering the exclusionary directive 
given in the early 1980s prohibiting war veterans to be office bearers in the party, many failed 
to qualify. However, noting that some loyalists were also excluded by this qualification there 
was provision for a waiver, particularly for members of the diplomatic corps who had 
returned from services abroad, but not for war veterans. Although war veterans used their 
mobilisation skills and were preferred by the ZANU-PF electorate the leadership did not 
waive the condition. In a charged meeting in January 2008 held at ZANU-PF Harare 
Provincial offices chaired by ZNLWVA Chairman, Jabulani Sibanda, war veterans were bitter 
about this exclusion (Personal observation January 2008). I personally campaigned for 3 
women war veterans (two were former Wampoa graduates, one having led land occupations 
in Chinhamora) and another war veteran man, during the primaries. Two of the candidates 
campaigned in my former war zone – Mazowe detachment. Three were disqualified despite 
their popularity in the constituencies. One of the women applied for an urgent chamber 
application to bar a Politburo-preferred candidate, and she enrolled as an independent when 
blocked by the ZANU-PF elite. In another case where another leader of (1998 and 2000) 
occupations had registered and was standing against Francisco Zhuwau, Deputy Minister of 
Science Technology and President Mugabe’s nephew, the army was used to beat up people 
protesting the imposition of Zhuwau. Because of fear many did not become independent 
candidates. However another Wampoa female graduate became an independent and joined 
the Simba Makoni camp led by former Minister of Finance and ZANU-PF Politburo member 
who registered his presidential candidature against Mugabe. These internal conflicts illustrate 
that the War Veterans’ movement is far from being co-opted and their struggle against the 
elite continues, if in changed form. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
In arriving at a general conclusion to this thesis it is appropriate to attempt to form 
some judgments about the evolving relations between the land movement and the 
state, for the light thrown on the nature of the Zimbabwean agrarian crisis. This leads 
to a final summation, linking the tendencies described in this thesis to the wider 
African context of rural violence, as seen in countries as diverse, distant and agrarian 
as Cote d'Ivoire and (most recently) Kenya. The land issue is far from being uniquely 
Zimbabwean. The failure of mercantilist political elites in Africa to address agrarian 
tensions or to invest in agro-technical improvement relevant to the needs of the rural 
masses lies close to the heart of much of the social tension plaguing Africa's rural 
areas.  
 
In the early occupation period (1998-9) the land movement came into conflict with 
both the state and the White commercial farmers. ZANU-PF elites and President 
Mugabe were against the occupations for reasons of their own (partly because the 
veterans were challenging elite grip on state power, but also because the government 
was anxious to defend a property regime from which its cronies benefited). The 
movement was at its strongest following the victory of some War Veterans in some 
of these early skirmishes (in 1997). From these early gains some War Veterans 
exercised a leverage to mobilise the existing land movement for land occupations, 
and this helped the ideologically-motivated Wampoa group to shape and pursue a 
(war-induced) alternative political vision for the future of Zimbabwe as a radically 
decentralised state based on ‘back to the land’ social (and technical) values. 
 
The later occupation period (1998-2000) encompassed dramatic and critical shifts 
reconfiguring political factions and forces in the wake of the referendum on 
constitutional reform and afterwards. At this juncture, President Mugabe was adept 
enough to forge an alliance with the land movement to withstand a political surge 
from a wider opposition alliance. This allowed the presidency and its backers to 
regain political control, through using War Veterans and the land movement as 
campaigning asset during the 2000 general elections and 2002 presidential elections. 
 
It has been made clear in this thesis that there were two levels of occupations 
within the process occurring in and around the year 2000 – one was led or inspired291 
by groups of War Veterans still in pursuit of liberation political visions and the other 
by ZANU-PF elites and the state. It has been argued that these two occupations had 
different objectives based on conflicting class orientations. The second kind of 
occupation process strengthened the emerging Black bourgeoisie and key political 
backers of ZANU-PF and the president. Occupations pushed by the ideologically-
motivated veteran group were swiftly negated by the Fast Track approach, resulting 
in this group of occupiers receiving inadequate land (Utete 2003), and coming into 
conflict with new rich farmers supported by the state and the ZANU-PF ruling elite. 
Be that as it may, the case for reform made by the land movement could not be 
totally deflected, and consequently 72 percent of land went to small scale farmers. 
Many land movement actors benefited this way, even if ZANU-PF ruling elite and 
President Mugabe were careful to marginalise those most in favour of the strong 
alternative ideological programme described in this thesis. 
                                                 
291 These include independent groups of occupiers of farm workers, peasants and peri-urban 
centres who were not directly led by War Veterans. 
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White farmers, once a key ally of the regime, were neatly replaced by a Black 
commercial farming class on the back of the social surge for land occupation. 
Political damage to the status quo was thus contained, even at the expense of some 
quite severe dislocations and decline in agricultural productivity. The gamble is that 
these inefficiencies will prove temporary – some White farmers may indeed stay on 
and supply consultancy services to the new group of large-scale owners. This would 
not have been a possibility had the War Veteran occupations succeeded, since (as we 
have seen in Chapter 6) the movement called for a radical shift towards localised 
food sovereignty around a different system of agro-technology. 
 
Winning the 2005 elections by ZANU-PF signalled irreversible political gains by 
the ruling party, proving that an alliance with those in the liberation movement with 
a ‘back-to-the-land’ ethos, was no longer needed for the survival of ZANU-PF. As a 
result Murambatsvina (Operation Restore Order) could then be commenced, 
marking a victory for ZANU-PF elites, the state security apparatus and President 
Mugabe over those within the land movement that they had earlier failed to co-opt 
or completely silence. And yet the failure to alleviate agrarian poverty – it has 
continued to worsen, in fact – or to address contradictions in the relationship 
between rural citizens and ZANU-PF elites makes it unlikely that the land movement 
will simply ‘wither away’. Cooption will then prove an expensive option, since it will 
require (in effect) deep economic reforms, based either on heavy investment in small-
scale production systems or in provision of urban jobs. The ‘archaism’ of the land 
movement thrives on the fact that the majority of Zimbabweans live impoverished 
and highly insecure lives, and still retain a strong sense that health and safety are to 
be found in peasant options. The Mugabe regime can, at best, have won only a 
temporary stay of execution, for failing earlier to develop agrarian policies 
independent of the needs of a White farming elite. It is suggested that the Lancaster 
House compromises will continue to haunt the regime. 
 
This thesis has attempted to characterise an Africanising land movement led by 
ideologically-motivated War Veterans, and to show that it was distinct from ZANU-
PF, ZNLWVA and the state, though far from being completely independent within a 
broader liberation movement framework. As shown, the War Veteran land 
movement has interacted with different institutions and political organisations in its 
operational environment, forging a range of alliances, and resulting in complex 
outcomes, with varying significance and practical consequences for participants at 
the top and bottom of the movement structure. Also the situation is fluid, and 
relations between the land movement, state, presidency, ZANU-PF and the 
opposition movement have evolved over time. At present, the state has the upper 
hand, but the agrarian problems, to which the War Veterans' land movement is a 
political response, will not go away. The Wampoa veterans (or their successors) are 
likely to return. 
 
The literature has recorded a number of hasty judgments about land occupations, 
failing to perceive the competing class interests involved. A complexity of outcomes 
and legacy is typical for social movements in general, but it is important for analysts 
to follow the twists and turns of development of the land issue in Zimbabwe, and to 
become aware of the details, if an important subterranean class conflict is not to be 
misrepresented. It is an overall conclusion of this thesis that blanket condemnation of 
the veteran-led land movement as stooges of the regime is premature and incorrect. 
This study has prepared the way for a fuller and more nuanced approach to the 
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topic, and challenges commentators and future analysts to grapple further with the 
details yet to be exposed. 
 
A correct assessment of the land movement in Zimbabwe is important for Africa 
more generally, which faces a crisis of food production and agricultural under-
productivity. This crisis is not (as often characterised) a technical problem alone. At 
root, it is a matter of social commitments and justice for the rural poor. The study 
supports recent work that has drawn links between land issues and the violence 
from which much of the continent suffers (Moyo and Yeros 2005, Richards 2004, 
Peters 2006, Chauveau and Richards 2008). Hunger for land is more than a desire for 
an economic asset; it is at root a deep desire for a more just, more equal and more 
communitarian way of life. 
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Appendix 1 
My Hero292 
 
My hero is the wrinkled old woman 
Who slowly uphill trudges 
Balancing a bamboo-woven basket 
Of hot sadza to the base 
Where fighters wearily lie. 
 
My hero is the teen-age girl 
Of tender flesh and innocent virtues, 
Trapping sharp acrid smell of billowing smoke 
Blowing glowing embers of wet wood 
For fighters at least to have a meal. 
 
My hero is the toddler lonely left, 
Humming nostalgic memories 
Singing jolly old days of breast feeding, 
When dear mother lullabies softly sang, 
And no soldier drove her to the strong point 
To answer puzzles of the dead and gone. 
 
My hero is mujibha 
Whose rolling piercing eye observes 
From the summit of the hill, 
Scanning battle-torn landscape below 
Watching soldiers in single file 
Marching silhouette to the camp. 
 
My hero is the machine operator in overalls 
Whose mind and muscle wane under bestial exploitation; 
Sitting on a squeaking bench of plank and nail, 
Splitting hairs of meager income earned, 
Calculating with boney fingers, 
What to spend and how much for combatants in the bushes. 
 
My hero is the brave fighter 
                                                 
292 Poem written soon after the burial of late Minister Morris Nyagumbo, a veteran ZANU-PF 
nationalist who committed suicide after being implicated in the Willowvale Motor Industry 
(Willogate) scandal having succumbed to the questioning by Justice Sandura Commission of 
Inquiry. Nyagumbo was buried at the National Heroes Acre. His burial can be contrasted 
with that of Sheba Tavarwisa, a woman war veteran and the first female intellectual to join 
ZANLA and receive military training with the first group of female trainees in Tanzania. She 
rose through the ranks and became the first ZANLA Central Committee member and became 
the highest woman commander with virtues described by Fay Chung as follows: “The only 
camp commander who to my knowledge refused to comply with this systematic abuse of some of the 
young women who had joined the struggle [by Tongogara and other top commanders] … was Shieba 
Tavarwisa, a top woman commander… a skilled and wise leader, who managed to maintain her 
integrity … “. However Shieba got no more than a pauper’s burial in her village and her 
credentials as a guerrilla leader are hardly known to the current generation. 
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Who never would backward retreat; 
But now roams the streets unemployed 
Stinking ages of sweat and dust, 
Hunger pangs on dry cracking lips written, 
Recalling gory memories but better days 
When on his lap the gun lay. 
 
My hero is not posthumously popular, 
Nor is his heroism pruned and grafted 
By eloquent eulogies at the graveside; 
But candidly curved by courage and commitment 
In the licking fires of the battle field 
At road blocks, in keeps and the bases 
 
My hero’s life and her name are unknown; 
They appear not in prepared speeches and The Herald 
No one holds high her noble revolutionary banner, 
Except the suffering workers, peasants and students 
Whose wishes are no more than old man’s dreams 
Sweet suckling with toothless gums, 
His mother’s granite breast. 
 
My hero is not passively beneath 
The old ground levels of Heroes Acre, 
Nor will he there ever lie; 
But in the simple hearts and minds 
Of the poor that toil and spoil, 
The wet picture of heroism painted now. 
 
My hero knows both night and day 
Nor is she nightly guarded every hour 
By ex-combatants of Warren Park; 
His violet flame eternally glows 
In the minds of workers and peasants 
At work, in queues and in fields. 
 
Wilbert Sadomba 1989
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Appendix 2 
Dear Land 
For a decade this red earth I have tilled 
The blunt of my hoe scratching sharp gravel 
That cut the underside of my feet yester-years 
As I covered distances like a mad man. 
When bullets whizzed, earth you gapped 
In your caves and dongas you swallowed me, 
Like a bream shielding offspring from birds of prey 
You’ve ta’en all dirt and scorn from me: 
Smelly jet of blood, your soils have bathed 
Spattering tears of grief from my cheek, 
Down memory line of comrades dead and gone. 
The foreskin of my toe peeled off by rock 
You buried without word of complaint 
When I suffer in the background, land 
And my voice is muffled, my gun taken, 
When I wobble up and down streets unemployed, land, 
Engulfed by sweet fragrance of misery, 
I will always come back to you for protection. 
Land, take me back from deafening sirens of cities 
And embrace me in the heart of your hinterlands 
Where tormented souls droop in sympathy 
At the unworthiness of my bitter struggle 
When my heart sinks in the depths of the abyss 
Under burdensome weight of relegation 
I will always remember you land, my saviour. 
I would, you swallow me forever 
Should drought be too persistent for you to feed me. 
 
Wilbert Z. Sadomba 
 
April 1990
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Appendix 3 
Communication between War Veterans and White Commercial 
Farmers293 
These are transcripts of letters between War Veterans and commercial farmers 
during the land occupations of Nyabira, throwing light on the nature of the conflict 
and how it was managed. They help evidence the claim that the land movement, led 
by war veterans, was a mass movement with well structured ideological arguments, 
thus countering arguments that War Veterans and occupiers were mere ZANU-PF 
tools. 
 
Letter from the Towns, Directors of the Ball Farm, dated 16 August 2000. The 
letter was addressed to T, the Chairman and G and was copied to Vice president 
Msika and Minister of Home Affairs John Nkomo. It partly reads: 
 
In response to numerous visits by yourselves over the last six months with 
requests to see ourselves personally we would like to make out our official response 
to your requests as follows: 
1. Mr B and ourselves do appreciate that up to this stage your requests have been 
peaceful and non confrontational. 
2. We understand that as War Vets you are carrying out your mandate to take over 
Ball Farm. 
3. We have not received any formal documentation as to your credentials or 
authority as to the lawfulness of your demand. 
4. To this date we have not received any notification or visitation from the relevant 
government authority concerned with land redistribution asto the intended 
acquisition of this farm. 
5. It has come to our attention that T alleges to Mr. M that you have been informed 
that: (in your words) ‘The labour on this farm has been mistreated and some of 
them have died’. By this we presume that you are accusing ourselves and others 
on the Ball in the past of physically assaulting the labour to the point that some of 
them have died. We question the authenticity of this information and believe it to 
be an accusation that has to be denied completely. If you have any official 
evidence to back your allegations up please feel free to furnish us with it and we 
will investigate to the best of our ability. 
6. Yesterday there was a request for the farm to supply maize meal to your 
representatives. We would like to advise that maize meal would only be sold 
from the farm stock to your representatives at $7.50 per kilo. 
7. In addition there was a request for firewood from your representatives. There are 
areas nearby where your representatives can collect their firewood. There is no 
need for any trees to [be] cut down for this purpose, as there is sufficient 
deadwood available. 
8. Any actions undertaken by yourselves and/or your representatives, which are 
illegal under Zimbabwean law (which as citizens of Zimbabwe we acknowledge), 
will be reported immediately to the Zimbabwean Republic Police who have 
assured us of their willingness to take action should the law be broken. 
                                                 
293 These letters between War Veterans and the commercial farmers are in the author’s 
personal archives. 
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9. A full report of your demands made to Mr. B has been submitted to the Nyabira 
Police station (R.R.B. No. 310710) and faxed to the C.F.U. 
10. We believe the latest directive from Minister John Nkomo (as of Friday 11 
August) has made it cleat to the Commissioner of Police, and the CFU that there 
will be no more invasions, threats or lawlessness. As your visitation and 
continued presence thereafter falls after the date of the directive (11/08/00) it is 
perfectly obvious to us that you are in violation of this directive. 
11. As concerned citizens of Zimbabwe we agree with the urgent need to redress the 
current land imbalance however we believe this should be conducted in an 
organised and transparent manner. We cannot condone the present wave of 
violence and intimidation being carried out under the banner of ‘land reform for 
the landless’, which is obviously your agenda. (The Commercial Farmers are 
being blamed for the inability of the present government to plan and carry an 
orderly land reform policy, which, as you are well aware, had the financial 
backing from most other countries in the world.) 
 
Response of the Association, dated 18 August 2000, signed all the executive 
members of the Association and copied to the two Ministers, Chairman of ZNLWVA 
and the Commissioner of Police: 
Your letter of the above dated 8/16/00 is acknowledged and herein refers: 
1. We have always had and believed in peaceful and non-confrontational approach 
to our quest for our motherland as can be witnessed by our consultations with 
your Colleagues in the several farms our members occupied since February, 2000. 
As an Association, we went further to request your (Commercial Farmers in 
Nyabira and Mazoe) representation into our Association and some of your 
Colleagues reflected that they welcomed the idea, though they never came back 
from the time we discussed on the issue. May be they discussed with us in bad 
faith, clumsily defending their material comfort at the expense of the toiling poor 
masses and those who died for the same land to gain economic empowerment as 
their own liberators. 
2. The mandate to take over Ball Farm comes from our historical background and 
the that twenty years after has passed when our Government had extended the 
hand of reconciliation, and request yourselves to consider land sharing equitably, 
but proved to have been resisted. We as freedom fighters and reserved forces o 
our motherland, have an obligation to put the record straight forthwith for the 
benefit of our land hungry Comrades in particular, and the landless masses at 
large. It is our birth right to demand to share one farm whilst you remain with 
one. 
3. Any formal documentation in connection with acquisition and compensation is 
done by the Zimbabwe Government, or in consultation wit the British 
Government, depending on what is to be compensated on the farm. Our mission 
is to fulfill the wishes of our fallen Heroes and the toiling masses of Zimbabwe 
which is to justifiably break through the blockages or hindreances deliberately 
created by nature of imperialism, hence our stay put on Ball. 
4. We forwarded to Government our interest in occupying Ball like any other farm 
we occupied and our remarks were that you have two farms; and we are to stay 
at Ball for ever as our home farm. Yours id Lil farm and the earl[ier] you shift 
from Ball the better. We are not going to let the farm idle, but to start land 
preparation since we are completing pegging within the course of his week. We 
are more concerned with land redistribution that the Government’s pace. Better 
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you start the uphill struggle of energising your opposition and white supporters 
to realise the reality of Zimbabwean politics. 
5. T is unkown to us and you should not associate us with any of what transpired 
between Mr B and himself. The moment I received your letter … I went to see Mr 
B to enquire about T. After talking to Mr B, I made it sure case that I got in touch 
with T and went with his to the Police. At the police it was clear that T and us 
(Coordinating Committee) are two different peoplewith vast gap to our approach 
regarding land occupation. This we refer to items 5 to 9. We therefore, as the sole 
representatives body to all Ex-combtants and the landless masses in the farms we 
ossupied, dissociate ourselves from Mr. T and all the actions he might be 
requested to respond to. This trend is not only unacceptable, but it is downright 
immoral for you to engage in that direction to parcel us with activities you very 
much know we did not do. 
6. We checked with your report to Nyabira police station and the contents in your 
RRB No 31071; and advised the Member-in-charge … our position to your claims. 
It is naïve for yourselves to lay charges to police against us and T combined when 
you very much know that we are the association that created a peaceful 
[atmosphere] and establish the political environment which you enjoy from 
February to now through communication initiated by us to yourselves. 
7. Do not twist the justifiable political demands for land by ourselves to suit 
directives from Government Ministers as if you are ignorant of our obvious 
claims and the climax to which our forecast and expectations are now at. We 
wish to let you know that we are aware of all your hide and seek games in effort 
to turn around our aims and objectives. Be very careful to explode the time bomb 
we had strenuously controlled in order to create an enabling environment to both 
of us. Once it explodes, there will be no more room for negotiations [and] for 
dialogue as the comrades attitude to your negative response is do or die situation 
and sacrificial. You should have told [Ian] Smith about lawlessness, invasions, 
threats or rule of law when he declared U.D.I. not us. The [amassing] of our 
wealth (natural heritage) whilst we die poor is no longer acceptable. 
8. [“]As concerned citizens of Zimbabwe who agree with the urgent need to redress 
the current land imbalance[”], you should have welcomed our soft and confident 
approach and conducted an organised and mutual understanding in response so 
that by now we could have been offered the farm from yourselves. Do not hide 
behind land reform program which you want to be implemented to other whites 
and not on you when you know very much that you can not own more than one 
farm whilst the majority have no land for a home twenty years after 
independence. Why do you want to reflect to Government that there is a wave of 
violence and intimidation carried out by us when you know very much our 
approach that has nothing to do with your charges but our motherland. Once 
again, we day be careful to explode the time bomb you are sitting on; instead you 
must be thankful to us for non-confrontational attitude. 
 
The CFU, we are aware, is there to defend the settler minority like yourselves 
against the African majority through white advocates who left England to join the 
illegal regime’s resistance to release our motherland to its rightful owners. They see 
nothing wrong with the brutal way our land was taken and start calling us all sorts 
of names. May we advise you that property law in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe was 
meant to make colonial theft as permanent so that it could survive any changes of 
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Government. We brought Zimbabwe, a majority Government can not allow this theft 
to go forever. 
Remember we are aware that minorities like yourselves who have done well 
economically from our natural resources, and exploitation will never vote to a 
Government that advocate for such a land reform exercise like the one currently in 
place. This struggle demanding fast-track started with your inner-selves when you 
resisted the sharing of our land for the past twenty years. 
 
21 August 2000, a meeting was held to “deliberate on Comrade T’s fate” and the 
following was resolved and or observed294: 
That Comrade T be incorporated into the Nyabira Mazowe Coordinating 
Committee. 
His terms of reference entails to coordinate the activities of the Association 
(Nyabira/Mazowe) and those carried out by his group and Comrade Tk. This 
will avoid duplication of interest when occupying farms by comrades … 
when the main objective is commonly to resettle the landless comrades. 
That Cde. T in fact worked hard to consolidate the aims and objectives o the 
acquisition o our motherland. The only disturbing development was 
communication breakdown mainly focused on the white farmers who wanted 
to divide us and let us clash to create disintegration amongst ourselves. 
Instead, the meeting resolved that there be more and constant communication 
between us inclusive of UNITY between us. 
That Cde T write his report to defend the charges laid against him by the Towns 
family and present it together with that of the Association to Police. 
That Government should realise that time for land preparation has come and we 
can not wait anymore when we are in Self contained farming model. Our 
initiation to pull resources together and pay for surveyors is clear testimony 
to Government that we are more than ready. 
Mrs Towns and Towns are actually Directors, but one family. They have been left 
with Lil farm because they are trying to cheat Government as if the farm 
belongs to two different people as [recorded] in title deeds yet it is for one 
Owner. This observance and subsequent development makes the Ex-
combatants more disappointed and wishing to start utilising Ball forthwith. 
Thanks [to] GOD their tactics have made us aware and united us further to 
fight for a just war [-] that of repossessing our motherland. 
 
 “To whom it may concern” Towns, as undersigned writes: 
This letter serves to absolve entirely the management and staff of Ball (pvt) ltd. from 
any responsibility for any damage caused by whatever means to the property of any 
invaders, including any crops or machinery that are on the farm. Given that the farm 
is not designated at this juncture the staff and management are continuing with 
normal farming activities and cannot be held accountable for any wildlife tramping, 
or acts of God. Your understanding in this matter is appreciated. 
 
                                                 
294 Extract of the meeting proceedings as copied in a letter addressed (to whom it may 
concern) and copied to the two Minister and Chairman of the War Veterans Association. 
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Appendix 4 
Land dispossession: forced abandonment of an agricultural a 
research centre in Mazowe District 
 
Introduction 
This document was prompted by sudden land dispossession that was effected by the 
District Lands Committee of Mazowe of a farm that I and colleagues bought, 
occupied and established a research centre to support the agrarian revolution. We 
started negotiating with a Mr Hawskley to buy Subdivision A of the Rivers of Wengi 
River Estate sometime in 2001 after two of his four farms were designated and 
distributed among the landless. We sought the consent and support of Mazowe 
Rural District Council, District Lands Committee, Provincial Lands Committee and 
several Ministries to carry out activities of research to advance African agronomic 
techniques and biotechnologies. These Ministries include Ministry of Lands and 
Agriculture, President’s Office, Policy Implementation and Coordination. We then 
commissioned a number of research projects involving the University of Zimbabwe, 
Mazowe Institute of Veterinary Medicine our organisation African Nationalistic 
Paradigm (ANP). 
 
However, while we were in the middle of these researches without any warning, 
sometime in August 2006, we started to see people coming to claim the land arguing 
that they had been offered it by the Minister of Lands through the appropriate 
channels. This had started as a rumour which the Chairman of the District Lands 
Committee refused to confirm until the farm had been subdivided and people had 
already been allocated plots. Only one of us was offered a plot then. I was not offered 
any piece of the farm myself. We tried to seek audience with the District Lands 
Committee to present our case but in vain. 
 
When we bought the farm it included a herd of 270 cattle and I had an additional 
individual herd of 54 cattle. It had all infrastructure for cattle ranching. At its peak 
the farm had more than 500 cattle. However with the change of status we were 
forced to sell all the cattle that we had. We tried to advertise so that we could sell the 
cattle to breeders in order at least advance our original objectives but in many cases 
those who had ready cash were abattoirs and we had no choice than to sell breeding 
stock for slaughter. 
 
In the four years we had managed to transform the herd into mainly Tuli, an 
indigenous breed and we were now starting various projects to study the breed to 
improve it for purposes of restocking the depleted national herd as a contribution to 
the agrarian revolution. With my colleagues we had also managed to invent 
agricultural machinery which is appropriate for use by newly resettled farmers. We 
patented two agricultural implements. These programs had managed to attract 
serious students and researchers who had committed themselves but they 
immediately left the country when the projects suddenly stopped. 
 
The objective of this document is not to resist the demarcation of The Rivers A and 
its allocation to other needy farmers. Rather it invites us to reflect on our vision of the 
agrarian reform. It questions the decisions that we as a country, as people in position 
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of authority and as a party, (ZANU-PF) which is spearheading the agrarian 
revolution, are making. It is an earnest appeal for inward evaluation and self 
criticism without which we cannot expect the development of our country. 
 
As my personal details will show, I feel that the responsibility of raising such 
debate and criticism lies on people like me. Being a veteran of both the Second and 
the Third Chimurenga, I think the challenge we have now is to ensure the success of 
our agrarian transformation by addressing the more difficult issues beyond land 
allocation. With my history, academic standing and professional experience I feel I 
meet all requirements to raise these questions and criticism. Despite the land 
dispossession, I will continue to participate in shaping the agrarian transformation 
both in theory and practice. 
 
Personal history 
My name is Wilbert Zvakanyorwa Sadomba. In 1975, when doing Form Two, I left 
for Mozambique, to join the liberation struggle. I lived as an untrained recruit at 
Zhunda (where President Mugabe, Cde Edgar Tekere and Vice President Mujuru 
were) and Nyadzonya. I was trained at Chimoio, Mapinduzi Military Base with the 
first group under the command of Cde Tonderai Nyika (Brigadier Zimondi). 
 
I became a political instructor after graduating with the first group at Wampoa 
Political Academy (Chitepo College). … At Wampoa one of the most influential 
literature that I read was an agricultural picture book entitled Learning from Tachai 
which illustrated developments in Chinese agriculture and grassroots efforts of food 
self sufficiency. This enkindled an interest in me to study agriculture and rural 
development which I pursued after independence… I taught politics at Chimoio and 
Chibabava, Toronga Camp up to the end of 1977 after which I went to Beira and then 
into the front. 
 
I was deployed in Manica Province, Musikavanhu Sector, Mutambara 
Detachment during which time I operated with the current Army General, Cde. 
Constantine Chiwenga (Dominic Chinenge). I was wounded in a battle at 
Gwindingwi Estate and went back to Mozambique for treatment. When my wound 
healed I went to the north-eastern front, Tete Province and I operated in Mazowe 
Detachment, Chaminuka Sector. Mazowe Detachment covered Chinamora, 
Domboshawa, Masembura, part of Musana and Goromonzi, Mazowe Citrus, 
Concession, Mazowe farms, Nyabira, Mount Hampden and the city of Harare itself. I 
was engaged in many battles and I interacted with communities in both communal 
lands and commercial farms. 
 
Owing to the advanced position of Mazowe Detachment one could hardly avoid 
traversing the whole sector going up and down to the rear detachments of Chesa and 
Nyahui (Rushinga). With this exposure, guerrilla war experience and profound 
political training I was in a good position to develop theories and formulate war 
strategies. In 1978 I wrote a war strategy for Chaminuka Sector which was later 
converted into a Provincial strategy for Tete Province in 1978. The writing of the 
strategy was commissioned, then Provincial Political Commissar for Tete Province. 
This was in the presence of Cde MH and the strategy was submitted through the 
channels … I went to Mozambique to train a special group to execute the strategy 
and ceasefire was announced when the first group had entered Tete Province to 
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implement it. Unique to this strategy was that it included agricultural development 
that was aimed to provide food to sustain the war. It outlined how farms would be 
established in the liberated zones with participation of military youth, combatants 
and adults. These were trained in agricultural production and protecting farms in the 
liberated zones. Equipment, and inputs were moved by a special unit from the white 
commercial farmers to the liberated zones of Rushinga and Pfungwe along the 
Mazowe River. 
 
I went to Echo Assembly Point (Elim Mission) where I was responsible for 
political education – interpreting the Lancaster House Agreement to combatants and 
civilians. After independence I was assigned to Mazowe (Chiweshe Communal 
Land) to carry out political work and party building in 1980. I participated in the 
construction of party structures from branch to district levels. During this time I 
commissioned my own research project on the social and economic impact of keeps in 
Chiweshe. 
 
At independence I was trained as a Local Government Promotion Officer and 
deployed at Gokwe District office. During my two years in Gokwe, four of my 
projects became national policy and evolved into several statutes and regulations. 
These projects include: conception and formation of lower tier structures of the 
District Council i.e. Village and Ward Development Committees (VIDCOs and 
WADCOs); formation and outlining the functions of the District Resettlement and 
Development Committee of the council; formation of the District Development 
Coordination structure that outlined division of functions between the technocrats 
and policy makers (councillors) and I developed the first District Development plan 
that culminated in a documentary film (Gokwe People Speak) produced by Ministry of 
Information. These projects resulted in the Prime Minister’s Directive of 1984 and 
promulgation of several subordinate pieces of legislation. 
 
I left the district to head the Mashonaland Central Provincial Promotions and 
Training Section with more than twenty four junior staff in the districts. During that 
period I led the amalgamation of former Rural councils which were mainly 
composed of white commercial farmers and the District Councils which were for 
Africans in the Communal Lands. After that I joined the Training and Promotion 
Unit of the Ministry in 1977 where I led teams of Ministry personnel and consultants 
from Swedish Association of Local Authorities (SALA) seconded by SIDA and co-
authored the Administrative Handbook for Rural District Councils and I co-authored 
Towards Council Decisions: Minute Handbook for Rural District Councils. 
 
I left Government employment in 1989 to join the Water and Sanitation Sector. As 
Community Participation Coordinator and was responsible for spearheading 
community participation, supervising a team of consultants located in the districts 
and provinces. I wrote a manual for grassroots practitioners in the sector which was 
accepted for publication by Intermediate Development Technology Group (ITDG-
UK) in 1992. 
 
I joined United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in 1992 to research and 
develop a policy for community based management of water and sanitation and my 
project was rated among the best of UNICEF community based initiatives in this 
sector worldwide. It was wholly adopted by the Zimbabwean Government and 
remains the operating policy to date. I also developed new methods and approaches 
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in community participation and education gaining international recognition in the 
field through publications with, for example, International Institute for Environment 
and Development (UK) and Medicus Mundi (Switzerland). 
 
I left UNICEF and briefly worked as a freelance Rural Development Consultant 
during which time I met Professor Niels Roling from Wageningen Agricultural 
University who sported me through published works and facilitated my mature 
entry enrolment for a Masters Degree in Management of Agricultural Knowledge 
Systems which completed in 1999 with a distinction. My research topic was The 
Impact of Settler Colonisation on Indigenous Knowledge in Agriculture: Fusion, Confusion 
or Negation? The research gave me an insight of how agriculture was used as a 
cultural weapon to dominate the Africans. Sustainable (African) agronomic 
techniques and bio-technologies were systematically negated by western scientific 
agriculture as a process of colonisation. 
 
I fully funded myself for the MSc from personal servings and this cost me over US 
$35,000. In 2001 I was awarded a scholarship to do a sandwich PhD program which 
was partly funded to cover expenses in the Netherlands and tuition. . I also wholly 
funded the rest of the study including data collection and write up. My topic was 
War Veterans in the Land Occupations of Zimbabwe: Complexities of a liberation movement 
in Africa’s postcolonial settlerism. The research was motivated by the desire to ground 
the agrarian revolution in the momentum of the liberation movement by giving a 
voice to the war veterans who were vanguard to both revolutionary processes and it 
questions the postcolonial future of African liberation facing the complexities of neo-
colonialism. My defense is due in 2007. During this time I also wrote and published 
book chapters, journal articles and presented seminar papers both here and abroad. 
 
… When land occupations erupted in 2000, I immediately went to Mazowe 
District to participate. I chose Mazowe not because of its agricultural potentials first 
and foremost. I come from Honde Valley in the Eastern Highlands. Were it for the 
agricultural potential I would have gone to my home area and occupied Nyanga 
Highlands which fall under agro-ecological Region I whose potential is best in the 
country. I chose Mazowe as an area which encapsulates my historical experience and 
nobility of cause. I fought battles in places like Jumbo Mine, in mountains below 
Mazowe Dam, at Dengu village where Felix Chitepo died in my arms. I identify with 
the struggle of the people of Mazowe and surrounding areas to gain land and end 
poverty. Mazowe is vast therapeutic landscape to me. 
 
I mobilised people in my neighbourhood and facilitated transport to go and 
occupy land, joining the only war veteran who was in Matepatepa area with people 
from Chiweshe. I later moved across Mazowe District getting as far as Nyabira. I 
took part in occupations in Mvuma although I had no intention of settling there. 
With other war veterans I finally occupied Umvuradona Farm in Concession owned 
by Mr Geoffrey Hawksley in early 2000. When the farmer decided to quit farming I 
proposed to buy the last of his four farms (Subdivision A of the Rivers) for the 
organisation that I had formed with others – ANP – whose objective was to advance 
African thought, technologies and practices. The farm provided ideal space and some 
facilities for research. 
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My agrarian reform vision 
My ideological orientation, professional experiences and academic career have given 
me a basis for developing a land vision which became clearer as I took part in 
occupations. I argue that agrarian reform of this country can hardly address the key 
transformative issues if there is superficial understanding of the legacy of colonial 
history of agriculture. The decades 1920-1950 are critical in that therein lay the 
demise of African agriculture which had dominated since the coming of Europeans 
in the 15th Century. Other determining factors for the vision of agrarian reform are 
the micro and macro-economic environment. External markets, supply of machinery, 
chemicals, balance of payment support systems are vital aspects to the agrarian 
reform. With the sudden expansion of demand of machinery and inputs, dislocation 
of agricultural institutions like farmers’ associations and boards, as well as 
breakdown of financial support services (insurance and banks), the nature of 
agrarian changes need to be profound and holistic. 
 
There are other factors that need to be taken into consideration. In our people is a 
huge manpower resource with varied knowledge systems, skills and experiences. 
There is still wide knowledge of indigenous agronomic practices and biotechnology 
despite erosion through laws, extension packages, colonial land dispossession and 
forced relocations. Programs that changed food tastes, crop and animal varieties, bio-
diversity and production patterns resulted into mono-culture agriculture that is 
heavily dependant on external inputs with negative environmental impact. It is 
imperative for our agricultural policy to address these problems. 
 
As land redistribution benefited the Black majority it caused a backlash from both 
internal settlers and metropolitan Governments thereby affecting the pillars of 
agriculture that had been built by colonial systems. Institutions of agriculture that 
had been developed to this point cannot serve current agrarian transformation 
because the socio-economic and political environment during which they were 
nurtured is now different. New and innovative systems, techniques, institutions and 
extension approaches need to be developed to support this new dispensation. This 
calls for relentless efforts in research. 
 
I therefore saw the need for research into areas that can free our people from 
depending on foreign technologies and inputs for success in agricultural production. 
With benefit of understanding both indigenous and western scientific production 
systems borrowing from both to advance the agrarian reform became the most 
logical approach. Plant and animal breeding by our ancestors resulted into crops and 
livestock that have stood the test of time. They are suited to the agro-ecological 
environments of our region and they provided rich nutritional diet for the household 
especially during the long cyclical droughts. However, colonial education and 
research did not have interest to study African agriculture let alone to advance it. 
Only in the past one and a half decades have scholars started to confirm that African 
agricultural techniques were appropriate for environmental sustainability and 
provision of healthy food than the pursued European scientific approaches. 
 
My vision is therefore based on making African agronomic techniques, 
biotechnology and institutions the foundation of Zimbabwe’s agrarian 
transformation. Instead of relying on outside countries for our agriculture we need to 
be more introverted and look at our potentials, our resources and our manpower. We 
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must focus our energies on addressing issues of food security for our people as a 
matter of urgent priority. Zimbabwe should come first in our approaches and 
strategies. We need to address the food needs of our children, our HIV/AIDS 
patients, our old and our pregnant or lactating women before we think of providing 
a cigarette for the smoking pleasure of someone in distance lands. The opportunity 
cost of focusing on international trade is sustainable, adequate, healthy food is a 
basic a prerequisite for primary health care. This will induce unimaginable import 
substitution through reduced or elimination of food imports, drugs and chemicals 
due to improved nutrition. Food processing and marketing of value added 
Zimbabwean food products will curve a niche in the international food industry 
which will eventually improve our foreign currency position, employment and will 
develop agricultural based industry. 
 
When I participated in the land reform my vision was to practically build a model 
to demonstrate this direction of thought. I decided to develop a research institute and 
formed an NGO – African Nationalist Paradigm (ANP). Through this organisation 
with one of the members we bought “Subdivision A of the Rivers” farm inclusive of 
vast infrastructure for ranching, irrigation equipment for 30 hectares and a herd of 
270 cattle. We funded it solely from our savings. The CIO Bindura investigated into 
the organisation and I believe they arrived at this truth. 
 
My idea was to immediately start research programs in order to facilitate the 
agrarian reform by focusing on appropriate technology development to enhance 
productivity of newly resettled farmers. I wrote a concept paper and identified key 
contact persons at University of Zimbabwe (Animal Science/ Vet Departments), 
Mazowe Institute of Veterinary Science and Handerson Research Station. 
 
The first project was to replace the exotic herd with Tuli cross breeds breed with 
the intention of replenishing the depleted national herd. Tuli is a product of our 
African bio-technology. The breed is adapted to local conditions but also compete 
highly for commercial purposes internationally. (A few years ago an Australian, 
through intellectual piracy stole Tuli genetic material and patented it and now 
Australia earns millions of US $ from indigenous knowledge of our people). At the 
point when our project had started to flourish, the farm was subdivided and 
allocated to other people. The Tuli herd presently at the farm bares testimony of this 
and I invite anyone interested to visit the farm to see for him/herself. In addition to 
the study of the Tuli, the Veterinary Institute of Mazowe identified a breed in 
Chiweshe with features of a wild beast which we had started to study by first 
collecting social data of the animal with intentions to commission MSc. and PhD. 
studies on it. 
 
I influenced some scholars to take research in this direction. For example, my wife 
who had started on a medical degree dropped it to study Food Science and 
Technology and has just completed a Masters in Food Quality Management with 
Wageningen University. My daughter is also studying for a BSc. in food science and 
nutrition at the Midlands State University from my encouragement. Professor C’s 
(now with Fort Hare in SA) interest in studying local breeds was as a result of many 
discussions and his involvement with our research projects. We had started 
designing researches on indigenous food like different mutakura mixtures in order to 
develop precooked and canned mutakura for specific nutritional requirements for 
people like lactating mothers, AIDS patients, diabetic patients and so on. 
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In addition I commissioned researched in agricultural implements that advance 
African agronomic techniques. With a colleague I invented and patented two 
machines for furrowing and ridging appropriate for small, medium and large scale 
farmers and drawn by drought or mechanised power. We had just begun 
negotiations with a private company in Bindura for the production of these 
implements. A third invention in progress is a plough that can be used on land that is 
not stumped. 
 
My agrarian reform vision is to develop an agricultural system that makes 
Zimbabwe self sufficient and removes dependency on other countries by making 
maximum use of our material and human resources particularly indigenous 
knowledge systems. It is an agricultural system that should consider the broadening 
of the participants and aim at their empowerment. One way of doing so is to explore 
production techniques that encourage local systems than external ones. 
 
Subdivision of the research centre 
My vision was shuttered when in the last half of 2006 when I suddenly saw people 
coming to the farm holding offer letters and claiming that they had been resettled at 
the farm. It was shocking because the authorities had neither communicated about 
the subdivision nor warned us to prepare moving. We tried to seek audience with 
the District Lands Committee but we did not get sympathetic hearing. As we speak 
the land was divided into 7 plots and earmarked for cropping despite the huge 
infrastructure for beef farming, including boreholes, fenced paddocks, improved 
pastures, dip tank, handling facilities, weighing and loading infrastructure. I was not 
offered any land there so I had to rely on an A1 scheme nearby. However the future 
is also uncertain even there. I have not been given any offer letter and the boundary 
is in dispute. 
 
The major problem is where to put the remaining herd of cattle that I have. I 
started downsizing operations since last year. This year alone I have sold over 100 
cattle most of which have been breeding stock. It has been painful to sell breeding 
stock for slaughter because of the desperate situation. The last time (24 December 
2006) I tried to sell the cattle for slaughter the potential buyer was so touched that he 
refused to buy them for slaughter urging me to present my case to the authorities so 
that I save the herd. This prompted me to write this document. 
 
Numerous and intriguing questions come into mind after such experiences in our 
land reform. What really are we trying to achieve with our agrarian reform and how 
do we intend to achieve what we want? Do people in position of authority at all 
levels understand the nature of agrarian transformation that we are engaged in as a 
nation and do they understand the consequences of some of their actions? 
 
We cannot afford at this juncture when we are under economic siege that is 
causing untold suffering to our people, to waste time and resources, cripple 
production that has already taken off the ground and is running or generally retard 
progress. … If corrupt tendencies result in derailing this noble cause it is difficult to 
see how our nation will come out of its predicament and this is worrisome. I hope 
this document will at least arouse debate but also constructive criticism which is a 
prerequisite for the success of our agrarian reform and national development. If a 
person like me fails to meet the requirements for resettlement I wonder who will. 
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How many more are getting dispossessed of land that they fought for and took away 
from colonialists but without recourse? How many, particularly war veterans? 
 
I write this not because of desperation and the bitterness for loss. During the 
course of time I have managed to develop myself into an international professional 
and I can work anywhere in the world at any level but the question is why should I 
be forced to leave my country in search of livelihood? Why should I be denied the 
opportunity to serve my own people and contribute to the development of my own 
people whom I sacrificed so much for? Why? 
 
 
Signed: 
 
Distribution: 
 District Lands Committee (Mazowe District) 
 Mazowe Rural District Council 
 Provincial Lands Committee  
 Provincial Governor 
Provincial Administrator 
Chief Lands Officer (Mash. Central) 
Principal - Mazowe Institute of Veterinary Science 
Minister of policy Implementation and Coordination 
Anti Corruption Commission 
Minister of Agriculture 
Minister of Lands 
Reserve Bank Manager – Dr Gideon Gono 
CIO Bindura 
Director CIO 
Minister Local Government 
General Paradzai Zimondi (Cde. Tonderai Nyika) 
General Constantine Chiwenga (Cde. Dominic Chinenge) 
ZANU-PF Provincial Chairman for Mash. Central 
Honourable Vice President (Comrade Joyce Mujuru) 
Honourable Vice President (Comrade Joseph Msika) 
His Excellency President Robert Mugabe 
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Appendix 5 
Aspects of planning and implementation at Jambanja Farm Plan 
 
Available resources to implement the plan 
This plan is developed with the full realisation of the economic challenges that the 
country is facing and there is no hope that the situation will change in the near 
future. The plan is designed to be completely self-reliant. This means that the basic 
assumption is that there is no external financing that will be available to support the 
plan. As a result all the projects will be based on the fact that they will be financed 
from the household income. However should there be unconditional donations and 
loans the household will take advantage of it and use that efficiently. This however 
will just accelerate the speed but not determine the outcome of the plan. As this is a 
lifelong project and at that, an intergenerational program, resources that are readily 
available will only cater for the initial stages of the plan. A lot more resources are 
required in the long term and in the distant future. (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Cattle 
There are cattle that I have acquired since the year 2002. The general plan is to allow 
the herd to increase to an optimum of 100 herd and then begin culling to finance the 
agricultural plan. If pastures continue to be available on the ANP Farm this figure 
can easily be realised. But if ANP ceases to provide grazing rights then the number of 
100 will be too big to be maintained. In this case the mountain part of the farm will 
have to be fenced off and paddocked to provide for pasture. There are so far 40 cattle, 
six of which are steers and a Tuli bull. The livestock policy is to sell the steers, dry 
cows after the expiry of the mating season, aged cows and (some) trouble animals. 
These will be sold to sustain activities of the farm and to introduce projects wherever 
possible. (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Irrigation equipment 
There is irrigation equipment which has been acquired over the years. I have an 80 
horse-power Ford Major diesel engine fitted with an Ajax water pump. This 
equipment is capable of driving 60 sprinklers on average. The main line aluminum 
piping covers a length of 1,107 m. There are also other accessories including the 
sprinklers to complete a full set for irrigation. (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Inventions 
Another (item of) property which is available for potential use are the two inventions 
of the Furrow plough and the Ridging plough. These will be produced commercially, 
to generate income to support agricultural activities at Jambanja. Besides being 
produced for the market they will also provide cheap affordable equipment for use 
on the farm to advance African agronomic techniques. (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Requirements 
For the farm to operate securely and sustainably there are a number of measures that 
have to be taken. These include employment of skilled manpower, comprehensive 
security, fencing, and construction. (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Manpower recruitment 
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Recruitment of manpower to undertake relevant farming duties is important. A 
manager with knowledge in horticulture and other and growing of small grains is 
required. This manager will be responsible for planning and implementation of plans 
from season to season. She shall have at least six supporting members who will be 
unskilled labourers but with experience. All the six must have exposure of handling 
irrigation equipment. This will have to be done in phase 1. (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Development of draught power 
There are eight steers reserved for providing draught power. These steers need to be 
broken-in and trained as draught power. Relevant implements will have to be 
acquired like ploughs if the furrow or ridger are not yet available. This will have to 
be done in phase 1. (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Fencing 
Boundary fencing that will cover a total perimeter of about 5.5 km is required to 
fence the perimeter of Jambanja Farm. The western boundary is 2,555 km. About 
two-thirds of this is fenced but the wire needs rehabilitation. The eastern side is 
about 1.5 km. Being a new boundary, this length is not fenced. The distance from the 
apex to the eastern boundary is 675 km and is already fenced. 
 
The farm will further be divided into three areas according to the land use patterns 
as outlined above. The mountain will be fenced off and developed into pasture, 
wildlife and natural forest area. This requires a length of about 0.6 km. The 
potentially arable land will form the second block. The third block will cover the area 
south of the road, with its fence along the road. This fence is already there. The 
second block demarcates the vlei from the fields north of the road. This fence just 
needs rehabilitation. The last fencing is along the river on the other side of 
Garamapudzi. This fencing is about 1,575 km. A total length of about 4 km is 
therefore immediately needed to fence the perimeter and the blocks of Jambanja 
Farm. Phase 1 of the plan will concentrate with fencing of the eastern boundary. This 
might even mean removing wire from elsewhere for this purpose. Money from 
cropping will be targeted for fencing the eastern boundary. (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Water Harvesting points 
There is great potential for harvesting seasonal run-off from the mountains to 
augment irrigation. Suitable points will be surveyed for weirs and small dams to be 
constructed across the depressions and dongas. Pipes will deliver the water down to 
selected points including the central dam. Some of the dammed water will be 
allowed feed the bananas along the depressions. Harvesting technology will be 
developed so that there is perennial water to the orchards. (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Strategy and phases of Jambanja development 
In the Jambanja plan the first phase covers a period of 10 years ending 2010. This is 
the transitional period during which the established European system of agriculture 
is to be phased out. This will also be a period of intense capital investment. 
Furthermore, it is the period of staff development aimed at instilling the production 
ideology and ethics of the farm into workers. Phase two covers five years from 2010 
to 2015 and focuses on expansion of production, firm establishment of national and 
regional markets and agro-industrial development for value addition of farm 
products. Processing, branding and packing of Zimbabwean foods to compete on the 
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regional and international markets will be the main thrust of this phase. This will 
cover the period between 2015 and 2025. During this period fruit harvesting is 
expected to commence. The third phase focuses on horizontal integration by 
expanding production of invented agro-technological implements and marketing 
them nationally, regionally and internationally. 
 
Phase one and activities for 2006 
The plan for 2006 is determined mainly by the fact that Rivers A is being subdivided 
and allocated to other farmers. The following activities are imperative to shift from 
the ANP Farm: 
• Build living quarters for servants and family temporary accommodation 
• Construct sheds and storeroom 
• Buy supplementary feed 
• Move all equipment, bricks, poles etc. 
• Fence off paddocks 
• Plant stock feed 
• Prepare winter plough 
• Construct dip-tank (Jambanja Plan 2005) 
 
Phase One Achievements of Jambanja Farm 
To date this plan has been accomplished only in part. Five thousand metres of 
barbed wire was bought for demarcations as outlined in the plan. The herd of cattle 
was sold and converted into a piggery project. So far 30 sow units have been 
constructed. Stock feed for the piggery project is being cropped this 2007-8 season. 
Soya beans and maize was planted for this purpose. In addition, the two spans of 
oxen that were trained became the main source of draught power. However, contrary 
to the main objective of the plan, the plough remained the technology that formed 
the basis of production instead of the improved ridger and furrower ploughs as 
originally intended. This is because plans to have produce the ridger and the farrow 
plough were behind time owing to financial constrains. There was no equipment and 
materials to produce prototypes and test them for necessary modifications.295 This 
account of Jambanja (a project in which I participated) is offered not as a success 
story, but as an illustration of the extent to which an alternative vision for 
Zimbabwean agriculture can be developed under the conditions of land occupation 
as described elsewhere in this thesis. It can serve as a rather concrete case around 
which debate can be engaged about the technological and economic feasibility of the 
kinds of alternatives envisaged by activists inspired by the ANP vision. 
                                                 
295 The inventors approached Harare Polytechnique (a Government institution), the 
department of Agricultural Engineering (Hatcliff), Ministry of Science and Technology and 
Agricultural Rural Development (ARDA) for assistance to produce the inventions but all 
them refused. The department of Agricultural Engineering actually said that they preferred 
machines invented and produced in other countries because these are already tested and only 
need modifications. However there are plans to work with private companies which have 
been approached in Bindura and Concession but resources still inhibit (Personal 
participation).  
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Appendix 6 
On sources 
 
Newspapers and periodicals 
Daily News, 28 July 1999 
 
Daily News, 12 August 1999 
 
Daily News, 12 January 2000 
 
Daily News 15 December 2000 
 
Eastern Star 5 March 1999 
 
MOTSRUD undated flier outlining mission statement, objectives, target group and 
formation 
 
NADA, 1960, A Remarkable Career, NADA 37: 38-39, adapted from The Rhodesia 
Herald, 8 May 1959 
 
The Chronicle, 22 August 1997 
 
The Financial Gazette, 25 February 1999 
 
The Herald, 10 August 1988 
 
The Herald, 15 October 1988, Police step in to stop demo at Gutu’ 
 
The Herald, 31 October 1988 
 
The Herald, 8 January 1989 
 
The Herald, 13 December 1990, Sheer determination: dollars roll despite disability’ 
 
The Herald, 30 September 1991 
 
The Herald, 1992, Ex-Fighters call for Dismissal of Cabinet Ministers 
  
The Herald, 25 April 1992 
 
The Herald, 11 May 1995 Bringing them home from war, A P Reeler (Amani Trust) 
 
The Herald, 1 July 1995 
 
The Herald, 1998, 60 Odzi villagers 'resettle' themselves, Harare: The Herald: 1 
 
The Herald, 1998, Hunzvi against delisting of Farms, Harare: The Herald: 20 
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The Herald, 1998, Order to vacate Farm defied 
 
The Herald, 1998, Villagers repudiate Agreement to leave, Harare: The Herald: 24  
 
The Herald, 23 June 1998 
 
The Herald, 16 November 1998 
 
The Herald, 20 November 1998 Goromonzi villagers demonstrate outside 
Ngungunyana Building 
 
The Herald, 16 February 1999 
 
The Herald, 19 February 1999 
 
The Herald, 14 March 1999 
 
The Herald, 9 July 1999 
 
The Herald, 15 July 1999 
 
The Herald, 12 January 2000 
 
The Saturday Herald, Zvayi, C., 2005, Seize land without compensation: Gwisai, Harare: 7 
 
The Standard, 22 August 1999 
 
The Standard, 15-19 March 2000 
 
Ziana, 30 September 1991 
 
Ziana, 13 July 1999 
 
Ziana, 11 August 1999 
 
Zimbabwe Independent, Chirombowe, C., 2005, Only Hunzvi understood Bob's psyche, 
Harare 
 
 
High Court Cases 
District Administrator (Mazowe), 2000, Minutes of the Mazowe District Resettlement 
Meeting held at District Administrator's Offices on Tuesday 17th October 2000 at 
09:00 Hours. Resettlement meeting held at DA's Offices, DA's Offices Concession 
 
High Court of Zimbabwe, 1998, JG Forsyth Trust (Pvt) Ltd vs The War Veterans 
Association, Commissioner of Police and Retired Col. Khumalo-Muzhambe, High 
Court, Case No. HC 14192/98: Urgent Chamber Application 
 
High Court of Zimbabwe, 1998, OP Connor vs David Mutingwende, Colonel 
Khumalo (also known as Muzhambe) Officer Commanding ZRP, Mashonaland East 
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Province, Snr. Ass. Comm. Gaka, High Court of Zimbabwe Case No. HC14210 
Urgent Chamber Application 
 
Jambanja Farm Plan: Twenty-five Year Development Plan for Jambanja Farm 2000-
2005 (as revised by ANP Members in 2005) 
 
Minutes of Nyabira Mazowe Association held on 10 July 2000, the minutes 
 
Minutes of the Coordinating Committee held at ZANU-PF) Provincial offices on 4 
September 2000 
 
Provincial Stake Holder dialogues, 2004 
 
War Veterans’ Association (Mashonaland West Province), 2004, Corruption 
document, Mashonaland West Stake-holder Provincial Dialogue, Chinhoyi Institute 
of Technology  
 
 
Letters 
Chief Native Commissioner (Taylor) to Secretary to the Premier - Native Affairs 
Letter dated 18 November (year not decipherable), NAZ, S138/206 Report on training 
of Native Demonstrators at Tjolotjolo 
 
Email forwarded by Kouloumbaritis, S., 2000, The immediate Future of Zimbabwe, the 
Email was intercepted by war veterans circulating among White community and 
MDC members 
 
Email by Newmarch, M., 14 January 2000, Voter registration – urgent, Harare: Email 
circulated to the White community 
 
Email dated 14 January 2000 from Mr. N to commercial farmers and others 
 
Email from H, 11 February 2000 
 
Fax from Lombard to Husluck, 3 November 1998 
 
Letter from Director of Native Development to the Chief Native Commissioner, letter 
dated 25/06/24 (NAZ S138/206) 
 
Letter from Lombard to Hasluck, 5 November 1998 
 
Letter from Lombard to Hasluck, 6 November 1998; Forsyth High Court of 
Zimbabwe, 14192/98 
 
Letter from Lombard to Hasluck, 2000 
 
Letter from Lombard to Hasluck, undated 
 
Letter, addressed to ZNLWVA and ZANU-PF, 12 April 2000 
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Nyabira Mazowe War Veterans’ letter, 18 August 2000 
 
Sadomba, W.Z., 1992, Request for an appointment to meet President Mugabe; letter 
to Mugabe dated 12 May 1992, Harare 
 
Townsend’s letter to Nyabira Mazowe Association, 16 August 2000 
 
ZNLWVA, Zvimba District, (2000). Letter, ‘Complaint on non-equitable distribution 
of funds.’ to Hunzvi (Chairman ZNLWVA), P. and ZANU-PF Central Committee 
members 
 
 
Interviews referred to in this thesis 
A, October 2005, former farm worker irrigation foreman, interview at Ramahori farm 
 
BP, July 2000, War Veteran involved in Baeatrice occupations and later moved to 
Mazowe interviewed at his residential home in Harare 
 
BT, April 2004, a White commercial farmer interviewed at Lowdale Farm offices 
 
Bungu Spirit Medium, 2002, interview at Muguti Farm 
 
C, June 2000, leader of Matepatepa occupations interviewed at Benridge Farm 
 
Davison, 2000, a farm worker and foreman in Concession 
 
D, 2000-2004, Committee member of Nyabira Mazowe Association (I held 
longitudinal interviews) interviewed in Harare and Nyabira 
 
DD, December 2000, leader of War Veterans who participated in the 1998 Goromonzi 
occupations interviewed in Nyabira 
 
Dd, December 2000, War Veteran and member of ZNLWVA provincial executive 
interviewed at Concession house 
 
DM, August 2000-2007, interviews were held at different venues annually including 
his offices in Harare, residence, Nyabira and Mazowe 
 
DMT, November 2000, interview at Mvuradonha (Jambanja) Farm 
 
DT, August 2000, participant of group reinforced by Muzarabani War Veterans, 
interview at Ramahori Farm 
 
E, August 2003, former farm worker trained in seed production, interview Mvurwi 
compound 
 
F, January 2001, interview at Concession business centre 
 
Ff, April 2002, interview at Harare, author’s residence 
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G, November 2003, farm worker, irrigation specialist, interview at Nyabira business 
centre 
 
GG, 2000-2006, interview at different venues including African Institute of Agrarian 
Studies 
 
HK, 2007, former Provincial Commander of Tete Province, interview at Greencroft, 
Harare 
 
K, September 2000, a youth from Dandamera, interview Dandamera 
 
KK, November, 2000 interview at Glendale rural service centre 
 
M, September, 2000, woman occupier from Mvurwi, interview at Riverside Business 
centre 
 
Mk, October 2000, interview with woman, War Veteran leader at her residence in 
Concession 
  
Muchaneta, November 2005, female War Veteran and graduate of Wampoa Political 
Academy, interview at Nyabira Mazowe Association Offices  
 
Mwale, 2005-2006 farm worker in Concession, interview at Mazowe 
 
Mz, May 2003, interview at Mvurwi Centre 
 
Nehanda II Spirit medium, 2002, interview at Shavarunzwi residence, Ingleborough 
 
O, 2006, a woman War Veteran leader of occupations, interview at her farm near 
Hatcliff 
 
P, October 2000, interview at author’s residence, Harare 
 
Pf, October 2000, interview at Ramahori and Mvuradonha farms 
 
Q, September 2000, interview at Mvurwi business centre 
 
RN, April 2003, farm manager with diploma in agriculture attained by 
correspondence while working at the farm, interview at Lowdale shops 
 
RM, 2003, a woman leader of Zumba group, former cross border trader, interview at 
her new homestead, Ingleborough Farm 
 
Sabao, 2002, farm worker, former security guard and irrigation worker, interview at 
his new residence Concession 
 
Ss, October 2001, interview at Mazowe  
 
Tt, October 2000, interview at Concession, District Administrator’s office premises 
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Zep (Mr and Mrs), March 2006, War Veterans who participated in 1998 occupations, 
interview at their Hatfield residence, Harare 
 
Zumba spirit medium, 2003, interview at Lowdale shops 
 
 
Focus group discussions (FGD) referred to in this thesis 
Chief Hwata; Bungu and other spirit mediums, 2002, held at the new residence of 
Chief Hwata 
 
FGD with mixed group of farm workers, occupiers and A2 beneficiaries, 2005, at 
Lilifordia 
 
Goredema clan, 2004, held at Shavarunzwi hill 
 
Hwata FGDs, 2002, 2003, held at Lowdale Farm 
 
Mixed FGD of farm workers and peasants beneficiaries of A1 plots, Witchens Farm  
 
Retrospective community mapping with former peasants from Kutama Communal 
Lands at Machirori Farm, 2004 
 
Zumba group FGD, 2002, interview at Lowdale Farm house 
 
 
Films and reports analysed deposited in the National Archives of 
Zimbabwe (NAZ) 
Central African Filming Unit, 1957, NAZ RNN 58 1959 RNN 28 
 
Central African Filming Unit, A Stake in the Land, a film, NAZ Audio Visual Section, 
32 G - 1957 
 
French Producer, Pathe Magazine, a Rhodesian propaganda film on the guerrilla war 
 
NAZ., Box No 53278,  I S 326 A  Mobile Cinema Correspondence, period 1953-1963 
 
NAZ, File F26, Extracts from Cinema Film Reports: 1-15 
 
NAZ, File I.S. 327B/1454, Letter from the C.I.O. to the Under Secretary Native 
Agriculture and Lands dated 29 September 1961 
 
NAZ, November 1963, Cinema Unit 3, Bindura, Goromonzi and Salisbury, Report by 
J.C. Mundawarara 
 
NAZ, Volume 1 File Title I.S 327B, letter from L.A.W. Beck, Native Agriculture and 
Lands to the Chief Information Officer, dated 27 September 1961  
 
NAZ, File I.S. 327B/1454, Letter from the C.I.O. to the Under Secretary Native 
Agriculture and Lands, 29 September 1961   
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NAZ, File ref I.S. 327B/1367, letter from the C.I.O. to the Producer, CAFU, 15 
September 1961  
 
Rhodesia Information Services, Entering the Kraal, An (anthropological) military film 
used for introducing White recruits in counter (guerrilla) insurgence, NAZ 
 
Rhodesia Information Services, Vigil, NAZ 
 
Unknown Producer, Chimurenga Mozambique, producer unknown, film showing life 
of guerrillas and recruits in Mozambique, NAZ 
 
Unknown Producer, Pamberi neZimbabwe, a film about the liberation movement up to 
independence, NAZ 
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SAMENVATTING 
Dit proefschrift gaat over een van de grootste landbezettingsbewegingen in 
de hedendaagse tijd. De landbezettingsbeweging in Zimbabwe vindt zijn 
oorsprong in het begin van het formele kolonialisme rond 1890. In 2000 
explodeerde de beweging in een dramatische campagne, geleid bij de 
veteranen van de 1970-vrijdheid strijd. Het richtte zich op de Witte ‘settler’ 
landbezitters en de ondernemerschaps’ ideologie met welke zij hun 
eigendomclaims op land beschermden.  
 
Toen een door de regering gesteund voorstel voor een nieuwe grondwet 
was verworpen in een referendum in februari 2000 veranderde de 
landbezettingsbeweging dramatisch van richting, geleid bij de veteranen 
sinds 1998. Er was een snelle nationale, spontaan-ogende golf van bezettingen 
van boerderijen van Witte boeren door kleine boeren, landarbeiders, arbeiders 
uit de stad en werkelozen, professionele en oorlogsveteranen. De 
bezettingsperiode duurde in feite van 1998 tot 2002, en betekende een 
belangrijke uitdaging van de staat die het eigendomsregime ondersteunde en 
waarvan de Witte commerciële boeren profiteerden. De regering kreeg toen 
zijn grip op de macht terug door het uitvoeren van een politieke maatregel 
met de naam Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), ontworpen om de 
‘landhongerigen’ tevreden te stellen. Dit programma bleek een effectieve 
opportunistische stap in de grotere agrarische revolutie die de actoren die al 
lang actief zijn in de landbezettingen op te zetten tegen de nieuwe 
landeigenaren uit de groep van nationale elite politici, staatsfunctionarissen 
en een opkomende Zwarte bourgeoisie. 
 
Het referendum was een keerpunt in de ontwikkeling van deze 
confrontaties van klassenbelangen. Een oppositiebeweging kreeg vaart in de 
eerste jaren van de negentiger jaren nadat de regering de Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP) had geaccepteerd die resulteerde in 
neerwaartse spiraal van de levenstandaard van de bevolking die het gevolg 
was van verminderde sociale dienstverlening. De kosten van 
levensonderhoud schoten omhoog, net zoals de werkeloosheid, met 
wijdverpreidde vermindering en krimp van de industrie. De afstand tussen 
rijk en arm nam toe. De Witte ‘settler’ gemeenschap, waar zich een nieuwe 
opkomende Zwarte middenklasse elite bij aansloot, werd steeds rijker en er 
werd veel geld uitgegeven aan opzichtige zaken. Voor de gewone kleine boer, 
arbeider en oorlogsveteraan was het tegelijkertijd steeds moeilijker om zich de 
elementaire levensbehoeften te kunnen voorzien. Dit resulteerde in 
spanningen tussen hoogte en rassen en klassen, en een boemerang effect dat 
voor een deel de conflicterende en complexe natuur van de 
landbezettingsbeweging in Zimbabwe verklaart. 
 
Het proefschrift vertelt het verhaal over het landconflict dat resulteerde in 
de explosies in de periode 1998-2002. Het exploreert hoe 
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achtergrondconflicten en spanningen werden beïnvloed door de historische 
ervaringen en ideologische vorming gedurende de guerrilla oorlog in de 
zeventigerjaren die centraal waren in de sociale transformatie van Zimbabwe 
als natie (door verplaatsing van de Witte regulering). De aandacht is gericht 
op een incompleet proces van demobiliseren welke onvoldoende aandacht gaf 
aan de mentale en fysieke re-integratie van de vroegere strijders. Dit 
proefschrift zegt dat de bevrijdingsbeweging een samensmelting was van vier 
elementen – nationalisten, boeren, landarbeiders en guerrilla’s – met intra- en 
inter- groepsconflicten later belangrijk in het vormgeven van de groei en 
uitkomst van de landbeweging van 2000. Als sleutelactivisten in de oorlog 
verloor het kader van de guerrilla s grond ten opzichte van andere sociale 
elementen in de naoorlogse periode van economische groei. De militairen en 
speciaal de ideologische training van deze guerrilla’s was van een durend 
belang en ondersteunt een alternatieve, radicale visie van nationale 
ontwikkeling langs socialistisch-cooperatieve egalitaire lijnen, grotendeels 
gemarginaliseerd gedurende een periode van economisch succes, maar in 
toenemende mate betwist als de economische ramp die volgde op de 
‘structural adjustment’. Als gevolg van het ‘settler’ character van het 
Rhodesische colonialism werd land dat werd toebedeeld op basis van ras in 
de Land Apportionment Act (1930) en de Land Tenure Act (1969) een 
sleutelkwestie voor de in toenemende mate hoorbare voorvechters van deze 
alternatieve ontwikkelingsideologie. 
 
Toen de bevrijdingsbeweging op zijn hoogtepunt was, door de guerrilla 
strijd, de vechters, speelden een centrale rol in de verbinding maken tussen de 
nationale ‘exiles’ (die leiderschap op zich namen in de oorlog) en de kleine 
boeren en landarbeiders (de sociale basis in het land). Het waren de vechters 
die zich op dagelijkse basis bezig hielden met de rurale bevolking en land en 
omgevingskwesties in de bevrijdde gebieden en gebieden waar gevochten 
werd. Strijders, beïnvloed door militaire trainers hoofdzakelijk uit het 
Oostbloklanden van tijdens de koude oorlog periode, namen emancipatie-
ideologieën op die verschilden van die van de nationale ambities, en een 
belangrijke groep van ex-strijders begonnen zich te interesseren in het 
vestigen van meer egalitaire systemen in een onafhankelijk Zimbabwe, 
verschillend van de bezorgdheid van bourgeois over een nieuw Zwart 
leiderschap. Deze met elkaar strijdende ideologische trajecten veroorzaakten 
spanningen in de vrijheidsbeweging, resulterend in explosieve zuiveringen, 
met uiteindelijk de nationalisten in controle. De constitutionele 
onderhandelingen die gehouden werden in de Lancaster House voor de 
onafhankelijkheid van Zimbabwe slaagden er niet in een einde aan deze 
spanningen te maken  en ze hebben zich gedurende de periode na de 
onafhankelijkheid gecontinueerd, en in toenemende mate toen verarming van 
de rurale gebieden een feit werden in de negentiger jaren. Het proefschrift 
gaat over deze latere ontwikkelingen die resulteerden in de landbezettingen. 
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 In de Lancaster House overeenkomst hadden de nationalisten clausules 
geaccepteerd die de eigendomsregimes van de ‘settlers’ beschermden. In 
termen van verkrijging en verdeling van land, een constitutionele clausule 
vereiste dat land voor ‘resettlement’ alleen verkregen kon worden op basis 
van vrijwillige koop en verkoop. Er vond daarom maar beperkte 
landverdeling plaats in de periode onmiddellijk na de onafhankelijkheid. 
‘Resettlement’, wat in feite een proces was van regulariseren van 
landbezetting, was intens in de eerste vier jaar van de onafhankelijkheid 1980, 
maar stopte daarna. De regering tolereerde verdere bezettingen door 
deelnemers in de landbeweging niet meer en noemde hen ‘squatters’ en 
gebruikte draconische maatregels om hen te onderdrukken.  
 
Feitelijk was er een alliantie ontstaan tussen de Witte boeren en de 
nationale politieke elite, die beiden gebruik maakten van de neokoloniale 
staat om zich te verrijken, en daarmee de aspiraties van kleine boeren, 
landarbeiders en ex-guerrilla’s (nu oorlogsveteranen) te negeren. De geringe 
representatie van de belangen van de guerrilla in Lancaster en de 
daaropvolgende alliantie tussen nationalisten en de ‘settler’ economie had 
directe effecten op de veteranen. De ontwapening was degelijk maar de 
demobilisatie was onvolkomen en corrupt. Er waren praktisch geen 
rehabilitatie en re—integratieprogramma’s voor de ex-strijders. In het kort 
gezegd, zij raakten in vergetelheid, en zij die zich buiten het staatsbestel 
bevonden leden meer ontberingen dan zij die het geluk hadden daarbinnen 
een baan hadden. Maar zelfs de weinigen met werk binnen de verschillende 
overheidsinstellingen waren doelwit van inkrimping ten voordele van de 
ESAP. Het laten vallen van de bevrijdingsagenda, en de harde behandeling 
van de ex-strijders voedde de beweging van oorlogsveteranen die zich 
gemobiliseerde rond de grieven over hun welzijn, daarmee de 
bevrijdingsagenda van tijdens de oorlog oproepend om de alliantie tussen 
nationalisten en ‘settlers’ aan te vallen, welke resulteerde in de ESAP. The 
authenticiteit van deze politieke strijd werd in twijfel getrokken door vele 
commentatoren die in een post-ideologische periode leven en die aannemen 
dat de verouderde socialistische retoriek van de veteranen eenvoudigweg een 
rookgordijn is om hun activiteiten te kunnen presenteren als waren zij 
‘boeven’ die opereerden op gezag van het regiem. De mislukking om de rol 
van het agrarisch radicalisme naar behoren te evalueren is een kenmerk van 
een de analyse van een aantal huidige Afrikaanse conflicten, en dit 
proefschrift beoogt een belangrijke correctie daarop te zijn voor de 
Zimbabwaanse situatie.  
 
De beweging van oorlogsveteranen, onder toeziend oog van de 
neokoloniale staat, ondervond vele beletsels, special in het eerste decennium 
na de onafhankelijkheid. De mobilisering van oorlogsveteranen en hun 
agitatie werd door velen gezien als dissident en snel geassocieerd met de 
ZIPRA opstand en de Gukurahundi (de vervolging van dissidente elementen 
van de ex-ZIPRA vechters op beweerde gronden van een etnisch conflict in de 
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Matebeleland regio). Die gewelddadige onderdrukking blijft in de 
herinnering van de veteranen van de ZIPRA and ZANLA. ZANLA leed 
gedurende de oorlog onder intense generatie-, gender- en etniciteitconflicten 
welke ten volle werden uitgebuit door de nationalisten. Deze conflicten 
gingen gepaard met fysieke en psychologische marteling, stigmatisering, 
zuivering en isolaties en het terroriseren gebaseerd op angst voor extreme 
afstraffing. De oorlogsveteranen begonnen echter de kleine boeren en het 
electoraat in variërende mate te mobiliseren. Dit intensiveerde in het laatste 
gedeelte van de tachtigerjaren nadat het akkoord was getekend tussen de 
leidende nationalistische partijen van de bevrijdingsbeweging – Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU). The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association 
(ZNLWVA) was gevormd in 1989, en verenigde daarin de ZIPRA and 
ZANLA ex-guerrillas. Het proefschrift beschouwt de rol van de ZNLWVA in 
de latere landbezettingen. Het laat zien dat de veteranenbeweging een 
belangrijke katalysator was van de landbezettingen maar dat activisme 
binnen de beweging van onderaf kwam. Het leiderschap worstelde vaak om 
de vrede te bewaren. Hetzelfde geld voor de president, Robert Mugabe die op 
verschillende momenten de acties van de landbezetters veroordeelde, maar 
als het uit kwam hun samenwerking zocht voor zijn eigen doeleinden. Dit 
proefschrift beschouwt de verschillende bezettingsgolven, en brengt de 
onafhankelijke ideologische agenda naar voren van vele van de activisten, 
gebaseerd op een communale ‘terug-naar-het-land’ notie van agrarische 
samenwerking. Sommige van de implicaties voor de landbouwtechnologie 
worden nagegaan, inclusief de pogingen die sommige landbezetters deden 
om nieuwe meer Afrikaanse en duurzame productiesystemen te ontwikkelen. 
Maar geen van deze bood voldoende revenu voor het regime of kon de 
bezitsaspiraties beantwoorden van de politieke elite die de kern vormen van 
de regerende politieke partij (ZANU-PF). Na slechts een gedeeltelijk succes 
om de landbezettingsbeweging, geleid door radicale activisten, tot 
samenwerking te brengen, nam de regering het besluit hun bondgenoten, de 
Witte boeren, te laten vallen, en haar eigen bourgeoisie toe te staan om hen te 
vervangen terwijl ze tegelijkertijd enig geconfisceerd land aan de kleine 
boeren en landarbeiders toekende. De radicale landactivisten werden zelf in 
dit proces verplaatst en technologische experimenten waaraan zij deelnamen 
werden in de knop gesmoord. Het proefschrift eindigt met te suggereren dat 
tenzij de rurale economische condities snel beginnen te verbeteren  - en de 
tekenen zijn niet hoopvol – de radicalen hun aantrekkingskracht voor de 
massa blijven behouden. Zimbabwe’s agrarische toekomst is verre van zeker.  
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SUMMARY 
This thesis is about one of the most major land occupation movements in 
contemporary times, in terms of scale and intransigence. . The Zimbabwe land 
occupation movement dates back to the onset of formal colonialism in the 
1890s. In 2000 the movement exploded in a dramatic nationwide campaign 
led by veterans of the 1970s liberation struggle. It targeted White settler land 
owners and the business ideology through which they protected their claims 
to the land.  
 
When a government-sponsored draft constitution was rejected in a 
referendum in February 2000, a dramatic turn occurred in the land 
movement, led by war veterans since 1998. There was a sudden nationwide, 
seemingly spontaneous, wave of occupation of White owned farms by 
peasants, farm workers, urban workers and the unemployed, professionals 
and war veterans. The occupation period was, in fact, ongoing from 1998 to 
2002, and represented a significant challenge to the authority of the state 
which backed the property regime from which the White commercial farmers 
benefited. Government then regained its grip on power through 
implementation of a policy dubbed the Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(FTLRP), designed to appease significant numbers among the land hungry. 
This programme proved to be an effective opportunist step in a larger 
agrarian revolution pitting long-established land movement actors on one 
hand against new land owners from among the ranks of elite nationalist 
politicians, state functionaries and an emerging Black bourgeoisie. 
 
The referendum was a turning point in the development of this 
confrontation of class interests. An opposition movement had started to gain 
momentum in the early 1990s after government adopted the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) resulting in a spiral fall in the 
living standards of the population owing to reduced social services. The cost 
of living escalated, as did unemployment, with widespread retrenchments 
and shrinkage of the industrial base. The gap between the rich and poor 
increased. The White settler community, joined by a new rising Black middle 
class elite, was becoming highly affluent and spending on ostentatious goods 
was conspicuous, whereas for the ordinary peasants, workers and war 
veterans it was increasingly difficult to afford basic food, shelter and clothing. 
This resulted in height and race and class tensions, and a boomerang effect 
that partly explains the conflicted nature and complexity of Zimbabwe’s land 
movement. 
 
The thesis tells the story of the conflict of land resulting in the explosions of 
the period 1998-2002. It explores how background conflicts and tensions were 
influenced by historical experiences and ideological formation during the 
1970s guerrilla war, central to the social transformation of the Zimbabwean 
nation (through displacing White rule). Attention is focused on an incomplete 
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demobilization process, which paid insufficient attention to the mental as well 
as physical reintegration of former combatants. This thesis argues that the 
liberation movement was an amalgam of four major elements - nationalists, 
peasants, farm workers and guerrillas - with intra and inter-movement 
conflicts later important in shaping the growth and outcome of the land 
movement from 2000. As key activists in the war the guerrilla cadres lost 
ground relative to the other social elements in the post war period of 
economic boom. The military and especially ideological training of these 
guerrillas proved of lasting significance, it is argued, and fostered an 
alternative, radical vision of national development along socialist-
cooperative-egalitarian lines, largely marginalised during a period of 
economic success, but increasingly called into contention as the economic 
disaster following ‘structural adjustment’. Owing to the settler nature of 
Rhodesian colonialism, land, distributed according to race through the Land 
Apportionment Act (1930) and the Land Tenure Act (1969), was a key issue 
for the increasingly strident proponents of this alternative development 
ideology. 
 
When the liberation movement peaked, through the guerrilla struggle, the 
fighters, played a pivotal role in providing linkage between nationalist exiles 
(who assumed leadership of the war) and peasants and farm workers (the in-
country social base).. It was the fighters who dealt with the rural population 
and land and environmental issues on a day-to-day basis in liberated areas 
and zones of combat. Combatants influenced by military trainers mainly from 
the eastern block countries during the cold war era, imbibed ideologies of 
emancipation far different from those embraced by nationalist ambitions, and 
a significant group within the group of ex-combatants became interested in 
establishing more egalitarian systems in the post independence Zimbabwe, 
distinct from the bourgeois preoccupations of the new Black leadership. These 
competing ideological trajectories caused tensions in the liberation movement, 
resulting in explosive purges leaving the nationalists in control. The 
constitutional negotiations held at Lancaster House prior to Zimbabwean 
independence failed to address these tensions and they have continued to dog 
the post independence period, but increasingly so as mass impoverishment in 
rural areas became a fact of life during the 1990s. The thesis covers these later 
developments resulting in the land occupations. 
 
 In the Lancaster House settlement the nationalists had accepted clauses 
protecting settler property regimes. In terms of land acquisition and 
distribution a constitutional clause required that land for resettlement would 
be acquired only on a willing buyer and willing seller basis. Land distribution 
in the immediate post independence period, therefore, was limited. 
Resettlement, which was fundamentally a process of regularizing 
occupations, was intense in the first four years of independence in 1980 but 
thereafter stalled and halted. In fact government became intolerant of further 
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occupations by participants in the land movement, labelling them squatters 
and used draconian measures to suppress them. 
 
In effect, an alliance had emerged between the White farmers and the 
nationalist political elite, with both sides using the neo-colonial state as a 
vehicle for accumulation, and in consequence negating the aspirations of the 
peasants, farm workers and ex-guerrillas (now war veterans). Poor 
representation of guerrilla interests at Lancaster and subsequent alliance 
between the nationalists and settler economy had direct effects on the 
veterans. Disarmament was thorough but demobilisation was flawed and 
corrupt. There were virtually neither rehabilitation nor re-integration 
programmes for ex-combatants. In a nutshell, they were relegated and cast 
into oblivion, with those outside state employment experiencing worse 
hardships than those who were lucky enough to be employed. However even 
the few in employment in various state institutions, were targeted for 
retrenchment at the advent of ESAP. Abandonment of the liberation agenda, 
and the harsh treatment of ex-combatants, fuelled a war veteran movement 
mobilized around grievances of welfare, but evoking the war-time liberation 
agenda in order to attack the alliance between nationalists and settlers 
resulting in ESAP. The authenticity of this political surge has been questioned 
by many commentators, who live in a post-ideological age, and presume the 
antiquated socialist rhetoric of the veterans is simply a smoke screen to 
disguise their activities as ‘thugs’ operating on behalf of the regime. The 
failure to evaluate properly the part played by agrarian radicalism is a feature 
of the analysis of a number of Africa's current conflicts, and this thesis seeks 
to serve as a major corrective in the case of Zimbabwe.  
 
The war veteran movement, under close eye of the neo-colonial state, met 
many impediments especially during the first decade after independence. 
War veteran mobilization and agitation was viewed as dissident and quickly 
associated with the ZIPRA uprising and the Gukurahundi (pursuit of 
dissident elements of ex-ZIPRA fighters on the alleged grounds of ethnic 
conflict in the Matebeleland region). Memories of violent suppression of 
dissent lingered in the minds of war veterans from both ZIPRA and ZANLA. 
ZANLA had suffered intense generational, gender and ethnic conflicts during 
the war which were exploited to the full advantage of the nationalists. These 
conflicts had involved physical and psychological torture, stigmatised 
labelling, purgation and isolation and terrorization caused by fear of extreme 
punishment. War veterans however started to mobilize peasants and the 
electorate in varying degrees. This intensified in the late 1980s, after the unity 
accord between the leading nationalist parties of the liberation movement – 
Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU) – was signed. The Zimbabwe National Liberation War 
Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) was formed in 1989, uniting former ZIPRA 
and ZANLA ex-guerrillas. The thesis examines the role of ZNLWVA in later 
land occupations. Basically, it is shown that the veterans movement was an 
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important catalyst in sparking land occupations, but that activism within the 
movement came from below. The leadership often struggled the keep pace. 
The same applies to the president, Robert Mugabe, who at various times 
repudiated the actions of the land occupiers, but when it was opportune, 
sought to co-opt them for his own purposes. The thesis examines the 
occupations in several waves, and brings out the independent ideological 
agenda of many of the activists, based on a back-to-the-land communalistic 
notion of agrarian cooperation. Some of the implications for agro-technology 
are explored, including the attempts that some of the land occupiers made to 
develop new, and more African and sustainable systems of production. But 
none of this offered a revenue base to the regime or met the property 
aspirations of the political elites making up the core of the ruling political 
party (ZANU-PF). After only partially successful attempts to co-opt the land 
occupation movement led by radical activists, the government decided to 
abandon its allies, the White farmers, and allow its own bourgeois supporters 
to replace them, while at the same time offering some confiscated land to 
peasants and farm workers. The radical land activists themselves were 
displaced in this process, and the technological experiments in which they 
were engaged were nipped in the bud. The thesis ends by suggesting that 
unless rural economic conditions begin to improve very quickly – and the 
signs are not hopeful – then the radicals will still hold out an appeal to the 
masses. Zimbabwe's agrarian future is far from secure. 
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PFUPSIO 
Chinyorwa ichi chiri pamusoro pejambanja guru rekutora vhu munguva yatiri 
kurarama nhasi, tichitarisa kukura nekusendeka zvemirawo parutivi kwakaitika. 
MuZimbabwe, zvejambanja revhu, kutora minda nechisimba, zvine nhoroondo 
inobva pakandopambiwa nyika ino ngevarungu wakadzika mureza wavo muna 
1890. Mugore ra2000 zvekutora vhu zvakaputika zvikapararira nyika yese 
zvichitungamirwa ngewarwi wakakana hondo yekuma 1970 (wanamukoma kana 
kuti maKomuredzi ) yakasunungura nyika ino muna 1980. Jambanja iri rakanga 
rakanangana nehupfumi hwewapambevhu wechichena nemafungiro awo 
pakuumba nekugowiwa kweupfumi. Pfungwa dzawo idzi ndidzo dzaiita kuti 
warambire nevhu. 
 
Pakarambwa bumbiro remitemo rakanga raitiswa ngehurumende (draf 
constitution) mureferendamu yemuna Kukadzi 2000, makakatanwa ezvevhu akabva 
andoita chamupidigori wanamukoma wabata matomu pakutungamira jambanja, 
chidanho icho wakanga wasotora kubva muna 1998. Zvino zvakabva zvandoti 
fararira nenyika yese, zvichiita sekunga katsuro kamukira mumakumbo pachiti 
warimi waduku wekumaruwa, washandi wemumapurazi nemadhorobha, marovha, 
naanamukoma waye, zvikati andova madirativhange kutora vhu. Jambanja 
raitungamirirwa naanamukoma rakanga rasototanga muna 1998 rikazvika muna 
2002. Izvi zvakazungunutsa mbambo dzehutongi panguva iyoyo nekuti watongi 
ipapo waitsigira gowaniso yehupfumi yaisimbisa vapambevhu ruzhinji 
ruchitambura; warungu wakanga watotambarara hawo semunyemba. Hurumende 
yakazoti dzikiti papaya-paya ikabva kwaakuzoti futi dzvi masimba ekutonga anga 
aakupukunyuka. Yakazoita izvi yaakutoita zvekundundurudzwa kwaakuita 
chirongwa chekugowa vhu chakabva chatodaidzwa kuti ‘Kugowa vhu 
zvaazvekukundundurudzwa’ (Fast Track Land Reform Programme) chakanga 
chaachekutonhodza shungu dzemhomho yejambanja yaitambura ngepekugara 
munyika yechipikirwa. Chirongwa chehurumende ichi chakaunza wana mucheka 
dzafa, wakati tazvionera pano, pakati pekusanduka kwezvevhu zvakadzama 
zvakanga zvatanga. Nechirongwa ichi kwakachitanga zvino kukwikwidzanwa 
pakati pewatambi wejambanja nanamuchekadzafa waya. Asi wanamucheka dzafa 
awa waisawe wanhu nhando, waiti mashefu ezvematongerwo enyika, washandi 
wehurumende nekachikwata kezvigananda kakanga kari kusimuka zvine simba. 
 
Pakukweshana kunoita wapfumi newarombo referendamu ndiyo yakaita 
nhandare. Kubva kuma 1990 kwakanga kwatotanga zvekukwikwidza hurumende 
nenyaya yekuti iyo hurumende yacho yakanga yatora gwara reupfumi rekuti 
“kakara kununa kudya kamwe” (muchirungu richinziEconomic Structural 
Adjustment Programme – ESAP). Hupfumi hwenyika hwakati hwatanga 
kuondomoka hurombo nenhamo zvikati huya tiende. Zvingoraramisa wanhu 
nezviwakwa zvehurumende zvakatanga kuondongeka, zvikati magariro chaiwo 
otanga kuita mutserendende kudonha iko kurarama kukati kwadhura, kushaikwa 
kwemabasa kuchibva kwaita mutungagore kukwira kwaane chigumura indasitiri 
irikusvinwa. Mutsauko wepakati pewarombo newapfumi wakatobva wanyanya 
kuwedzera. Warungu, wachibatana zvino nekachikwata kezvigananda kewatema 
kaya kaiwe pamusoro, wakanga woita kudya kwekupfatsura zviri pachena pasisina 
zvekuhwanda kana kunyara, asi uku ruzhinji warimi waduku wewatema, washandi 
wemapurazi nana mukoma, wari kudya nhoko dzezvironda. Zviro zvekurarama 
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ndizvo zvakanga zvaazvekutamburira kuti uzvione: chikafu, zvokupfeka kana 
pekuisa musoro chaipo. Izvi ndizvo zvakaedzera shungu muwanhu ngekuti 
zvakanga zvaapachena kuti Warungu ndiwo wakagukuchira upfumi watema wasina 
icho wanacho. Zvakazodzoka zvozvimbiraizvo zvigananda zviya zvakare ngekuti 
Jambanja apo rakatanga rakabva ranyandura zvese zvikabva zvaita kuti nyaya 
yevhu yeZimbabwe itotane-totane seshinda, kuita huswa hwasunga hwena.  
Thisisi iyi ingotaura nezvemakakatanwa ezvevhu akaputika putika pakati pa1998 
na 2002. Ingoongorora kwakatangira nechakazofuridzira kupesana. Ingoti iyo 
makakatanwa aya angotoonekwa munhoroondo nepfungwa dzakaumbwa 
kuma1970 muhondo yeChimurenga, inowa ndiyo yakaita bindurazviro muno 
munyika nekubvisa uko yakaita hutongi hwewarungu. Tingozodzamisa nyaya 
yekuti kutsvetwa kwezvombo pasi (disarmament) nekugurunura magariro 
emusango (demobilization) hakuna kufambiswa zvakanaka munyika. Wanamukoma 
hawana kupiwa rutsigiro rwekuti wagone kudzoka kumisha kootangazve upenyu 
hutsva hwakasiyana nehwemuhondo. Izvi zviro zvinotoitirwa zvirongwa 
zvakadzama ngenyika kuti wasununguri wagone kuwa neupenyu hungonzwisiswa 
ngeruzhinji rwevanhu uye kuti wagone kugara pakati pewamwe zvakanaka 
(rehabilitation). Thisisi ino ingoratidza kuti hondo yerusununguko yakanga iri 
mubatanidzwa wemaneshinarisiti (nationalists), varimi waduku (peasants), 
washandi wekumapurazi (farm workers), naanamukoma kana kuti warwi ( freedom 
fighters). Zvikwata izvi ndizvo zvakasangana mukusunungura nyika asi pakanga 
patorine makakatanwa mukati nepakati pezvikwata izvizvi. Izvi zvakakosha kuti 
tizonzwisise mafambiro akazoita Jambanja remuna 2000. Wanamukoma 
wakarasirwa kwakadaro kwaakufuratirwa panguva yaibudirira upfumi hondo 
yapera asi wariwo wakanga wazvipira kuenda kuhondo koosunungura nyika. Asi 
tichitarisisa wana mukoma awa ndiwo wakawana mukana wekunyatsodzamisa 
pfungwa maererano nekuumba remangwana enyika. Kunyangwe wakakandiswa 
zvombo zvehondo pasi, chaisagona kuitwa newatongi kubvisa pfungwa dzewarwi 
idzi nekuti vakuru wakati chiri mumoyo chiri muninga. Saka pfungwa 
dzeremangwana enyika dzakaramba dzakasiyana. Warwi waida kuteedza 
zvebindura zviro munyika iri nyaya yekuda kuti muwe negutsaruzhinji munyika 
kwete humbimbindoga kana hushefu. Idzi pfungwa dzanga dzatorasirwa kure 
paikura upfumi kusvika wehutongi wotoita hawo gwara rekakara kununa kudya 
kamwe. Nerusarura ganda rwaiwe muno ichiri Rhodesia murawo waiteedzwa 
pakugowiwa kwevhu waiwe wekupatsanura marudzi nekwavangogara wainzi Land 
Apportionment Act (1930) neumwe wacho wainzi Land Tenure Act (1969). Iyi 
mitemo kunyngwe yakanga isingachashandi tasununguka kupatsanurwa 
kwemarudzi kwakaramba kuripo Warungu wakaramba wane vhu rawakapamba 
kubva kuwatema. Saka pfungwa dzegutsaruzhinji dzakabva dzatoramba 
dzichitonyon’onya warwi nemamiriro ezviro akaramba ariyo iwaya. 
 
Pakati hondo yeChimurenga yati tibvu yasimuka, wanamukoma wakaita 
musimboti wekubatanidza maneshinarisiti waiwe kunze kwenyika 
(wakazotungamira hondo ikoko), warimi kumamisha, newashandi wemapurazi 
(hwaro hwehondo). Wanamukoma ndiwo wairwa zuwa nezuwa newabereki 
kumamisha nemapurazi wachitaurrirana neremangwana ezvevhu nezviwanikwa 
zvenyika kunyanya munzvimbo dzanga dzatosunungurwa kare moto wehondo 
uchiri kuririma (liberated zones). Wanamukoma waiwana mazano kubva 
kunewaiwafundisa zvekukana hondo wekunyika dzemabvazuwa paya pakanga 
pakamisidzana nyika dzemabvazuwa nedzemadokero (cold war). Zvidzidzo izvi 
zvaiwe zvepfungwa dzakatosiyana kure kure nezvaifungwa neshinarisiti asina 
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kuwana mukana wekudzidzira zvekurwa. Kudambura ngetani dzehudzvanyiriri 
neusvetasimba zvechokwadi pasina kunyengedza wanhu ipfungwa dzakatoramba 
dziri chinangwa chewarwi wehondo waitoti pasina kuita izvi rusununguko hapana. 
Idzi ndidzo pfungwa dzegutsaruzhinji dzanga dzakatosiyana nepfungwa 
dzekachikwata kezvigananda kewatema waitungamira hondo. 
 
Maneshinarisiti akamirira hondo yerusununguko (Liberation movement) 
akabvumira kuti paiswe mirawo waizoti upfumi hurambe huri kuwapambevhu 
pakaitwa hurukuro nebumbiro remitemo kuRangasita Hausi. Nenyaya yekutora vhu 
nekuripa kuwanhu bumbiro remitemo iri raiti vhu raizotorwa richiitwa 
zvekutengwa kubva kuwapambevhu awa. Saka tichandotora nyika kugowiwa 
kwevhu kwakanga kwakaitwa zvishoma ngezvishoma sekudya kwendongwe. Kupa 
minda mirefu kwakanga kuri kundochinyatsa kugadzirisa wanhu wankanga watora 
ivhu ngejambanja kunyanya mumakore mana ekutanga kubva 1980 tichangowana 
kuzvitonga kuzere (independence) asi kuzongobva ipapo zvakambokamhinha 
zvikabva zvazomira zvachose. Kubva ipapa hurumende yakatotanga kuita utsinyi 
nekudzvanyirira zvikuru wanhu waipinda mumapurazi zvejambanja 
vachitumidzwa kuzi masikwata. 
Asi zvakanga zvaitika chaizvo ngezvekuti pakanga pane kubatana pakati 
pewarungu wemapurazi nemaneshinarisiti aitonga nyika, waakudya wese 
wachishandisa simba rehutongi kutora upfumi hwenyika, zvaisakisa kuti zvinangwa 
zvewarimi waduku, washandi wemapurazi newakasunugnura nyika 
zvisatewedzwe. Kusamiririrwa kwakakwana kwaanamukoma kuRangasita 
nekuzobatana kwewarungu nemaneshinarisiti kwakaitwa, kwakaisa warwi 
werusununguko panguwa yakaoma. Warwi wakatorerwa zvombo asi kudzokeswa 
kumusha (demobilization) hakuna kuitwa nemazvo ngekuti pakapinda huori. 
Hapana kana kugeza zvemusango, kuwaka ruziwo rutsva rwaienderana nehupenyu 
hwemumusha nekurapa nhengo dzakakuwara (rehabilitation) kwakaitwa kuwarwi 
werusununguko. Nechidimbu, warwi wakandokandwa kwakadaro kwaakusiiwa 
zvikawa dambudziko kunyanya kune wasina kuita mhanza yekuona mabasa 
muhurumende itsva iyi. Asi kana wakaona mabasa wacho ndiwo wakabva 
wanangwa pakaitwa gwara reupfumi rekakara kununa kudya kamwe (ESAP). 
Kusendekwa kwezvinangwa zvehondo yerusununguko neutsinyi hwakaitirwa 
warwi werusununguko (war veterans) zvakakwichidzira warwi kuti watange 
kuzviunganidza wachipengera hurumende kuti igadzirise zvayakaondonga 
maererano neupenyu hwawo. Mukupenga kwewarwi awa wakabva watangisa 
kusimudza zvibvumirano zvekuhondo zvekuti nyika yaizoitwa sei tatora kubva 
kuvarungu. Izvi zvakaita kuti warwi watange kurwisa mubatanidza wewarungu 
nemaneshinarisiti wakanga uripo. Wamwe wanhu warikupa pfungwa dzekuti 
manyepo kuti warwiri werusununguko wakamboita pfungwa dzawo pachavo 
wachiti kuda kueadza kuwiga ubhinya hwaiitwa ngewarwi awa wachitumwa 
ngewatungamiri wemusangano weZANU-PF. Kutadza kunyatsoongorora chidanho 
chanotorwa nevanopindura magoverwo nemashandisiro ezvevhu chiro 
chingopenengurwa mukurwisana kuri muAfrica saka chinyorwa chino chiri kuedza 
kugadzirisa zvingotaurwa pamusoro peZimbabwe panyaya iyoyi. 
 
Warwi werusununguko, wachitarisiswa nehutongi hutsva hwaitsigirana 
newarungu uhu, wakasangana nezvimhingamupinyi zvakawanda mumakore gumi 
tichandotora nyika. Kuunganidzana nekudzidzisana kwaitorwa sekupanduka 
wanhu wonzi waakuita madhizidhendi sewaya warwi weZIPRA wakanga 
wapandukira hurumende wakazorwiswa ngemauto kusvika pazoita nyaya 
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yeGukurahundi kuMatebeleland. Simba rakashanda kurwisa madhizidhendi 
rakaramba rindori mumusoro mewarwi weZIPRA ne ZANLA. Warwi weZANLA 
wakanga wamboona kupesana pakati pawo kwaibva pakati pewabva zera 
newechiduku muhondo, rusarura rudzi nekubata wakadzi zvakasiyana newarume 
zvakashandiswa ngemaneshinarisiti. Besanwa iri rakasakisa kuti pawe 
nekurwadziswa kwenyama kushungurudzwa kwepfungwa, kutumidzwa mazita 
eupanduki, kubviswa mumusangano nekonyenyeredzwa pakati pewamwe 
zvakaunza kugedageda kwemeno kuri kutya kurangwa ukazi wapanduka. Asi 
hazvo warwi wakatanga kuunganidza wabereki nekutaura newanhu wanovhota 
nenzira dzakasiyana. Zvakazonyanya kudzama mukupera kwekuma 1980 paitwa 
mubatanidzwa we ZAPU ne ZANU-PF. Ndipo pakazobva pauumbwa Zimbabwe 
National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). Chinyorwa chino 
chinoongorora mabasa eZNLWVA mukufamba kwejambanja rakazotevera. 
Zvingopangidzwa kuti warwi ndiwo wakakwenya Jambanja asi Jambanja rakatobva 
muwanhu waiwa pasi. Watungamiri waito nzunzutira wachitevera kuti wasasare 
sure. Kana utungamiri hwenyika, hwaitomboshorawo zvejambanja izvi nguwa 
dzakawanda hukazosanduka hwaona kuti warwi, warimi waduku newashandi 
wemapurazi hawachadzoki sure. Utungamiri huya hwakabva hwatoenda pamberi 
sekunga ndihwo hwakaita zveJambanja riya asi hwakanga hutorinewo zvimwewo 
zvinangwa zvakatosiyana. Thisisi iyi ingotarisa masaisai ejambanja akawanda 
ichipangidza kuti warwi waitonga wakazvimiririra wane pfungwa dzawo dzakanga 
dziri dzekuti ngatidzoke kuvhu tironge upenyu hweumhuri nekushanda takabatana. 
Kuti izvi zvaizotaurei nenyaya yemarimiro nezvekushandisa pakurima nekuedza 
kwakaitwa newejambanja kuita zvekushandisa (technology) zvingoendesera mberi 
pfungwa nemarimiro epasichigare anepundutso, tingozvioongorora muno. Asi idzi 
pfungwa hadzina kutorwa nevari pamusoro zvimwe ngekuti zvanga zvisingaunzi 
mari kwawari kana kuti handizvo zvaitarisirwa newatongi wari muZANU-PF. 
Yandobudirira kukwezva kachikwata kewanhu wejambanja hurumende yakabva 
yasiyana nezveWarungu awo yanga yakabatana nawo ikabva yati zvigananda 
zvaiitewera zvitore nzvimbo yewarungu awa ukuwo ichigovera varimi vadiki 
vekumaruwa newamwewo washandi wemumapurazi mimwe minda yacho. 
Wejambanja waipisa musoro nezvevhu chaiwo wakabva wasudurutswa nekufamba 
kwenguwa zvichibva zvakanganisa mabasa ekushandura marimiro nekuwandudza 
zvombo zvekurimisa kwanga kuchiitwa ngewamwe wawo. Chinyorwa ichi 
chingopedzisira chaakupa pfungwa dzekuti kana zvekumira kweupfumi 
mumaruwa kukasachimbidza kusimuka watambi wejambanja wanogona kuramba 
wachitaura newanhu kuti zviro zvigadziriswe. Kuti zvino Zimbabwe inyika ingazi 
remangwana yayo yakagadzikana here nenyaya yezvevhu takatarisa mamiriro 
akaita zviro parizvino, mubvunzo ungoti netsei chaizvo. 
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